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1
Introduction
This is the first study to look at public health in Germany in the aftermath of the 
Second World War, which rigorously compares the four occupation zones 
and  regimes of Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States. 
It juxtaposes the initial assumptions of each occupation power with the way in 
which realities on the ground forced each to modify its policies and programmes.
In May 1945 the problem of public health confronted millions of people in 
Europe: those who fell sick; those who cared for sick children, relatives, or neigh-
bours; those who worked as physicians, nurses, or relief workers; and those who 
attempted to establish a measure of order and administration. Tens of millions of 
Russians, Germans, Poles, Yugoslavs, Greeks, Italians, and other Europeans had 
died as a result of war, disease, and famine. Hundreds of thousands of people had 
died in slave labour camps, and European Jewry east of the Rhine had been practi-
cally wiped out. Governments and economies had collapsed. The after-effects of 
war and foreign occupation comprised not only severe shortages of many living 
essentials such as food, water, clothing, fuel, and housing, but also grave social, 
political, and moral uncertainties. The public health situation reflected these prob-
lems: the spread of infectious diseases was facilitated by terrible sanitary condi-
tions, widespread malnutrition, growing prostitution, and the mass movement of 
people across the Continent. This, in combination with the lack of medical sup-
plies and broken infrastructure, concerned politicians and health workers 
everywhere.
In defeated Germany the potential for public health disasters was particularly 
severe. The country and its population were in a state of disintegration, exhaustion, 
and uncertainty. The Allied bombing raids and advancing armies had destroyed 
significant parts of the German hygiene infrastructure that could have helped to 
cope with public health problems. Many towns were without clean drinking water, 
electricity, or gas; garbage was no longer collected. Sanitary conditions deteriorated 
as sewage spilled through damaged pipes into rivers and lakes, already polluted by 
unburied corpses. Lice, flies, rats, and mosquitoes bred and multiplied. The people 
whose houses had been destroyed now lived crowded together in cellars and bomb 
shelters, easy targets for infectious diseases. Hospitals overflowed with patients, but 
lacked beds, doctors, nurses, vaccines, and drugs. The movements of millions of 
people further exacerbated these conditions. The German occupation zones were 
at the heart of much of this movement: displaced persons; German expellees from 
the territories now integrated into Poland and Czechoslovakia; prisoners of war 
and disbanded soldiers; liberated inmates from concentration camps and prisons; 
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city inhabitants evacuated to rural areas—all now tried to return home or settle 
somewhere new. These wandering people brought typhus, dysentery, typhoid fever, 
and venereal diseases with them and facilitated their spread, and the areas they 
passed through provided a fertile ground for epidemics.
This is a study of how the occupiers’ political and economic interventions 
contained measures to keep their own troops, the displaced, and the ex-enemy 
population alive and, to some extent, healthy. From the beginning, public health 
was much more than a medical problem, and encompassed more than medical 
considerations. While the war was still being fought, German public health was a 
secondary consideration, an unaffordable and undeserved luxury. Once fighting 
ceased and occupation duties began, it rapidly turned into a principal concern of 
the occupiers, recognized by them as an indispensable component of creating 
order, keeping the population governable, and facilitating the reconstruction of 
German society. Several years on, public health work provided a means (often 
unintentionally) to integrate former Nazis into German society. The public 
health problem was, throughout the post-war era and in all occupation zones, 
closely linked to much broader questions regarding how the defeated population 
should be treated, how Nazism could be eradicated, and who should, and could, 
be sought out as collaborators, helpers, and allies. The work of the British, American, 
French, and Soviet public health teams in Germany was, at this time of turbu-
lence and political upheaval in the aftermath of the Nazi regime, shaped by 
concerns about economic recovery, and political tensions and uncertainty in the 
early stages of the Cold War.
This study also examines the responses by the German medical profession, 
which in the immediate aftermath of war was shaken up by deliberations about its 
identity, credibility, and legitimacy. When Allied programmes for the cleansing of 
German society from Nazi influence were being initiated, Germans in all zones 
tried to distance themselves from the Nazi regime. Many attempted to place them-
selves in the context of acceptable German traditions by locating the origins of 
medical and public health practice in German activities dating from before 1933. 
As a number of contemporary observers, Allied and German, pointed out, this 
search for a positive identity by German doctors often attempted to conceal sub-
stantial continuities from the Nazi era into the post-war period.
THE HISTORICAL CONTExT
The story begins at the point at which the Big Three—Britain, the Soviet Union, 
and the United States—began to give thought to the treatment of Germany after 
its defeat. In a series of conferences from 1943 onwards, the three heads of govern-
ment and their foreign ministers not only agreed on war strategies, but also deter-
mined the basic character of the post-war occupation. Their primary focus at this 
time was on how Germany could be defeated and the war ended; all other issues 
were of secondary importance. But even if not much agreement was reached 
beyond the fact of a joint Allied occupation of Germany, the reduction of German 
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territory, and the division of the country into zones, these were important deci-
sions which circumscribed and determined the occupiers’ subsequent conduct. 
Each of the occupiers was to receive one zone of control. France was invited later 
to join the occupation, primarily upon British insistence. Berlin was to be occu-
pied jointly. A dispute over whose troops were to capture the capital continued 
until the final months of the war; nonetheless, the Red Army launched its attack 
on Berlin in April 1945. Later that month, American and Soviet troops linked up 
at Torgau on the river Elbe.
Military governments in each zone began to administer and control their areas 
even before the German army’s formal capitulation on 8 May 1945. Their occupa-
tion territories were clearly demarcated, as agreed at the wartime conferences 
(see Fig. 1.1): Soviet troops controlled the area roughly east of the Elbe, an area 
that contained Berlin (although Berlin itself was to be divided up, each occupier 
taking control of one sector); British forces occupied the Rhineland and the Ruhr; 
the American armies controlled southern Germany and Bavaria as well as two 
 enclaves on the North Sea; the French occupied a comparatively smaller area of 
south-west Germany near the French border.
In the weeks and months after the end of war, a complex military government 
apparatus was established in each zone, at the top of which stood the military gov-
ernor and his staff. Since the central German government and most regional and 
local authorities had collapsed, military government officers were now responsible 
for administrating their zones even on the most basic questions. They regulated 
political, economic, and social life in each zone through a series of laws, regula-
tions, and directives. They appointed Germans to carry out administrative work, 
and over the course of the next few years, the German state bureaucracy gradually 
took shape from the local level upwards, as political parties were reformed and 
German officials began to take over responsibilities from the occupying powers. 
Local elections were held first in the American zone in January 1946. The British, 
French, and Soviet zones followed with elections in September 1946.
The chapters in this book follow this broad chronology. Part I (Chapters 2, 3, 
and 4) examines how the occupiers and some instrumental groups of German 
physicians and health officials approached future occupation duties and the prob-
lem of health; Part II (Chapters 5 to 8) contrasts public health work in each of the 
zones in the first four years of the occupation, and shows how it often diverged 
wildly from the plans that were made at the start.
Chapter 2 considers how, while the war was still in full swing, the Allies 
 approached the public health problem of a post-war Germany. The chapter shows 
how official plans for health operations were limited by the prevalent concepts that 
guided occupation aims and principles: Germany was to be treated as a defeated 
and conquered nation, and public health, just like other kinds of reconstruction 
work, was limited by the provision that it had to be based entirely on existing 
German economic resources, personnel, and administrative structures, paid for by 
the Germans. Many public health issues were not touched on at all in these plans. 
They were to be the responsibility of the German health officers, under supervision 
by military government teams.
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During the war, British and American policy-makers were influenced by a belief 
that a prevalent national character had shaped much of German history and limited 
what could be achieved under Allied occupation. The consequences of this notion 
of a national psychological make-up were particularly tangible in the realm of public 
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health. At the beginning of the occupation, it resulted in the non-fraternization 
policy, which prescribed that occupation troops were to avoid contact with German 
civilians beyond that which was officially sanctioned and absolutely necessary. 
But this conflicted with the basic realities of public health work: health officers’ 
work demanded that they cooperate with the Germans under their control; yet 
 according to the rules of non-fraternization any contact had to be explicitly justified.
If there really was a national German psyche, could there be any potential German 
friends and collaborators to support Allied aims? Chapter 3 shows that the notion of a 
German national character was one of the considerations that  underlay the rejection by 
Britain and the United States of any substantial cooperation with German émigrés. 
This, too, shaped public health work after 1945. By contrast, French and Soviet conclu-
sions about the use of émigrés were different, fuelled by greater material and personnel 
shortages. The national character concept played only a marginal role in Soviet plans 
for Germany, and Soviet officials worked with politically loyal German émigrés who 
promised to work in Soviet interests. The French authorities, too, made use of émigrés 
who supported their own political programme. Continuing these themes, Chapter 4 
examines German debates about public health in two very different institutions based 
in Berlin. It shows that the notion of a distinct German character sat uneasily with a 
shared conviction among the western health officers that medical work was fundamen-
tally apolitical and that German doctors suffered unfairly under denazification.
Together, the chapters in Part II ask how, given these tensions, denazification 
was applied concurrently with emergency public health work. Once they arrived in 
Germany, military government officials were often overwhelmed by the extent of 
physical destruction in the cities and the fact that no functioning German admin-
istration was available to assume public health responsibilities. In response, health 
officers in all zones began to modify or even reject completely their guidelines on 
occupation conduct. Part II shows that a focus on public health work can help to 
pinpoint when and how British, American, Soviet, and French approaches to the 
German problem were adjusted and transformed in the course of the post-war 
period. At the outset, plans had provided only for minimal and short-term involve-
ment by Allied officers in German public health work. But once the occupiers’ 
armies arrived in Germany, a powerful argument about the primary importance of 
public health was formulated by them and their German colleagues.
The most immediate health concerns during this initial period were the problem 
of spreading infectious diseases and the possibility of these turning into European, 
even global, epidemics; the problem of rocketing rates of venereal diseases and 
their threat to the occupying troops; and the problem of malnutrition and starva-
tion. The occupiers’ epidemic and venereal disease control suggests that, through-
out the post-war period, public health work in Germany remained tied up in 
contradictions. Typhus and dysentery, gonorrhoea and syphilis threatened the 
 occupation armies, and potentially the world population at large, almost as much 
as the Germans. The occupiers had to consider whether the dangers to Allied health 
warranted that German doctors once loyal to the Nazis should be left unpunished, 
or whether the abandonment of efforts to remove them compromised world secu-
rity. They also had to decide whether precious resources should be diverted from 
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other countries who had suffered enormously during the war, for Germany’s 
 benefit. These kinds of questions were even harder to answer when it came to dis-
eases that affected Germans without threatening their neighbours, such as those 
resulting from malnutrition. Allied health officers expressed concern about whether, 
given their at least implicit and often explicit complicity in Nazi crimes, the 
German population deserved food imports, especially when this meant that other 
populations would not be getting their share. Some also questioned whether the 
German health officials and their data could be relied upon, because they might 
have been trying to paint a bleaker picture than the reality warranted in order to 
get a better deal for Germany.
Public health work was primarily conducted separately within each occupation 
zone, despite the fact that the Potsdam Protocol set out that uniform standards 
were to be applied jointly for all four zones. The Allied Control Council (ACC)—
which convened for the first time in June 1945 and began its work properly in the 
autumn of that year—was the forum in which joint policy for Germany was sup-
posed to be made and agreed by the four occupation powers. At the meetings of 
the ACC’s Health Committee officials discussed how public health measures could 
be coordinated between the zones. But from the beginning, the reconciliation of 
the different occupiers’ priorities and strategies was fraught with problems. At the 
Potsdam conference it was agreed that the ACC could act only by unanimous 
consent of the four representatives. However, France never accepted the Potsdam 
Protocol in full. Early on in the life of the ACC a French veto blocked all schemes 
which treated Germany as a political and economic unit, with the immediate result 
that German administrations were formed independently for each zone. Later, a 
Soviet veto prevented agreement on other fundamental questions. As the occupi-
ers’ relationships became increasingly strained, their joint administration of 
 Germany broke down. In this climate, the occupation zones, and public health 
work at zonal, regional, and local levels, took on a significantly different character.
The occupation landscape changed dramatically when the British–American 
Bizone became effective in January 1947. In the months that followed, the differ-
ences between East and West increased substantially. Anglo-American policy, 
eventually also joined by the French, now focused on rebuilding Germany as a 
bulwark against communism, while Soviet efforts began to be directed towards 
the creation of an Eastern Bloc. In this mobilization of allies and supporters, both 
sides finally discarded many of the remaining restrictive policies for Germany and 
replaced them with new objectives. For public health this meant a transformation 
of priorities away from the removal of former Nazis towards a cooperation with 
Germans and the production of fit, healthy, and happy German workers and citi-
zens. Local administrators and elected politicians in each zone took over the vast 
bulk of responsibilities, and the military governments shrunk to a fraction of their 
initial sizes.
The key moment in the American-led reorientation of Anglo-American eco-
nomic policy, which bookends this study, was the Marshall Plan, announced in 
June 1947, followed a few months later by a new Soviet economic policy for 
Germany and the decision to establish the Cominform. Marshall aid and new 
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political  priorities also helped to repair the formerly fraught relationship of 
America and Britain with France, and in March 1948 the French occupation 
territory was added to the Bizone to create a single economic unit. In the same 
month, the ACC was effectively dissolved. Out of protest against the currency 
reform in the western zones in June 1948, the USSR launched a full blockade of 
the surface routes to the western sectors of Berlin. The famous airlift kept the 
besieged city supplied until the autumn of the following year. The divisions 
hardened further when in September 1949 Trizonia became the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany (FRG), followed in October 1949 by the creation of the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR) out of the Soviet zone.
THE HISTORIOGRAPHICAL CONTExT
Writing about the Second World War seems to have no end. Apart from the appar-
ently insatiable popular and academic interest in the Second World War, the histo-
riographical output also reflects the wealth of archival sources, particularly in the 
wake of newly opened Soviet and Eastern European archives and the release of 
formerly classified French, British, and American material. But public health—
which, as the occupiers were to discover soon after their arrival, quickly became 
fundamental to all other occupation aims and agendas—has received remarkably 
little detailed historical attention.1
What do we know about the occupation years? Much of our understanding of 
the years 1945 to 1949 has been shaped by the many autobiographies and mem-
oirs of the occupation era published since the late 1940s. One of the most influen-
tial insights to come out of these accounts is the notion of the ‘successful pragmatism’ 
of the American and British occupations. For example, William Strang, political 
adviser to the commander-in-chief of the British occupation forces in Germany, 
Field Marshall Montgomery, praised the ‘single-minded devotion’ of military gov-
ernment staff; the ‘skill, good humour and common sense with which they were 
guiding the local German administrations which were growing up under their care 
might be fairly said to derive from a traditional aptitude for government’. ‘I also 
thought’, he added, ‘that they reflected credit upon those who, while the war was 
still being fought, had planned and conducted the courses of instruction under 
which these staffs had been trained.’2
Michael Balfour, a member of the British Element of the Control Commission 
for Germany in Berlin (CCG(BE) ), reminisced in similar terms. He thought that 
American policy towards Germany was marked by enthusiasm and common sense. 
‘Their respect for the scientific method’, he said, ‘has led them to believe that a 
solution can be found for all problems provided they are approached in the right 
1 One notable exception concerns the problem of venereal diseases. See Annette F. Timm, The Politics 
of Fertility in Twentieth-Century Berlin (Cambridge, 2010). Norman Naimark, The Russians in Germany: 
A History of the Soviet Occupation, 1945–1949 (Cambridge, Mass., 1997), 97–101.
2 William Strang, Home and Abroad: An Autobiography (London, 1956), 230.
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way and with the necessary determination.’ ‘One of their greatest strengths’, he 
thought, was ‘their urge to “get cracking” ’.3 The British, too, had much to cele-
brate. The Foreign Office and the policy unit at Chatham House had managed to 
steer clear of an impractical, overly coercive German policy on one hand, and an 
overly lenient approach on the other.4 Much of the credit had to go to Churchill 
himself, who by ‘humane good sense rather than well-organised briefing . . . pre-
vented the British people from falling for any of the cheap-jack solutions’.5 The 
Western Allies, Balfour argued, should be proud of their results: it was ‘no small 
achievement to have prevented civil war and any widespread degree of epidemic 
diseases or starvation from breaking out in Germany’—and all this was ‘largely due 
to strenuous, well-conceived, and, in the main, disinterested efforts on the part of 
the individual Allied officers, and to generous aid from America and Britain’.6
American accounts often sounded remarkably similar. Robert Murphy, political 
adviser to both Eisenhower and Lucius Clay (and William Strang’s counterpart), 
fondly remembered Clay’s no-nonsense approach.7 He was ‘an excellent engineer 
and administrator’, who knew that the first step had to be ‘to get things running 
again’; next, the zone had to be made as self-sufficient as possible. While Clay con-
stantly battled against his superiors’ unwillingness to lift restrictive political shack-
les, in the end, and ‘[d]espite all the handicaps imposed upon OMGUS, the 
Americans nevertheless managed in a short time to bring order out of chaos in our 
zone’. Unlike the other occupiers, Murphy noted, the ‘Americans had relatively 
few bitter memories and so could approach the reconstruction of our zone in a 
businesslike manner’.8
Memoirs from lower-ranking soldiers stationed in Germany provide comple-
mentary insights. Their daily lives were filled with battles against bureaucratic or 
bigoted authorities on the one hand, and prospering relationships between the 
 occupiers and the occupied population on the other. Consider, for example, the 
account by Leon Standifer, published in 1997, who, as a 21-year-old GI stationed 
in Bavaria in 1945, got into harmless mischief and exciting scrapes, during which 
he acquired a thorough understanding of the Germans and the German problem. 
‘During the occupation period’, he noted, ‘most of us had come to like the German 
people—men, women and children. They were cleaner, friendlier and more trust-
worthy than the French we had known during the war . . . [T]he Germans had been 
good soldiers and would make good civilians.’9
3 Michael Balfour, ‘Four Power Control in Germany’, in Balfour and John Mair, Four Power  Control 
in Germany and Austria, 1945–1946 (Oxford, 1956).
4 Balfour, ‘Four Power Control in Germany’, 29.
5 Balfour, ‘Four Power Control in Germany’, 35.
6 Balfour, ‘Four Power Control in Germany’, 63.
7 Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (London, 1964).
8 Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 359. Also see Lucius Clay, Decision in Germany (London, 1950).
9 Leon Standifer, Binding Up the Wounds: An American Soldier in Occupied Germany, 1945–1948 
(Baton Rouge, La., 1997), 81. Norman Hidden, Liaison Officer: Germany and the Anglo-US Occupation, 
1946–1947 (Clydesdale, 1993). Wilfred Byford-Jones, Berlin Twilight: On Life under the Allied Occupation 
(London, 1947). Claude Hector Dewhurst, Close Contact: An Account of the Author’s Experiences as Chief 
of the British Mission to the Soviet Forces of Occupation in Germany, 1951–1953 (London, 1954).
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A certain picture of American and British occupation officers emerged in these 
memoirs which historians have generally adopted. Businesslike, full of energy, humour, 
and common sense, with a keen eye for what needed to be done, they rolled up their 
sleeves and ‘got cracking’. As a result, as the historian Anthony Nicholls maintained, 
after spring 1945 they ‘increasingly discarded’ old myths ‘as common sense prevailed’.10 
Many studies of the occupation years thus begin with a list of all that was destroyed 
or broken in 1945—both items of physical destruction (roads, factories, and hospi-
tals) as well as more elusive damage (the electoral system and public morale)—and end 
with much of it having been fixed, after strenuous effort. Credit is particularly lavished 
upon the officers who helped to erect buildings, cleared roads, repaired utilities, 
planned cities and roads, handed out welfare and relief packages, organized economic 
reforms and, of particular concern in this book, those who cared for the sick.11
Nowhere has this focus on the laudable British and American pragmatism been 
more visible and enduring than in studies of health and medicine in post-war 
 Germany, which offer celebratory accounts of the practical successes achieved by 
health officers and doctors ‘against all the odds’.12 And while since the mid-1980s 
scholars have critically re-examined some fields of Allied policy (particularly de-
nazification, education, and industrial policy), scholarship on public health and 
medicine has largely escaped revision. Even relatively recent studies continue to 
praise American and British health officers for preventing epidemic outbreaks and 
thereby helping the Germans back on their feet. Some authors even reiterate the 
notion that health and medicine were by their very nature free from political con-
cerns. In fact, the issue of public health is often still treated as a fundamental ele-
ment of the success of the western occupation—an occupation which continues to 
be treated as an exemplary accomplishment in comparison to later, less successful, 
ventures.13 An often implicit subtext is that the Anglo-American medical officers 
and their German collaborators were somehow more pragmatic and professional, 
and thus better able to sidestep the growing political entanglements, than their 
non-medically or non-scientifically trained colleagues.14 Together with individuals 
such as Lucius Clay, engineer by training, they ensured that common sense 
prevailed.
10 Anthony Nicholls, ‘The German “National Character” in British Perspective’, in Ulrike Jordan 
(ed.), Conditions of Surrender: Britons and Germans Witness the End of the War (London, 1997), 7.
11 e.g. on city planners, see Jeffry M. Diefendorf, In the Wake of War: The Reconstruction of German 
Cities after World War II (Oxford, 1993).
12 BAK, Z45F, 5/323-3/2, Philip Beckjord, ‘Post-War Developments in the Public Health of 
 Austria, 1945–1949’, Oct. 1949, 3–4.
13 e.g. Hans-Ulrich Sons, Gesundheitspolitik während der Besatzungszeit: Das öffentliche Gesundheitswesen 
in Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1945–1949 (Wuppertal, 1983). Andreas Dinter, Seuchenalarm in Berlin: Seuchen-
geschehen und Seuchenbekämpfung in Berlin nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg—Auszüge aus der Dissertation ‘Die 
Seuchen im Berlin der Nachkriegszeit, 1945–1949’ (Berlin, 1999). Sabine Schleiermacher, ‘Gesundheits-
politische Traditionen und demokratische Herausforderung: Gesundheitspolitik in Niedersachsen in 1945’, 
in Wolfgang Woelk and Jörg Vögele (eds.), Geschichte der Gesundheitspolitik in Deutschland: von der Weima-
rer Republik bis in die Frühgeschichte der ‘doppelten Staatsgründung’ (Berlin, 2002), 266.
14 e.g. F. S. V. Donnison, Civil Affairs and Military Government in North-West Europe 1944–1946 
(London, 1961), esp. 232, 455. Also see Robert S. Anderson, Preventive Medicine in World War II, v. 
Communicable Diseases Transmitted Through Contact or by Unknown Means (Washington, 1960), e.g. 
109–10, 253, 326–8.
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Approaches to the occupation era have changed over time. Accounts written 
before the mid-to late 1980s differ substantially from later studies. Older histories 
insist that, on one hand, the British and Americans were unfettered by ideological 
impulses and thus achieved praiseworthy results, while on the other hand, the 
Soviet and French occupation programmes were ideologically driven, chaotic, and 
harmful to democratic principles. Only recently have scholars begun to question 
this unbalanced assessment of the occupiers, although many of the older assump-
tions still persist.
Let us briefly examine these positions. On one hand, many older studies 
 asserted that the British and American occupiers simply let the Germans in their 
zones get on with their reconstruction, a notion which still underlies many 
 histories of the early years of the Federal Republic of Germany.15 Hans-Ulrich 
Sons contested the claim that the occupation period constituted a break with 
older German traditions in the realm of public health.16 Other authors have 
argued that although some ideas on public health re-entered Germany in 1945 
with the Americans on German soil, these were ideas that had earlier been 
 imported from Germany to America in the first place, and thus were actually 
‘native’.17 Similarly, in the British case, studies have maintained that develop-
ments were entirely separate from those in Britain, as a result of which the tradi-
tional German social security system and much else was preserved in its entirety.18 
Overall, scholars have argued that, as Stefan Kirchberger put it, the Americans 
and British did not bring ‘a special political interest to the German health system. 
Insofar as this area was not affected by a general regulatory ordinance (i.e. 
denazification)—or, rather, insofar as the political responsibility of the German 
agencies was not already limited by general provisions—the Western Allies left 
health policy to the Germans.’19 Although histories of the Americanization of 
West German society and culture have for some time pointed to a more involved 
and less benign influence of the western occupiers, histories of public health and 
medicine long failed to follow suit.20
15 e.g. in mild form, in Hermann Graml, Die Alliierten und die Teilung Deutschlands: Konflikte, 
Entscheidungen, 1941–1948 (Frankfurt, 1999).
16 Sons, Gesundheitspolitik während der Besatzungszeit.
17 Ruth Mattheis, ‘Der öffentliche Gesundheitsdienst in der Nachkriegszeit: Reorganisation und 
zukunftsorientierte Ansätze’, in Akademie für öffentliches Gesundheitswesen in Düsseldorf (ed.), 50 
Jahre Gesetz über die Vereinheitlichung des Gesundheitswesens (Düsseldorf, 1984), 44. Klaus-Dieter 
Müller, ‘Die Ärzteschaft im staatlichen Gesundheitswesen der SBZ und DDR 1945–1949’, in Robert 
Jütte (ed.), Geschichte der deutschen Ärzteschaft: Organisierte Berufs- und Gesundheitspolitik im 19. und 
20. Jahrhundert (Cologne, 1997), 243–74.
18 H. G. Hockerts, Sozialpolitische Entscheidunge in Nachkriegsdeutschland: Alliierte und Deutsche 
Versicherungspolitik, 1945 bis 1957 (Stuttgart 1981). On a re-evaluation of British social security ideas 
for Germany after 1948, see Ulrike Lindner, Gesundheitspolitik in der Nachkriegszeit: Grossbrittanien 
und die BRD im Vergleich (Munich, 2003).
19 Stefan Kirchberger, ‘Public Health Policy in Germany, 1945–1949: Continuity and a 
New Beginning’, in Donald Light and Alexander Schuller (eds.), Political Values and Health Care: The 
German Experience (Cambridge, Mass., 1986), 199.
20 e.g. Alexander Stephan (ed.), Americanisation and Anti-Americanisation: The German Encounter 
with American Culture after 1945 (London, 2004).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 03/19/2015, SPi
 Introduction 11
This is an open access publication. Except where otherwise noted, this work is distributed under the terms of a 
 Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence, a copy of which is available 
at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. For enquiries concerning use outside the scope of the licence 
terms, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com.
On the other hand, both the Soviet and French occupations have long received 
bad press (albeit for different reasons) in both the German and the English-speaking 
literatures. From the beginning, American and British memoirs recorded that 
 Russian soldiers were allowed, even encouraged, to exact vengeance, and to ‘loot, 
pillage, rape, and murder’. As Leon Standifer, then a young American GI in Bavaria, 
remembered: ‘No comparison [to the American occupation] is possible.’21 At the 
political level, scholars have long maintained that Soviet policies were from the start 
aimed at transforming the Soviet zone of Germany into something resembling the 
Soviet system; that the Soviet occupiers attempted to ‘Sovietize’ the Germans in the 
east.22 In the realm of health, authors writing at the height of the Cold War focused 
exclusively on the political and ideological content of East German health policy, 
and detected in it a deliberate imitation of Soviet structures. The weight of these 
studies focused on the analysis of the East German health care system after 1949, 
but many specifically identified the first occupation years as an instrumental period 
in the Sovietization of health policy. For example, according to Wilhelm Weiß, the 
Soviet zone’s health ministry was ‘an exclusively political organ, where specialists 
have no say’.23 Furthermore, ‘the principal function of the state organs of the health 
system in the Soviet zone is the introduction and maintenance of Bolshevism in 
this area of public life. The actual specialist responsibilities are, in the eyes of the 
Communist authorities, only of secondary significance.’24 As Udo Schagen has 
shown, a number of medical officers who left the Soviet zone (and later the GDR) 
and started new careers in the West contributed substantially to these studies under 
Weiß’s name, although they were not acknowledged as co-authors.25
Central elements of this perspective have survived into the 1980s. Renate Baum 
argued that it was clear from the start that ‘East Germany would receive a social 
order patterned on that of the Soviet Union’, whereas in the western occupation 
zones ‘public health and welfare policy was more or less a reinstatement of pre-war 
conditions’.26 In these terms, the claim that the health system of the GDR was 
imposed by the Soviet authorities and modelled on Soviet institutions has fre-
quently served as a direct criticism, as ‘implicit proof ’ that it was unsuitable for 
German conditions.27
21 e.g. Standifer, Binding Up the Wounds, 205–6.
22 For an early example in this extensive literature, see e.g. John Peter Nettl, The Eastern Zone and 
Soviet Policy in Germany, 1945–1950 (London, 1951).
23 Wilhelm Weiß, Das Gesundheitswesen in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone (Bonn, 1952), 9.
24 Weiß, Das Gesundheitswesen, 11.
25 Udo Schagen, ‘Kongruenz der Gesundheitspolitik in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone?’, in Woelk 
and Vögele (eds.), Geschichte der Gesundheitspolitik in Deutschland. For similar arguments, see e.g. Hans 
Harmsen (ed.), Zur Entwicklung und Organisation des Gesundheitswesens in Sowjetrussland, in Osteur-
opäischen Volksdemokratien und in Mitteldeutschland (Hamburg, 1975). Hans Harmsen (ed.), Gesund-
heitspolitische Aufgaben in der DDR und UdSSR (Hamburg, 1978). Gerhard Baader, ‘Politisch motivierte 
Emigration deutscher Ärzte’, Berichte der Wissenschaftsgeschichte, 7/2 (1984), 67–84, citation 9.
26 Renate Baum, ‘Out of the Rubble: Political Values and Reconstruction’, in Donald W. Light and 
Alexander Schuller (eds.), Political Values and Health Care: The German Experience (Cambridge, Mass., 
1986), 241–2.
27 Kirchberger, ‘Public Health Policy’, 189.
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Even in more recent works a fundamental problem remains. In order both to 
offset the celebratory East German assessments and to fill the vacuum created by 
the continued absence or inaccessibility of Soviet records, scholars regularly cite 
East German dissidents not simply as commentators on, but as evidence for, the 
shortcomings of Soviet policies. Accounts by Wolfgang Leonhard—graduate of 
the Comintern school in Moscow who returned to Berlin with the Red Army, and 
since 1949 a well-known dissident—feature in practically every discussion of the 
early life of the GDR, but often without any comment on his perspective, claims, 
and motives.28 In the realm of public health, accounts by Barbara von Renthe-Fink 
(vice-president of the Soviet zone’s Central Health Administration, before moving 
to West Berlin in 1949), among others, have been given exaggerated weight.29
The French occupation zone was long written off as a failure. At the beginning it 
was the harsh and uncompromising French policies and matching behaviour of 
French troops which dominated commentaries on France’s conduct as an occupying 
power. In November 1945 The Times noted that, ‘unlike the British and Americans’, 
the French had ‘lived through the rigours, humiliations, and terrors of five [sic] years 
of German occupation. Now that the roles are reversed, it would be indeed surpris-
ing if what the French have suffered did not sometimes influence their bearing 
now.’30 But other commentators were less sympathetic. Accounts of French soldiers’ 
rape and pillage in the early days of the occupation, and of the pompous feasts and 
lavish parades organized by the French military commander-in-chief, General Jean 
de Lattre de Tassigny, became shorthand for an image of the French as the most 
revengeful, exploitative, ruthless, and aloof of the western occupiers—very different 
from the pragmatic British and Americans.
This verdict survives unchallenged in much of the academic literature, particularly 
that written by German scholars.31 Boosted by unfavourable comparisons with the 
British and American zones as much as by scathing French accounts of French pro-
cedures, studies insisted that the territory occupied by France was marred by chaos 
and an ill-advised and ill-executed occupation programme.32 In the first of a five-
volume history of the FRG, the politician and political scientist Theodor Eschenburg 
noted disdainfully that the French had treated their zone as a ‘colony of exploitation’ 
(Ausbeutungskolonie), ruled by a ‘military and administrative “tyranny” ’.33 Where the 
Russians had built an ‘iron curtain’ to sever ties between their zone and the rest of the 
28 e.g. Eric D. Weitz, Creating German Communism, 1890–1990: From Popular Protests to Socialist 
State (Princeton, 1997). Most quoted is Wolfgang Leonhard, Die Revolution entlässt ihre Kinder (1955; 
21st edn. 2003). English trans. Child of the Revolution (1955).
29 Often cited are Barbara von Renthe-Fink, ‘Das Gesundheitswesen in der deutschen Ostzone’, 
Ärztliche Mittelungen, 36 (1951), 98–102; Renthe-Fink, So alt wie das Jahrhundert: Lebensbericht einer 
Berliner Ärztin (Frankfurt, 1982). On Renthe-Fink, see Atina Grossmann, Reforming Sex: The German 
Movement for Birth Control and Abortion Reform, 1920–1950 (Oxford, 1995).
30 ‘In the French Zone’, The Times, Friday, 30 Nov. 1945.
31 For an important exception, see F. Roy Willis, The French in Germany (Stanford, Calif., 1962) 
and France, Germany and the New Europe (Stanford, Calif., 1968).
32 e.g. Klaus-Dietmar Henke, ‘Politik der Widersprüche: Zur Charakteristik der französischen Militär-
regierung in Deutschland nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg’, in Claus Scharf and Hans-Jürgen Schröder 
(eds.), Die Deutschlandpolitik Frankreichs und die Französische Zone, 1945–1949 (Wiesbaden, 1983).
33 Theodor Eschenburg, Jahre der Besatzung: 1945–1949 (Stuttgart, 1983), 96.
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country, the French had separated their territory just as decisively by a ‘silk curtain’.34 
According to many scholars, the zone’s biggest problem was that it always lagged 
behind developments in the American and British zones, until it finally joined the 
Bizone in 1949. With the end product (the creation of a West German Republic) in 
mind, many studies ignore the French zone entirely, and justify their neglect because 
it was the smallest and least important of the zones, eventually subsumed by the 
Anglo-American project.
More balanced analyses of the Soviet and French occupation regimes have 
 appeared since the end of the Cold War. Works on the Soviet zone, for example, 
have begun to refine or even abandon the Sovietization model. Combing the 
 archives for evidence on Soviet strategies and procedures, scholars have brought 
into focus a shift in Soviet policy in 1947–8—before which it is misleading to talk 
of a deliberate Sovietization policy, and after which it needs to be understood in 
the context of wider political and security concerns.35 They also point out that the 
interpretation of Soviet German policy as a Sovietization project obscures the sub-
stantial shared agreement between the occupiers on matters such as demilitariza-
tion and even denazification.36 Assessments of the French occupation have also 
shifted, particularly since the opening of the French archives in the mid-1980s. 
Studies now attempt to understand French policy in its own terms, aided by the 
fact that they no longer have to rely solely on British and American documents 
(which portrayed the French authorities as a nuisance) or German records (which 
were unreflectively negative about French policy). Whereas the earlier works fo-
cused on France’s political repression, and the economic exploitation of the zone, 
historians now argue that the French occupation programme contained important 
and successful policies for German renewal, reform, and democratization. They 
point to the fields of culture and education, where French achievements formed 
the basis of the subsequent rapprochement between France and the FRG, and thus 
shaped the history of European security and the European Union.37
The history of medicine has remained largely hermetically sealed from these 
 re-evaluations of the occupiers’ projects and experiences.38 However, since the fall 
34 Eschenburg, Jahre der Besatzung, 94. The concept of a ‘seidene Vorhang’ (silk curtain) first 
 appeared in Die Zeit in 1947.
35 e.g. Naimark, Russians in Germany. Jürgen Kocka (ed.), Historische DDR-Forschung: Aufsätzte und 
Studien (Berlin, 1993). Alexander Fischer (ed.), Studien zur Geschichte der SBZ/DDR (Berlin, 1993). Also 
Gabriele Moser, ‘Im Interesse der Volksgesundheit …’ : Sozialhygiene und öffentliches Gesundheitswesen in der 
Weimarer Republik und der frühen SBZ/DDR—ein Beitrag zur Sozialgeschichte des deutschen Gesundheits-
wesens im 20. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt, 2002).
36 Jeanette Michelmann, Aktivisten der ersten Stunde: Die Antifa in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone 
(Cologne, 2002).
37 e.g. Stefan Zauner, Erziehung und Kulturmission: Frankreich’s Bildungspolitik in Deutschland 1945–
1949 (Munich, 1994). Edgar Wolfrum, ‘ “La Mission culturelle”—Medienpolitik der französischen 
Besatzungsmacht und die Rolle von Remigranten’, in Claus Dieter Krohn and Axel Schildt (eds.), 
Zwischen den Stühlen? Remigranten und Remigration in der deutschen Medienöffentlichkeit der Nachkriegs-
zeit (Hamburg, 2002).
38 e.g. on doctors in the Soviet zone, see Klaus-Dieter Müller, ‘Die Ärzteschaft im staatlichen Gesund-
heitswesen der SBZ und DDR 1945–1949’, in Robert Jütte (ed.), Geschichte der deutschen Ärzteschaft: 
Organisierte Berufs- und Gesundheitspolitik im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Cologne, 1997), 243–74.
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of the Berlin Wall in 1989 German scholars have produced new insights by focus-
ing on German continuities, in the medical field as in other areas. Where older 
works promoted the differences and incompatibilities between the FRG and the 
GDR, since reunification studies emphasize their shared traditions.39 They now 
point to a range of new institutions and health reforms which originated during 
the 1920s, the apparent heyday of public health, and their re-emergence in both 
German states after 1949. Much of this work is motivated by very contemporary 
concerns, sometimes unapologetically so. As Jens Alber declared in 1989: ‘He who 
wants to understand the welfare state of the Federal Republic has to return to its 
history and ask when and under what conditions the individual institutions of 
today’s socio-political framework were created’40—and many medical historians, in 
particular, have heeded his call.
The growing historiography on medicine and public health in the Third Reich 
has further refined our understanding of these German traditions. A number of 
studies have shown that many of the social democratic and communist health 
 reformers of the 1920s did not actually return to Germany from exile abroad.41 
Paul Weindling and others have demonstrated that the glowing assessments of the 
progressive Weimar era ignore the significant presence of eugenics and other no-
tions later developed by the National Socialists after 1933, as well as the many 
fierce political differences between different factions of social hygienists.42 Together, 
these works highlight continuities of the post-1945 states with both the Weimar 
Republic and the Third Reich, and undermine the claim that the year 1945 formed 
a Zero Hour (Stunde Null ) as a radical break and new start. The output of the last 
ten years presents a specifically German account of the history of health and medi-
cine. The narrative tends to begin with Bismarckian social security concepts, before 
zooming in on health policy developments in the Weimar Republic, and briefly in 
the Third Reich, and tracing the legacies of these traditions in the post-war era up 
to the 1960s and 1970s.43
The history and histories of Germany are being rewritten as older Cold War per-
spectives are being dismantled. Although not all pay specific attention to the years 
1945–9, the more recent works have tended to minimize the influence of the four 
occupiers on German society. As Jeffrey Herf has argued, the impact of the occupa-
tion years consisted perhaps less in the importation of new ideas about  liberal 
39 e.g. Thomas Elkeles et al. (eds.), Prävention und Prophylaxe: Theorie und Praxis eines gesundheits-
politischen Grundmotivs in zwei deutschen Staaten, 1949–1990 (Berlin, 1991).
40 Jens Alber, Der Sozialstaat in der Bundesrepublik 1950–1983 (Frankfurt, 1989), 46; also quoted 
in Woelk and Vögele (eds.), Geschichte der Gesundheitspolitik in Deutschland, 14.
41 e.g. Gerhard Baader, ‘Politisch motivierte Emigration deutscher Ärzte’, Berichte der Wissenschafts-
geschichte, 7/2 (1984), 67–84. Michael Hubenstorf, ‘ “Aber es kommt mir doch so vor, als ob Sie dabei 
nichts verloren hätten”: Zum Exodus von Wissenschaftlern aus den staatlichen Forschungsintituten 
Berlins im Bereich des öffentlichen Gesundheitswesens’, in Wolfram Fischer et al. (eds.), Exodus von 
Wissenschaften aus Berlin—Fragestellungen, Ergebnisse, Desiderate. Entwicklungen vor und nach 1933 
(Berlin, 1994).
42 Paul Weindling, Health, Race and German Politics Between National Unification and Nazism, 
1870–1945 (Cambridge, 1989).
43 e.g. see the essays in Woelk and Vögele (eds.), Geschichte der Gesundheitspolitik in Deutschland.
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 democracy or communism to Germany, than in the creation of new conditions 
where old German ideas and traditions could re-emerge and flourish after the hiatus 
of the Third Reich.44 In other words, both similarities and differences  between the 
zones were the product not so much of the occupiers’ input, but rather of the self-
conscious rearticulation of different aspects of the German heritage.
This study, by contrast, argues that the arrival of the four occupation armies 
marked a crucial moment in German history, and their visions for and actions in 
Germany in the years after the war deserve closer examination. Even as some uneven 
assessments of the older historiography are being refined, other assumptions have 
persisted precisely because of a lack of comparison of the different  occupation 
 regimes. To this day the British, American, Soviet, and French occupation policies 
and experiences are rarely examined in the same context in any depth.45 In fact, as 
scholars’ fields of vision have become ever narrower and more localized, they only 
rarely consider whole occupation zones, let alone compare them. Instead, they study 
regions, cities, and towns.46 While for a long time this lack of comparison was the 
result of an underlying notion of the different regimes’ fundamental incomparabil-
ity, increasingly it reflects the practical problems associated with having to manage 
vast amounts of often very uneven archival material.47
The following chapters examine the policies, priorities, experiences, and encoun-
ters of the occupiers’ health officers with Germans in all four zones. They try to 
overcome not just academic and temporal divisions, but also geographic and 
 political ones, by situating the problem of public health in the broader context of 
post-war Germany. They show that the relatively specific focus on public health 
can shed light on the occupation period much more generally. Public health was 
central to the functioning of the occupation zones in the aftermath of the war, a 
period where the occupiers and the German population collided, and where dif-
ferent priorities were debated at length.48 This study aims to present a much more 
balanced assessment of the four occupation regimes. Why was it that the same, 
apparently practical and technical, questions concerning the solution to public 
44 Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory: The Past in the Two Germanies (Cambridge, Mass., 1997). 4.
45 Studies that do compare entire occupation zones, sometimes with other countries, are often 
unsatisfactory—e.g. Kirchberger, ‘Public Health Policy’. Andrew Szanajda, Indirect Perpetrators: The 
Prosecution of Informers in Germany, 1945–1965 (Lanham, Md., 2010).
46 On public health, see e.g. Thomas Bauer, Vom ‘stede arzt’ zum Stadtgesundheitsamt: Die Geschichte 
des öffentlichen Gesundheitswesens in Frankfurt am Main (Frankfurt, 1992). Ulrike Lindner, ‘ “Wir 
unterhalten uns ständig über den Milchpfennig, aber auf die Gesundheit wird sehr wenig geachtet”: 
Gesundheitspolitik und medizinische Versorgung 1945 bis 1972’, in Thomas Schlemmer and Hans 
Woller (eds.), Bayern im Bund (Band I): Die Erschließung des Landes 1949 bis 1973 (Munich, 2001). 
Doris Foitzig, ‘ “Sittlich verwahrlost”: Disziplinierung und Diskriminierung geschlechtskranker Mäd-
chen in der Nachkriegszeit am Beispiel Hamburgs’, Zeitschrift für Sozialgeschichte des 20. und 21. 
Jahrhunderts, 12/1 (1997), 68–82.
47 On recent discussions about comparative history, see Philipp Ther, ‘Beyond the Nation: The 
Relational Basis of a Comparative History of Germany and Europe’, Central European History, 36/1, 
(2003) 45–73. Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Jürgen Kocka (eds.), Comparative and Transnational His-
tory: Central European Approaches and New Perspectives (Oxford, 2009).
48 e.g. compare with Dagmar Ellerbrock, ‘Die kulturelle Konstruktion der neuen Ordnung: zum 
Zusammenhang von Demokratisierung und Gesundheitspolitik in der amerikanischen Besatzungszone’, in 
Christian Groh (ed.), Öffentliche Ordnung in der Nachkriegszeit (Ubstadt-Weiher, 2002), 109–25, at 110.
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health problems in the defeated, occupied Germany were initially answered so 
 differently by the different occupation powers? Conversely, why, after the occupi-
ers’ arrival in Germany, did they come to some remarkably similar conclusions? 
The answers, as the following chapters will show, do not just lie in the fields 
of diplomatic relations and inter-state political conduct, but also in the social, 
cultural, and ideological setting of the occupation projects.
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AllIEs AND GErmANs
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2
A Hard Peace? Allied Preparations for the 
Occupation of Germany, 1943–1945
I have said, and say again, that the German nation needs the most drastic 
cure in history, and that, if it is not applied, the world will die of the German 
disease . . . [W]e are not concerned with all old, unhappy, far-off things but 
with what Germany has done to her neighbours in our century, and how 
and why.1
The problem of what was to be done with Germany after its defeat had been under 
consideration since at least December 1941 and the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor. In the course of the next three years, the British, American, and soviet 
leaders—not yet joined by the French—debated in a series of conferences and 
summits the principles that were to guide their post-war treatment of, and conduct 
in, the defeated country. These deliberations shaped the course of the post-war era: 
Germany would be occupied, stripped of its military and industrial capabilities, 
and cleansed of Nazi influences. It would be asked to pay compensation to those 
countries who had suffered. most importantly, it would be prevented from threat-
ening peace and stability again.
After spring 1943, when the ‘unconditional surrender’ formula was agreed, 
plans focused primarily on the organization of military governments and the 
appointment of leading officers and their staffs. Planners also began to draft 
arrangements for problems such as the handling of prisoners of war, civil inter-
nees, and displaced persons; the control of German agriculture, industries, and 
mines; and the coordination of military government departments with German 
local and regional governments. In addition, some gave first thought to the 
denazification of German authorities, while others drafted plans for the opera-
tion of basic public health services on German soil. These plans posited that 
public health work, both in the short and long term, was to be conducted by 
existing German authorities (therefore only indirectly a concern of the occupi-
ers), but they noted that some military government-directed epidemic work 
would have to proceed at the early stages and was a crucial element of the 
occupation.
1 robert Vansittart, The Leopard and the Spots: Selected Extracts from ‘Lessons of my Life’ (Win the 
Peace Pamphlet No. 1; london, [1944]), 81.
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For much of the war the only significant preparations for occupation took place 
in Washington and london: both governments had staffs familiar with the admin-
istration of overseas colonies and territories, both were able to devote manpower 
and resources to the problem of Germany and were willing to collaborate with 
each other. The soviet government, by contrast, concentrated on the war effort 
itself and was distrustful of Anglo-American motivations and agendas. The French 
government-in-exile not only did not feature as an occupying power until later, but 
had few resources to contribute to these efforts. Only later did the soviet and 
French authorities rush to catch up, often by copying and adapting British and 
American plans and policies.
This chapter analyses the Allied plans for the post-war occupation of Germany. 
It shows that decisions and agreements reached in Washington and london funda-
mentally shaped the entire occupation framework until the creation of the two 
German republics in 1949, and beyond—a fact about which the soviet and 
French leaders later frequently complained. recurring themes on ‘the German 
problem’, particularly the belief in a dominant and totalitarian national German 
character, influenced these preparations and conditioned the early stages of the 
occupation. Public health officers faced a number of dilemmas: their efforts to 
prevent the spread of infectious diseases had to proceed in a country under strict 
military control; Germany had to restrict its industrial capacities and pay compen-
sation to its victims, but without damaging the health of its population. These 
problems were exacerbated by the fact that public health work among the German 
population initially ranked far below more pressing military and political 
priorities.
AmErICAN AND BrItIsH Pl ANs FOr  
tHE OCCuPAtION OF GErmANy
(i) Starting premises
General guidelines for the political treatment of Germany crystallized in the 
course of the wartime meetings and conferences of the Big Three. Within these 
parameters planning staffs in london and Washington worked out detailed 
directives for specific issues. From the start there were tensions between the 
united states, Britain, and the soviet union, but some basic purposes and 
 assumptions bound them together: they agreed that, in the interest of world 
security, Nazism had to be defeated and Germany’s war potential had to be 
destroyed. The principle of an ‘unconditional surrender’, announced at 
Churchill and roosevelt’s meeting in Casablanca in January 1943, signalled 
that the Allies would fight until they had achieved Germany’s total defeat; no 
successors to the National socialist government would be able to negotiate the 
terms of peace. Fears that this formula would prolong the war notwithstand-
ing, roosevelt and Churchill insisted that the mistakes of the First World War 
were not to be repeated, that the German population would be dealt with 
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firmly.2 But, apart from these general premises, the conferences of Casablanca, 
moscow, and teheran left open many questions of future Allied policy in 
 Germany. Even the work of the inter-Allied European Advisory Commission 
(EAC), a body set up to coordinate future occupation policy, suffered from a 
general lack of certainty as to what should happen.3
separate British and American bodies, such as the British Foreign Office and its 
research Department (FOrD) and the us War Department’s Civil Affairs Division, 
conducted research on Germany’s existing governmental structures and drafted plans 
for future administration. These plans were integrated and coordinated in Anglo-
American organizations such as the offices of the Chief of staff to the supreme Allied 
Commander (COssAC), later turned into the G5 Division of the Anglo-American 
joint command supreme Headquarters Allied Epeditionary Force (sHAEF). Public 
health came under the aegis of ‘civil affairs’. some of these preparations began imme-
diately after the outbreak of war, but the early work concentrated almost exclusively 
on war strategy. From the end of 1941, much of the planning work was overseen by 
the newly created Combined Chiefs of staff Committee. This body, responsible to 
the British prime minister and the American president, produced plans for an inva-
sion of the  European continent and the shape of military governments.
some of this work concerned itself with the training of future military govern-
ment officers. Barely half a year after the united states had entered the war, the 
first school of military Government opened its doors on the campus of the 
 university of Virginia in Charlottesville to train officers for work in civil affairs 
headquarters. Here, the ‘stress was on military government problems and their 
solution in terms applicable to a large variety of local situations, but under condi-
tions basically like those in Burma and Bulgaria in that they involved an occupying 
army and an indigenous enemy—or allied—population’. Foreign language instruc-
tion was not part of this training, and the ‘foreign area study’ was ‘sketchy and only 
suggestive of many possible situations in different parts of the world’.4 By June 
1943, less generic training commenced in (eventually) ten Civil Affairs training 
schools, known as CAts, all based at universities who appointed a civilian direc-
tor. Courses were taught by specialists in fields such as local government, farming, 
industry, commerce, public welfare, public safety, and public health. Courses for 
work in Europe lasted between eight and twelve weeks, and up to six months for 
the Japanese programme. The director of the Central European area programme of 
2 On reservations, see e.g. Alfred Vagts, ‘unconditional surrender: Vor und nach 1943’, Viertel-
jahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 7 (1959), 279–309. Friedrich argued that the call for an unconditional 
surrender only had propaganda functions, see Carl Joachim Friedrich (ed.), American Experiences in 
Military Government in World War II (New york, 1948). Also see Ian Kershaw, The End: Hitler’s 
 Germany, 1944–1945 (london, 2011).
3 On the EAC, see Boris meissner, ‘Die Vereinbarungen der Europäischen Beratenden Kommis-
sion über Deutschland von 1944/45’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 46 (1970), 3–14. Hans-Günter 
Kowalski, ‘Die European Advisory Commission als Instrument alliierter Deutschlandplanung, 
 1943–1945’, Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 19 (1971), 261–93. David reynolds, ‘roosevelt, the 
British left and the Appointment of John G. Winant as united states Ambassador to Britain in 
1941’, International History Review, 4 (1982), 393–413.
4 John Brown mason, ‘lessons of Wartime military Government training’, Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, 267 (Jan. 1950), 183–92, at 184.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 03/21/2015, SPi
22 Allies and Germans
This is an open access publication. Except where otherwise noted, this work is distributed under the terms of a 
 Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence, a copy of which is available 
at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. For enquiries concerning use outside the scope of the licence 
terms, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com.
the CAts at stanford, John Brown mason, explained that ‘attention was paid to 
the kind of knowledge and local points of view that would help the civil affairs 
officer to understand the people with whom he must deal and to meet effectively 
the problems which he was likely to encounter. These needs called for special 
 attention to the study of national psychology, political customs and philosophies, 
religious convictions and outlooks, inherited attitudes, pattern of thought (or non-
thought) acquired under the monopolistic propaganda of Nazism, recent history, 
and so forth.’ However, even here, mason argued, not enough consideration was 
given to the particularities of individual countries. more seriously, mason argued 
in 1950 that the differences between military government in enemy and Allied 
countries were ‘not sufficiently appreciated during training’, and ‘[w]hile the 
 occupation of Allied countries would be necessary, it would also be temporary and 
of a basically different character [from that in enemy countries]’. Here, ‘problems 
would be quite different from those encountered in enemy states, they called for 
other attitudes and methods.’5
After relatively slow beginnings, planning for the occupation and training of 
military government officers accelerated rapidly in the aftermath of the Casablanca 
conference of January 1943, which confirmed that Germany’s borders would be 
changed as conquered territories would be returned, that dismemberment or some 
kind of division into zones was likely, and that the Allies would occupy the country 
for a significant but unspecified period of time. The Casablanca meeting also made 
clear that occupation forces would have to supervise basic administrative functions 
until a central German government could be reinstalled.
After Casablanca, preparations concentrated on the division of responsibilities 
within the military government machinery. Initially, it was to be based on the 
 organization of the British and American armies, and then to be turned into a 
Control Commission, mirroring the organization of German local government. 
The term ‘military government’ originally referred to the sum of all occupation 
troops in Germany, but was increasingly used to describe occupation officers in the 
different zones.6 These bodies quickly produced a deluge of acronyms: the British 
contingent was the Control Commission for Germany (British Element), or 
CCG(BE); the American the united states Group Control Council, usGCC, 
later turned into the Office of military Government, united states, known as 
OmGus. The soviet operation was to be the sovietskaya Voyennaya Administra-
cia v Germanii, sVAG, or soviet military Administration in Germany, smAG. 
When at the last minute the French were added, they administered their zone 
through the Commandement en Chef Français en Allemagne, the CCFA, and the 
Gouvernement militaire de la Zone Française d’Occupation, referred to as 
GmZFO.
The commanders-in-chief from each of the occupying powers—Dwight Eisen-
hower, Bernard montgomery, and Georgy Zhukov (eventually joined by Pierre 
Koenig)—were to form the highest authority in each zone. They were to decide 
5 mason, ‘lessons of Wartime military Government training’, 185, 189.
6 Balfour, ‘Four Power Control in Germany’, 92–107.
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Germany-wide questions within the Allied Control Council (ACC). The ACC’s 
directorates and the departments of the occupation authorities in each zone were 
to mirror the relevant German authorities, to which they would leave the execu-
tion of policy. German ministries were to be seized on surrender and continued 
under Allied control. The administration of civil affairs (which included public 
health) was to be part of the many responsibilities of the Internal Affairs and Com-
munications Division.
As plans for these structures emerged during the second half of 1943 and 
1944, planning staffs also began to compile manuals and handbooks to familiar-
ize officers with German history, major German institutions, and Allied policy. 
most were not overtly political, but they frequently incorporated popular and 
academic analyses of the German problem, such as the identification of Prussia 
as the source of fascism and authoritarianism, the existence of a pervasive militar-
ist tradition, and the psychological nature of Nazism, analogous to the mental 
state of schizophrenia (of which the carrier was often unaware). A guide on ‘The 
mentality of the Germany Officer’, for example, set out to ‘trace the develop-
ment of [the German’s] curious mentality through earlier years’. It discussed 
issues such as the influence of German traditions on military officers, German 
attitudes to the Versailles treaty, German officers’ obsession with ‘honour’, and 
how to manage German soldiers after defeat. It concluded that while Allied 
troops had to prepare themselves for dealing with the Germans’ ‘ferocious fanati-
cism’ and ‘contempt of moral restraint’, their assignment was assisted by the 
likelihood of ‘fierce factional splits among them’, which, ‘combined with the fact 
that the Germans as liars are clumsy and transparent (far inferior to the latins)’, 
would make their work easier.7
A paper entitled ‘The German Character’ explained to Allied troops some of the 
attributes of the German psyche, such as ‘an abnormal respect for authority’, ‘an 
inferiority complex due in part to Germany’s late start as a nation, a guilt complex 
resulting from misdeeds, and at the same time an awareness of great gifts and tal-
ents’. The ‘average German’, this paper stated, had a tendency towards ‘fanatical 
extremist tendencies’ and an ‘unswaying loyalty’ to leaders, which meant defeat 
was likely to lead to reactions such as ‘hysteria, running amok, killings and destruc-
tion of others or self ’. In what was later to become an important theme in the 
selection and appointment of Germans to administrative jobs, the paper insisted 
that the population could not be ‘divided into two classes, good and bad  Germans’. 
rather, there were ‘good and bad elements in the German character, the latter of 
which generally predominate’. The paper also warned that Allied officers should 
not be deceived by Germans’ attempts to befriend occupation officers, as 
they would try to divide the occupation powers.8 The paper also included a list 
of ‘some Do’s and Don’t’s’, spelling out how Allied officers were to conduct them-
selves (see Fig. 2.1).
7 tNA, FO 371/46864, ‘The mentality of the German Officer’, Brigadier W. E. van Cutsem 
(research Branch, Control Commission for Germany), 15 Jan. 1945.
8 tNA, FO 371/46864, ‘The German Character’, Brigadier W. E. van Cutsem, 9 mar. 1945.
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Figure 2.1. ‘some Do’s and Don’ts’, British Control Commission paper ‘The German 
Character’, 9 march 1945
This material is not covered by the Creative Commons licence terms that govern the reuse 
of this publication. For permission to reuse please contact the rights holder directly.
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In addition to these manuals, planning staffs compiled a series of hand-
books and technical guides.9 the German refugee Francis Carsten was one of 
a group of native German speakers recruited by the British Political Warfare 
Executive to assist in their preparation. He was told, he remembered later, that 
‘[t]hey didn’t want to be caught unprepared as in the case of the First World 
War’. Carsten was involved in the preparation of the Basic German Handbook, 
which, he remembered, ‘contained factual information on  Germany—National 
socialist Germany as well as pre-Nazi Germany—on administration, legal 
system, educational system, Nazi political organisations’ background, et 
cetera’. Carsten and his colleagues were briefed not ‘to give any political advice, 
being enemy aliens. this was left to the Foreign Office and the ministry of 
Economic Warfare.’ Instead, he and his fellow refugees ‘were only to provide 
factual information on what was the state of affairs in Germany and what was 
the situation a British officer coming into a German town would find there as 
regard to local government or local education or public utilities or whatever’. 
the handbooks, Carsten remembered, were widely distributed and very popu-
lar, since ‘the large majority of these British officers who went into Germany 
had no knowledge of German and so this was all they could rely on when they 
went in’.10
In the last year of the war, instructions and guidelines were displayed most 
prominently in the sHAEF Handbook for Military Government. Drafts from April 
and June 1944 attempted to lay out concisely the methods by which military gov-
ernment officers were to administer and supervise German affairs.11 Officers would 
have to ensure that the German governmental machinery ran efficiently, and this 
would best be achieved if the centralized German administrative system was 
retained. It was likely that the Allies would have to subsidize German economic 
development for some time, and that a range of commodities and relief supplies 
would have to be imported.12 Although these drafts acknowledged that food would 
be scarce all over Europe, they nonetheless set the target for German rations at 
2,000 calories per person per day, i.e. at the same level set for the populations of 
the non-Axis liberated countries. An August 1944 draft of another handbook, the 
Manual for Administration and Local Government in Germany, made similar rec-
ommendations: it stated that because the war damage in Germany was likely to be 
extensive, it was in the interests of Allied officers to focus on resolving housing and 
9 some of these are discussed by ulrich reusch, Deutsche Berufsbeamten und britische Besatzung: 
Planung und Politik 1943–1947 (stuttgart, 1985).
10 IWm sound Archive, 4483/03, interview with Frances ludwig Carsten, 2 Oct. 1979. Also see 
Volker Berghahn, ‘Francis l. Carsten, 1911–1998’, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 25 (1999), 504–10.
11 tNA, WO 220/220, ‘sHAEF military Government Handbook for Germany: Prior to Defeat or 
surrender’. For a later version, see tNA, FO 371/39166. This handbook has been much discussed in 
the older historiography on Allied planning, mainly because of its role in the morgenthau controversy. 
see e.g. Earl F. Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944–1946 (Washington DC, 
1975). F. s. V. Donnison, Civil Affairs and Military Government in North-West Europe 1944–1946 
(london, 1961). Harry l. Coles and Albert Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors 
(Washington, DC, 1964).
12 see Pogue in Donnison, Civil Affairs, 200.
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economic problems.13 A number of scholars’ recommendations strengthened this 
conclusion. The Harvard sociologist talcott Parsons, for example, argued in 1944 
that lasting ‘institutional change’ demanded ‘a policy of fostering a highly produc-
tive, full-employment, expanding economy for Germany. The inherent tendencies 
of the modern, industrial economy are such that if this is achieved its influence on 
institutional change will be automatically in the right direction.’14
However, a number of factors complicated and slowed the preparation of con-
crete plans. Germany’s future was just one of many Allied preoccupations. Numerous 
strategic decisions had to be made regarding campaigns and operations in North 
Africa, France, Italy, Poland, and the soviet union, and arrangements for the rede-
ployment of troops to the Pacific. Britain was heavily dependent on American 
credits and would have to urgently rebuild its export trade. The future of Germany 
was vital, certainly, but as michael Balfour, a member of the British  Element of 
the Control Commission in Berlin, remarked: ‘Giving the German question the 
importance due to it was easily confused with favouring the cruel enemy at the 
expense of the unfortunate victim.’15
The coordination of the different Allied governments’ diverging interests was at 
times difficult, but internal divisions were also significant. The roosevelt adminis-
tration was divided by a long-running struggle between the Department of state 
and the War Department, which centred largely on the role of the armed forces in 
occupation and military government. The War Department argued that ‘the 
demands of military necessity and unity of command’ precluded civilian responsi-
bilities, and that it was impossible for civilian agencies to operate independently 
until military operations had been completed.16 to counter that, ideological objec-
tions about the wisdom of giving political power to soldiers were voiced repeatedly, 
but by November 1943 roosevelt eventually directed the War Department to take 
charge of planning, because it was ‘quite apparent that if prompt results are to be 
obtained the Army will have to assume the initial burden’.17 While it had not been 
proven that civilians would not perform occupation duties better than soldiers, the 
argument that they could not perform them at all during a world war and its after-
math was powerful and influential.18
The American debates over occupation responsibilities were mirrored, to a 
lesser degree, by differences between the British government’s War Office and 
Foreign Office. responsibility for the administration of Germany was tossed 
back and forth between them because of changing ideas on the nature of military 
occupation. until march 1944, the occupation was to be supervised by the War 
Office; then a revision handed responsibility to the Foreign Office, until in June 
13 BAK Z45F, 44-45/3/1, ‘manual for Administration and local Government in Germany’, draft 
prepared by the Branch of the Interior Division, German Country unit, 19 Aug. 1944.
14 talcott Parsons, ‘The Problem of Controlled Institutional Change’, discussed by uta Gerhard, 
Talcott Parsons: An Intellectual Biography (Cambridge, 2002), 116–17.
15 Balfour, ‘Four Power Control in Germany’, 14.
16 Kenneth O. mcCreedy, ‘Planning the Peace: Operation Eclipse and the Occupation of  Germany’, 
Journal of Military History, 65/3 (July 2001), 713–40, at 717.
17 roosevelt to stimson, quoted in mcCreedy, ‘Planning the Peace’, 718.
18 Ziemke in mcCreedy, ‘Planning the Peace’, 718.
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1945 the War Office took over again. In October 1945 a special agency, the 
Control Office for Germany and Austria (COGA) was set up to coordinate 
the two. However, military government officers continued to report directly to 
the Foreign Office, bypassing the War Office and particularly COGA, which was 
dissolved soon after its establishment.19 However, British officials, just like their 
American colleagues, ultimately came to the conclusion that civilian responsibil-
ity for the administration of an occupied country was, for the near future at least, 
not viable.20
As a result of these divisions, both governments were constrained by the prevail-
ing uncertainties and displayed great unwillingness to commit to any specific direc-
tions too early. Both roosevelt and Churchill delayed firm decisions. In October 
1944, roosevelt told his secretary of state, Cordell Hull, that it was ‘all very well 
for us to make all kinds of preparations for the treatment of Germany, but there are 
some matters in regard to such treatment that lead me to believe that speed on 
these matters is not an essential at the present moment . . . I dislike making detailed 
plans for a country which we do not yet occupy.’21 Churchill voiced similar reserva-
tions. As late as February 1945, he argued that it was ‘much too soon for us to 
decide these enormous questions . . . I shall myself prefer to concentrate upon the 
practical issues which will occupy the next two or three years, rather than argue 
about the long-term relationship of Germany to Europe . . . There is . . . wisdom in 
reserving one’s decision as long as possible and until all the facts and forces that will 
be potent at the moment are revealed.’22 ‘Practical issues’ such as war strategy and 
specific operations in France and Germany were prioritized, and preparations for 
the future of a defeated Germany were marked by a lack of direction and an 
 unwillingness to commit.23
(ii) The Morgenthau Plan
up to this point, preparations were conducted by two well-oiled bureaucratic 
machines, while the political leaderships were distracted by more urgent problems 
and unwilling to commit to any specific proposals. In both Washington and 
london, civil servants drew upon a familiar set of procedures while preparing for 
the German occupation: they trained staff, conducted research into likely scenar-
ios, compiled handbooks. The result was a set of preparations similar in tone and 
substance to plans produced for other countries, with little strategic thought about 
what the Allies wanted to achieve in Germany.
19 Eva mayring in Wolfgang Benz (ed.), Deutschland unter alliierter Besatzung, 1945–1949/1955: 
Ein Handbuch (Berlin, 1999). Also see Adolf Birke et al. (eds.), Akten der britischen Militärregierung in 
Deutschland, Control Commission for Germany, British Element, Sachinventar (munich, 1993).
20 Donnison, Civil Affairs, 9.
21 roosevelt, quoted in robert murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (london, 1964), 281.
22 Winston Churchill, The Second World War, Abridged Edition with an Epilogue on the Years 1945 
to 1957 (london, 2002), 879–80.
23 snell has termed this a ‘policy of postponement’. see John l. snell, Wartime Origins of the East–
West Dilemma over Germany (New Orleans, 1959).
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It was in this context that in August 1944 the morgenthau Plan entered the 
planning arena, when Henry morgenthau, secretary of the us treasury, prepared 
a comprehensive scheme on the political and economic treatment of Germany 
after surrender.24 He criticized what he perceived to be a widespread emphasis in 
American circles on German ‘reconstruction’. such tendencies, he maintained, 
could be identified in the official memoranda. The sHAEF Handbook seemed to 
convey the impression that a transformation of Germany could be achieved by 
forbidding National socialism and improving living conditions. If these directives 
were to guide American conduct, morgenthau argued, any change of German 
society was going to be superficial and temporary. Germany’s participation in a 
third world war could not be prevented by the kind of controls that had been 
imposed after 1918. Experience had shown that factories converted to peacetime 
production could always be converted back; that the destruction of industries only 
had a temporary effect; and that banning Nazism would only drive it underground. 
Allied military governments would not be able to supervise Germany for ever.25 
Policy in Germany would have to be fundamentally different from operations in 
countries liberated from Nazi control.
The key to the German problem, according to morgenthau, lay in economics. 
Germany would only become peaceful if it was transformed into an agrarian society, 
if its industrial base was stripped away, and if the industries vital to military strength 
were dismantled and transported to other nations as a form of restitution. A mili-
tary occupation would have to prevent their re-establishment, and would have to 
continue for at least twenty years. During this time Germany should receive no 
economic aid. In fact, the Allies should not ‘assume responsibility for such economic 
problems as price controls, rationing, housing, or transportation, or take any meas-
ure designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy, except those which 
are essential to military operations’.26 Conditions should not be allowed to be better 
than those prevailing in Germany’s poor and war-ridden neighbours.
The fate of the morgenthau Plan is well known. roosevelt initially supported it, 
but the Foreign Office, the state Department, and a series of economic advisers 
objected to at least some of its proposals. reparations would have to be extracted 
in a more viable way, they argued, or else Germany would become a heavy burden 
on Allied governments and taxpayers. Although the plan was never fully or even 
partially implemented, a number of (primarily German) historians have ascribed 
to it great influence.27
24 Herny morgenthau, Germany Is Our Problem (New york, 1945).
25 see Balfour, ‘Four Power Control in Germany’, 18.
26 morgenthau, Germany Is Our Problem, 22.
27 Its effects are overstated in e.g. James Bacque, Other Losses: An Investigation into the Mass Deaths of 
German Prisoners of War After World War II (1989; london, 1991); James Bacque, Crimes and Mercies: 
The Fate of German Civilians Under Allied Occupation 1944–1950 (london, 1997); Kurt Keppler, Tod 
über Deutschland: Der Morgenthau Plan (tübingen, 1971). It is considered unimportant in e.g.  mcCreedy, 
‘Planning the Peace’; Donnison, Civil Affairs. more balanced assessments are given by John H. Backer, 
‘From morgenthau Plan to marshall Plan’, in robert Wolfe (ed.), Americans as Proconsuls: United States 
Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944–1952 (Carbondale, Ill., 1984), 155–65. Bernd 
Greiner, Die Morgenthau-Legende: Zur Geschichte eines umstrittenen Plans (Hamburg, 1995).
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It did have a number of consequences. most importantly, the debates it trig-
gered signalled to planners that the occupation of Germany was different from 
other Allied projects. some of the plan’s premises and specific clauses were taken 
up in later policy. The notion of a ‘Carthaginian peace’ (similar in spirit to the set-
tlement imposed by the romans on Carthage), gave some shape to the vague for-
mula of ‘unconditional surrender’. specifically, German living conditions (and 
features such as the health service) were now treated as part and extension of the 
German state’s war machine, to be dealt with accordingly. This proved to be of 
fundamental importance for the planning of public health operations. In the 
absence of other clear directions, the plan signified a move towards a ‘hard peace’. 
Aspirations of toughness predominated thereafter, and handbooks and outline 
plans were rewritten to conform to these new standards. Planning staff’s wariness 
of going beyond the political premises of a ‘hard peace’ resulted in a lack of policy 
in many areas, which was preferable to the accusation of having exceeded ‘the 
bounds of strict military necessity’.28
From september 1944, preparations were different in tone. They emphasized 
the differences between liberated countries and Germany, and declared that the 
standard of living could not be allowed to be higher in Germany than elsewhere. 
In that month, after the third and fourth drafts of the sHAEF Handbook were 
withdrawn as ‘too soft’, the Combined Chiefs of staff ordered that all existing 
work on Germany was to be supplemented by three principles. First, no steps 
towards the economic rehabilitation of Germany were to be undertaken; the 
responsibility for maintaining existing conditions lay exclusively with German 
authorities. second, no relief supplies were to be imported or distributed beyond 
the minimum necessary to prevent disease and disorder, and only insofar as these 
might hamper military operations. This was particularly crucial to the planning of 
health work. Third, all Nazis and Nazi sympathizers were to be punished system-
atically and all Nazi organizations were to be dissolved.29 subsequent editions of 
the Handbook incorporated these principles. As a result, the later drafts of the 
public health section of the Handbook focused on the pervasiveness of Nazi ideol-
ogy in the health service, rather than, as before, the achievements and successes of 
German public health and social medicine before 1933.30
At the same time, General Eisenhower, supreme commander of the Allied Forces in 
Europe, instructed his forces in september 1944 in just these terms about the conduct 
of the occupying forces in Germany.31 A few months later, a December 1944 directive 
on the ‘procedures to be employed in the military government of occupied Germany’ 
spelled out the new guiding principles. The ‘essence’ of Allied policy was that ‘no effort 
will be made to rehabilitate or succor the German people. rather, sole aim of the 
 military Government is to further military objectives.’ It went on:
28 mcCreedy, ‘Planning the Peace’, 720.
29 Donnison, Civil Affairs (1961), 201–3.
30 Dagmar Ellerbrock, ‘Healing Democracy’: Heilende Demokratie (Bonn, 2004), 68 ff.
31 BAK, Z45F, 3/153-3/15, Eisenhower to the Army Groups, subject: ‘Policy, relationship between 
Allied Occupying Forces and Inhabitants of Germany’, 12 sept. 1944.
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All planning, direction and instruction by us elements concerning military govern-
ments should be guided by this policy which reflects firm us views as known in this 
Headquarters. Principal points to be emphasized are the following:
 a.  Germany will not be ‘liberated’, but occupied as a defeated nation.
 b.  The German people will be made to realize that all necessary steps will be taken to 
prevent any further attempt by them to conquer the world.
 c.  No steps will be taken looking toward the economic rehabilitation of  Germany nor 
designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy except those needed to 
prevent epidemics or serious diseases and serious civil disorder which would endan-
ger the forces and to prevent the dissipation or sabotage of German equipment 
required for Allies countries.32
This focus was vital, the directive stated, because ‘[r]eports from the field indicate 
that the military Government Detachments and G5 staffs of subordinate forma-
tions are inclined to try to do too much to relieve the problems of the German 
people. There seems to be a disposition to approach the administration of  Germany 
with the idea that it is our job to make Germany a “happy land” again. It is essen-
tial that all military Government personnel be disabused of this concept.’ Finally, 
it added, the ‘position of this Headquarters is equally firm with regard to 
fraternisation’.33
The morgenthau Plan also left traces in the major planning directive which 
guided the American occupation until 1947, the document known as JCs 1067.34 
This directive underwent numerous draft editions, reflecting the process of work-
ing out a compromise between the various views within the us government. Its 
final version (the eighth) was issued to Eisenhower on 14 may 1945. It contained 
measures on the reorganization of industry and administrative structures, but over-
all emphasis was placed on the prohibition of attempts to facilitate or aid German 
recovery. Although a major purpose of occupation was to bring democracy to 
 Germany, the country was to be treated as a ‘defeated enemy’. ‘It should be brought 
home to the Germans’, it stated, ‘that Germany’s ruthless warfare and the fanatical 
Nazi resistance have destroyed the German economy and made chaos and suffering 
inevitable and that the Germans cannot escape responsibility for what they have 
brought upon themselves.’35
The directive instructed Eisenhower that Germany ‘will not be occupied for the 
purpose of liberation but as a defeated enemy nation. your aim is not oppression 
but to occupy Germany for the purpose of realizing certain important Allied objec-
tives. In the conduct of your occupation and administration you should be just, 
32 BAK, Z45F, 44-45/3/1, Chief of staff (G5, sHAEF) to G5 12th Army Group, G5 6th Army 
Group, and CO European Civil Affairs Division, subject: ‘policy in occupied Germany’, 11 Dec. 
1944.
33 see n. 32.
34 ‘Directive of the united states Joint Chiefs of staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the united 
states Forces of Occupation regarding the military government of Germany’, Apr. 1945, in Beate 
ruhm von Oppen, Documents on Germany Under the Occupation, 1945–1954 (london, 1955).
35 ‘Directive of the united states Joint Chiefs of staff ’, Apr. 1945, 15.
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but firm and aloof. you will strongly discourage fraternization with the German 
officials and population.’36 Finally, it emphasized that responsibility for all matters 
of German survival, welfare, and government would have to be shouldered by 
German officials. Assistance from the occupation forces in the provision of food 
and relief goods was limited to the minimum necessary ‘to prevent disease and 
unrest’. There were clear implications for public health work: health operations 
had to be oriented towards military necessity, and the burden of work had to be 
carried by German authorities. ‘you will estimate the requirements of supplies 
necessary to prevent starvation or widespread disease or such civil unrest as would 
endanger the occupying forces,’ JCs 1067 instructed Eisenhower, and
[s]uch estimates will be based upon a program whereby the Germans are made respon-
sible for providing for themselves, out of their own work and resources. you will take 
all practicable economic and police measures to assure that German resources are fully 
utilized and consumption held to the minimum in order that imports may be strictly 
limited and that surpluses may be made available for the occupying forces and dis-
placed persons and united Nations prisoners of war, and for reparation. you will take 
no action that would tend to support basic living standards in Germany on a higher 
level than that existing in any one of the neighboring united Nations.37
Pl ANs FOr PuBlIC HEAltH
(i) Public health as ‘civil affairs’
Preparations for public health work in the countries liberated or occupied by the 
Allied armies came under the aegis of ‘civil affairs’, which, apart from public 
health, included issues such as the distribution of relief supplies, the liaison with 
local religious representatives, the care of displaced persons, the establishment of 
basic civil administrations, and the restoration of police and justice systems. Civil 
affairs ranked relatively low down in the hierarchy of military plans, suffering not 
only from the vague and shifting political objectives that affected all planning, but 
also from the fact that priority was given to combat operations. In his official his-
tory of the British civil affairs teams, F. s. V. Donnison observed that civil affairs 
staffs were often seen as an obstacle to military success. Even though their con-
cerns were going to be essential for the period after defeat, it was ‘sometimes hard 
for a commander to see Civil Affairs officers in this light. At a time when he is 
bending all energy and resources to the overcoming of his enemy, Civil Affairs 
staffs can easily appear as impediments rather than aids to his operations. . . . 
[t]hey frequently are demanding “lift” for relief supplies, protesting against req-
uisitioning (or looting), standing up for the minimum rights and amenities of the 
civil population. In fact, these activities are intended to facilitate longer term mili-
tary operations. But for the commander there may be no long term operation if 
36 ‘Directive of the united states Joint Chiefs of staff ’, Apr. 1945, 16.
37 ‘Directive of the united states Joint Chiefs of staff ’, Apr. 1945, 22.
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he fails in the immediate battle.’38 As a result, civil affairs staffs were not fully 
accepted into the military hierarchy and were treated as ‘quasi-civil poor rela-
tions’. The British army divisions, Donnison noted, contained some ‘extremely 
able officers …, with a sprinkling of regular soldiers. But many tended to be 
eccentrics, skilled in some little-known or faintly ludicrous employment, but 
hopelessly unmilitary, and some even anti-military. Or else, somewhat naturally, 
they were the weaker members rejected from the more active units. All Civil 
Affairs officers were likely to be a little elderly. A General Officer delivering an 
inaugural address at the Civil Affairs staff centre seemed to see seated before him 
all those officers whom he had, over the past months, been at pains to weed out 
from under his command.’39
Donnison did not discuss public health, but his observations also apply to this 
field. The records from American and British public health staffs show that their 
work suffered from a low ranking in the military hierarchy. Public health opera-
tions, especially those dealing with civilian populations, were widely seen as sec-
ondary considerations. Public health often fell into the gap between military and 
civilian authorities’ responsibilities, as a result of which there were many overlap-
ping agencies, but a shortage of officers and field personnel.40 The fact that the 
American Public Health Branch’s request to be represented on the usGCC Plan-
ning Coordinating section was turned down was symptomatic of its low status.41 
Their representation was undesirable, came the response, because ‘[i]f such an 
officer were detailed for this field of secondary importance we could expect to be 
flooded by requests from special staff sections and the services who have much 
more legitimate pleas than the medical Corps’.42 At exactly the same time, similar 
concerns were also expressed in British public health quarters. Brigadier E. W. 
Wade from the army’s medical sub-Branch was ‘very worried to see that medical 
questions do not appear in any high level documents’; he thought ‘that a medical 
representative should be present at all meetings of Planning staffs on whatever 
level’.43 Here, too, these demands were refused.
This problem of status is important for understanding how Allied staffs expected 
public health work to fit into the occupation. In organizational terms, responsibil-
ity for civilian health was given to the Public Health Branch of G5/sHAEF. some 
work was also conducted within the Internal Affairs and Communications Divi-
sion of the future Control Commissions. The British division was based in london 
and was active from 1944 onwards, but in the early stages was primarily concerned 
with the recruitment and training of its staff. The director of the British Public 
38 Donnison, Civil Affairs, 28–9. Donnison only talks about civil affairs in general and does not 
mention health officers or public health work.
39 Donnison, Civil Affairs, 28.
40 richard Arthur leiby, Public Health in Occupied Germany, 1945–1949 (PhD, university of 
Delaware, 1984).
41 BAK, 44-45/11/4, exchange of letters from 13 to 24 Feb. 1945 between Chief medical Officer 
(maj. Gen. A. W. Kenner) and Generals milburn and Wickersham.
42 BAK, 44-45/11/4, Brigadier General J. E. lewis to the acting deputy of usGCC, 17 Feb. 
1945.
43 tNA, FO 1038/33, Brigadier E. W. Wade, Feb. 1945.
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Health Branch was William H. Boucher.44 The corresponding American division 
was established in November 1944, and its Public Health and Welfare Branch was 
headed by morrison C. stayer.45 The work carried out by sHAEF and the two 
Control Commissions was supplemented by preparations by the British and 
American army groups who were about to move into Germany. In both, basic 
public health work was carried out by the medical officers in military government 
detachments. An American directive from April 1945 explained that these 
detachments
are military units which have prescribed missions, including public health activities. 
They are provided to relieve the fighting forces of civil commitments to the maximum 
practicable. Whenever possible they, like military Government staffs, serve as chan-
nels for dealing with civil authorities. Their primary objective is to stimulate the activi-
ties of indigenous personnel in reestablishing or maintaining medical and public 
health services, so that the military effort is not impeded, and ‘will be the agencies of 
their respective Commanders to ensure that governmental authorities take the neces-
sary measures for observance by the civilian population of any such policies laid 
down’.46
Infectious diseases posed the most urgent threats. Army staffs were to prevent epi-
demics, especially of typhus and typhoid fever, by putting in place strict quarantine 
arrangements, reporting all incidences of disease, supervising vaccination pro-
grammes, and repairing sanitary installations. Instructions demanded that detach-
ments were to make contact with native health officials and give assistance where 
necessary.
These health operations were very different from work that was overseen by 
the British and American civilian health departments in their countries, and from 
the activities by non-governmental or international relief organizations such as the 
red Cross or the united Nations relief and rehabilitation Administration 
(uNrrA). There simply was no forum for non-military health work in Germany. 
The Health Organization of the league of Nations had more or less shut down by 
the outbreak of war in 1939; the Office International d’Hygiène Publique officially 
continued to operate throughout the war and relocated from Paris to near Vichy, 
but was not involved in practical health work among German civilians. uNrrA, 
although it was actively organizing medical relief on German soil, was specifically 
barred from assisting German citizens, or ‘enemy subjects’, and was restricted to 
the care of displaced uN nationals.47
It was for these reasons that British public health work in Germany was pre-
pared within the War Office, not the ministry of Health. The ministry’s only 
44 e.g. tNA, FO 936/90, W. H. Boucher (Public Health Branch) to J. K. O’Donoghue (Norfolk 
House), 16 Oct. 1944.
45 BAK, Z45F, 3/169-2/159, minutes of meeting convened by Chief, Public Health Branch, G5 
Division, sHAEF, 15/16 Jan. 1945. Also Christoph Weisz (ed.), OMGUS-Handbuch: Die amerikan-
ische Militärregierung in Deutschland 1945–1949 (munich, 1994), 109.
46 BAK, Z45F, 44-45/11/4, Colonel W. l. Wilson (Public Health Branch, G5, sHAEF), ‘Concept 
of Public Health Functions in Germany’, 11 Apr. 1945.
47 Helping the People to Help Themselves (1944), 12.
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involvement concerned the supply of medical officers: throughout the war,  William 
Boucher, ‘an experienced civil servant’48, and his staff regularly approached the 
ministry and the scottish Department of Health with requests for medical officers. 
Boucher asked whether they could recommend suitable candidates, and whether 
they could offer guidelines on the salary ranges to be adopted for these officers. He 
also asked for advice on how to advertise jobs and conduct job interviews.49 The 
ministry repeatedly replied by pointing to the shortages of medical officers they 
themselves were facing. ‘This is a bad time for us’, wrote the scottish Department 
of Health on more than one occasion, and it would be ‘very difficult for us to 
release any of our own men’.50 These demands for the release of individual medical 
officers from their duties regularly provoked protests and complaints by ministry 
officials. They complained fiercely about how ‘Boucher’s army of medical officers’51 
interfered with public health and civil defence at home in Britain, and responded 
by dragging their feet.
The following episode illustrates the fractious relationship. In march 1945, just 
weeks before the British Control Commission’s Public Health Branch was to com-
mence its work in Germany, mr Donelan from the ministry of Health minuted 
that Boucher had approached him with a plea to help in the appointment of ‘ “two 
or three” public health doctors’. ‘I find this request a good deal more than I bar-
gained for, in these days when public health doctors of quality are like gold’, Done-
lan complained. It had made him wonder: ‘ “If the Berlin section alone wants ‘two 
or three’ doctors, how many is the whole Commission going to want eventually?” ’52 
One of the men Boucher had asked for was the medical officer of health for Bromley, 
a Dr Kenneth tapper. Donelan observed that tapper was ‘one of the best m.OsH. 
[medical Officers of Health] in the london region and occupies a key position in 
the Civil Defence services and in Group 8 thereof and represents the Kentish 
Authorities on the Commissioners’ Advisory Committee. Civil Defence alone 
would feel his loss very heavily. moreover that area has had heavy inroads made on 
its P.H.med Officers.’53
Donelan and other ministry officials insisted that appointments to the Control 
Commission could only be made if public health provisions in Britain were guar-
anteed. As one official minuted, the problem ‘rest[ed] upon whether the present 
[public health] staff could carry on either with or without part time assistants or 
with or without consultation with a neighbouring m.O.H.’.54 Another noted that 
it was ‘a matter of appraisement as to which sphere of activity needs Dr tapper 
most. If the Control Commission to Germany gets him they win a first class man 
& we lose him. It would be a big price for us to pay’, he thought, ‘but taking into 
48 tNA, FO 1050/757, lt. Gen. B. G. Horrocks (BAOr) to Pm Balfour, 12 sept. 1945.
49 e.g. tNA, FO 936/90, Boucher to major General s. W. Kirby, 5 Oct. 1944.
50 tNA, FO 936/90, G. Wallace (Establishment Officer, Dept. Health for scotland, st Andrew’s 
House, Edinburgh) to G. A. Aynsley (Control Commissions, Foreign Office, Norfolk House), 27 
Oct. 1944.
51 tNA, mH 76/333, minute by mr Bliss (ministry of Health), 6 Jan. 1945.
52 tNA, mH 76/333, C. J. Donelan to mr Ainsworth, 26 mar. 1945.
53 tNA, mH 76/333, C. J. Donelan to mr Ainsworth, 26 mar. 1945.
54 tNA, mH 76/333, minute by W. W. Andrew, 28 mar. 1945.
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consideration the present war situation I feel we should foot the bill.’55 Others 
argued that the problem had to be dealt with in general, not just in relation to Dr 
tapper: ‘The Control Commission is no doubt unaware of the extremity to which 
we have now come as regards public health medical staff, and appears to be seized 
of the idea (perhaps not unnaturally) that there must still be persons in this field 
on which it can reasonably draw for the ideal men required for the Commission’s 
purposes.’ However, this note went on, it was now ‘desirable to dispel this idea, and 
to take the line, as things now stand, that there is no hope of finding any further 
assistance for the Commission among medical officers, who are now quite ineffi-
cient to meet the minimum needs at home’.56 Kenneth tapper, who was decorated 
for his efforts to relieve suffering among air-raid victims in Bromley, does not seem 
to have made it to Germany.57
This conflict was not just about the priority of home requirements, but the 
questionable entitlement of the soon-to-be defeated enemy. Why should British 
needs suffer because of Germany? A ministry of Health official explained that it 
had been difficult enough to get local authorities to release their medical officers 
for civil affairs work in the ‘liberated countries’, who had ‘a strong intrinsic claim’—
and it was ‘almost certain that there will be far greater difficulty in getting Authori-
ties to release men for the benefit of Germany (which is how they will interpret 
such demand)’.58
Everywhere, the military’s public health work was affected by personnel short-
ages and the low status of public health work. But the widely acknowledged ‘seri-
ous dearth of medical practitioners’ was here aggravated by the fact that public 
health work in Germany, in particular, was not perceived to be a priority.59 By late 
1944, staffing for the German occupation had become a regularly voiced concern 
in public health quarters, and was discussed at length at a meeting of sHAEF 
public health officers from the American and British military groups in January 
1945. Items on the agenda included problems such as the lack of equipment and 
transportation, the lack of time, and the lack of coordination with other sections 
of the military. But more than any other issue, they bemoaned the lack of suitable 
public health personnel. As the deputy of the Public Health Branch of sHAEF’s 
G5 division, Colonel Wilson, stated: ‘[i]f we do not get the right distribution, 
public health operations will fail. We must keep plugging away.’ Concerns about 
‘numerical shortages’ were bad enough, they said, but ‘[a]ctual functional short-
ages are even more evident’. Participants also voiced their concerns about ‘short-
ages in the British area, the fact that all officers in the American area are not 
qualified for public health work, and the fact that the current status has been 
55 tNA, mH 76/333, minute by Whitworth Jones, 28 mar. 1945.
56 tNA, mH 76/333, minute to mr lindsay, 27 mar. 1945.
57 ‘From the Archives: The George medal Winner from Otago Boys’, Otago Boys’ High school 
Foundation newsletter, June 2011, http://www.obhsfoundation.co.nz/news_and_events/newsletters/
Newsletter-June2011.cfm.
58 tNA, mH 76/333, minute to mr lindsay, 27 mar. 1945.
59 tNA, FO 936/90, W. H. Boucher to major General s. W. Kirby, 5 Oct. 1944.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 03/21/2015, SPi
36 Allies and Germans
This is an open access publication. Except where otherwise noted, this work is distributed under the terms of a 
 Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence, a copy of which is available 
at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. For enquiries concerning use outside the scope of the licence 
terms, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com.
 presented to the Combined Chiefs of staff. reference was made to numerical 
shortages to show what we are up against in the matter of qualified personnel.’60
The shortages were apparently acute. Colonel Crichton from the twenty-First 
Army Group maintained that the British situation was ‘extremely serious’:
unless we can get better promise of personnel we require, it is impossible for me to 
accept the responsibility which has been placed upon me. I cannot do it without tools, 
and by tools I mean bodies. The planning I have committed to has been restricted to 
10 medical officers per group. I have 16 present out of 80 authorized and 80 is the 
barest minimum by which we could succeed. This has been taken up here at sHAEF 
and at the War Office, but at home they do not realize how serious this matter is, and 
the fact that German health conditions, if not taken care of sufficiently, will boomer-
ang on us and the Army in general. The matter should be stressed, and stressed very 
forcibly at this time.61
Another commentator noted that the ministry of Health was ‘scouring the public 
health local authorities for the names of men who are willing to take the civil 
affairs test. The list is a fairly substantial one but of course, a number of people are 
unfit, some are not willing to volunteer, and there are people whom the authori-
ties are not willing to release.’62 It was not only the severe shortages in themselves, 
but the absence of qualified health staffs which proved to be of most serious con-
cern. since detachments and army groups were to shoulder the real health work, 
it was crucial to provide them with ‘proper and enough people’ who were quali-
fied for public health work.63 Colonel Crichton hoped that ‘when civil agencies 
are being requested to part with their men . . . they do not think Civil Affairs is a 
refuge for the doddering . . . but that we do need active men who are really good 
at their jobs’.64
(ii) Liberated vs enemy countries
shortages of qualified personnel and the low status of public health were not spe-
cific to the German occupation, but here they were magnified by problems not 
shared elsewhere: not only were staff for Germany particularly hard to find, but 
health work was restricted by a distinction between liberated and enemy countries. 
A manual for Operation Eclipse, designed as the first stage of the peace and initi-
ated as the Allied armies crossed the siegfried line, described this differentiation. 
In the liberated countries, it stated, ‘we are dealing with our allies and it is only the 
accident of war that brings us into their country. We therefore respect their sover-
eignty and their institutions, and we endeavour to work in harmony with them. 
We do not interfere with their laws, nor attempt to impose any of our own; and we 
60 BAK, Z45F 3/169-2/159, ‘minutes of meeting convened by Chief, Public Health Branch, G5 
Division, sHAEF, for Discussion of military Government Public Health Plans and Operations’, 
15–16 Jan. 1945, 7.
61 BAK, Z45F 3/169-2/159, ‘minutes of meeting’, 15–16 Jan. 1945, 17.
62 BAK, Z45F 3/169-2/159, ‘minutes of meeting’, 15–16 Jan. 1945, 25.
63 BAK, Z45F 3/169-2/159, ‘minutes of meeting’, 15–16 Jan. 1945, 4.
64 BAK, Z45F 3/169-2/159, ‘minutes of meeting’, 15–16 Jan. 1945, 25.
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claim no jurisdiction whatever over their citizens.’65 In Germany, on the other 
hand, it was
the duty of commanders to impose the will of the supreme Commander upon the 
German people. The diplomatic approach to civil authority which is used in liberated 
territories will be replaced by the issue of orders, obedience to which will be exacted, 
and disobedience to which will be punishable in our own military Government courts. 
The civil administration, and all aspects of civil life, will be directed and controlled 
according to the requirements of, initially, the supreme Commander and, ultimately 
the Control Council, whose authority will be final. Germany will be made to realise 
that this time she has been well and truly beaten in the field by force of arms, and must 
now do as she is ordered.66
This distinction also applied to public health. Donnison put his finger on it when 
he described civil affairs work in Burma, where the officers ‘were invested with a 
dual responsibility, to the military authorities for the bare prevention of disease 
and unrest, [and] to the Burma Office or to the Colonial Office to raise standards 
above this level, since the people of these countries were British subjects, and it was 
felt that they should be treated more generously than enemies’.67 By contrast, in 
Germany, ‘generous treatment’ was highly inappropriate, and security concerns 
determined the work of the health officers. Colonel Wade, a senior medical officer 
in the British Control Commission, inquired about the ‘policy in respect of the 
issue of drugs which are potentially explosive, to German civilians and military 
medical services’, particularly glycerine, iodine, sulphur, and certain potassium 
salts. His view was ‘that [the Germans] should be made to use substitutes and that 
these should all be kept for use by the Allies, or be destroyed’.68
such a distinction between public health work in Germany and other countries 
was not inevitable. As we have seen, this distinction was absent in earlier schemes. 
The work produced by the Allied Committee on Post-War requirements, the 
 so-called leith-ross Committee, is a case in point. In a February 1942 paper on 
measures for post-war relief and reconstruction, the authors recognized that the 
difficulties of prioritizing ‘among the conflicting claims, and unequal situations, of 
Allied, neutral and enemy countries, [were] clearly enormous’.69 They argued that 
‘[t]he only hope of achieving rough justice in the allotment of priorities would be 
to regard Europe (or those parts of it to which we have access), so far as possible as 
a whole from the beginning. Even if “need” is referred to the barest necessities in 
food, clothing and medicaments, the acceptance of such a view will demand 
an important intellectual and moral effort of the more favoured peoples.’70 
65 tNA, FO 1039/590-592, 21st Army Group, Operation Eclipse, Pamphlet No. 10.
66 tNA, FO 1039/590-592, 21st Army Group, Operation Eclipse, Pamphlet No. 10.
67 Donnison, Civil Affairs, 29.
68 tNA, FO 1038/31, Colonel E. W. Wade (medical services Branch) to the Brigadier in charge of 
Adm. serv, 10 Nov. 1944.
69 tNA, FD 1/6819, ‘Immediate post-war measures of relief and reconstruction in Europe’, sir 
Frederick leith-ross (royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House) to medical research 
Council, 9 Feb. 1942.
70 tNA, FD 1/6819, ‘Immediate post-war measures’, section A, point 5.
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 Germany was here conceived as a necessary part of international relief efforts. 
‘When the present war ends’, the paper stated, ‘the needs of many parts of Europe 
will be more urgent than those of Germany, but she should also receive what is 
estimated to be due to her on the scale of need’, with the addition that ‘any politi-
cal or financial conditions to her doing so should be settled beforehand’.71 relief 
work was to be determined by need, and the neediest countries were those which 
had seen the heaviest fighting.72 Finally, the leith-ross paper stated that, since ‘the 
control of starvation and such diseases as may be expected after the war depends 
primarily on transport, economic reconstruction and agricultural recovery’, it was 
‘from a health point of view . . . essential to continue urgent relief work for suffi-
cient time to enable a fair degree of economic and agricultural prosperity to be 
reached, probably over a period of some years’.73
This and other papers did not distinguish in principle between Germany and 
other countries. However, these premises disappeared from later plans. After the 
morgenthau controversy, schemes no longer focused on possible German needs, but 
rather on Germany’s comparatively high pre-war standard of living. similarly, the 
recommendation that public health required a level of economic and agricultural 
development clashed with later principles of what the occupation was to achieve: the 
aim was not to facilitate Germany’s recovery, but rather to remove the German threat 
to world security. As a result, the link between the population’s health and the coun-
try’s prosperity was subsequently removed from occupation manuals.
In practice, health planning for Germany was very different from the leith-ross 
Committee’s recommendations. One episode illustrates the tenor of the debate. In 
June 1942, mr Gorvin from the ministry of Economic Warfare wrote to the Polish 
ministry of Finance that he was compiling estimates of the immediate post-war 
requirements of Germany, and wondered whether the Poles could help with data 
or ideas.74 Immediately a storm erupted, and colleagues noted that Gorvin had 
‘fairly put his foot in it with the Poles’. The Central Department of the Foreign 
Office expressed concern about likely complaints from other Allies, ‘on the grounds 
that this is hardly the appropriate time to discuss the feeding and reprovisioning of 
Germans, seeing that we have not yet settled how to deal with the immediate needs 
of our own Allies. If such representations are made I think that the only line to take 
will be to say that mr Gorvin acted entirely on his own initiative and that there is 
of course absolutely no intention on our part to commit ourselves in any way to 
proposals for feeding Germans before we have all made up our minds on the politi-
cal problems involved.’75 several government departments stepped in to remedy 
the ‘acute embarrassment . . . caused by mr Gorvin’s action’.76 Central Department 
71 tNA, FD 1/6819, ‘Immediate post-war measures’, section A, point 7.
72 tNA, FD 1/6819, ‘Immediate post-war measures’, section D, point 29.
73 tNA, FD 1/6819, ‘Immediate post-war measures’, section D, point 31(3).
74 tNA, FO 371/31508, J. H. Gorvin (ministry of Economic Warfare) to mr t. Zamoyski, (Polish 
ministry of Finance), 20 June 1942.
75 tNA, FO 371/31508, Gladwyn Jebb to mr makins, mr law and mr ronald, 4 July 1942.
76 tNA, FO 371/31508, mr ronald (Central Department) to mr Dudley Ward (ministry of 
Economic Warfare), 13 July 1942.
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tried to soothe worries: ‘[t]here is of course no justification’, one official wrote, 
‘for putting postwar requirements of Germany at all high on our list of priorities 
and it would certainly be our intention to make certain that the main principles of 
essential relief for our Allies and for the victims of German aggression are formally 
established before devoting any considerable thought as to how to better the lot of 
the aggressor countries.’77
Britain’s sometimes fragile relationship with the other allies was one considera-
tion; another was that there was an apparent educational component to restricting 
the health and relief offered to Germany, as suggested by insights into the German 
national character and its limited potential for improvement. some argued that for 
pedagogical reasons the Germans should be given food only after all the nations 
who had suffered because of Germany.78 As Henry Dicks, a British psychiatrist 
who was drafted to work for the British Control Commission in Germany, put it: 
from the ‘psychological point of view’, the ‘manner of administering such relief as 
is contemplated will be important in influencing German attitudes. The rations 
should be kept below those of our Allies.’79 This was a persuasive argument, all the 
more appealing at a time of shortages and supply bottlenecks.
As a result, health operations in Germany were to be conducted in a different 
tone from those elsewhere. Differences concerned particularly the provision of 
supplies and personnel—and since so many of the discussions focused on supply, 
this was crucial. American and British health officers were instructed to distribute 
food, drugs, and medical supplies first to liberated populations, and once in 
 Germany, to Allied nationals and non-German displaced persons, before considering 
the requirements of the German population. Germans were not to be given any 
medical supplies beyond the absolute minimum necessary.80 The provision of 
 supplies was planned differently for the two categories: ‘For German civilians, 
planning [provided] only for basic medical units; for displaced persons, we have 
planned for basic medical units, x-ray supply units, sanitation supply units, obstet-
rical bags, etc.’81 In these terms, Colonel scheele from sHAEF’s Preventive medi-
cine section observed that ‘[t]he general medical supply program for Germany is 
not too generous, but the program is adequate for communicable disease control. 
The first effort will be to utilise German biological and other medical supplies.’82
Even more urgent than medical supplies was the supply of food. Allied troops 
were instructed to ensure a daily allocation of 2,000 calories per person in the 
friendly countries and for those non-Germans in the displaced persons camps in 
Germany, mainly by using up military stocks and distributing donations and 
German stores. On the other hand, in the light of prevalent shortages rations for 
77 tNA, FO 371/31508, Gladwyn Jebb, 4 July 1942.
78 ‘manifesto’, in Emil ludwig, How to Treat the Germans (london, 1943), 70.
79 tNA, FD 1/6046, ‘Germany after the war: a resume with commentary by lieut. Colonel H. V. 
Dicks’, Feb. 1945, 7.
80 BAK, Z45F 3/169-2/159, lt. Colonel Cullyford (Chief of the Public Health Branch, G5/Offi-
cers Army Group) at the public health meeting of 15–16 Jan. 1945, 25.
81 BAK, Z45F 3/169-2/159, Colonel stuart smith (Chief of the sHAEF supplies Coordinator 
section), 10.
82 BAK, Z45F 3/169-2/159, Colonel scheele (Chief of the sHAEF Preventive medicine section), 13.
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the German population had to be significantly lower. ‘The feeding of the Germans 
was going to be a difficult one’, Colonel Hermann thus noted in January 1945, 
particularly since ‘[t]here will be no imported food issued to the German popula-
tion except in extreme emergencies’.83 Colonel Wilson made this point most 
bluntly. speaking about the allocation of food supplies, Wilson asked: ‘The ques-
tion is, how much can you cut the German down and keep him breathing. How 
much do we dare cut him down?’84
(iii) Public health plans for Germany
let us briefly examine two particular plans for public health work, which were 
ready just before the end of the war. First, the twenty-First British Army Group 
drew its instructions about public health work from the ‘Eclipse medical Outline 
Plan’. The plan predicted that the public health problems in Germany would be 
similar to those already encountered by troops in the advance from Normandy to 
Brussels, ‘with the important difference that the operation will take place in hostile 
enemy territory and there can be no reliance on the co-operation of the civilian 
population’.85 It anticipated that destruction and economic conditions were ‘likely 
to be much worse than anything we have yet experienced’, and it was ‘essential that 
all Hygiene [officers] should have a plan to work on’.86 major problems demanding 
health officers’ attention, it suggested, were the control of infectious diseases; 
arrangements for hospital accommodation of displaced persons and refugees, and 
emergency beds for epidemic outbreaks; and the restoration of water and sewage 
systems and the civilian laboratory services.87
However, despite this, practical assessment health work was limited by the 
premises of Allied occupation policy. The plan thus emphasized that health work 
must not exceed the bounds of ‘military necessity’. It differentiated between health 
work in liberated countries and in Germany. And it spelled out that in Germany, 
the officers’ primary task was the maintenance of health among the occupying 
forces and displaced persons. ‘The hygiene task is likely to be immense’, it stated, 
but ‘it will not be possible to meet all demands, and we must, therefore, in the first 
place, concentrate on essentials.’
 (a)  The first concern is and remains the health and prevention of disease in the British 
Armed Forces.
 (b) secondly, concentration on our own and Allied PW.
 (c)  Thirdly, there must be insistence on reasonable Hygienic standards in German 
 concentration areas, and
 (d) Fourthly, everything possible must be done to reestablish, at the earliest possible 
time, civilian health services.88
83 BAK, Z45F 3/169-2/159, Colonel Herrmann (sHAEF supplies and Economics Branch), 13/14.
84 BAK, Z45F 3/169-2/159, Colonel Wilson, 13.
85 BAK, Z45F 3/169-2/159, Appendix B/3.   86 BAK, Z45F 3/169-2/159, Appendix B/3.
87 BAK, Z45F 3/169-2/159, VI/57-59.   88 BAK, Z45F 3/169-2/159, Appendix B/3.
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Because the existing German authorities were to continue to administer health 
services, only one short section of the plan considered hygiene measures for the 
German population, while twelve sections concentrated on medical care for Allied 
forces and uN displaced persons and prisoners of war. Instead of preparing for 
epidemics and health crises, health teams were told to focus on the collection of 
information on German equipment and medical stores, through which the require-
ments of Allied purposes elsewhere were to be met.89 In April and may of 1945 
public health officers involved in the Eclipse Plan met in the context of a working 
party to examine the ‘long term medical policy for Germany’, and their primary 
concern was the examination and stocktaking of German medical material, per-
sonnel, and installations for uses elsewhere.90
A second example is the Bavarian operational health plan, produced by an 
American detachment in April 1945. The plan began with an overview of the 
German regional and local organization of health administration and the role per-
formed by the German ministry of the Interior. It went on to anticipate the kind 
of situation likely to be faced by the American health staffs. ‘In the event of danger 
of spread of communicable disease beyond the borders of Germany,’ it spelled out, 
‘emergency measures beyond those prescribed by the International sanitary Con-
vention may be taken’, if absolutely vital.91 But apart from these emergency sce-
narios, ‘the Public Health functions of mil Gov’ would be limited to:
 (1)  Control of communicable diseases among civilians which might affect the health 
of Allied troops. This necessitates a responsible civilian health organization, 
 properly equipped and staffed with suitable facilities and powers to carry out its 
necessary functions.
 (2)  Provisions of medical care necessary to protect the health of united Nations 
 Nationals in Germany. This necessitates provision of medical staffs, facilities and 
services for these people.
 (3)  utilization of German medical and Public Health resources and productive 
 capacity to the extent needed to supply urgent needs of the united Nations, and 
to allow the balance to be used for maintenance of public health in Germany.
 (4)  removal of active Nazis and ardent Nazi sympathizers from German public health 
services, and their replacement by acceptable personnel.92
Just weeks before the end of war, both plans limited public health operations in 
Germany to ensuring the success of military operations and the protection of the 
health of the occupying troops and uN nationals on German soil. Civilian health 
89 BAK, Z45F 3/169-2/159, ‘German War material required for use in the war against Japan’, 
Annexure III to Appendix F.
90 see tNA, FO 1038/33, correspondence on ‘long term medical Policy for Germany’. 
The terms of reference of this working party were set on 25 Apr. 1945, and the first meeting took 
place on 1 may 1945, and the second on 1 June 1945. After this, the working party seems to have 
been disbanded.
91 BAK, Z45F 3/177-1/6, ‘Proposed operational plan for public health’, HQ, Detachment E1 F3, 
regional Command for Bavaria, 12 Apr. 1945.
92 see n. 91.
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did not feature as a major concern, because German authorities were expected to con-
tinue with their work, and Allied health officers were only required to supervise them.
Directives on the treatment of Germany after its surrender thus had a clear 
impact on public health work. They had developed the notion of a ‘hard peace’; 
they had presented the health system as an extension of the German war state; and 
they demanded that Allied officers were not to show any sympathy for German 
suffering. Health officers were instructed that, in the interests of security and jus-
tice, German living standards and nutrition were to be capped at levels below those 
of neighbouring countries. The main effect was to limit health work. While public 
health work carried out by army detachments usually involved making contact 
with the native population and combining army and civilian resources, it was to be 
much more limited in Germany.
Four related premises shaped the preparations for British and American troops’ 
public health work. First, the notion of ‘military necessity’ served to remind health 
officers that the main focus of occupation policy was the defeat of Germany, the 
eradication of Nazism, the punishment of those responsible, and the freeing of 
forces for operations in the Pacific. Health operations on German soil were neces-
sary only so far as they affected Allied troops and Germany’s neighbours. supplies 
were to be confined to ‘a minimum necessary to prevent disease and such disorders 
as might endanger or impede military operations’.93 Health officers were to ‘plan 
and coordinate the provision of resources for prevention and control of disease 
among civilians or animals which might interfere with military operations’ and to 
‘assure availability for distribution of medical supplies necessary to prevent or con-
trol diseases which might affect or interfere with military operations or health of 
the troops’.94 ‘military necessity’ thus defined the purpose, reach, and objectives of 
occupation public health programmes in Germany.
second, the occupiers were to rely on German organizations for the bulk of 
necessary tasks. According to the principle of ‘indirect control’, which stemmed 
from British experiences with its colonies, Allied officers were to supervise and 
control German health authorities indirectly, without actually doing any of the 
necessary work themselves.95 The plans for the British and American public health 
branches were based on the assumption that the Allies would issue directives to a 
central German government, and that the Internal Affairs and Communications 
Division would control and supervise the German ministry of the Interior.96 When 
in January 1945, General Draper asked whether ‘the Germans [will] actually do 
the work in the field?’, Boucher explained:
yes. It will be the military Government officers who will be controlling each Public 
Health department at Provinz level. Our relationship is with the ministry on top and 
93 F. s. V. Donnison, Civil Affairs and Military Government: Central Organisation and Planning 
(london, 1966), 201–3. BAK, Z45F 3/169-2/159, ‘sHAEF memorandum on Post Defeat military 
Government Planning’, 3 Jan. 1945.
94 BAK, Z45F 44-45/12/5, ‘memorandum on the reorganisation of G5 Division’, 24 mar. 1945.
95 Birke et al. (eds.), Akten der britischen Militärregierung in Deutschland, vol. i, p. xvi.
96 tNA, FO 936/90, ‘New establishment proposal for CCG(BE), Public Health Branch’, 15 Oct. 1945.
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does not extend beyond that. The rules for dissemination of instructions have not 
been worked out as yet, but possibly we, on behalf of the supreme Command, will 
give directions to the German ministry for the issue of instructions on this matter 
down to those in the field, and it will be for the military Government officer in the 
field to see that those instructions are duly acted upon, and are effected. We are plan-
ning on the assumption that central government in Germany will still exist.
‘We have no intention of assuming any executive responsibility,’ he added. ‘Our 
job is to control them, not to do the work for them.’97
As a result, planners allocated only limited supplies and personnel, and assumed 
that the German authorities would to continue to work without interruption while 
denazification was in process. The inherent contradiction was only rarely acknowl-
edged. In september 1944, when the uK treasury was in the process of approving 
the sizes of various Control Commission branches, a treasury official, mr Wilcox, 
inquired about the extent to which the British authorities were going to interfere 
with medical and health arrangements in Germany. ‘I can see that in the early days 
there will need to be a pretty close supervision to guard against epidemics in the 
chaotic conditions that may exist’, he wrote to Boucher, ‘but one would have 
thought, prima facie, that after this initial period the health services would be 
essentially a thing which the Germans in their own interests would want to run as 
efficiently as possible.’98 In reply, Boucher argued for some need of regimentation. 
‘I agree that the administration of their own health services is something which we 
can ultimately rely on the Germans to run for themselves on efficient lines with a 
minimum of oversight on our part’—but, he added,
How soon they can be left to do so is entirely conjectural. We do not know in what 
condition we shall find the administrative machine, but one thing, to my mind, is 
quite clear: Nazi doctrine permeates the whole public health structure and must be 
eradicated. If control amounted to no more than this, its result would undoubtedly be 
to eliminate the severe regimentation to which the health services and their personnel 
are at present subjected. These services cannot, however, be permitted to function on 
purely parochial lines, in face of the many public health problems likely to confront 
us for a considerable time after the cessation of hostilities. regimentation of a fairly 
strict kind will be essential, and it will be our job to enforce it.99
Nevertheless, when a month later Boucher listed the future duties of his senior 
staff, these tasks were those of administrators and overseers, not those of health 
officers who were going to get at all involved in any practical public health work.100 
The fact that large sections of the German health service had joined the Nazi Party 
and would now need to be removed, was also asserted by other sources. As Brig-
adier Wade, senior medical officer of the British Control Commission, noted in 
may 1945: while ‘the Political Investigators have not got very far with the 
97 BAK, Z45F 3/169-2/159, General Draper at the public health meeting of 15–16 Jan. 1945, 15.
98 tNA, FO 936/90, C. H. m. Wilcox (treasury Chambers) to H. C. rayner (Enemy Branch), 
21 sept. 1944.
99 tNA, FO 936/90, W. H. Boucher to mr J. K. Donoghue, 26 sept. 1944.
100 tNA, FO 936/90, 16 Oct. 1944.
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 identification of medical Officers by Political creed’, he thought that it was ‘the 
opinion of the Political Intelligence Dept. that a very high proportion of the medi-
cal Officers are Nazi’.101 But if indeed ‘Nazi doctrine permeates the whole of public 
health structure’, exactly who the Allies could supervise and control was not spelled 
out. Not only were the terms of ‘ardent sympathisers’ and ‘active Nazis’ vague, but 
many schemes also assumed that, while Nazi public health laws obviously had to 
be annulled, most existing laws and health arrangements could remain in force 
unaltered, since they were ‘sound in most instances’.102
By late 1944, a third premise of preparations for the German occupation con-
cerned the concept of a German standard of living—an assumption which only 
appeared in this form in the later stages of the war. The 1942 leith-ross paper had 
still noted as a matter of fact that the most extensive health and relief operations 
would have to be conducted in countries where the heaviest fighting had taken 
place, Germany included. But this notion disappeared after the morgenthau epi-
sode, supported by planners’ belief in the ultimate efficiency and superiority of the 
German health organization.
The united states strategic Bombing survey’s study The Effect of Bombing on 
Health and Medical Care in Germany, compiled during the last year of the war and 
published in autumn 1945, exemplified this perspective and its contradictions. In 
close to 400 carefully researched pages it laid out how German health and medical 
care had been severely disrupted by the war. It did not mince its words on effects 
and consequences: although it found ‘no evidence of Allied effort to break the 
health of the German people’, it showed unequivocally that the bombing had ‘suc-
ceeded in greatly lowering the standard of health throughout Germany by destroy-
ing facilities for the maintenance of environmental sanitation, by creating the most 
acute conditions of overcrowding which have been encountered in the western 
world, by denying civilians hospital care and adequate drugs, and by changing 
three meals a day from an individual habit to an object of individual ingenuity’. In 
effect, ‘the average inhabitant of the German cities was placed in the same position 
as the soldier in the battle field’. And yet, such observations did not prompt a 
reconsideration of the problems to be encountered by the occupation troops. On 
the contrary, its conclusions pointed to the fundamental strength and soundness of 
German structures. ‘[t]he one outstanding fact which the study of these data 
defines’, it maintained, was that ‘a people well trained in personal hygiene, 
who . . . know where the dangers to ill health lie, are the strongest bulwark against 
breakdown of public health when their cities have been destroyed by the enemy.’ 
Even a ‘democratic society’ such as the united states could usefully learn about 
how ‘a thoroughly regimented nation reacted to air raids’, and how it could thus 
‘rise to a similar threat in the future’.103
101 tNA, FO 1038/33, War Office to Brigadier Wade, 31 may 1945.
102 BAK, Z45F 3/169-2/159, Colonel scheele at the public health meeting of 15–16 Jan. 1945, 16.
103 united states strategic Bombing survey, morale Division, medical Branch report, The Effect of 
Bombing on Health and Medical Care in Germany (Washington, 30 Oct. 1945), 1, 5.
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such observations signalled to health planners caution in designing programmes 
that were ‘over-generous’.104 Public health measures had to be ‘adequate’ for the 
protection of troops and neighbouring countries, and nutrition teams had to 
ensure that food supplies did not exceed minimum levels.105 From autumn 1944 
onwards, British and American planners often overestimated the conditions they 
expected to encounter in Germany. They no longer contemplated that the German 
standard of living might actually have to be raised because of extensive destruction. 
As late as January 1945, Colonel Wilson was optimistic that ‘Germany has main-
tained a good status of public health, and more than likely, we are going to be able 
to accomplish the same thing . . . we must accomplish at least as much’.106 The inher-
ent contradiction between maintaining a basic standard of living at the same time 
as deindustrialization and demilitarization were in process only became fully appar-
ent after occupation began.107
Finally, a fourth premise in occupation plans stemmed from conclusions about 
the German mentality and the expectation that the Germans would attempt to 
trick or corrupt Allied officers by spreading pro-Nazi, pro-German, militarist 
propaganda. Perhaps the most important result was the ‘non-fraternization’ rule, 
which prohibited Allied troops stationed in Germany from maintaining any per-
sonal contacts with the German population. By early 1944, instructions informed 
troops not just about the ‘mission of the occupying forces’, but also about the 
‘characteristics of the German people, their probable attitude towards the forces of 
occupation and the type of propaganda which they are liable to employ’.108 A formal 
non-fraternization rule was the logical next step. The ‘avoidance of mingling with 
Germans upon terms of friendliness, familiarity or intimacy, whether individually 
or in groups, in official or unofficial dealings’109 was to guard occupation officers 
against Germans’ attempts at persuading them of their innocence, and to avoid 
situations where they would be overly exposed to the German plight. Even shaking 
hands with the Germans was prohibited, since, as one instruction explained, to 
‘ “shake hands on it” is commonly accepted as “burying the hatchet”. Broadly 
speaking, in civilized communities it signifies a token of friendship. The Germans 
will endeavor to shake hands on every possible occasion in an attempt to curry 
favor. Drinking with Germans, visiting German homes, playing games or taking 
part in sports with Germans and accepting or giving gifts, is not permitted. German 
women will be treated with courtesy but behavior towards them is to be strictly 
104 BAK, Z45F 3/169-2/159, Colonel scheele at the public health meeting of 15–16 Jan. 1945, 13.
105 BAK, Z45F 3/169-2/159, Colonel scheele, 13.
106 BAK, Z45F 3/169-2/159, Colonel Wilson, 9.
107 This was acknowledged by the German standard of living Board, set up in summer 1945 to 
recommend a standard of living for the German peacetime economy. A sept. 1945 report recognized 
that it would take at least four years of German recovery to achieve the standard of living of its neigh-
bouring countries. see BAK, Z45F 44-45/6/9, ‘draft of a preliminary report to the German standard 
of living Board by the working staff of the Board on A minimum German standard of living in 
relation to Industrial Disarmament and reparations’, 20 sept. 1945.
108 BAK, Z45F 3/153-3/15, ‘Policy on relations between Allied occupying forces and inhabitants 
of Germany’, 12 sept. 1944.
109 BAK, Z45F 3/153-3/15, ‘Policy on relations between Allied occupying forces and inhabitants 
of Germany’, 12 sept. 1944.
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governed by the policy of non-fraternisation.’110 Those who had studied the 
German national mentality saw non-fraternization as an important protective 
mechanism, but in practice it was to create problems, particularly for the Allied 
health teams, who had not only to work closely with their German colleagues, but 
also to tackle the products of their fellow occupiers’ violations of the ban, namely 
venereal diseases and unwanted pregnancies.
tHE OtHEr tWO? sOVIEt AND FrENCH APPrOACHEs 
tO tHE OCCuPAtION OF GErmANy
Preparations for the Allied occupation of Germany in Washington and london 
created the blueprints not just for the British and American zones but for the entire 
occupation of Germany. They bound the other two occupiers, the soviet union 
and France, to priorities they did not always share and arrangements they did not 
always support. Both soviet and French attempts to develop plans of their own 
were hampered by internal disagreements over aims, a lack of resources, and, most 
acutely for the French, a lack of time.
(i) The Soviet Union
soviet plans built upon the main principles for the treatment of Germany agreed 
at the wartime conferences: after defeat, Germany would be demilitarized, its 
industries decartelized, and its institutions and public life denazified. However, the 
Big Three’s public accord disguised discord behind the scenes. soviet policy priori-
tized military and economic security in a manner frequently distrusted or openly 
rejected by the British and Americans, particularly in matters of reparations. In 
view of the devastation of large parts of the soviet union, the soviet government 
was determined to demand the payment of a huge reparations bill. In a proposal 
presented at the yalta conference, stalin called for German reparations of $20 bil-
lion, of which $10 billion were to go directly to the soviet union.111 They were to 
come from a variety of different sources: dismantled German industrial installa-
tions, direct deliveries of goods from current German production, and German 
manpower. The morgenthau Plan, although not implemented, marked a shift 
within Anglo-American thinking to a more tough-minded handling of Germany. 
By contrast, there were clear economic reasons why the soviet union supported 
proposals to deindustrialize Germany. later, at the Nuremberg trials, roman 
Andreyevich rudenko, chief prosecutor of the soviet union, presented staggering 
figures of damage, loss, and destruction as part of the soviet union’s case against 
110 BAK, Z45F 44-45/4/6, ‘Policy and instructions on relations with the Germans of Allied Armed 
Forces and Control Commission staffs in the initial period of control’, 21 Dec. 1944.
111 On soviet reparation demands, see e.g. maisky to molotov, ‘Wie hoch sollen die reparations-
forderungen der udssr sein?’, 15 Dec. 1944, in Jochen laufer and Georgii Kynin (eds.), Die UdSSR 
und die deutsche Frage 1941–1948: Dokumente aus dem Archiv für Außenpolitik der Russischen Födera-
tion, i (Berlin, 2004), 502–7.
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the Third reich. He maintained that 679 billion rubles of damage had been 
caused as a result of the war, and 1,710 towns and 70,000 villages had been com-
pletely or partially destroyed, as well as 6 million bridges, 65,000 kilometres of 
railway tracks, over 100,000 farms, and 40,000 hospitals. At least 25 million 
people had been made homeless and 88 million soviet citizens lived under occu-
pation. His estimates went down to the last heads of livestock: 7 million horses, 
17 million cattle, 20 million pigs, 27 million sheep, 110 million poultry had been 
killed or stolen.112
By the time rudenko presented this evidence, soviet planners, economists, and 
politicians had been compiling estimates of damage and calculations on repara-
tions claims for several years. One of them was the Hungarian-born economist and 
communist theoretician Eugen Varga—director of the soviet Academy of sciences’ 
Institute for International Economics and Policy, and secretary of its Department 
of Economic science and Jurisprudence, and, in the words of one West German 
scholar, ‘one of the most significant and influential economists in the soviet 
union’.113 Throughout the war, Varga prepared papers and reports on subjects such 
as the economic consequences of total mobilization in Germany, the Third reich’s 
exploitation of the countries it occupied, and the post-war legacy of Hitler’s new 
order in Europe.114 soviet reparations policy began to take shape in a series of pub-
lications and memoranda Varga composed for the People’s Commissariat for For-
eign Affairs. In early 1942, he presented the basic premises of soviet policy in a 
paper entitled ‘lessons from the First World War’.115
In a september 1943 report addressed to maxim litvinov, the former soviet 
ambassador to the united states and then deputy foreign minister, Varga examined 
the economic consequences of divisions of German territory into three, four, or 
seven separate states. Each scheme, he concluded, would lead to the substantial 
weakening of Germany’s—and particularly Prussia’s—military and economic 
112 speech of the Chief Prosecutor of the soviet union, lt. General r. A. rudenko at the Nurem-
berg trials, Feb. 1946, in Vechernyi Leningrad, 12 Feb. 1946, No. 37, 4. rudenko was appointed as 
chief prosecutor in Oct. 1945, see Vyvhinskij to Gen. A. A. sobolev, 6 Oct. 1945, in laufer and Kynin 
(eds.), Die UdSSR und die deutsche Frage 1941–1948, 141–2. On the soviet participation at the 
Nuremberg trials, see Francine Hirsch, ‘The soviets at Nuremberg: International law, Propaganda 
and the making of the Postwar Order’, American Historical Review (June 2008), 701–30.
113 On Varga’s own writings, see Peter Knirsch, Eugen Varga (Berlin, 1961). laszlo tikos, ‘E.Vargas 
tätigkeit als Wirtschaftsanalytiker und Publizist in der ungarischen sozialdemokratie, in der 
Komintern, in der Akademie der Wissenschaften der udssr’, Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Osteuropafor-
schung, Forschungsberichte und Untersuchungen zur Zeitgeschichte, 20 (tübingen, 1965). Gerhard 
Duda, Jeno Varga und die Geschichte des Instituts für Weltwirtschaft und Weltpolitik in Moskau, 1931–
1970 (Berlin, 1994). Eugen Varga: Hervorragender Funktionär der internationalen Arbeiterbewegung 
und bedeutender marxistisch-leninistischer Wissenschaftler (leipzig, 1980).
114 e.g. Eugen Varga, ‘The results of total mobilisation in Germany’ (translation of an article in 
Pravda for 22 July 1943) (moscow, 1943) and other articles in Knirsch, Eugen Varga, 88–90. Varga 
also wrote an article on the historical roots of the peculiarities of German imperialism, published 
initially in Bolshevik, 11/12 (1943), 39–52; a German translation was published as Die historischen 
Wurzeln der Besonderheiten des deutschen Imperialismus (Berlin, 1946).
115 e.g. ‘Beschluß dess Politbüros des ZK der VKP(b)’, 28 Jan. 1942; G. saksin, ‘Vorläufige mater-
ialien zum Bericht des sekretariats der Kommission über die tätigkeit der Kommission zur Vorberei-
tung diplomatischer materialien für das Jahr 1942’, 2 Feb. 1943, both in laufer and Kynin (eds.), Die 
UdSSR und die deutsche Frage 1941–1948, 41–2, 89–94, 590.
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potential.116 His conclusion was that reparations programmes would have to be 
comprised of German industrial installations, to be rebuilt in the Allied nations by 
German labourers. In addition, the soviet union should receive income from cur-
rent industrial production and raw materials. Where morgenthau had concluded 
that German industry would have to be dismantled not simply to prevent another 
war but also because of justice and pedagogy, Varga and other soviet economists 
saw reparations as a means for rebuilding the economies of Germany’s former vic-
tims, above all that of the ussr. This was a crucial difference.117 Apart from mater-
ial reparations, soviet planners also saw the occupation as a means to acquire 
German military technology and scientific knowledge for application at home. It 
was clear from the beginning that German resources were to provide for the main-
tenance and upkeep of the soviet troops on German soil.
These pillars of the soviet union’s agenda—security and soviet economic 
 recovery—were explicit enough, as was the fact that public health among the 
Germans did not rank highly (or, indeed, at all) in this project. But matters 
were complicated by the sheer variety of politicians and government institu-
tions which took an interest in Germany. Just days after the German invasion 
of the soviet union in June 1941, the chief of the red Army’s Political Admin-
istration instructed the newly created soviet Bureau for military Propaganda to 
begin preparations for the aftermath of the war. The bureau was staffed with 
renowned individuals such as the former secretary of the Communist Interna-
tional, Dimitry manuilsky; the deputy people’s commissar for foreign affairs 
(under Vyacheslav m. molotov), solomon lozovksky; the head of the People’s 
Commissariat for Foreign Affairs’ press department and from 1943 director of 
the soviet news agency tass, Nikolai Grigoryevich Palgunov; and Eugen 
Varga.118 From 1941, and with renewed vigour after autumn 1943, the bureau 
examined various problems of the post-war occupation, for example by study-
ing the British and American occupation of sicily.119 In parallel, a number of 
technical departments of the soviet Communist Party’s Central Committee 
worked on similar questions, also directed by the red Army’s Political Admin-
istration. Individual ministries of the soviet government also set up their own 
116 E. Varga to m. litvinov, ‘sonderbericht: Varianten der Aufgliederung Deutschlands und deren 
wirtschaftliche und militärische Auswirkungen’, 27 sept. 1943, in laufer and Kynin (eds.), Die UdSSR 
und die deutsche Frage 1941–1948, 159–69.
117 see also Gromyko’s account of a meeting with morgenthau, where morgenthau apparently 
stated that the united states had no need for German reparations and would not ask for any. Gromyko 
to molotov, 13 Nov. 1944, in laufer and Kynin (eds.), Die UdSSR und die deutsche Frage 1941–1948, 
496–501, esp. 500.
118 On lozovsky and his execution during the ‘Night of the murdered Poets’ in Aug. 1952, see e.g. 
Joshua rubenstein and Vladimir P. Naumov, Stalin’s Secret Pogrom: The Inquisition of the Jewish Anti-
Fascist Committee (New Haven, 2001). For a contemporary pen portrait of Palgunov, see Henry C. 
Cassidy, Moscow Dateline, 1941–1943 (Boston, 1943). Also see martin Ebon, The Soviet Propaganda 
Machine (New york, 1987), 172, 179.
119 Jeanette michelmann, Aktivisten der ersten Stunde: Die Antifa in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone 
(Cologne, 2002), 57. michael Iwanowitsch Burzew, Einsichten (Berlin, 1985), 35 ff. Jan Foitzik, 
Sowjetische Militätadministration in Deutschland (SMAD), 1945–1949: Struktur und Funktion (Berlin, 
1999), 35 ff.
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committees and planning staffs. During 1943, the People’s  Commissariat for 
Foreign Affairs created three specialist commissions on the problem of post-war 
Germany: one, headed by maxim litvinov, worked on ‘war aims’ and prepared 
for the peace settlement and post-war order; a second one, headed by marshall 
Clement Voroshilov, former commander of the north-western front, prepared 
for the terms of the armistice and German capitulation; while a third commis-
sion, headed by Ivan maisky, the former soviet ambassador to Great Britain, 
prepared for matters of reparations and the dismantling of German industry. 
together, these various bodies and commissions provided the means for politi-
cians to begin to stake out their interests in the occupation of Germany. But 
there was little or no coordination between the ministries and the Bureau for 
military Propaganda, or between the different ministries themselves—and 
many of their preparations were not widely read or distributed beyond the cir-
cles of their authors.120 There was no coordinating authority able to mediate 
between them.
And for many future occupation problems there were simply no preparations or 
instructions whatsoever. That quickly became a subject of concern and complaints. 
In December 1943, Andrei s. smirnov, former soviet ambassador to Iran and then 
head of the Foreign ministry’s third European Department, warned that the 
absence of clear instructions for the conduct of the soviet military in the occupied 
territories could lead to catastrophic mistakes and miscalculations. He  remembered 
from his time in Iran, he wrote, that the soviet army leadership had not been 
familiar with ‘local particularities, customs and conventions, state and administra-
tive structures, legal regulations, and so on’. The situation would be little better in 
Germany, Hungary, or romania. ‘We know only very little about the organisa-
tional structures of the administrative system in Germany’, he noted, nor about its 
‘tax system and agricultural levies arrangements, price policy, local supply of the 
population, structure of ministries, banks and other organisations’. It was neces-
sary to compile information dossiers and handbooks on Germany, produce maps, 
compile lists of local facilities and businesses, and familiarize officers with the local 
administrative organs, the Nazi Party, the German army, and other organizations. 
All this was urgent, he added, because the war was already moving into its last 
decisive phase. since the occupation of Germany involved extensive negotiations 
between the three occupying powers, soviet military leaders would have to come 
prepared for ‘complicated diplomatic discussions’ requiring detailed knowledge of 
conditions, and the Foreign ministry’s diplomatic apparatus had to be ready to 
assist the military authorities. He suggested that members of the People’s Commis-
sariat for Foreign Affairs who had worked in Germany in the past should now be 
recruited for occupation duties.121 Half a year later, smirnov complained again that 
guidelines for the selection and training of personnel for the occupation had still 
120 sergeij semjonow, Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow: Ein halbes Jahrhundert in diplomatischer Mission 
(Berlin, 1995). michelmann, Aktivisten der ersten Stunde, 57.
121 A. smirnov to V. G. Dekanozov (Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs), 31 Dec. 
1943, in laufer and Kynin (eds.), Die UdSSR und die deutsche Frage 1941–1948, 241–4, at 243.
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not been produced.122 By autumn 1944 the training of soviet specialists for the 
occupation had evidently still not begun.123
to make up for these deficiencies, soviet analysts studied British and American 
press reports, transcripts of speeches, memoranda, briefings, policy instructions, 
and reported conversations with Western leaders—both to track approaches hostile 
to, or in contradiction with, those of the soviet union, and to identify practices and 
policies which could be copied.124 smirnov thought an analysis of previous British 
and American military occupations could assist soviet preparations. ‘I have to say 
that we have no experiences in this area’, he noted, ‘whereas the [Western] Allies 
already possess a well-rehearsed system, with roots going back to the previous war. 
They have people who carried out the military administration of enemy territories 
after the defeat of Germany in 1918.’125 When the EAC suggested that the soviet 
government dispatch ‘45 to 55’ soviet officers to london to take part in joint Allied 
preparations, soviet officials saw this primarily as an opportunity for their personnel 
to study and familiarize themselves with Anglo-American methods, systems of 
training, and concrete policies.126 some soviet instructions therefore drew explicitly 
on Anglo-American documents and duplicated their premises. When the Americans 
agreed in late march 1945 to give their military government handbooks to the 
soviet authorities,127 a number of sHAEF guidelines found their way into soviet 
instructions to their troops. Beria’s recommendations in April 1945 for the organi-
zation of a military administration for civilian affairs essentially restated sHAEF’s 
instructions to use existing local German administrations for matters of police, law, 
finance and tax, and other local problems such as public health.128
The soviet readiness to copy Anglo-American approaches meant that the 
premises underlying future public health work also extended to the soviet zone. At 
the same time, however, gaps and shortcomings in soviet plans were filled by very 
different preparations, namely by those of exiled German communists, whose 
plans for post-war Germany were conducted under the direction of Georgy 
 Dimitrov. Dimitrov had been secretary-general of the Comintern, and after its 
122 A. smirnov to V. G. Dekanozov, 5 July 1944 and 17 July 1944, both in laufer and Kynin (eds.), 
Die UdSSR und die deutsche Frage 1941–1948, 409–15, 417–18. In the latter he included a list of 
German-speaking soviet officers who should be appointed to prepare for the occupation.
123 A. Vysinskij to V. m. molotov, 29 Oct. 1944, and K. Voroshikov to stalin and molotov, 29 Novem-
ber 1944, both in laufer and Kynin (eds.), Die UdSSR und die deutsche Frage 1941–1948, 495, 501.
124 e.g. a pamphlet of the soviet Party’s information bureau from 1 may 1945 pointed out that 
there was a contradiction between the Americans’ tough peace declarations and Eisenhower’s plans for 
the distribution of food supplies in Germany. see laufer and Kynin (eds.), Die UdSSR und die deutsche 
Frage 1941–1948, 657. For examples on reviews of the Anglo-American press, see e.g. litvinov to 
V. m. molotov, ‘Die Behandlung Deutschlands und anderer Feindstaaten in Europa’, 9 Oct. 1943, in 
laufer and Kynin (eds.), Die UdSSR und die deutsche Frage 1941–1948, 194–214.
125 A. smirnov to V. G. Dekanozov, 31 Dec. 1943, in laufer and Kynin (eds.), Die UdSSR und die 
deutsche Frage 1941–1948.
126 see e.g. K. V. Novikov to Vyshinskij, 21 sept. 1944, and Voroshilov to stalin and molotov, 22 
september 1944, both repr. in laufer and Kynin (eds.), Die UdSSR und die deutsche Frage 1941–1948 
458, 459–60.
127 Frus, vol. iii. 1945 (1968), 443. ralf Possekel, ‘sowjetische speziallager in Deutschland’, in 
sergei mironenko et al. (eds.), Sowjetische Speziallager in Deutschland 1945 bis 1950 (Berlin, 1998), ii. 
54. michelmann, Aktivisten der ersten Stunde.
128 ralf Possekel, ‘sowjetische speziallager in Deutschland’, 54.
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 dissolution in 1943 became chief of the soviet Party’s Department of International 
Information (known as the ‘foreign department’). In both capacities, he coordi-
nated the work of foreign communists in moscow. In spring 1944, Dimitrov 
instructed the German communists in exile to prepare for vital questions of post-
war Germany, while his Comintern colleague Dmitry s. manuilsky took over the 
training of German POWs. By march 1945, the German communists had drawn 
up guidelines for future political work in Germany, using soviet information. 
These guidelines, sent by Dimitrov to molotov, proposed that German antifascists 
were to accompany the red Army and assist its progress through newly liberated 
areas by calling on German troops to surrender and urging the population to 
co operate. They were to assist soviet officers in the administration of urgent work 
such as the clearing of rubble, epidemic control, the revival of radio and newspa-
pers, and the appointment of local officials.
(ii) France
In France, disagreements about different strategies centred around the different 
weight that should be given to short-term economic exploitation and military 
toughness on the one hand, and longer-term efforts to reform and reintegrate 
 Germany into the world, on the other. Popular French analyses of the German 
menace concluded that Nazism had been able to rise due to the inadequate post-
war settlement of 1919, which had not gone far enough or imposed sufficiently 
serious measures on Germany; in subsequent years the original demands for repar-
ations had been dropped completely, and the German war-spirit allowed to grow 
unimpeded. The second World War was evidence not only of chronic German 
aggression, but also of British and American failure to contain it. Among France’s 
politicians those who insisted on permanent German disarmament, and those who 
emphasized reform and reconciliation instead, could agree that the occupation 
provided a means to guarantee future French security and aid the reconstruction of 
France. These two priorities were often closely linked: both required a strong 
France, militarily and economically, and a weak Germany. A group of French 
advisers pointed out at a Chatham House study group meeting on post-war recon-
struction that ‘Europe would not be safe’ as long as ‘a country with a population of 
sixty million, vast industrial resources and an apparently permanent impulse to 
aggression remained in the centre of Europe’.129 Finding ways to render Germany 
incapable of fighting was central to any French plan for the economic rehabilita-
tion of Europe.130
But although they overlapped, the security focus and economic considerations 
soon produced diverging, even contradictory, approaches. French security 
demanded disarmament and the dismantling of installations, a division of the 
129 t. E. utley, ‘French Views’, 245.
130 Nehemiah robinson, ‘Problems of European reconstruction’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
60/1 (Nov. 1945), 1–55, at 32–3. robinson later became director of the World Jewish Congress’ 
Institute of Jewish Affairs. On robinson’s work, see Angelika timm, Jewish Claims against East 
 Germany: Moral Obligations and Pragmatic Policy (Budapest, 1997), 74.
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country into zones, and the decentralization of its political structures. But French 
economic interests required German industry to continue to produce raw materi-
als and goods, and the four zones to be treated as an economic unit. Initially, many 
insisted that security had to come first, but the economic rationale was strength-
ened when in early 1945 a number of authorities compiled estimates on French 
losses and minimum compensation levels. The French ministry of reconstruction 
and City Planning calculated in January 1945 that between 1,200,000 and 
1,500,000 buildings had been destroyed or damaged since the outbreak of the war 
(compared to 927,000 during the First World War).131 At a session of the French 
Consultative Assembly a few months later, experts estimated that the cost of clear-
ing the wreckage and rebuilding houses, industrial plants, and enterprises would 
be around 1,236 billion francs.132 In August 1945, a special French commission 
revised these estimates upwards, and calculated that the cost of war and occupation 
damage amounted to a staggering 1,832 billion francs.133 Another influential 
report, compiled by a member of the French Consultative Assembly’s Foreign 
Affairs Committee, P. O. lapie, estimated reconstruction costs at 2,500 billion 
francs, and some experts thought that the real costs would be closer to 3,000 
billion.134
Nor did it end there. some economic experts pointed out that France had 
propped up the German war economy for four years. Apart from physical destruc-
tion, financial burdens stemmed from the maintenance of armies in the field, 
demographic losses, forced exports and German requisitions, pillage, and looting. 
until 1944 France had supplied the German population with goods—partly 
funded through occupation charges (set in August 1940 at 20 million reichsmark 
a day), and partly paid for in occupation currency, which was, as one of the French 
zone’s historians, F. roy Willis, notes, ‘a worthless paper money whose ultimate 
backing fell on the French taxpayer’.135 Over 700,000 French workers had been 
sent to work in Germany.136 These figures led to widespread agreement that France 
had to seek reparations and compensation. From this priority came other conclu-
sions: after defeat the Germans would pay the costs of the Allied occupation, and 
the French zone’s economy would have to be developed so as to be of maximum 
benefit for French economic requirements. Precisely what would be of greatest use 
for French reconstruction (acquisition of German resources and dismantled instal-
lations, or continued German production) was not spelled out at this stage, which 
helped to obscure the contradiction between demands for the decentralization of 
131 French Press and Information service, report of 9 Jan. 1945, quoted in robinson, ‘Problems of 
European reconstruction’, 3.
132 Files of the French Press and Information service, session of the French Consultative Assembly 
on 3 march 1945, quoted in robinson, ‘Problems of European reconstruction’, 3.
133 report of the ministry, 1 Aug. 1945, quoted in robinson, ‘Problems of European reconstruc-
tion’, 3.
134 ‘Pour la Victoire’, report by P. O. lapie, 4 Aug. 1945, quoted in robinson, ‘Problems of Euro-
pean reconstruction’, 4.
135 F. roy Willis, France, Germany and the New Europe, 1945–1963 (stanford, 1965), 4–5. see also 
Paul Farmer, Vichy: Political Dilemma (New york, 1955), 111–12.
136 Willis, France, Germany and the New Europe, 4.
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German political life and the centralization of its economy.137 Public health work 
would be caught directly in between.
During the planning stage, France, more than any other occupying power, suf-
fered under time pressure and lack of representation at key moments of Allied 
decision-making. lucius Clay, Eisenhower’s deputy military governor, later thought 
that ‘the German problem as it then stood, originated in international confer-
ence’,138 but the French had been absent at all the major wartime conferences. They 
were not present at the meeting of roosevelt and Churchill in August 1941, which 
resulted in the Atlantic Charter. They had not participated in discussions at 
moscow in autumn 1943, which was, according to William strang, ‘perhaps the 
most fruitful of all the international ministerial conferences held during the war’.139 
As a result, France also missed the early days of the EAC. It was not represented at 
the teheran conference in winter 1943, which planned the second front, or at the 
meeting of roosevelt and Churchill in Quebec in september 1944. France did not 
take part in the yalta conference in February 1945, which finalized many details on 
the future occupation, including the fact of a French zone. By the time France 
entered proceedings, all the important decisions had already been made. And in 
spite of de Gaulle’s proclamation that it would be ‘a grave error’ to make decisions 
about Europe without involving France,140 France was not invited to the Potsdam 
conference in July 1945. This exclusion had lasting effects: not only was it ‘a bitter 
blow to French pride’, but it also produced a situation where a member of the 
ACC did not consider itself bound by Potsdam decisions and did not recognize 
the policy on which the Council was to operate.141 The ACC could only act by the 
unanimous consent of its four member delegations, and this quickly produced an 
unbridgeable rift between France and the others, as French leaders successfully 
vetoed the creation of central administrative agencies for Germany.142
Preparations for the occupation of Germany thus began much later in France 
than they did in Britain, the united states, and even the soviet union. When 
American and British planners first met to draft plans, the French were preoccu-
pied with their own affairs: following the French military defeat, the vote by the 
National Assembly, and the assumption of power by marshal Pétain in July 1940, 
France itself had become a divided and occupied country, formally partitioned 
into a northern zone, occupied by the Wehrmacht, and an unoccupied ‘free zone’ 
in the south. Although the Vichy government’s civil jurisdiction officially extended 
over both areas, in practice it proved difficult to assert its authority and maintain 
its sovereignty from the German occupiers, until in November 1942 even the 
southern zone was invaded.
137 On this contradiction, see rainer Hudemann, ‘Zentralismus und Dezentralisierung in der 
französischen Deutschland- und Besatzungspolitik, 1945–1947’, in Winfried Becker (ed.), Die Kapit-
ulation von 1945 und der Neubeginn in Deutschland (Cologne and Vienna, 1987), 181–209.
138 lucius Clay, Decision in Germany (london, 1950), 10.
139 William strang, Home and Abroad: An Autobiography (london, 1956), 74.
140 Charles de Gaulle, Discours et Messages: Pendant la guerre, juin 1940–janvier 1946 (Paris, 
1946), 484.
141 Balfour, ‘Four Power Control in Germany’, 39.
142 On the effects of the French veto, see e.g. murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, 371.
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The years between France’s fall in 1940 and its liberation in 1944 were not 
simply a problem of external aggression or foreign occupation. The Vichy 
regime drew upon considerable domestic support, and it represented, in some 
ways, the latest manifestation of long-standing internal French antagonisms. In 
his study of European fascist movements, the sociologist michael mann 
observed that by 1940 France, like Germany, had seen decades of struggle 
between democratic and authoritarian forces. ‘The main prewar protofascist 
theorists (maurras, Barrès, sorel) were French,’ mann points out, ‘and France 
had the largest interwar authoritarian parties of both right and left in the north-
west [of Europe] . . . Had the election due in 1940 been held (and in peacetime), 
the quasi-fascist PsF might have won over 100 parliamentary seats.’143 support 
for authoritarian or fascist movements was far from the only fault line dividing 
French society. Throughout the Vichy regime’s existence and for years after its 
demise, French citizens were fiercely divided between republicans and anti-
republicans, collaborators and resisters, members of the army and resistance 
fighters, aristocrats and class warriors, between the political right and the left, 
supporters and opponents of a managed economy, anti-religious forces and 
Catholics, Protestants, and Jews. The French political landscape reflected and 
enshrined these factions for decades to come, and gave rise to frequently clash-
ing priorities and conflicting demands for control over the occupation of 
Germany.
Only after June 1944, when the Germans were ousted and the Vichy govern-
ment was driven into exile, could France begin its ascent to the realms of Allied 
diplomacy, and eventually turn from an occupied into an occupying power.144 
 suddenly things were happening at great speed. Paris was liberated in August 1944. 
During the following weeks, as the Allied armies liberated much of French terri-
tory, de Gaulle built his provisional government and created or reformed the 
 ministries which would tackle, among many other issues, France’s military strategy 
and foreign policy. His stubborn insistence on France’s involvement in world affairs 
soon saw some major successes. until the autumn of 1944 French participation 
had not featured in Anglo-American plans for post-war Germany, but by Novem-
ber France had obtained both a seat on the EAC and a promise of a share in the 
occupation. Before the year was out, recruitment began for the first military 
143 michael mann, Fascists (Cambridge, 2004), 40. robert soucy, French Fascism: The Second Wave, 
1933–1939 (New Haven, 1995). On the debate about the importance of indigenous French fascism, 
see also Brian Jenkins (ed.), France in the Era of Fascism: Essays on the French Authoritarian Right 
(Oxford, 2005). Kevin Passmore, ‘The French Third republic: stalemate society or Cradle of Fas-
cism?’, French History, 7/4 (1993), 417–49.
144 In Aug. 1944 the Vichy government established a government in exile, the Commission gou-
vernementale française pour la défense des intérêts nationaux, based in sigmaringen (soon to be in the 
French zone of Germany), headed by Fernand de Brinon. This was dissolved on 22 Apr. 1945; most 
of its members were eventually sentenced by the new provisional government. Brinon was executed on 
15 Apr. 1945. Philippe Pétain (who had not gone on to sigmaringen) was sentenced to death for 
treason, but his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. see e.g. William l. shirer, The Collapse 
of the Third Republic: An Inquiry into the Fall of France in 1940 (New york, 1969). Henry rousso, 
Pétain et la fin de la collaboration: Sigmaringen 1944–1945 (Brussels, 1999).
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 government teams for France’s German zone,145 even before the territory to be 
occupied by France was formally agreed.
French participation in the military government of Germany only became a 
matter of fact in autumn 1944, when Eisenhower and sHAEF began to plan for 
French troops’ participation in the attack on Germany. Initially, French personnel 
were to participate in military government detachments under American and 
 British command. But by October 1944, sHAEF’s plan for military government 
operations built on the assumption that French forces would be responsible for 
military government in the areas occupied by them, and that their detachments 
would be under French command. This revision presented another victory for de 
Gaulle’s efforts to expand France’s role in the occupation. As one American histor-
ian put it, sHAEF’s G5 officers feared that ‘any proposal to deprive the French of 
the power to command would lead to violent reactions’.146 France was still not 
formally allocated its occupation zone until February 1945, just three months 
before the end of the war.
De Gaulle’s provisional government took its first concrete steps in occupation 
matters with the creation of the military mission for German Affairs (mission 
militaire pour les Affaires Allemandes, mmAA) in November 1944—an office 
directed by General Koetz, but directly responsible to de Gaulle, charged with both 
representing French interests on the Allied High Command and liaising between 
the different French ministries. These first preparations focused almost exclusively 
on personnel and recruitment. under Koelz’s leadership this office recruited offi-
cers for the French Administrative Corps for Germany (Corps d’Administration 
militaire Française en Allemagne, AmFA), and by the end of 1944 had put together 
the first contingents. AmFA’s frustrations about recruitment at a time of acute 
personnel shortages mirrored those encountered by the other occupiers. Because 
the ministries insisted on keeping qualified and competent staff in Paris, the mili-
tary administration soon filled up with lower-ranking officers and with old retired 
officials of questionable abilities or dubious political pasts.147
In the absence of clear French instructions, and with little time to prepare, the 
French military relied heavily on American and British preparations. In their train-
ing of staff, the French immediately asked sHAEF for assistance. The French 
school of military Government opened at the sorbonne in December 1944, where 
American and British officers, together with French academics such as Edmond 
Vermeil, taught short courses on German history, geography, politics, and psychol-
ogy, and occupation policies.148 Just like their colleagues at the CAts in the us, 
many of those who taught here later occupied military government posts in 
145 reinhard Grohnert, Die Entnazifizierung in Baden 1945–1949: Konzeptionen und Praxis der 
‘Epuration’ am Beispiel eines Landes der französischen Besatzungszone (stuttgart, 1991), 11–12. Also see 
Klaus-Dietmar Henke, ‘Aspekte französischer Besatzungspolitik in Deutschland nach dem Zweiten 
Weltkrieg’, in Festschrift für Helmut Krausnick zum 75. Geburtstag (munich, 1980), 169–91, at 178.
146 see Joseph r. starr, Denazification, Occupation and Control of Germany, March–July 1945 (1950; 
salisbury, 1977), 9.
147 Grohnert, Die Entnazifizierung in Baden, 11 ff.
148 Grohnert, Die Entnazifizierung in Baden, 12–13.
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 Baden-Baden, including Charles J.Furby, later general director of justice, and the 
radical politician Jean Filippi, who had been chief of the Financial Department 
under Pétain and became director general of economy and finance.149 By 30 
December 1944, 218 French officers had graduated from the school, and 27 
Americans and 13 British officers had taken part in their training.150 some French 
occupation personnel also attended courses on German language, history, culture, 
and economy at the Centre d’Études Germaniques in strasbourg.151
Throughout this time and well into the beginning of the occupation, instruc-
tions to French officers remained very sparse. One of the few guides available to 
French personnel was the sHAEF Handbook for Military Government in Germany, 
initially only in English, until a French translation was completed in December 
1944 and published in march 1945.152 Concrete French directives on general 
occupation policy only appeared months after French troops had already begun 
their occupation duties, when the Comité Interministériel des Affaires Allemandes 
et Autrichiennes (CIAAA) issued its first instructions to General Koenig in late 
July 1945, and even then French officers were bound by the priorities, inconsisten-
cies, and contradictions of the sHAEF manuals.
CONClusIONs
The moral fronts were clear as the British, French, soviet, and American troops 
made their way into Germany: it was in the interests of the peaceful and peace-
loving nations that the Nazi regime should be defeated, and that after defeat, an 
occupation by the victorious wartime partners would ensure the eradication of any 
lingering remnants of Nazism, whether ideological, economic, industrial, or struc-
tural. German military and industrial capacities would have to be restricted, and 
German society would have to be cleansed and forcibly steered towards a better, 
peaceful, ‘democratic’ path. Throughout the planning period, probable areas of 
conflict and potential blemishes on this moral certainty were kept to a minimum.
At first policy stemmed from an early default level of preparations, based upon 
the assumption that Germany was fundamentally like any other country about to 
be occupied; after the morgenthau debate a more considered ‘hard peace’ devel-
oped, based upon widely shared views of Germany and the Germans, but stopping 
149 Grohnert, Die Entnazifizierung in Baden. see portraits in Claude Albert moreau and robert 
Jouanneau Irriera, Présence Française en Allemagne: Essay de géographie cordiale de la Zone Française 
d’Occupation (Paris, 1949). On Filippi, see Del Vayo, ‘The People’s Front’, The Nation, 16 Nov. 1946.
150 starr, Denazification, 9.
151 Christiane Falbisaner-Weeda, ‘mémoires des officiers stagiaires au Centre d’Etudes German-
iques dans l’entre-deux-guerres’, Revue d’Allemagne, 34/3 (2002), 327–45.
152 A French translation was completed by Dec. 1944, and published in mar. 1945 as A.M.F.A. 
Mémento pour les Officiers de Détachements de Gouverment Militaire. Jérôme Vaillant, ‘Bedeutung und 
Ausmaß des französischen Einflusses auf die kulturelle Entwicklung im Nachkriegsdeutschland’, in 
Vaillant (ed.), Französische Kulturpolitik in Deutschland, 1945–1949: Berichte und Dokumente 
 (Konstanz, 1984), 11. Grohnert, Die Entnazifizierung in Baden, 13. Also see COl, AC 836, Enemy 
Branch, Foreign Office and ministry of Warfare, london, ‘Germany Basic Handbook’, Aug. 1944.
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short of the us treasury secretary’s recommendations. late in the day, the soviet 
and French authorities attempted to develop their own procedures, guided by their 
security and economic priorities.
As the Allied troops entered Germany, the public health problem raised a 
number of issues that were morally and politically not nearly clear-cut. The  problem 
of how epidemic work could proceed within a population under foreign occupa-
tion, with whose resources and under whose control, was not adequately solved. 
Other contradictions also remained. The notion that Allied supplies to Germany 
were to be strictly limited and that the overwhelming burden of work was to rest 
with existing authorities was accompanied by a conviction that German society, 
and its health service, should be thoroughly cleansed of Nazi influence and person-
nel. The inherent clash between the decision to assign the overall responsibility for 
epidemic work to German doctors, and to simultaneously restrict which Germans 
could then be allowed to carry out this work, was not paid the attention it would 
later require. more generally, Anglo-American planning staffs at this time made a 
number of assumptions which later proved unrealistic. Contrary to their expecta-
tions, there was no longer a functioning German administration; the occupation 
was not brief; and the principle of indirect rule, which had been so successful in 
the British Empire, was not easily implemented.
One assumption that was particularly detrimental to later public health pro-
grammes was the Allies’ overestimation of German conditions. many Anglo-
American proposals presented a positive picture of the conditions their officers 
were going to encounter in Germany. This had important implications. military 
government health departments were very small at the outset, since officers were 
there to supervise the German authorities and control them indirectly, not to carry 
out the work themselves. The idea that the German standard of living would have 
to be restricted rather than raised also contained important consequences for public 
health work. Amid fears that America and Britain were at risk if German industrial 
strength and military power were not reduced permanently, the German health 
service was identified as one element of the German war machinery. This overesti-
mation also symbolized the extent to which the American and British planners 
were convinced about the inherent efficiency and functionality of German health 
and medical organization. many of the medical officers we have encountered in 
this chapter believed that the German health administration was so efficient as to 
need no post-war changes beyond the removal of dangerous Nazi personnel and 
the annulment of explicitly fascist laws.
Both soviet and French preparations for the occupation took place not just in the 
shadow of Anglo-American authorities and priorities, but also in the light of their own 
security concerns and economic agendas. For both countries, the second World War 
began with German invasion, and for both this revived and entrenched much longer-
standing anxieties about the German threat. soviet and French thinking about their 
occupation of Germany was shaped by the all-important priorities that Germany had 
to be prevented from conducting another war against them, and that their own econ-
omies had to be rebuilt at Germany’s expense. to both, German public health only 
had marginal impact beyond their own security. Competing interests within each 
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country, and, for France, a serious shortage of time, meant that neither occupier 
arrived in Germany with a clear idea about public health operations beyond the 
immediate emergency stage, and both drew heavily on sHAEF preparations. 
Within sHAEF, the framework in which preparations for public health work were 
made, substantially limited the reach of Allied health work on German soil. Health 
schemes were designed to accompany and bolster Allied military operations. The 
extent of destruction and chaos in Germany, the enormous population upheavals, 
the severe supply shortages, and the absence of any central German organization to 
be able to take charge—none of this had been foreseen by the Allied health 
 planners. An overestimation of the Germans’ standard of living and an underesti-
mation of the Allied public health task in Germany went hand in hand.
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3
‘Can we distinguish the sheep from the 
wolves?’:1 Émigrés, Allies, and the 
Reconstruction of Germany
Around half a million people fled Germany and Austria in the years after the 
National Socialists took power and spent the next decade or longer in exile in a 
number of countries.2 This chapter looks at a minority among them: the German 
émigrés who wanted to return to Germany after the war. It juxtaposes their ideas 
about the reconstruction of the defeated country with the ways in which the Allied 
governments thought about and dealt with them. Their relationship is crucial to 
understanding what happened in the occupation zones after 1945, and in no field 
was this so visible as in medicine and public health.
The chapter seeks to remedy a long-standing omission. The study of emigration 
and exile is by now a well-established academic field, and the German-speaking 
emigration after 1933 has received more attention than any other, not least by 
historians of science and medicine.3 However, the return of émigrés after 1945 
has not featured in this literature. Only in recent decades have historians begun 
to examine the phenomenon at all systematically, and have coined the term 
‘re-emigration’ or ‘remigration’.4 These studies have identified psychological  factors 
which shaped individuals’ experiences of return, and argued that it was primarily 
the individual personalities and inclinations of the returning émigrés that were the 
1 TNA, FO 371/46835, D. Carter (Trading with the Enemy Department) to J. M. Troutbeck 
(German Department), 24 Aug. 1945.
2 Michael F. Scholz, Skandinavische Erfahrungen erwünscht? Nachexil and Remigration, Die ehemaligen 
KPD Emigraten in Skandinavien und ihr weiteres Schicksal in der SBZ/DDR (Stuttgart, 2000).
3 Work on émigré physicians includes Mitchell G. Ash and Alfons Söllner (eds.), Forced Migration 
and Scientific Change: Émigré German-Speaking Scientists and Scholars after 1933 (Cambridge, 1995). 
Gerhard Baader, ‘Politisch motivierte Emigration deutscher Ärzte’, Berichte der Wissenschaftsgeschichte, 
7/2 (1984), 67–84. Paul Weindling, ‘Frauen aus medizinischen Berufen als Flüchtlinge in Großbritann-
ien während der 1930er und 1940er Jahre’, in Ulrike Lindner and Merith Niehuss (eds.), Ärztinnen—
Patientinnen: Frauen im deutschen und britischen Gesundheitswesen des 20. Jahrhunderts (Cologne, 
2002), 111–30. Paul Weindling, ‘The Contribution of Central European Jews to Medical Science and 
Practice in Britain, 1930–1960’, in Werner E. Mosse (ed.), Second Chance: 2 Centuries of German-
speaking Jews in the United Kingdom (Tübingen, 1991), 243–54. Kathleen M. Pearle, Preventive 
 Medicine: The Refugee Physician and the New York Medical Community, 1933–1945 (Bremen, 1981).
4 See e.g. Scholz, Skandinavische Erfahrungen erwünscht? Marita Krauss, Heimkehr in ein fremdes 
Land: Geschichte der Remigration nach 1945 (Munich, 2001). Karin Hartewig, Zurückgekehrt: Die 
 Geschichte der jüdischen Kommunisten in der DDR (Cologne, 2000). Laura Fermi, Illustrious Immigrants: 
The Intellectual Migration from Europe, 1930–1941 (Chicago, 1968).
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most significant determinants of their post-exile lives.5 This chapter, by contrast, 
tries to understand the structural constraints within which émigrés acted, and the 
extent to which their choices about their return to Germany were confined or 
encouraged by the Allies.
Who wanted to return voluntarily to a defeated, bombed-out country under 
Allied control? Numbers are difficult to estimate, but it is clear that only a fraction 
of émigrés expressed an interest in returning permanently to Germany after the 
war. It was particularly those who had left because of political persecution under 
the Nazi regime, who were most likely to go back: around half of the 30,000 
German political émigrés eventually returned to Germany.6 The Jewish-Italian 
writer and political activist Laura Fermi, who emigrated to the US with her Nobel 
Prize-winning husband, Enrico Fermi, wrote a study of the intellectual migration 
from Europe. The earliest group of ‘returnees’, she wrote, consisted of ‘statesmen, 
political leaders, and others who hoped to assist in the reconstruction of their 
countries’. She observed that they were in the minority, and even many of those 
formerly in the political limelight now preferred to ‘remain quietly’.7 This reluc-
tance to return characterized large sections of the émigré communities all over the 
world, but applied particularly to those of German origin. If half of political exiles 
returned to Germany, that rate was significantly lower among those who had left 
because of racial or religious persecution; only around 5 per cent returned.8 Some 
professions were more likely to consider a return, but doctors did not feature 
prominently in the move back. The historian Hans-Peter Kröner estimated that 
between 9,000 and 10,000 German-speaking émigrés had worked in the medical 
professions, and only around 5 per cent went back after the war.9
Many of those who returned to Germany were motivated by an absence of 
opportunities for medical practice in their countries of exile. Others, however, 
were driven by their desire to take an active part in the reconstruction of Germany 
and its public health system, and it is those that this chapter examines. It contrasts 
the different occupiers’ responses to their requests to assist in the rebuilding of 
Germany: British and American authorities frequently rejected cooperation with 
these émigrés, usually regardless of their political orientations; the Soviet govern-
ment liaised with a set of politically useful Germans in Soviet exile who worked 
under Moscow’s direction. The French authorities were between these two 
approaches: although they distrusted and rejected many of the émigrés’ claims, 
they were prepared to work with individuals and groups who supported their aims. 
5 Krauss, Heimkehr in ein fremdes Land, 11.
6 Krauss, Heimkehr in ein fremdes Land, 11. Also see Werner Röder, ‘Die politische Emigration’, in 
Claus Dieter Krohn et al. (eds.), Handbuch der deutsch-sprachigen Emigration, 1933–1945 (Darmstadt, 
1998), 16, 23. Krohn estimates that 60 per cent of political émigrés returned, see pp. 1 and 158.
7 Fermi, Illustrious Immigrants, 385–6.
8 See Krauss, Heimkehr in ein fremdes Land.
9 Hans-Peter Kröner, ‘Die Emigration deutschsprachiger Mediziner im Nationalsozialismus’, 
Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte, 12 (1989); Hans-Peter Kröner, ‘Medizin’ in Krohn et al. (eds.), 
Handbuch der deutsch-sprachigen Emigration, 783, 789.
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All four occupiers’ attitudes to collaboration with exiles were shaped by their diag-
nosis of the German problem.
ÉMIGRÉ ORGANIz ATIONS: THE ‘FREE 
GERMANy ’ MOvEMENT ’
A complex network of émigré groups and organizations developed in countries 
across the world between 1933 and 1945. Most political shades and convictions 
were represented, and there were also many non-political groups: cultural and self-
help associations. These organizations were the forum where many exiles examined 
and debated the possibilities of a regenerated and reconstructed Germany and 
prepared programmes for the future, some of which dealt specifically with a public 
health system. A useful example of émigrés’ activities, and the occupiers’ responses 
to them, is the various branches of the so-called ‘Free Germany movement’, a net-
work of communist-run groups.
The Free Germany movement was a series of multi-party associations that devel-
oped in many of the prominent countries of exile, including the Soviet Union, 
France, Mexico, the United States, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and Sweden. 
Most of these groups were organized and directed by communists, but they also 
contained various socialist, liberal, and even conservative émigrés. Following the 
1935 Comintern congress and its new popular front strategy, communists had 
been attempting to build such multi-party alliances.
The initial template for groups in the movement came from the Free Germany 
National Committee (Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland, NKFD) in Moscow, 
made up of exiled German communists and ‘re-educated’ prisoners of war. It got 
off the ground after the German defeat at Stalingrad, through which large numbers 
of German soldiers entered Soviet captivity. Some were willing to renounce fas-
cism, and as such were seen as suitable material for communist re-education. In 
July 1943, thirteen communist émigrés and twenty-five POWs signed a manifesto, 
calling on the German population and the Wehrmacht to join the fight against 
Hitler, and supporting a democratic and socialist renewal of Germany.10 The sign-
ing of the NKFD’s manifesto was intended to initiate the formation of similar 
groups across the globe, but as Georgy Dimitrov, general secretary of the Com-
munist International, noted in his diary in August 1943, the creation of similar 
groups in Hungary, Romania, and Italy was considered but, ‘owing to unfavoura-
ble discussions in England and America regarding the German Free Germany 
committee’, never took place.11
10 There is a large historiography on the NKFD. For an overview see Hartmut Mehringer, ‘Deut-
sche Emigranten im Nationalkomitee “Freies Deutschland”  ’, in Krohn et al. (eds.), Handbuch der 
deutsch-sprachigen Emigration, 629–37.
11 Ivo Banac (ed.), The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov 1933–1949 (New Haven, 2003), 16 Aug. 1943, 
284. See also 24 May 1943, 276–7.
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The NKFD’s strategy was to encourage opposition to Hitler within Germany 
and the Wehrmacht through radio, newspapers, and leaflets, and to set up antifas-
cist schools in POW camps. From January 1944 onwards, members also worked 
with the Red Army, using loudspeakers or leaflets to call directly on German units 
to desert and surrender. Precisely what the Kremlin’s intentions were with the 
NKFD was much debated in London, Washington, and Paris. Some analysts 
watched with alarm what they feared was the beginning of a separate Soviet peace 
with Germany; others saw the NKFD as a merely a propaganda tool, which the 
other Allies would do well to imitate.12 According to Dimitrov, Stalin initially 
seemed to have envisaged a more far-reaching role for the group, including ‘[t]he 
struggle to save Germany from ruin, for restoring the democratic rights and 
freedoms of the German people, for the establishment of a parliamentary order, 
and so on’.13 But as the war wore on, the Soviet government lost interest in the 
committee, partly because the failed coup of July 1944 had ended hopes for a revo-
lution within Germany. Nonetheless, it closely monitored its activities, and, once 
the occupation of Germany was about to commence, drew upon the NKFD’s 
plans and preparations.
German émigrés in the NKFD were often also active in several different, over-
lapping institutions. Some worked in the German Communist Party’s (KPD) exile 
organization, others worked as instructors in German POW camps. Others were 
active in the Soviet Army or in the Seventh Department of the Political Adminis-
tration of the Army. A number were also involved in the Comintern, or, after its 
dissolution, in the Department of International Information of the Soviet Party’s 
Central Committee. These overlapping networks of both formal organizations and 
informal gatherings were an important characteristic of the world of the German 
exile. In Moscow, they helped to anchor some émigrés in Soviet institutions and 
connected them, directly or indirectly, to Soviet officials and authorities. One of 
the most prominent was Maxim zetkin, a German doctor who later became a 
leading authority of the Soviet zone’s health system.14 In the 1920s he had accom-
panied his mother, the well-known German communist leader Clara zetkin,15 to 
12 e.g. Memorandum by James Grafton Rogers (OSS Planning Group) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
‘Manifesto to the German People by the Moscow National Committee of Free Germany’, 6 Aug. 
1943; report from Lanning Macfarland (OSS Istanbul) to OSS Washington, ‘Free Germany Move-
ment under Anglo-American Auspices’, 3 Nov. 1943; report by OSS Research and Analysis Branch: 
‘Free Germany: An Experiment in Political Warfare’, 26 Nov. 1943; ‘Minutes of a Meeting of the OSS 
Planning Group: Propaganda Use of Free Germany Committees’, 4 May 1944; telegram from Allen 
W. Dulles (OSS Bern) to OSS Washington, ‘How should the United States react to the Russian Free 
German Committee’, 5 Feb. 1945; all printed in Jürgen Heideking and Christof Mauch (eds.), Ameri-
can Intelligence and the German Resistance to Hitler: A Documentary History (Boulder, Colo., 1996). 
Also see Heike Bungert, Das Nationalkomitee und der Westen: Die Reaktion der Westalliierten auf das 
NKFD und die Freien Deutschen Bewegungen 1943–1948 (Stuttgart, 1997).
13 Banac (ed.), Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 12 June 1943, 280.
14 Jentzsch estimated that 300 of 4,000 NKFD members in 1944 were doctors, see Jentzsch in 
Kurt Kühn (ed.), An der Seite der Arbeiterklasse: Beiträge zur Geschichte des Bündnisses der Deutschen 
Ar beiterklasse mit der medizinischen Intelligenz (Berlin, 1973), 157.
15 Clara zetkin had played a crucial role in the establishment of the Communist Party of Germany 
and the Comintern. She was a friend of Lenin, and married a Polish revolutionary, Maxim’s father.
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several Comintern congresses, and worked for a number of Comintern missions.16 
He qualified as a doctor in 1909 in Stuttgart. After working at a number of German 
clinics immediately after the First World War, he was invited to practise surgery in 
Moscow.17 For several years, he moved between Germany and the USSR, before 
emigrating in the late 1920s. He worked at prestigious Soviet medical institutes 
such as the First and Fourth Moscow City Hospitals and the surgical clinic of the 
Second Moscow Medical Institute. From 1936 to 1939, he served as a doctor in 
the International Brigades in Spain, and from 1942 to 1945 as a military surgeon 
in the Caucasus.18 Along with only a very small number of German-born émigrés, 
zetkin even joined the Soviet Communist Party.19
The leadership of the KPD in Moscow, particularly Walter Ulbricht and  Wilhelm 
Pieck, directed the work of the NKFD and its post-war plans. The KPD had been 
supervising the propaganda used for German soldiers in Soviet captivity, and had 
emphasized the need to train personnel to return to Germany. Pieck and Ulbricht, 
together with the NKFD, constructed plans for future appointments of individu-
als to specific jobs and functions, producing long cadre lists in the process.20 Apart 
from its work with the NKFD, the KPD leadership was active in the context of the 
Comintern-organized German commission which was to investigate policy for the 
post-war period.21 It also formed its own work commissions and task forces to 
prepare for German reconstruction.22 A number of émigrés assisted the Soviet 
commanders in dealing with civilian populations of the German regions overrun 
by the Red Army, and, finally, in April and May 1945, several groups of them 
returned to Germany.23
Although not officially sanctioned by the Soviet authorities or those of the host 
countries, the NKFD stimulated the foundation of similar groups elsewhere, and 
gave new direction to existing organizations. One of the largest Free German 
groups to be established after July 1943 operated in France, under the name of 
‘Free Germany Committee for the West’ (often referred to by its French name, 
Comité Allemagne Libre Pour l’Ouest, CALPO).24 Its president, an émigré com-
munist from the Saar, Otto Niebergall, later remembered that hearing about the 
16 BBAW, zetkin Nachlaß, ‘Abschrift vom Lebenslauf ’, 7 Mar, 1947; ‘Lebenslauf ’, 14 Jan. 1951; 
‘Reise im Auftrag der Komintern von Moskau nach vologda’, 13 Feb. 1922.
17 BAB, DQ1/1614, ‘Charakteristik der Präsidenten und Abteilungsleiter’, 2 Apr. 1946.
18 Helmut Müller-Enbergs et al. (eds.), Wer war wer in der DDR? (Bonn, 2001).
19 BBAB, zetkin Nachlaß, ‘Lebenslauf von 1946’, 22 Sept. 1946. Another example was Frida 
Rubiner.
20 ‘Besprechung Wilhelm Piecks mit Georgi Dimitroff, Handschriftliche Notizen von Wilhelm 
Pieck, 9 August 1944’, in Gerhard Keiderling (ed.), ‘Gruppe Ulbricht’ in Berlin, April bis Juni 1945: 
Von den Vorbereitungen im Sommer 1944 bis zur Wiedergründung der KPD im Juni 1945 (Berlin, 
1993), 118–24.
21 Banac (ed.), Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, Nov. 1942, 212.
22 BAB, Sgy12 files, also Wolfgang Leonhard, Das kurze Leben der DDR: Berichte und Kommentare 
aus vier Jahrzehnten (Stuttgart, 1990), 13–14.
23 See Ch. 7 for more details.
24 Gilbert Badia, in Eveline and yvan Bres, Un Maquis d’antifascistes allemands en France,  1942–1944 
(Montpellier, 1987), 10. Also see Bungert, Das Nationalkomitee und der Westen. Karlheinz Pech, An 
der Seite der Resistance: zum Kampf der Bewegung ‘Freies Deutschland’ für den Westen, 1943–1945 
(Berlin, 1974).
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establishment of the NKFD was of ‘enormous political significance’ for him and 
his fellow émigrés.25 Listening to the manifesto being read out on the radio, they 
copied, printed, and distributed it among German soldiers in France, and began to 
think about similar associations in France. An appeal to found CALPO was pub-
lished in the October issue of the émigré communist propaganda paper Volk und 
Vaterland, and its inaugural meeting took place in November 1943. In spite of 
Niebergall’s influence, communists formed a minority in this group, and social 
democrats (particularly from the Saar), former members of the zentrum Party and 
the Deutsches volkspartei (DvP), and German officers of the Wehrmacht were all 
well represented.26 The group became the centre of German popular front work in 
France (including Free German committees in Toulouse, Lyons, and Marseilles), 
Belgium, and  Luxembourg. It focused on encouraging Wehrmacht deserters, and 
published  several newspapers and pamphlets for this purpose.27
Members of CALPO also participated in several overlapping political institutions 
and networks in France. CALPO was supported by the French Communist Party 
(PCF), who had in autumn 1940 created a special branch of the Resistance dedicated 
to infiltrating the German fascist and vichy authorities—the Travail Allemand (TA, 
also known as Travail Anti-Allemand)—and had recruited German-speaking émigrés 
to work in this body. Even older was the Main d’Œuvre Immigrée (MOI), a group 
created by the PCF in 1924 as an umbrella organization for refugees living in France. 
Its German sub-branch was flooded with émigrés who came to France after 1933 and 
1935. Discussions between members of the KPD exile group, the PCF’s central com-
mittee, the TA, and the MOI pre-dated the creation of CALPO, and signalled the 
degree to which this body, like that in Moscow, was connected with certain French 
political institutions. Both the PCF and MOI recognized CALPO as a legitimate 
German resistance group. In April 1944, CALPO was also recognized as an official 
German branch of the resistance by the Conseil National de la Résistance (CNR, 
which existed from May 1943 as the official authority of the various Resistance groups 
in France), which meant that it could now join the Maquis in southern France.28
25 Otto Niebergall, ‘Der antifaschistische deutsche Widerstandskampf in Frankreich—seine 
 Leitung und Entwicklung’, in Dora Schaul (ed.), Résistance: Erinnerungen deutscher Antifaschisten 
(Frankfurt, 1973), 51.
26 Members included Karl Hoppe (SPD from Saar), Dr Wilhelm Leo (SPD), Wilhelm Tesch 
(DvP), Prof. Dr Heinrich W. Friedemann (zentrum), D. Kümmel (zentrum), R. Klein (trade union-
ist), Feldwebel Arno Müller (DNvP), Obermaat Hans Heisel (KPD), Karl Mössinger (SPD from 
Saar) and his wife Luise Schiffgens (SPD), Fritz Glauben (SPD from Saar), and Paul Hertzberg (SPD). 
See Werner Röder, International Biographical Dictionary of Central European Emigres/Biographisches 
Handbuch der Deutschsprachigen Emigration nach 1933 (Munich, 1983). Niebergall had long been 
involved in popular front groups such as the ‘Working committee for the preparation of a public front 
for the Saarland’ (Arbeitsausschuss zur vorbereitung einer volksfront für das Saargebiet) in 1937.
27 Initially Soldat im Westen, then Volk und Vaterland and Unser Vaterland. In Belgium and Luxem-
bourg it published Die Wahrheit. Also see Free German Movement in Great Britain, Free Germans in 
the French Maquis: The Story of the Committee ‘Free Germany’ in the West (London, 1945).
28 ‘Maquis’ (shrubland, underground) was used as a collective term for all units and groups of 
armed resistance fighters and partisans. According to Bungert the first written recognition dates from 
June 1944, after the CALPO representative for the southern zone met the CNR representative for the 
Toulouse region, see Bungert, Das Nationalkomitee und der Westen, 133. See also Henri Nogères, 
 Histoire de la Résistance (5 vols., Paris, 1967). Gerhard Leo, Frühzug nach Toulouse: Ein Deutscher in 
der französischen Résistance (Berlin, 1992).
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Apart from its propaganda work, CALPO’s military commission also trained 
military cadres for the resistance and a possible partisan war on German soil. The 
British and American authorities turned down its offer of collaboration, but the 
French Forces of the Interior (Forces Françaises de l’Intérieur, FFI—the unified and 
centralized army of the French armed resistance) supported it. Around 100 German 
émigrés fought with the FFI in the battle for Paris. In August 1944, CALPO was 
allowed to send its members into the German POW camps.29 And in early September 
1944, some CALPO delegates went to the western front and fought with the First 
Paris Regiment. It seems to have prepared fewer detailed studies for the post-war 
period than other Free German groups, probably as a result of its concentration on 
military and POW work. Only after the liberation of Paris in August 1944 did this 
become more important. Niebergall later recalled how the liberation changed the 
nature of CALPO’s work, not least because it received offices on the Boulevard 
Montmartre from the CNR and an official paper ration for its publications from 
the FFI.30 It now prepared plans to assist the management of territory under Allied 
control, and its war crimes department compiled a list of 1,366 German individuals 
suspected of having committed war crimes because of their leading positions in the 
Gestapo and Sicherheitsdienst.31 Although in late 1944 and early 1945 CALPO’s 
relationships with the French authorities cooled significantly, many former CALPO 
members returned to Germany, some of them to the French occupation zone.
The group in Britain—the ‘Free German Movement in Great Britain’ (Freie 
Deutsche Bewegung in Großbritannien)—also prepared plans for the reconstruc-
tion of post-war Germany.32 Its inaugural meeting took place in September 1943 in 
London, during which a twenty-three-member committee was elected (roughly half 
of whom were communists) and the manifesto was unveiled.33 In its London base, 
in a series of regional groups throughout Britain, and in a variety of ‘study groups’34 
it attempted to prepare plans for the immediate post-war period. One of the move-
ment’s leading members was the former KPD Reichstag deputy Wilhelm Koenen; 
another was the head of KPD Landesgruppe, Heinz Schmidt. But although com-
munists dominated here, the membership, like that of CALPO, was more complex 
than was the case in Moscow. The social democrats in London had so far always 
rejected communist proposals to put the popular front strategy into action. This 
time, while the SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands)  leadership again 
rejected collaboration, stating that the old animosities between KPD and SPD had 
29 Barbara vormeier, ‘Frankreich’, in Krohn et al. (eds.), Handbuch der deutsch-sprachigen 
Emigration.
30 Niebergall, ‘Der antifaschistische deutsche Widerstandskampf in Frankreich’.
31 vormeier, ‘Frankreich’, 242.
32 e.g. Werner Röder, Die deutschen sozialistischen Exilgruppen Großbritanniens (Hanover, 1969). 
Jürgen and Margarete Kuczynski, ‘Die “Freie deutsche Bewegung” in Grossbritannien’, Mitteilungs-
blatt der Arbeitsgemeinschaft ehemaliger Offiziere, 7 (1963), 4–6.
33 FO 371/39119, Count Potulicki (Secretary-General of the Inter-Allied Research Committee) to 
Mr Roberts (Foreign Office), ‘Activities of the Free German Movement in Britain’, London, May 
1944. On its views on the NKFD, see Siegbert Kahn, The National Committee ‘Free Germany’: Back-
ground, Tasks, Men (London, 1943).
34 e.g. Association of Anti-Nazi Doctors and Medical Workers, Study Group of German Children’s 
Nurses, Study Group of Anti-Nazi Social Workers.
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not been resolved,35 a significant proportion of SPD members nonetheless joined 
the organization, even without the support of their leadership. The group’s new 
chairman, Dr Karl Rawitzki, left the SPD as a result of their disagreements.36
Many of the ideas of the British group were similar to those of the NKFD and 
CALPO. Their manifesto pledged support of Allied policy on the defeat of 
 Germany and its future occupation. Their aim, the manifesto stated, was to bring 
about the speedy fall of Hitler and to contribute to the reconstruction of an inde-
pendent, healthy, and undivided Germany, purged of all remnants of Nazism and 
militarism.37 The group addressed the British government in countless appeals, 
memoranda, and letters. Like in Moscow and Paris, POW work was considered 
crucial, because ‘the largest reservoir of the forces for a democratic reconstruction 
of Germany is to be found among the German prisoners of war’.38 They were to be 
targeted through radio broadcasts, books, and other propaganda work.39 However, 
this work was not endorsed by the British government.
Another group inspired by the NKFD was the Council for a Democratic 
 Germany, which was founded in May 1944 in New york by a number of German 
émigré intellectuals and politicians from various political backgrounds.40 As a result 
of disputes very much like those in London, the right-wing of the SPD was not 
represented, but overall, the Council included a number of Catholics from a wing 
of the zentrum Party, socialists from a range of affiliations, communists, non-
partisan democrats, and a few Protestants. Although communists were much less 
represented here than in the British and French groups, accusations regarding its 
closeness to Moscow persisted.41 The Council supported Allied policy and the 
 earliest possible defeat of Germany, but at the same time also voiced concern that 
the ‘good, non-fascist’ Germany had not been given a proper voice. To counter 
this, it proclaimed, it was necessary to unify anti-Nazi forces abroad, and to identify 
representatives of a new Germany who could contribute to its reconstruction.
Although the New york Council welcomed the Soviet use of émigrés in  principle, 
it dismissed the Moscow Committee as lacking in independence. The council 
35 BL, 1884.b.25, ‘Open letter from the London representative of the German Social Democratic 
party Wilhelm Bander to Mr Kuczynski’ [Sept. 1943].
36 August Weber, ‘Der zusammenschluß der Hitlergegner’, in Freie Deutsche Bewegung, Ziele und 
Aufgaben (Feb. 1944). Also see Anthony Glees, Exile Politics during the Second World War: The German 
Social Democrats in Britain (Oxford, 1982).
37 e.g. see the correspondence of the Free Germans with the British Foreign office. FO 371/39119, 
‘Manifesto of the Free German Movement in Great Britain’, 5 June 1944; ‘Memorandum on pro-
posed activities of the Free German Movement in Great Britain for mobilising anti-Nazi refugees from 
Germany in support of the Second Front’, [June 1944]; ‘The Free Germans to the British People’, 7 
June 1944. FO 371/39120, ‘The Co-operation of the movement “Free Germany” in the re-building 
of democratic institutions in Germany’, 31 Oct. 1944.
38 FO 371/39120, ‘The Co-operation of the movement “Free Germany” in the re-building of 
democratic institutions in Germany’, 31 Oct. 1944.
39 FO 371/39120, ‘Draft of a 4 weeks’ broadcasting programme (of daily 15 minutes), and some 
additional programme suggestions’, 17 July 1944.
40 Ursula Langkau-Alex and Thomas Ruprecht (eds.), Was soll aus Deutschland werden? Der Council 
for a Democratic Germany in New York, 1944–1945: Aufsätze und Dokumente (Frankfurt, 1995). James 
K. Lyon, Bertolt Brecht in America (London, 1982).
41 FO 371/39119, report by J. Wheeler-Bennet on the Council for a Democratic Germany, 3 May 1944.
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argued that its most important role was to advise and influence the US administra-
tion’s preparations for a future occupation of Germany, and to provide informed 
and politically aware background briefings. Within the council, until its formal 
dissolution in June 1945, a number of specialist committees dealt with specific 
features of the new Germany. POW work was also considered essential here. Con-
vinced of the need to separate Nazi POWs from the other soldiers who could be 
re-educated—and dismayed by reports of the failure of American officials to con-
tain attacks on antifascist prisoners—the council urged the US War Department 
to cooperate. However, just as was the case in Britain, none of the council’s propos-
als were recognized or used by the American authorities, nor did they consider 
cooperation with other groups of German exiles.
In sum, here were four similar-minded sets of German émigrés in four different 
environments. Politically active doctors were represented in many Free German 
groups, including those not discussed here. (Kurt Winter, for example, was active 
in the Swedish group and Rudolf Neumann in Mexico—both men will appear 
again in later chapters since they worked for the health service in the Soviet zone). 
Each of those groups sought to cooperate with its host country’s authorities, and 
each attempted to participate in the future German reconstruction. A comparison 
of their results highlights crucial differences between the different Allies.
PL ANS FOR THE RECONSTRUCTION OF GERMANy
Many émigré groups and individuals never lost sight of what they perceived to be 
their function in the new Germany (see, for example, the cover page of the émigré 
paper Inside Nazi Germany, Fig. 3.1). Their work accelerated in early 1943, in 
direct response to the Casablanca conference and its call for an unconditional sur-
render. In émigré circles this announcement was greeted with relief, since it made 
the defeat of Germany only a matter of time. But it also posed a direct threat to 
their legitimacy as representatives of any future Germany. They had not been rec-
ognized by most Allied authorities as legitimate representatives of German inter-
ests, and they had not been officially included in the planning process. An internal 
German revolt, which might have justified their claims, had not happened. None-
theless, even without this official backing the plans developed in émigré circles 
looked at what ought to happen to Germany. Some focused on ways of toppling 
the Hitler regime from the inside. Many tried to explain the mistakes of the Weimar 
period, and made recommendations for a second post-war reconstruction. Many 
also concentrated on some of the immediate problems likely to arise in the after-
math of war, such as the huge population movements and expulsions of Germans 
from Eastern European countries, the management of German POWs, the 
 implementation of denazification procedures, and the issue of restitution.42 
42 On some Free German groups’ plans for restitution schemes, see e.g. Constantin Goschler, 
 Wiedergutmachung: Westdeutschland und die Verfolgten des Nationalsozialismus, 1945–1954 (Munich, 
1992), 30–8. Also see Constantin Goschler, Schuld und Schulden: Die Politik der Wiedergutmachung 
für NS-Verfolgte seit 1945 (Göttingen, 2005).
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Some plans looked specifically at the reconstruction of the German public health 
system, as the following two examples show.
The first comes from the Council for a Democratic Germany in New york. 
Among the various committees and study groups of the Council was a welfare 
Figure 3.1. ‘Germany is Not Hitler!’, Inside Nazi Germany, February 1940
This material is not covered by the Creative Commons licence terms that govern the reuse 
of this publication. For permission to reuse please contact the rights holder directly.
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committee (Fürsorgeausschuß ), which looked at questions ranging from the care 
of POWs in the United States to public health reforms in post-war Germany. Its 
president was the endocrinologist Felix Boenheim, a Jewish communist, who 
had formerly been a senior consultant for internal medicine at the Hufeland 
Hospital in Berlin.43 Käte Frankenthal (a former member of the Prussian Diet 
and Berlin City Council, and one of the main SPD health policy specialists) and 
Kurt Glaser (a dermatologist who had been a long-serving SPD city councillor) 
were also actively involved.44 In the autumn of 1944, Boenheim, Frankenthal, 
and Glaser composed a draft on medical and health policy issues.45 It began by 
stating that the total destruction of all remnants of Nazism and militarism was 
an obvious precondition for any democratic reconstruction. First measures 
would have to be directed towards the containment of epidemics, both among 
the military and the civilian populations, for which adequate provision of clean 
water, soup kitchens, basic food and medical supplies would be essential. It 
would also be crucial to develop centralized medical clinics in each region, 
equipped with the necessary apparatus and the full range of medical specialists. 
Destroyed hospital buildings would have to be rebuilt as soon as possible. Short-
ages in medical supplies would have to be contained in the first instance by using 
stocks in German military depots. The authors anticipated a shortage of doctors 
and trained medical personnel as the central problem. This could be overcome, 
they argued, through the reinstatement of those sacked after 1933 for racial or 
political reasons, particularly those  currently in exile or imprisonment. This 
point was made repeatedly, but also generated the greatest disagreements with 
the future occupiers.
In the spring of 1945, Glaser, Frankenthal, and Boenheim completed a more 
substantial memorandum on the reconstruction of the German health system.46 
Beginning with a detailed description of Nazi reforms and the likely state of the 
health service after the war, the authors listed measures which, they claimed, were 
not overly idealistic but explicitly ‘practical’ and ‘pragmatic’, and which built upon 
the flourishing native German public health traditions before 1933. Measures for 
the transitional post-war period mirrored those formulated earlier. It would be in 
the Allies’ interest, the authors argued, to maintain the health of the civilian popu-
lation, since epidemics would not stop outside the quarters of their own troops. 
There would be an immediate need for food, and released concentration camp 
victims and political prisoners were to be given higher rations than the population 
43 Thomas Michael Ruprecht, Felix Boenheim: Arzt, Politiker, Historiker: Eine Biographie, 
 (Hildesheim, 1992). Stephan Leibfried and Florian Tennstedt (eds.), Council for a Democratic Germany: 
Fürsorge-Ausschuss, Unter-Ausschuss für ein deutsches Gesundheitsprogramm (Bremen, 1981).
44 Kurt Glaser, Vom Reichsgesundheitsrat zum Bundesgesundheitsrat: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des 
deutschen Gesundheitswesens (Stuttgart, 1960). Bernhard Meyer, ‘Eine Medizinerin in der Politik: Die 
Ärztin Käte Frankenthal (1889–1976)’, Berliner Monatsschrift (1999), 67–72. Käte Frankenthal, Der 
dreifache Fluch: Jüdin, Intellektuelle, Sozialistin: Lebenserinnerungen einer Ärztin in Deutschland und im 
Exil (Frankfurt, 1981).
45 ‘Denkschrift für Sofort-Maßnahmen’, in Langkau-Alex and Ruprecht (eds.), Was soll aus 
 Deutschland werden?, 215–29.
46 ‘Aufbau eines demokratischen Gesundheitswesens in Deutschland’, in Langkau-Alex and 
Ruprecht (eds.), Was soll aus Deutschland werden?, 230–47.
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at large. Basic utilities such as gas, water, and electricity would have to be restored. 
Medical supply and services should be centralized into ‘treatment centres’.47
In the 1920s, all three authors had been active in the multi-party Association of 
Socialist Doctors, and their 1945 memorandum developed many of those older 
ideas. They acknowledged the Beveridge Report, the work of the US National 
Resources Planning Board, and the proposals of the American Public Health Asso-
ciation as important influences on their proposals, but in substance their recom-
mendations drew upon their interwar public health work in Germany. They urged 
the formulation of a centrally directed, integrated, and socially oriented health 
policy. Proposals included the creation of a central ministry of health and the 
replacement of the various insurance bodies by a single new institution, run by the 
members themselves. Both demands had featured frequently in the association’s 
work. They recommended that insurance bodies become much more involved 
with preventive medicine, just as had partly been the practice in 1920s Berlin. 
Other demands in this programme also rearticulated older concerns, such as a new 
kind of occupational medicine. The ‘treatment centres’ were to become the main 
components of the new health system, in which most important medical disci-
plines and specialities were to be represented and accessible. The programme also 
contained recommendations on how the medical profession was to be dealt with 
under Allied control. The authors unequivocally condemned Nazi medicine and 
argued that even in the face of the likely grave shortages of medical personnel in 
post-war Germany, the temptation to relax denazification efforts would have to be 
resisted. Doctors’ responsibility for the barbarous acts that had been committed 
could not be ignored, they insisted, and their programme demanded the strictest 
punishment and permanent controls, as well as a complete restructuring of the 
medical syllabus.
Similar plans were drawn up in other émigré quarters and outside the Free 
German groups. A second example is Dr Hugo Freund, who in October 1945 
approached the British Foreign Office with a proposal for the reconstruction of the 
German health service.48 Freund, a member of the SPD, had emigrated from 
 Germany to Palestine in 1933, and, he assured Philip Noel-Baker, certainly had 
enough experience with German public health: he had been in a leading position 
in the German state health administration.49 Although less detailed, his proposals 
mirrored the New york programme. Freund, too, argued that the necessary emergency 
measures would have to be accompanied by a strategy for a lasting reorientation of 
the public health system. Because the German population was likely to be at its 
physical and psychological limits a properly coordinated health policy was crucial 
47 ‘Aufbau eines demokratischen Gesundheitswesens in Deutschland’, 121.
48 FO 371/46885, Hugo Freund, ‘Plan for the reconstruction of the German Health Organisation’, 
26 Oct. 1945. Also see Hugo Freund, ‘Entwicklungstendenzen der Gesundheitspolitik’, in Lotto 
Lemke (ed.), Die Arbeiterwohlfahrt: 1952 Jahrbuch (Bonn, 1953). Hugo Freund, ‘Sozialistische 
Gesundheitspolitik’, Sozialistische Mitteilungen: News for German Socialists in England, 108 (Feb. 
1948), 7–8.
49 See exchange in FO 371/46885. He had also been an executive member of the Hygiene 
Museum in Dresden, see Sozialistische Mitteilungen der London-Vertretung der SPD, No. 104–5 
(Oct.–Nov. 1947).
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for the success of all other Allied measures. Moreover, lessons would have to be 
learnt from the interwar years. While the health system developed after the First 
World War contained a number of ‘progressive elements’, Freund argued, ‘in deci-
sive points it proved to be unsatisfactory and defective. The mistakes committed 
then must not be repeated once more.’ Failures included, above all, the lack of a 
central ministry of health, and the over-representation of physician’s interests 
 particularly with regard to the insurance funds, as a result of which ‘the great 
opportunity to develop a social physicianship was carelessly thrown away’ and the 
‘mercantile interest [had] gained the upper hand’. The ‘progressive parties and the 
unions [had been] insufficient[ly] advised in questions of health policy’50 but now, 
a uniform and centralized health policy could be developed, not least because ‘pro-
gressive German doctors’ in exile were more than willing to assist the Allies. Their 
first step should be the formation of a central health department, to oversee all 
further work. Strict denazification of the medical profession was crucial, and new 
doctors should be appointed from among those who had been active before 1933, 
doctors like himself. Communal and social medicine was to become a compulsory 
component of the medical syllabus, and all medical faculties ought to have chairs 
in this. Preventive medicine had to become the guiding principle in health admin-
istration, Freund argued.
These two programmes diverged from, even clashed with, Allied decisions on 
many issues.51 While Boenheim’s group and Hugo Freund argued for a centralized 
health organization, a major emphasis of Allied plans was one of decentralization, 
and the country’s division into zones had already been agreed. French policy-mak-
ers, in particular, stressed the importance of decentralization, more so than the 
British, Americans, or Soviets. Apart from these disagreements, however, both 
plans were essentially compatible with much of Allied occupation policy: they sup-
ported the Allied occupation in principle; they emphasized the need for extensive 
denazification of the medical profession; and they focused on some of the achieve-
ments of the public health system in 1920s Germany and wanted to redevelop 
these traditions. The proposals were compatible with the notion of indirect con-
trol, but they disagreed most with the occupiers’ intentions about the kinds of 
Germans to be appointed to the civilian authorities.
Two features are significant in these proposals. The first, which Chapter 4 will 
explore further, regards the émigrés’ perception of the significance of a number of 
German traditions, both medical and political, which they now tried to develop; 
the health policy debates of the 1920s in particular were to form a starting point 
for future work. But secondly and much more generally, they claimed to represent 
the better, and new, denazified Germany. Their appeals and memoranda, regardless 
of their political affiliations, read as tracts on why émigrés were best suited to lead 
the reconstruction efforts: they represented ‘the other Germany’, untainted by 
50 FO 371/46885.
51 Other examples include two articles by Rudolf Neumann from the Free German Committee in 
Mexico: Rudolf Neumann, ‘Die Ärzte im Neuaufbau’, Alemania Libre—Freies Deutschland Mexico, 12 
(Nov. 1944), 53. Rudolf Neumann, ‘zum Aufbau des deutschen Gesundheitswesens’, Alemania 
Libre—Freies Deutschland Mexico, 11 (Oct. 1945), 25–6.
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 fascism and Nazism, and they had sampled the ‘wealth of experience of democratic 
countries’.52 They were, they said, the only Germans with any political legitimacy 
and credibility. A memorandum by the Free League of Culture in Britain stated that 
help of ‘qualified and conscientious’ émigrés in the ‘rebuilding of German civilisa-
tion’ was vital.53 A later circular by the British Free German group argued that in the 
necessary purge of Nazis and Nazi sympathizers, the return of antifascist refugees 
would be crucial.54 The message was clear: it was exiled Germans, the good Germans 
scattered across the globe, who would be needed most once the war was over.
It was in this spirit that numerous émigré organizations and individuals con-
tacted the various Allied authorities to offer their services. As Niebergall put it: 
their work in France was done, and ‘Our place was now in Germany’.55 The Free 
German branches were particularly active organizers for the return of émigrés. In 
summer 1944, the British group sent questionnaires to register those who were 
willing to return after the war and carry out ‘important jobs’.56 In spring 1945, it 
announced in a press statement that it had ‘amongst its members lawyers, doctors, 
technicians and a considerable number of persons with wide administrative experi-
ence. They all have fine anti-Nazi records to their credit. Many of them are pre-
pared to go to Germany at once to assist in the administration.’57 In June 1945, 
Karl Rawitzki, the group’s chairman, presented the Foreign Office with a list of 
567 people who were willing to return at once. ‘All concerned are proven oppo-
nents of Nazism’, he wrote, and ‘many of them with a fine record of underground 
work, others have spent years in concentration camps. Most of them have been 
officers of democratic institutions and organisations. Some have years of practical 
experience behind them but there are also those whose lack of professional qualifi-
cations will amply be compensated for by organisational and political experience 
in the fight against Nazism.’ He thought that their repatriation would alleviate the 
‘scarcity of reliable anti-Nazi Germans in Germany itself ’.58
Wading through these letters and appeals, Foreign Office staff seemed grudg-
ingly impressed by their organizational efficiency and diligence. Commenting on 
Heinz Schmidt, secretary of the Free German movement in Britain, R. W. Selby 
from the German Section of the Foreign Office minuted that ‘[h]e has pestered us 
a good deal about the return of his refugees and he has the hide of a rhinoceros, but 
52 FO 371/46745, Free German League of Culture in the UK, ‘Memorandum on the Rebuilding 
of German Cultural Life’, undated [7–8 July 1945]. Of course, the existence of ‘the other Germany’ 
was fiercely debated, not least by émigrés themselves, see Thomas Mann, Deutsche Hörer: 55 Radio-
sendungen nach Deutschland (Stockhold, 1945), and Thomas Mann, ‘New year Address on the BBC’, 
30 Dec. 1945, in J. F. Grosser (ed.), Die große Kontroverse: ein Briefwechsel um Deutschland (Hamburg, 
1963), 79.
53 e.g. FO 371/46745, Free German League of Culture, Memorandum, [undated].
54 FO 371/46804, Memorandum, Aug. 1945.
55 Niebergall, ‘Der antifaschistische deutsche Widerstandskampf in Frankreich’, 69. CALPO’s last 
meeting took place in Aug. 1945.
56 FO 371/39120, ‘Fragebogen der Freien Deutschen Bewegung betr. Berufsbetätigung im Nach-
kriegsdeutschland’, Aug. 1944.
57 FO 371/46802, Press statement by the Free German movement in Great Britain, 30 Apr. 1945.
58 FO 371/46803, Memorandum and List on the Repatriation of Refugees from Germany, [undated].
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he has been extremely efficient’. Moreover, he thought, the ‘Free German Move-
ment’ had been ‘extremely efficient over this question [of repatriation], and the 
refugees who have applied to them in connexion with their repatriation to Germany 
will undoubtedly have an advantage in effect over refugees who have not’.59
Numerous individuals also offered their services. Hugo Freund, who sent a plan 
for a new German public health service, also applied to work in Germany. Freund 
felt, he said, ‘the obligation of submitting my services’ and considered himself ‘the 
more justified as I have been a member of the Social Democracy (since 1912) and 
the trade unions in Germany. I am in touch with the London office of the SPD . . . 
My friends of the SPD are able to give information about my personality and 
political history.’60 Other offers included those from three German doctors, Carl 
Coutelle, Herbert Baer, and Rolf Becker, who were working as health officers with 
the Red Cross and the US army at the war fronts in Burma and India, and who had 
run training schools for lay civilian personnel to deal with famine conditions and 
epidemics—a scenario which they thought likely in Germany. All had served in 
the Spanish Republican Army Medical Corps, and were seeking to work for the 
British authorities in the new Germany, in whichever occupation zone or area they 
were needed most.61
The American authorities received similar offers. One of many examples was 
that of the well-known lawyer Robert Kempner, a former German government 
counsellor, who was twice detained in concentration camps before arriving in the 
US in September 1939.62 In March 1945, Kempner wrote to General Lucius Clay, 
Eisenhower’s deputy in the American occupation zone, with a list of German émi-
grés currently living in the US (some of whom had already been naturalized), 
whom he considered to be potentially useful. The list included public health offi-
cials such as Franz Goldmann, Alfred Korach, and Heinrich Brieger, as well as a 
number of welfare officers and health insurance specialists. All of them, Kempner 
wrote, ‘possess invaluable personal contacts and inside information. Many of them 
also have experience in U.S. Government service’, and all ‘were dismissed by the 
Hitler regime for political or racial reasons and legally admitted to the U.S.’63 
Despite their political differences, these émigrés agreed on one thing: they saw 
themselves as different from, and more legitimate than, the mass of Germans at 
home. But the future occupiers disagreed.
59 FO 371/55487, minute by R. W. Selby (German Section of the Foreign Office), 26 Feb. 1946.
60 FO 371/46885, ‘Plan for the reconstruction of the German Health Organisation’ by Hugo 
Freund. Also see letter Dr Hugo Freund (Haifa, Palestine) to Mr Noel-Baker (Foreign Office), 26 Oct. 
1945.
61 FO 371/46844 and FO 371/46846, Foreign Office correspondence with China Medical Aid 
Committee, June 1945 to Jan. 1946.
62 Paul Weindling, Nazi Medicine and the Nuremberg Trials: From Medical War Crimes to Informed 
Consent (Basingstoke, 2004), 138. Also see files in NyPL, Displaced German Scholars, Box 19: 
Kempner.
63 BAK, z45F/44-45/21/3, letter from Robert Kempner to Major General Lucius Clay, 30 Mar. 
1945, and ‘Former German Public Officials now in the U.S.’, 20 Feb. 1945. Kempner later assisted 
the American prosecutors at the Nuremberg Trials, and eventually went to Germany as chief prosecu-
tor for the trial of German Foreign Office diplomatic staff, see Weindling, Nazi Medicine. Robert 
Kempner, Ankläger einer Epoche: Lebenserinnerungen (Frankfurt, 1983).
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ALLIED POLICy
The problems faced by German émigrés were similar in all countries of exile. 
Unlike refugees from other nations, they lacked a unifying centre and were unable 
to turn themselves into a homogenous, unified force. While there were several 
attempts to organize broad groups, everywhere they were ridden by factionalism, 
particularly among the various sections of the Left. Even more serious was the issue 
of legitimacy. The Nazis were not simply occupying their home country; the reality 
of ‘the other Germany’, which the émigrés claimed to represent, remained con-
tested. Many Allied planners thought that active German participation in the 
decision-making process was to be avoided at all costs. As a result, German émigrés 
did not establish themselves successfully or influentially in exile. At no point any-
where was there a German government in exile; even a much more minor partici-
pation of émigrés was ruled out in principle.
But there were differences in the ways in which the four occupiers dealt with 
and utilized émigrés. The American and British governments refused contact with 
the Free German groups on principle; political organizations such as the British 
Labour Party went to some effort to distance themselves from them.64 The French, 
although sceptical, were willing to support at least some of those who shared 
French occupation aims. The Soviet authorities maintained steady contact with the 
Free German Committee in Moscow throughout the later war years, and, after 
1945, organized repatriation drives for Free German members to Germany.
(i) Britain and the United States and German émigrés
Peter Ludlow and other historians have written persuasively on the ‘revolution in 
British foreign policy’ that took place between 1938 and 1940. Appeasement ten-
dencies were accompanied by a belief in the inherent reasonableness of  Germans. 
In response, people like Robert vansittart emphasized the inherent unreasonable-
ness of Germans, their long-standing militarism and disregard of other peoples. In 
the context of this ‘general unwinding of appeasement’,65 the prevalent views on 
the nature of the German character now made any serious distinction between 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ Germans obsolete, removing legitimacy from even the most active 
antifascist supporters of Allied aims. In the United States, too, the possibility that 
émigrés, or at least some of them, could be useful in the post-war occupation 
 contradicted prevalent notions of what the Germans were like. Both countries 
used German émigrés as advisers to their government authorities, but the idea of 
using them in Germany was something quite different. By 1941, the British and 
American authorities approached the problem of  Germany in essentially the same 
64 Isabelle Tombs, ‘The victory of Socialist “vansittartism”: Labour and the German Question, 
1941–1945’, 20th Century British History, 7/3 (1996), 287–309.
65 Peter Ludlow, ‘The Unwinding of Appeasement’, in Lothar Kettenacker (ed.), Das ‘Andere 
Deutsch land ’ im Zweiten Weltkrieg: Emigration und Widerstand in Internationaler Perspektive (Stuttgart, 
1977). On this shift, also see Glees, Exile Politics.
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manner:66 tied together in such organizations as the Combined Chiefs of Staff and 
SHAEF, they were jointly committed to securing the military defeat of Germany 
and its subsequent occupation. In both countries public opinion, if often confused, 
played a role, since organizations such the British ‘Never Again Association’ and the 
American ‘Society for the Prevention of World War Three’ drummed up some sup-
port for a harsh stance on Germany, and had some influential advocates.
Both countries also faced similar internal conflicts. The Roosevelt administration 
was fractured by a long-standing debate about the relative spheres of responsibility 
of the State and the War Departments. This clash over the military as opposed to 
civilian sphere of influence was mirrored by differences between the British War and 
Foreign Offices, and responsibility for the administration of Germany was fre-
quently passed between them. As a result, both governments were constrained by 
the prevailing uncertainty about the future of Germany and refused to commit 
themselves to any specific directions too early, whether they involved émigrés or 
not. It was only clear that the needs of the German civilians featured long after the 
requirements of Allied military governments, displaced persons, United Nations 
nationals, and the demands of the military operations in the Far East.67
British sources occasionally suggested that American policy was more lenient 
towards German émigrés, especially with regard to their employment in advisory 
positions, and expressed concern that American authorities might be exhibiting a 
dangerously ‘soft’ attitude. There were concerns over reports that the American 
military authorities had been ‘whisking off ’ some 300 German émigrés resident in 
the UK for jobs in Germany.68 Or as Lt. Col. Thornley from SOE wrote to the 
Foreign Office: although it had been agreed that ‘it was undesirable that political 
émigrés should be allowed into the Occupied zone at an early stage where they 
might be a source of considerable embarrassment’, he had ‘good reason to believe’ 
that the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was ‘asking various émigrés to proceed 
to Allied Occupied territory (presumably the American zone) in order “to combat 
the Nazi Underground movement, assist in the reconstruction of German Trades 
Union, etc” ’.69 Similarly, A British draft cabinet paper on the issue of repatriation 
noted that the US seemed to have ‘adopted a different policy from ourselves in 
regard to the employment of German refugees on their Control Commission’: they 
had ‘openly clothed German refugees (including many from the U.K.) in American 
uniforms and sent them out to Germany for limited periods’, even if they had 
hitherto refrained from repatriating them permanently.70 Most of the cases 
 mentioned here regarded émigrés who had acquired American citizenship. During 
the first occupation years, American authorities in Germany did indeed seem to 
become more relaxed about the use of returning émigrés than the British. 
66 e.g. Anthony J. Nicholls, ‘American views of Germany’s future during World War II’, in Kettenacker 
(ed.), Das ‘Andere Deutschland’, 77.
67 FO 1038/32, 21st Army Group, Eclipse Outline Medical Plan, Feb. and Mar. 1945.
68 FO 371/46803, draft letter Harrison to Captain Watson (MPO), [26 June 1945].
69 FO 371/46802, letter from Lt. Col. Thornley to Mr Geoffrey Harrison, 16 Mar. 1945.
70 FO 371/46842, draft cabinet paper (3rd draft) [undated], ‘Draft Paper for the O.R.C. Committee—
The Return of Refugees and Internees to Germany and Austria’.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 03/19/2015, SPi
76 Allies and Germans
This is an open access publication. Except where otherwise noted, this work is distributed under the terms of a 
 Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence, a copy of which is available 
at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. For enquiries concerning use outside the scope of the licence 
terms, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com.
But throughout the war and immediate post-war period, British and American 
policy towards émigrés was fundamentally similar and shared a number of 
assumptions.
Many people in both the Foreign Office and the State Department saw 
German politicians in exile as representatives of a failed political system. They 
were discouraged by the messiness of German politics, and particularly by the 
fact that leftists were splintered into countless factions, none of whom were 
representative on their own. Even the New york Council could not claim any 
mandate to represent German exiles, let alone Germans more generally. Another 
consideration was that all contacts with this ‘other Germany’ were to be avoided 
so as not to come under suspicion of planning a compromise peace or other-
wise endangering the fragile anti-Hitler coalition. The fact that some of the 
social democratic and conservative émigrés repeatedly warned about the Soviet 
Union made them troublesome, even if British and American views on com-
munist affiliations were often no different.71 Most of all, any promises that 
would limit future freedom of action were to be avoided. For a while, it still 
seemed possible that Hitler could be overthrown by Wehrmacht generals, and 
they were not to be discouraged; and a delegation of exiled leftist antifascists 
would seem absurd to them. By the time an internal German resistance had 
been ruled out, cooperation with Germans had become even more 
inadvisable.
The Churchill government rejected a compromise peace and began a general 
distancing from émigré groups in Britain, which was shared by American offi-
cials once they joined the war. Political developments in Germany were now 
analysed purely with the aim of weakening Germany militarily, and so even 
conservative émigrés lost their political attraction. Official opinion in both 
countries was opposed to the idea of negotiating with any anti-Nazi groups, 
either inside Germany or through exiled Germans. Although in many points 
émigré plans were compatible with Allied schemes, policy considerations dic-
tated that no use of émigrés could be made.While in practise the British and 
American authorities’ refusal to recognize the Free German groups had a clear 
anticommunist rationale,72 their relationship to other émigré groups was little 
different. The multitude of socialist, centrist, and liberal German émigré 
groups, among them vocal anticommunists, experienced the same treatment. 
The SPD in exile, which, after a period in Prague and Paris set up its headquar-
ters in London in 1941, or the German People’s Socialist Movement, were 
treated essentially no different than the Free Germans.73 British and American 
refusal to work with or recognize German émigré groups extended far beyond 
a suspicion of communists.
71 Lothar Kettenacker, ‘Die britische Haltung zum deutschen Widerstand während des zweiten 
Weltkriegs’, in Kettenacker (ed.), Das ‘Andere Deutschland’ , 64.
72 FO 371/39119, Parliamentary Question by Lt. Col. Sir Thomas Moore, 7 June 1944. Minutes 
by D. Allen, 6 June 1944.
73 e.g. see Glees, Exile Politics, 6. TNA, FO 371/46802, Memorandum by the German People’s 
Socialist Movement/Deutsche volkssozialistische Bewegung [Mar. 1945].
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The archives of the British and American authorities document that, from the 
start, officials refused to draw a consistent distinction between émigrés and 
 Germans at large. Many enemy aliens in Britain first encountered such a lack of 
distinction in the internment scare of spring 1940. Although throughout 1939 
tribunals had assessed hundreds of thousands of enemy aliens and allocated them 
into one of three security categories, after the fall of Holland and the ensuing fifth 
column panic, many of those who had been assessed as safe were interned together 
with those of medium and serious risk, and in the makeshift internment camps 
Nazis and Nazi-sympathizers were now assembled together with antifascists and 
Jews.74 Here, at the height of concerns about British national security, efforts to 
distinguish between different kinds of Germans collapsed. Similarly, as far as émi-
grés were concerned, there were no attempts to group them into different categor-
ies of reliability or usefulness.
As Con O’Neill, Foreign Office adviser on Germany, explained in his memoran-
dum entitled ‘Talking Points’: ‘Talking good and bad Germans misses the point. 
Of course they are not all bad. But the trouble is that the vast majority of them are 
indifferent. Only, they have a deeply ingrained proclivity to respect authority, no 
matter how acquired; to admire the use of force, no matter for what purpose; to 
ask no questions; and to accept no responsibilities. The Germans are the weakest 
people in the world—morally.’ A direct corollary was to prevent any ‘influence of 
émigrés’, since, O’Neill argued, to ‘expect an impartial or unprejudiced opinion 
from an émigré is like expecting grapes from a pear tree’. Because they were 
‘Germans first and émigrés second’, they might be conditioned to ‘work against 
the regime that kicked them out, but they’ll never work against Germany’. Their 
expulsion from Germany was no guarantee of an anti-German position, and there 
were no reliable groups among the émigrés. The German Jews, O’Neill wrote, 
‘always were the most patriotic Germans, and they will be again—what’s left of 
them’. Claims of underground resistance were similarly unreliable: there ‘is not 
and has never been a German “Underground movement”. It’s a pure legend 
invented by the German émigrés.’75
Neither here nor in other statements of this nature was it acknowledged that 
Jews could not actually be ‘German’ according to Nazi racial criteria, or that any 
real opposition to Germany was possible from those who had been rejected by and 
expelled from Germany. The fact that this was not simply a public façade is docu-
mented by comparable statements in the privacy of Foreign Office minutes, such 
as the rhyming minute below, which evocatively illustrates the prevalent British 
approach. It responded to the application by a Mr Sass, a former managing direc-
tor of the Rheinwerke in Düsseldorf, now in exile in Columbia, to work for the 
British control authorities:
74 e.g. F. L. Lafitte, The Internment of Aliens (London, 1940). Ronald Stent, A Bespattered Page: 
The Internment of His Majesty’s Most Loyal Enemy Aliens (London, 1980).
75 FO 371/39919, Con O’Neill, draft ‘Talking Points’ [June 1944], a copy was to be sent to the 
British Embassy in Washington. Also see FO 371/39119, ‘Possibility of Council for Democratic 
 Germany carrying out a soft-peace campaign’, minute by Harrison, 13 July 1944.
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From Africa’s shore, from Colombia’s sun-drenched strand
Urgent there streams an eager Hebrew band.
Imbued with pure desire to serve their aims
Of Allied justice, see them stake their claims
To jobs in Germany. They know the ropes.
And their control will answer all our hopes.
‘Let us but serve, and we will prove our worth.
‘Till Hitler came and rudely thrust us forth
‘We helped the men who laid the powder train,
‘So you can trust us not to help again.
‘Good Germans, we? Perhaps, but all the same,
‘Profit or lose, we’ll play the allies’ game.’
Such altruistic offers shall we spurn,
Nor rather, trusting, to these helpers turn.
Loose them like vultures on the German scene
And hope they will not pick the carcass clean
Or, worse, revert to type and aid the Hun
To germanise the world with tank and gun?
Prudence invites we leave them where they are
And hitch our wagon not to David’s star …76
Apart from its anti-Semitic undertones, statements such as these contained a par-
ticular notion of German nationalism: not evidence of a certain kind of political 
engagement, but an invariable constant exhibited by all Germans by their very 
nature. Their political affiliations only came second. The harder the émigrés pro-
tested against this kind of analysis and the more altruistic their offers to help 
seemed, the more suspect they became.
Cooperation with any émigrés or émigré faction was also seen as inadvisable and 
undesirable because of the public relations problems that would entail. As a For-
eign Office minute spelled out, the government would ‘certainly have parliamen-
tary difficulties if we started this sort of thing . . . Unless there is something very 
concrete to gain it is a mistake to commit ourselves to any German body.’77 When 
the Free Germans submitted their lists of people willing to return and work in 
Germany, a Foreign Office minute stated, somewhat regretfully, that the ‘list would 
be quite useful if we could use it, but I do not think that we can’.78
Émigré medical personnel were not excluded from this blanket rejection. When 
the Public Health Branch of the British Control Commission for Germany sug-
gested it get in touch with the Free German Institute of Science, which was 
reported to have compiled dossiers of German doctors and scientist waiting to 
return after the war, the Foreign Office warned against this contact. Troutbeck, 
another Foreign Office adviser, stated that while the institute ‘may well be an 
estimable body’,
76 FO 371/40816, ‘Offer of services by Mr Sass for post-war work in Germany’, minute by J. Chaplin, 
15 June 1944.
77 FO 371/39120, ‘Suggestion of Free German broadcast to Germany’, minute, 25 July 1944.
78 FO 371/46803, ‘Return of German refugees to Germany’, minute by R. W. Selby, 26 June 
1945.
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whether or not it has a recognisable political colour itself, it is affiliated with other 
organisations which definitely have. It is indeed almost inevitable that émigré organi-
sations, even if predominantly technical in their interests, should have a political tinge. 
This being so I am afraid we should not like to see any initiative taken by the British 
Element in order to obtain the advice of the Institute. I may say for your future guid-
ance that we see objection in general to consulting émigré groups or institutions. 
Apart from the point I have already made, it is undesirable that these bodies should 
gain the impression that they are in our confidence, or that they or their members can 
count on any official consideration for their interests in the future.79
The Society for the Protection of Science and Learning (SPSL), a British charity 
involved in the placement of refugee academics in positions in Britain and abroad, 
directed by notables such as William Beveridge, Henry Dale, and Friedrich von 
Hayek, had some contact with the British Control Commission in spring and 
summer 1945. The secretary had prepared lists for the Public Health Branch of 
displaced university medical teachers registered with the SPSL, a fact which he— 
unlike the British and American authorities—regarded as ‘prima facie evidence of 
[their] reliability’.80 But after an initial welcome of such work, contact soon lapsed, 
and the secretary was eventually informed by the Control Commission that ‘a high 
level decision here has ruled against direct contact with refugees’.81
Underneath this rhetoric, a number of more subtle analyses of émigrés were 
coming together as the war wore on. Apart from the problem of their representa-
tiveness, British officials argued that these émigrés were ‘out of touch with develop-
ments in Germany’.82 The psychiatrist Henry Dicks, who later worked for the 
British Control Commission in Germany, expressed this well:
The old democratic trade-unionist may well be found to be useless, to cut no ice, in a 
community as disrupted as Germany will be. His very aloofness from the process of 
bitter disenchantment through which his people have passed, may have made him 
into an anachronism, a sort of émigré. It can be said that the émigré, or the political 
deserter, is not often the foundation of a new beginning, useful though he may be, and 
congenial as his views may be to us.83
On these grounds, émigré preparations were neither useful nor necessary. As one 
official observed, past experiences showed that the British had ‘no reason to think 
that such material will prove useful and there is no reason to believe that the Free 
German Movement are better qualified than the various Departments of H.M.G 
to undertake work of this kind’.84 Some also rejected the notion that émigrés could 
79 FO 371/46882, letter from CCG(BE), Political Division to Foreign Office, 19 Feb. 1945. Trout-
beck’s reply on 5 Mar. 1945.
80 Bod SPSL, 91/1, J. B. Skemp (SPSL secretary) to Ernest Cowell (CCG(BE), Health Branch), 21 
June 1945.
81 Bod SPSL, 91/1, ‘Comments on Cooperation with various Branches of the Control Commis-
sion’, 6 Dec. 1946. SPSL, 91/1, Major F. K. Paul (CCG(BE), Education Branch) to J. B. Skemp 
(SPSL secretary), 26 July 1945.
82 FO 371/39120, Eden to Stafford Cripps, 10 Nov. 1944.
83 FO 1032/1464, ‘Selection and re-education of German Prisoners of War, by Lt. Col. H. v. Dicks’, p. 1.
84 FO 371/39120, ‘Cooperation of “Free German” Movement in re-building democratic institu-
tions in Germany’, minute by D. Allen, 8 Nov. 1944.
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be anything other than passive guests. As A. v. Hill countered the claim that 
German émigré scientists had ‘played their role in the fight against fascism’: ‘They 
didn’t take part in the fight except as victims for the most part. They were sacked, 
robbed and persecuted.’85
As a result, when individual requests for employment and offers to assist in 
reconstruction tasks were received by the British and American authorities, the vast 
majority were rejected. Of course, both the British and American governments did 
make some use of émigrés in advisory capacities, particularly in their psychological 
propaganda efforts.86 But while émigrés worked for institutions as the American 
Office of Strategic Services, the British Foreign Office Research Department, and 
the BBC, in practice German politicians in British or American exile were impo-
tent and helpless. Most of their initiatives were ignored and they had no influence 
on any of the central political decisions of the time.
Many individual cases document this policy. Hugo Freund, who had submitted 
a plan for the reconstruction of the health service, was told in November 1945 that 
little could be done to grant his request to help in Germany.87 By May 1946, he 
had still not been successful and his plan was simply filed away.88 The list of German 
health officials in the United States experienced a similar fate, and none of the 
public health officials on this list returned to Germany.89 The three Germans in 
Burma—Rolf Becker, Carl Coutelle, and Herbert Baer—faced similar difficulties, 
even after the British China Medical Committee took up their case. ‘We have had 
nothing but praise of their work and their integrity from the Chinese Red Cross, 
the U.S. Army and the Friends Ambulance Unit who have worked alongside them’, 
their sponsors wrote.90 All three had ‘excellent anti-Nazi records’ as well as ‘the 
medical qualifications required to do good work in their own countries. And since 
Europe is short of doctors and we really have none to spare here it would seem 
more sensible to get these doctors back again.’91 But the committee was told that 
one possible employer, UNRRA, was ruled out by the fact that it would not employ 
Germans, ‘no matter how good their qualifications are’,92 and because of transport 
85 Bod SPSL, 92/14, A. v. Hill to Esther Simpson, 8 Mar. 1942.
86 Although even this was repeatedly criticized by some: e.g. TNA, FO 371/46802, letter from 
vansittart to Orme Sargent, 24 Mar. 1945. See also TNA, FO 371/46802, Hansard copy of House of 
Lords debate on 2 May 1945.
87 FO 371/46885, J. S. Tahoudin (Foreign Office) to Hugo Freund (Haifa), 12 Nov. 1945.
88 FO 371/46885, Hugo Freund, 26 May 1946.
89 Werner Röder and Herbert A. Strauss (eds.), Biographisches Handbuch der deutschsprachigen Emi-
gration nach 1933/International Biographical Dictionary of Central European Emigres 1933–1945, 3 
vols. (Munich and New york, 1980–3). Both Korach and Goldmann remained active in public health 
in the United States until their retirements. See e.g. Franz Goldmann, Payment for Physicians’ Service 
under Crippled Children’s Programs (Washington, 1949). Franz Goldmann and Hugh R. Leavell (eds.), 
Medical Care for Americans (Philadelphia, 1951). Franz Goldmann, Patients in Chronic-Disease Hospi-
tals: A Profile (New york, 1960).
90 FO 371/46844, ‘Repatriation of refugee doctors from China’, Mary Gilchrist to Kenneth 
younger (MP), 22 Sept. 1945.
91 FO 371/46844, ‘Proposed repatriation of nine doctors sent out to China by the China Medical 
Aid Committee’, Mary Gilchrist (honorary secretary) to Mr Harrison (German Section, Foreign 
Office), 18 June 1945.
92 See n. 91.
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shortages it was at any rate ‘not yet possible for German and Austrian refugees to 
return to their countries’. Nor could the doctors travel through Britain as the 
Home Office refused to issue them transit visas.93 As the MP Kenneth younger 
observed, ‘the British are not particularly interested in employing these men either 
in China or Germany at the moment. No doubt transport is difficult but it has not 
been suggested that that is the real obstacle to their return to Germany.’94
Another case was that of Dr Lucie Adelsberger. She was a specialist in internal 
medicine and immunology, and an Auschwitz survivor. During a period of recu-
peration in Holland she applied for jobs at medical schools in the USA. But when 
told that it was unlikely that they would employ a middle-aged German when 
there was ample supply of young American medical students, she decided to seek 
employment in Germany, with the British Control Commission, UNRRA, or 
similar organizations. via the SPSL, who had taken up her case, she, too, received 
the by-now-familiar rejection. ‘[T]hey tell us rigidly that they cannot employ 
 Germans or Austrians’, wrote the SPSL secretary, and commented that in ‘a case 
like this it is manifestly foolish and wrong’.95 A referee from the Harvard Medical 
School wrote to UNRRA in protest: ‘She is a German; obviously she is not a Nazi. 
She is in complete sympathy with the Allies and the principles of democracy. She 
is very much on our side.’96 None of this mattered.
The British and especially the American armies contained a number of individu-
als of German origins, now naturalized, who temporarily worked for the occupa-
tion authorities, before returning to Britain or the United States. But for many 
others even temporary work in Germany proved impossible because of the diffi-
culty of obtaining permits. Dr Hans Schlossmann, a former lecturer at the Phar-
macological Institute of the Düsseldorf Medical Academy, who had been dismissed 
on racial grounds and who had lived in Britain since 1934, tried in January 1946 
to go with a team of biochemists to the British zone to advise the occupation 
authorities on nutrition problems, but ‘was eventually turned down because he was 
not yet naturalised’.97 Those who had become naturalized Allied citizens were often 
in no better situation. The SPSL was in September 1946 dealing with the case of a 
German émigré, already an American citizen, who wanted to accept a guest 
appointment at the University of Hamburg, but had been told that there was ‘no 
likelihood of citizens of Allied countries being allowed to take up employment in 
Germany Universities. The question has been under discussion for some time, but 
no satisfactory solution has been found as it involves the employment of Allied 
Nationals by German Masters, which is a major difficulty under the existing 
93 FO 371/46844, ‘Return of refugees to Germany: Dr Becker’, Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs to Mr J. P. Coghill, Acting British Consul-General, Kunming, 24 Oct. 1945.
94 FO 371/4684, ‘Repatriation of refugee doctors from China’, minute by Kenneth younger MP, 3 
Dec. 1945.
95 Bod. SPSL, 389/4, Skemp to Rackemann (Harvard Medical School), 10 Oct. 1945.
96 Bod. SPSL, 389/4, Francis Rackemann to ‘the officer in charge of foreign personnel’, UNRRA, 
Washington, 30 Oct. 1945.
97 Bod. SPSL, 415/6, J. B. Skemp (Secretary of SPSL) to Sir Will Spens (Master of Corpus Christi 
College Cambridge), 17 Apr. 1946, regarding Schlossmann’s application for naturalization.
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 conditions of Control.’98 Nor could he simply become a German citizen again, 
‘since grant of nationality is always a discretionary matter, and there is at present 
no central authority for Germany which could exercise such discretion’.99
The involvement of the China Medical Committee illustrates that it did not 
make much difference whether the émigrés had British or American sponsors or 
not. Dr Hugo Freund was apparently supported by the MP Richard Crossmann; 
others by other MPs and political figures, but to no avail.100 Roger Wilson of the 
Society of Friends was in the same situation: in September 1945 he tried to organ-
ize a relief mission to Germany, and approached the Foreign Office with the sug-
gestion to use Germans currently in Britain. Relief work would have to fall more 
and more upon the Germans, he wrote, and the society knew at least a hundred 
suitable people with whom they had worked since 1933. He urged Bevin to give 
‘urgent attention’ to ‘the possible use of people of German nationality for relief 
work under the auspices of British voluntary societies in Germany’.101 However, he 
was told repeatedly that even when Germans with the right qualifications had been 
found and no suitable Englishmen were available, it was still impossible to employ 
them in Germany.102
These examples put the later observation by occupation officials such as Robert 
Murphy, who expressed surprise and dissatisfaction at not having enough German-
speakers who could be assigned to administrative posts in Germany, into a new 
light.103 The debate over the employment of returning émigrés continued well into 
the occupation, and even after the Americans seemed to have relaxed their opposi-
tion somewhat.104 In June 1946, General Clay commented in a letter that ‘[i]n the 
functional field, we have recruited a number of men of German origin and some 
of them have proved to be very good indeed. However, much depends on what is 
meant by German origin. If these men are second or third generation Americans, 
their knowledge of Germany is usually very remote even though they may speak 
the language.’ In this context,
The Germany refugee who left Germany to go to the United States and subsequently 
became a citizen of the United States, is not always a good representative of military 
government. We have found that many of them understand Germany better than 
America and, as such, fail to represent America in Germany. It is difficult to estimate 
their reactions on their return to Germany, as, in fact, it will vary from the reaction of 
Dr. Brandt, who became extremely sympathetic to the German plight and an open 
98 Bod. SPSL, 111/5, Bertha Bracey (COGA) to Ilse Ursell (SPSL secretary), 28 Sept. 1946.
99 Bod. SPSL, 111/5, Bertha Bracey (COGA) to Ilse Ursell (SPSL secretary), 10 Oct. 1946.
100 FO 371/46885, Hugo Freund to Foreign Office, 26 May 1946. For other examples, see Susan 
Pedersen, Eleanor Rathbone and the Politics of Conscience (New Haven, 2004).
101 FO 371/46806, Roger Wilson (General Secretary, Friends Relief Service) to Major Kenneth 
younger, MP (House of Commons), 21 Sept. 1945.
102 FO 371/46806, ‘Interview with Mr Roger Wilson, Society of Friends’, Kenneth younger MP, 
12 Sept. 1945.
103 Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (London, 1964), 306.
104 Not least in response to reports such as this: Memorandum by OSS (Wiesbaden), ‘views of a 
group of reliable and democratic Germans’, June 1945, in Heideking and Mauch (eds.), American 
Intelligence and the German Resistance to Hitler, 406–12.
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opponent of Potsdam, to the view of Professor Lowenstein in our Legal Division who 
believes that the re-education and democratisation of Germany are completely 
hopeless.105
In April 1947, in the context of a review of the continued employment of Germans 
who had acquired American citizenship and worked for OMGUS in any capa-
city, the deputy military governor Major-General Keating paraphrased Clay’s view 
of German émigrés as being politically unreliable, stating that ‘many of these indi-
viduals have not been sufficiently indoctrinated in American ideologies to warrant 
their retention in our employment. It is anticipated that, with few exceptions, their 
contracts will be terminated.’106
(ii) France and German émigrés
France was in a very different position to Britain and the United States. On the 
one hand it had long been a major country of refuge for people fleeing fascism 
and Nazism. By 1936, 2.2 million foreign refugees lived within France.107 
German refugees often went first to France, before moving on eventually to Britain 
or the United States, if they could overcome American immigration restrictions. 
Politically active German émigrés of many affiliations, who had been coming to 
France since 1933 and the reintegration of the Saar into Germany in 1935, were 
well organized in bodies such as the Central Association of German Emigration 
(zentralvereinigung der deutschen Emigration), which represented twenty-two 
émigré groups in France, and which was recognized in October 1938 by the 
League of Nations as an official representation of German refugees.108 Many 
exiled political parties set up their headquarters in Paris, where a number of 
French parties and trade unions had declared their solidarity with the German 
exiles. These favourable conditions for political collaboration with German émigrés 
seemed to prosper further when Léon Blum’s Popular Front government was 
elected in May 1936.109
But on the other hand, France was the first of the future occupiers to be 
attacked and invaded, and the only one to be fully occupied by Germany and 
partly run by a collaborationist government. It did not take part in the impor-
tant Allied wartime conferences; it did not officially become an occupying power 
until 1944; and the borders of its occupation zone were not finally settled until 
105 BAK, z45F, 3/177-1/6, Clay to Major General Oliver R. Echols (Director Civil Affairs Divi-
sion, War Department, Washington), 25 June 1946.
106 BAK, z45F, 17/162-2/10, Deputy Military Governor General Frank Keating to OMGUS divi-
sions, 25 Apr. 1947.
107 vormeier, ‘Frankreich’, 213.
108 vormeier, ‘Frankreich’, 219.
109 vormeier, ‘Frankreich’, 222. Harald Hauser, Gesichter im Rückspiegel (Berlin 1989). Michel 
Grunewald and Frithjof Trapp (eds.), Autour du ‘Front Populaire Allemand’: Einheitsfront-Volksfront 
(Bern, 1990). The PCF, the SFIO, and the Radical and Socialist parties were represented in Blum’s 
government. By contrast, Heinz Willmann thought that because of restrictive visa and work regula-
tions, France was no haven for German émigré communists, Willmann, ‘Erinnerungen’, in Klaus 
Jarmatz, Simone Barck, and Peter Diezel, Exil in der UdSSR (Leipzig, 1979), 18.
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the summer of 1945.110 Its post-vichy government, a multi-party coalition which 
contained communists, socialists, and Christian democrats, was unelected for over 
a year. Throughout this time, the country was riven by deep internal struggles—
between the vichy regime and the Free French, between followers of General 
de Gaulle and General Giraud, and between the various factions of the Left and 
the Right. Like the Anglo-American planners, those in Paris had to negotiate 
conflicting spheres of responsibility between the military and the civilian author-
ities, but France was at the same time marred by far more acute divisions and 
uncertainties over future policies.
As a result, the French position on German émigrés was less categorical than 
the British or American. After the outbreak of war, German refugees were interned 
indiscriminately and regardless of their political affiliations.111 It is also true that 
public support for German exiles in France waned radically after 1939, and many 
public figures shared Anglo-American views of German nationalism and milita-
rism. But where émigrés in Britain and the United States failed to be recognized 
as legitimate representatives of an alternative to Nazism, a number of German 
groups in France had more success. CALPO was not just closely connected with 
institutions and networks of the PCF and the trade union movement, it was also 
recognized as an official resistance organization, and its members fought along-
side the French forces on the western front and in the battle for Paris.112 The 
group, and many individual members, were recognized as Resistance fighters, and 
a number of French figures vocally supported them. In October 1944, in a speech 
in Toulouse, vincent Auriol—head of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Con-
sultative Assembly, and later to become first president of the Fourth Republic—
emphasized CALPO’s contribution to the speedy capitulation of German troops 
on French soil.113
Nonetheless, by late 1944 and early 1945, CALPO’s relations with the French 
authorities began to deteriorate, and eventually France declined cooperation with 
CALPO on post-war Germany. By February 1945 the French Foreign Ministry 
laid down the line that authorities had to show greater distance from CALPO, 
and all embassies were instructed to maintain distance towards German émigré 
110 See e.g. Philip E. Mosely, ‘The Occupation of Germany: New Light on How the zones Were 
Drawn’, Foreign Affairs, 28/4 (July 1950), 580–604. Michael Balfour, ‘Four-Power Control in 
 Germany, 1945–1946’, in Michael Balfour and John Mair (eds), Four Power Control in Germany and 
Austria, 1945–1946 (Oxford, 1956).
111 e.g. André Fontaine, Le Camp d’étranger des Milles 1939–1943 (Aix-en-Provence, 1989). On 
internment after 1940, see esp. Soma Morgenstern, Flucht in Frankreich (Berlin, 2000). Also see 
Edwin M. Landau and Samuel Schmitt, Lager in Frankreich: Überlebende und ihre Freunde, Zeugnisse 
der Emigration, Internierung und Deportation (Mannheim, 1991).
112 CALPO also must have been partially funded by the PCF, as in Jan. 1945 it claimed to have 34 
million francs at its disposal. See ‘Minutes of OSS-Inter Branch Meeting: OSS Relations with the 
CALPO Resistance Group’, 10 Jan. 1945, printed in Heideking and Mauch (eds.), American Intelli-
gence and the German Resistance to Hitler, 357.
113 vincent Auriol, Oct. 1944, in Bungert, Das Nationalkomitee und der Westen, 131. CALPO had 
some very positive press coverage in a number of French papers, see e.g. extracts in Free German 
Movement in Great Britain, Free Germans in the French Maquis: The Story of the Committee ‘Free 
 Germany’ in the West (London, 1945), 22–4.
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 organizations and to enquire discreetly about their political orientation.114 The 
group’s activities were increasingly supervised, restricted, and ultimately prohib-
ited, until it was disbanded in August 1945.115 The reasons for this cooling of rela-
tions did not simply lie in the group’s communist affiliations, since (unlike in 
Britain and America) support of the Soviet Union alone did not warrant suspicion. 
Until 1947 it was a major pillar of French foreign policy to mediate between Soviet 
and Anglo-American approaches.116 Why did French officials have doubts about 
CALPO? At least in part their response can be understood as an effort to bring 
French policy in line with American and British standards and to assure them, 
often still sceptical about France’s role as an occupying power, that it was up to the 
job.117 The distancing from CALPO was also partly testimony to the increased 
marginalization of French communists in occupation affairs. As in Britain and 
America, there were real worries about a premature commitment to any particular 
German faction which would limit future freedom to operate.
All these factors offer partial reasons for the French position on CALPO, but the 
most important was a clash with crucial elements of the French agenda. As CALPO 
began to agitate for a reconstructed, centralized, and unified Germany, it contra-
dicted the basic security premise of French policy. France’s central priority was that 
the defeated Germany had to be radically and permanently decentralized (perhaps 
even dismembered), and militarily and economically weakened. The proclama-
tions by members of CALPO and other émigré groups (such as the SPD in exile) 
on a future centralized country—even if it was demilitarized and denazified—were 
thus entirely unacceptable in French officials’ eyes. These proclamations repre-
sented, they argued, Germans’ desire to see Germany ‘regain its full place in the 
sun, even, if possible, in the distant future, and the realisation of the aims of Hitler 
and his followers’.118
French views on CALPO’s plans for Germany were to a large degree shaped by 
its concerns about the shape of post-war Germany. Their increasingly negative 
position was further entrenched by the arrival of members of the Swiss Free German 
group in the territory of the French occupation zone in the last weeks of the war, 
who began to agitate for centralized German reconstruction.119 Like other Free 
114 Circular letter from the French Foreign Ministry, 31 Mar. 1945, MdAE, Europe, Allemagne, 
Dossier 45, cited in Bungert, Das Nationalkomitee und der Westen, 141.
115 The French secret service kept close tabs on it since autumn 1944, see vormeier, ‘Frankreich’. 
Christine Levisse-Touzé, Des Allemands contre le nazisme: Oppositions et résistances 1933–1945: Actes 
du colloque franco-allemand organisé á Paris du 27 au 29 mai 1996 (Paris, 1997).
116 e.g. The Times, ‘French influence in Europe’, 14 July 1949.
117 Bungert, Das Nationalkomitee und der Westen, 136. On OSS relations with CALPO, see ‘Min-
utes of OSS-Inter Branch Meeting: OSS Relations with the CALPO Resistance Group’, 10 Jan. 1945, 
printed in Heideking and Mauch (eds.), American Intelligence and the German Resistance to Hitler.
118 My trans., AN, F1A, Dossier 2246, ‘Conference a l’Hotel Matignon, dans l Cabinet de M. Joxe, 
au sujet de l’activite sur notre territoire de l’Association pour l’Allemagne libre de l’ouest’, 6 Feb. 1945, 
quoted in Bungert, Das Nationalkomitee und der Westen, 135.
119 See Edgar Wolfrum, ‘ “La Mission culturelle”—Medienpolitik der französischen Besatzungs-
macht und die Rolle von Remigranten’, in Claus Dieter Krohn and Axel Schildt (eds.), Zwischen den 
Stühlen? Remigranten und Remigration in der deutschen Medienöffentlichkeit der Nachkriegszeit (Ham-
burg, 2002).
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German groups, the Swiss movement called not just for the arrest of all war 
 criminals, the denazification of German authorities, and the democratization of 
German public life, but also demanded the ‘recovery of the German people’s sov-
ereignty’ and the ‘unity of the Reich, under free development of the historically 
determined particularities of the German regions’.120 Where the Free Germans 
fought ‘for the salvation of the German nation’,121 French occupation policy was to 
prevent just that—there was to be no salvation of the nation and no unity of the 
Reich, and the German particularities were to be suppressed and remoulded. To 
the French authorities, these émigrés were therefore not simply representatives of 
the failed Weimar regime, but, more disturbingly, they continued to share the basic 
premises of German unity, centralization, and German recovery represented in 
both Bismarck’s and Hitler’s world views. The French official position towards the 
Free German émigrés was thus not the product of a blanket rejection of the use of 
émigrés, but a calculated move.
The fact that the French authorities evaluated the degree to which the émigrés’ 
programmes matched their own priorities, rather than refusing cooperation on 
principle, is demonstrated by evidence that they utilized those individuals and 
groups who supported French policy, and were politically useful to it. A revealing 
(even if peculiar) case is that of the Saar, a region which had changed hands several 
times between Germany and France, but which had been under German control 
since the plebiscite of 1935, and was now part of the French occupied territory in 
Germany. The Saar became something of an ‘émigré state’ even before it was given 
autonomous status and was economically integrated into France after 1947.122 
 Gilbert Grandval, who in August 1945 became the Saar’s military governor, found 
in the returning émigrés a useful means to strengthen the cooperation between his 
military and their civilian administrations, and from the start they assumed vital 
positions in the Saar civilian authorities.123 The German Catholic democrat Johannes 
Hoffmann, a vocal opponent of the return of the Saar to Germany in 1935, had 
emigrated first to France and then to Brazil, where he kept in close contact with 
members of the French Resistance. In September 1945, he returned to Saarbrücken 
via Paris with help from the Interministerial Committee on German and Austrian 
Affairs (Comité Interministériel des Affaires Allemandes et Autrichiennes, 
CIAAA)—the new liaison office between the French occupation authorities in 
Germany and the ministries in Paris. Shortly afterwards he became head of the 
newly licensed Christian People’s Party of the Saar (CvP), and later minister 
120 See Wolfgang Langhoff, Die Bewegung freies Deutschland und ihre Ziele (zurich, 1945), 20. Also 
see Karl Hans Bergmann, Die Bewegung ‘Freies Deutschland’ in der Schweiz, 1943–1945 (Munich, 
1974).
121 Langhoff, Die Bewegung freies Deutschland und ihre Ziele.
122 Gerhard Paul, ‘Saarland’, in Krohn et al. (eds.), Handbuch der deutsch-sprachigen Emigration, 
1176. See essays in Rainer Hudemann et al. (eds.), Grenz-Fall: das Saarland zwischen Frankreich und 
Deutschland, 1945–1960 (St Ingbert, 1997).
123 Dieter Marc Schneider, ‘Gilbert Grandval: Frankreichs Prokonsul an der Saar’, in Stefan Mar-
tens (ed.), Vom ‘Erbfeind’ zum ‘Erneuerer’: Aspekte und Motive der französischen Deutschlandpolitik nach 
dem Zweiten Weltkrieg (Sigmaringen, 1993), 210. Between Mar. and July 1945, the territory was still 
controlled by American troops, and some émigré appointments dated from this period.
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 president of the Saar.124 Hoffmann was no isolated example. More émigrés were 
appointed to the new Saar administrative commission after the first communal 
elections on 8 October 1946, among them Richard Kirn as director for work and 
welfare, and Emil Straus as director for education. German émigrés also played a 
vital role in the political parties of the Saar; most of them—such as the CvP, the 
Social Democratic Party (SPS), and the Communist Party (KPS)—were in fact 
run by returning émigrés.125 Another influential political movement run by émi-
grés was the Mouvement pour la Libération de la Sarre (MLS), founded in March 
1945 by German exiles in Paris, and which demanded the complete annexation of 
the Saar by France. Members of this movement, and its later reincarnation as the 
Mouvement pour la Rattachement de la Sarre à la France (MRS), were appointed 
by the military authorities to a number of influential positions.126 In all these cases, 
the preference for émigrés was a component of the French political programme for 
the Saar, which included calls for the separation of the Saar from Germany and its 
economic integration with France.
The French authorities’ relationships with German political émigrés were thus 
shaped by their support of French policies. A party which initially did not share this 
programme and which did not have an émigré leader, the DPS (Democratic Party 
of the Saar), was licensed later than the other parties, only after Grandval and his 
staff had coaxed its leaders into agreement with a separation of the Saar. Conversely, 
the émigré-headed parties of the Saar (except for the KPS) had from the start assured 
their compliance with French occupation policy in the Saar.127 CALPO, by con-
trast, disagreed over the issue of the separation and decentralization in the Saar, and 
founded its own organization for Saar refugees, and trained its members for admin-
istrative duties there, without abandoning its calls for the full integration of the Saar 
with the rest of Germany.128 The importance of émigrés’ affinity with the French 
occupation programme as a precondition for their political success is also illustrated 
by those CALPO members who did return to the Saar, but left again thereafter—
such as Otto Niebergall, CALPO’s president, who was expelled by the military 
authorities in 1947 and moved to Rheinland-Pfalz (a different Land in the French 
zone), and Fritz Nickolay, who presided over the KPS, but moved to the GDR in 
1950 after being accused of causing public unrest at a May Day demonstration.129
124 Klaus Altmeyer, ‘Johannes Hoffmann: Sein politisches Wirken in den Nachkriegsjahren 1945 
bis 1947’, in Brigitte Steinle (ed.), Johannes Hoffmann: Ein Leben (Saarbrücken, 1993). ‘Wieder in der 
Heimat’, Neue Saarbrücker Zeitung, 29 Sept. 1945, in Johannes Hoffmann, Am Rande des Hitler-
krieges: Tagebuchblätter (1948; Gollenstein 2005). Johannes Hoffmann, Das Ziel war Europa: der Weg 
der Saar, 1945–1955 (Munich, 1963). Other émigrés in key positions were Heinrich Danzebrink, as 
head of internal affairs, and Georg Schulte, as head of personnel.
125 Winfried Becker, ‘Die Entwicklung der politischen Parteien im Saarland 1945 bis 1955 nach 
französischen Quellen’, in Rainer Hudemann et al. (eds.), Die Saar 1945–1955/La Sarre 1945–1955: 
Ein Problem der europäischen Geschichte (Oldenbourg, 1992).
126 Incl. the politicians Edgar Hector, Thomas Blanc, and Friedrich Pfordt (the latter a commu-
nist), the lawyer Charles Levy, the journalists Claus Becker and Walter Gebelein, and the police official 
Jacques Becker. See Röder and Strauss (eds.), Biographisches Handbuch.
127 Schneider, ‘Gilbert Grandval’, 211.
128 See Bungert, Das Nationalkomitee und der Westen, 135.
129 Röder and Strauss (eds.), Biographisches Handbuch.
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Elsewhere in the French zone, there were few returning émigrés in leading adminis-
trative positions, proportionately even fewer than in the British and  American zones. In 
the media the numbers were surprisingly low: only 7.6 per cent of all returning émigrés 
who worked in the media went to the French zone, compared to over 40 per cent in the 
Soviet zone, 26 per cent in the American zone, and almost 17 per cent in the British.130 
The French zone’s health authorities, too, were not significantly shaped by émigrés. 
Since French policy prioritized decentralization, this absence of émigrés can be explained 
to a large degree by the fact that the main German political parties and movements—
unlike those in the Saar—had no history of lobbying for separation or decentralization 
of the cobbled-together regions in the French zone. In fact, in all zones (apart from the 
Saar) both the SPD and the KPD opposed any decentralization or dismemberment of 
Germany, and continually tried to develop inter-zonal party programmes. Similarly, 
German doctors active in the SPD or KPD had since the 1920s argued for greater 
centralization in the German health service and the establishment of a central ministry 
of health. In the French case, this, rather than any communist affiliations, would have 
made them extremely unpopular with the occupation authorities.
A revealing exception in the French zone’s health sector is the case of Frédéric 
Falkenburger, a German Jewish doctor who had studied medicine at the University 
of Strasbourg before the First World War, and subsequently worked in Berlin in a 
venereal disease clinic and local health insurance body. He emigrated to France in 
1933. In 1936–7 he spent some time working in Moscow, before returning to 
France and taking French citizenship in 1937. In the same year he also began to 
work at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) in Paris. He 
returned to Germany in 1945 as an officer in the French military government’s 
Public Health Branch in Baden-Baden. Later he became head of the health service 
of the French high commissioner in Germany, and was for some time based at both 
the universities of Mainz and Paris.131 His value to the French authorities was no 
doubt highlighted by the fact that he had been educated at French institutions, and 
was bilingual and naturalized. Like Maxim zetkin in the Soviet zone, Falkenburger 
was an ‘intermediary’ between French and German officials, and unlike most other 
Germans who came back in French uniform and as French citizens, Falkenburger 
continued to work in Germany until his death.
(iii) The Soviet Union and German émigrés
The Soviet scenario was different again. The community of political exiles in the 
Soviet Union was much more homogenous in its interests than those in France, 
130 See Wolfrum in Krohn and Schildt (eds.), Zwischen den Stühlen? Also see Krauss, Heimkehr in 
ein fremdes Land, and Johannes Tuchel, ‘Le Souvenir de la résistance au national-socialisme dans 
l’Allemagne d’après 1945’, in François Marcot and Didier Musiedlak (eds.), Les Résistances, miroirs des 
régimes d’oppression, Allemagne, France, Italie (Paris, 2006), 375–87.
131 He died in Mainz in 1965. See Joseph Walk, Kurzbiographien zur Geschichte der Juden, 
 1918–1945 (Munich, 1988), and Röder and Strauss (eds.), Biographisches Handbuch. He may have 
converted to Catholicism after divorcing his Jewish wife (Else Joseph) and marrying a Roman  Catholic 
woman, Herta Friedrich.
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Britain, or the United States. German representatives in the Comintern’s executive 
committee estimated in 1936 that of the roughly 4,600 Germans with ‘political 
émigré’ status, the vast majority were communists. In 1938 and 1939 their number 
was increased further by the arrival of communists who had fought in the 
 Spanish Civil War or who came from French internment camps.132 Because of 
non-communists’ reluctance to emigrate to the Soviet Union—and even if they 
did, because of countless problems in being granted asylum status and establishing 
themselves in exile133—there were fewer competing factions among the political 
émigrés. Doctors were strongly represented among both the communist émigrés 
and those who initially arrived as ‘Jewish’ refugees, and many were employed in the 
Soviet health service to alleviate a serious shortage of doctors. Whereas in Britain 
and America German doctors often had to retrain and requalify before they could 
work, here they were easily absorbed. This proved particularly important for the 
post-war years because, at least in German eyes, émigré doctors were valuable 
in the future German reconstruction after the war. As Lothar Wolf—himself a 
communist doctor from Berlin, and in exile in the Soviet Union since 
1934—explained to Wilhelm Pieck: ‘the emigration and use of such a large number 
of doctors has a great political significance (not just in terms of health policy) for 
the KPD and its training of cadres. These doctors, as highly qualified forces, will 
be very useful once in Germany.’134
The émigrés faced undeniable difficulties in Soviet exile. They had to undergo 
rigorous checks into their past and present activities. Only a minority of them were 
based in Moscow, while many more were scattered across the Soviet Union, includ-
ing Siberia.135 They had to stay silent during the German–Soviet pact, many had 
died in Spain, and many more were deported or executed during the Stalinist 
purges. Lothar Wolf was arrested by the state security service (NKvD) in 1937 and 
died shortly afterwards. His wife Martha Ruben-Wolf, also a politically active 
doctor from Berlin, committed suicide in 1939.136 There were many similar cases. 
Nonetheless, Soviet policy on the use of German nationals for future work in 
 Germany was more flexible than that of Britain and the United States. The Soviet 
government supported and worked with those émigrés who were useful to its 
 priorities in Germany, even more actively than the French. A number of exiles were 
able to draw upon older émigré infrastructures, such as political groups, as well as 
132 Hans Schafranek, ‘Sowjetunion’, in Krohn et al. (eds.), Handbuch der deutsch-sprachigen 
 Emigration, 384. Carola Tischler quotes estimates in 1936 of ‘four to five thousand émigrés’, and 
thinks that the number was probably higher. Tischler, Flucht in die Verfolgung: Deutsche Emigranten im 
sowjetischen Exil, 1933 bis 1945 (Münster, 1996), 26.
133 Tischler, Flucht in die Verfolgung, 26.
134 My trans., Wolf to Pieck, 27 July 1936, quoted in Tischler, Flucht in die Verfolgung, 78.
135 Tischler, Flucht in die Verfolgung, 78.
136 See Anja Schindler, ‘Mit der Internationale durchs Brandenburger Tor’, in Ulla Plener (ed.), 
Leben mit Hoffnung in Pein: Frauenschicksale unter Stalin (Frankfurt/Oder 1997), 35–53; and Reinhard 
Müller, ‘ “Menschenopfer unerhört”: Eingaben und Briefe deutscher Emigrantinnen an Stalin, Molotow 
und andere’, in Simone Barck, Anneke de Rudder, and Beate Schmeichel-Falkenberg (eds.), Jahrhundert-
schicksale: Frauen im sowjetischen Exil (Berlin, 2003). Also see Lothar and Martha Ruben-Wolf, 
Im freien Asien: Reiseskizzen zweier Ärzte (Berlin, 1931)
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some of the institutional remainders left behind by the German minorities in the 
Soviet Union (newspapers, periodicals, publishing houses, and theatres).137 And 
just as communist émigrés in France benefited from their connections to the 
French Communist Party, émigrés here were more embedded in Soviet political 
institutions and networks than those in either British or American exile—in the 
orbits of the Comintern, the Soviet Communist Party’s training schools, universi-
ties, and the Red Army.
The recognition that émigrés could be of assistance to the occupying powers was 
thus not at issue. The situation was in some ways simpler than it was in the West. 
Many communists, émigrés and Russians alike, agreed with a distinction in prin-
ciple between the German working class, who suffered under the small clique of 
Nazis and who had been used as cannon fodder to fight their war, and those 
responsible for the war. For many non-communists, this distinction between 
apparently good and bad Germans was much harder or even impossible to main-
tain. A diary entry by Georgy Dimitrov offers a glimpse of this position. In 1938, 
in the context of developments in Czechoslovakia, he commented that ‘a nation is 
not some gang of traitors willing for the sake of its class privileges to offer up its 
own people to be torn to pieces by German fascism. A nation is millions of workers 
and peasants, working people, who are being betrayed by the Chamberlains and 
Daladiers.’138
In discussions with German comrades in subsequent years, Dimitrov applied 
this notion to Germany. A diary entry from January 1943 recorded a meeting with 
Wilhelm Pieck and the German writer Johannes R. Becher, both of whom he 
advised to be clear about the differences between the Nazis and the German popu-
lation at large—if not from conviction then for reasons of political expediency: ‘I 
explained to Becher’, he wrote, ‘that it is politically inexpedient to represent the 
German people in its entirety as corrupt, with bad and dangerous qualities. you 
have to differentiate and show the positive qualities to be found in the depths of 
the German people, on the strength of which the German people could rise up and 
rid themselves of the Hitlerite clique, washing away their shame and the bad and 
dangerous qualities. There is a need for serious national self-criticism, but not for 
indiscriminate self-flagellation.’139 In March 1945, Dimitrov noted that while 
Hitler was trying to drag ‘the German populace down with him into the abyss’, 
what they needed was ‘for some Germans to appear who are capable of salvaging 
what could still be salvaged for the survival of the German people. Organise the 
municipality . . . , re-establish the economy, etc., on the German territory taken and 
occupied by the Red Army. Establish local government agencies out of which 
would eventually develop a German government’.140
In addition to being willing to distinguish between good and bad Germans (or 
at least between those who were useful and those who were not), Comintern 
137 Schafranek in Krohn et al. (eds.), Handbuch der deutsch-sprachigen Emigration, 387.
138 Banac (ed.), Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 24 Oct. 1938, 86.
139 Banac (ed.), Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 20 Jan. 1943, 256.
140 Banac (ed.), Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 17 Mar. 1945, 363.
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 officials had long been involved in the German Communist Party, whose leading 
individuals identified themselves as communists first and Germans second. 
Although the Comintern was officially disbanded in 1943—just days before the 
formation of the NKFD—its equipment and operations were taken over by a 
number of Soviet agencies, and aspects of its approach informed official activities. 
Soviet priorities at this point lay strictly with winning the war and conducting 
military operations, but their interests overlapped with those of the Comintern, 
not least because the lack of preparations for the occupation dictated that they use 
Germans’ help in rebuilding Germany wherever they could.141 This was also exactly 
what Ulbricht and the KPD leadership had in mind. The Central Committee of 
the Soviet Communist Party had, at any rate, long been involved in the training 
of German communists who were in Soviet exile, and memoirs of the period of 
exile in the Soviet Union often record the many training schools and cadre 
programmes.142
Some time before the French authorities (and in contrast to those in London 
and Washington), the Soviet government decided to make use of German émigrés 
for the implementation of their German policy. Where in France it was émigrés’ 
affinity with the French occupation agenda that mattered most, Soviet officials 
were more interested in broader questions of political reliability and party training. 
With the plurality and changeability of Soviet plans for the future occupation, 
insisting on adherence to any principles was not very practical.143 Even after Stalin’s 
proclamations at the Teheran conference in November 1943 on the harshest pos-
sible treatment of Germany the Soviet authorities did not rule out a collaboration 
with German émigrés. Throughout the war they maintained close contacts with 
people such as Pieck and Ulbricht. Although by the end of the war Dimitrov was 
not as influential as he had been in the late 1930s, through him something of the 
old Comintern mentality found its way into the spring 1945 preparations for the 
Soviet administration of their German zone. Significantly, it was Dimitrov (him-
self a Bulgarian) who regularly met the Germans, as well as all the other national 
groups of the Comintern, to discuss their future tasks. When in November 1943 
a group of German émigrés came to see him about a range of German issues, he 
‘[B]rought to their attention’, he wrote in his diary, ‘that they are to proceed on the 
basis of the most likely prospect, the destruction of fascist Germany under the blows 
of the armed forces of the Sov[iet] Union and its allies, [and] thereafter the tempor-
ary occupation of Germany, with all the ramifications of this fact. Therefore the 
task of the German Com[munist] party (as regards the postwar period) lies first of 
141 Norman Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Occupation Zone,  1945–1949 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1997), 10, 41. Also see Alexander Fischer, Sowjetische Deutschlandpolitik im 
Zweiten Weltkrieg, 1941–1945 (Stuttgart, 1975).
142 See e.g. Klaus Jarmatz, Simone Barck, and Peter Diezel, Exil in der UdSSR (Leipzig, 1979). Also 
see Beatrix Herlemann, ‘Der deutschsprachige Bereich an den Kaderschulen der Kommunistischen 
Internationale’, Internationale Wissenschaftliche Korrespondenz, 18/2 (1982), 205–29. Jörg Morré, 
‘Kader aus dem Exil: vorbereitungen der KPD auf eine antifaschistische Nachkriegszeit’, in Andreas 
Hilger, Mike Scheitzner, and Clemens vollnhals (eds.), Sowjetisierung oder Neutralität? Optionen sow-
jetischer Besatzungspolitik in Deutschland und Österreich, 1945–1955 (Göttingen, 2006).
143 On the changing Soviet thoughts on the occupation of Germany, see Ch. 6.
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all in creating the sort of organised national force that, with the help of the Soviet 
Union, would be capable of taking upon itself the rebirth of Germany as a genu-
inely democrat[ic] country.’144 During the last days of the war, it was primarily 
Dimitrov who, with the help of Pieck and Ulbricht, prepared lists for Stalin of the 
German émigrés and POWs who were to be sent back for work in the occupied 
territory.145 When the Red Army approached the German border, Pieck made a 
formal request to Dimitrov to send a group of German communists with the Red 
Army to liberate Berlin. Dimitrov approved this, and on his recommendation the 
Central Committee sent three groups to Germany, one with each of the major 
armies.146 During June 1945, roughly 70 German communists and 300 POWs 
from the antifascist schools were sent back to Germany for administrative 
work.147
After Germany’s unconditional surrender, the Free Germany committee in 
Moscow was disbanded and many of its members were appointed to positions in 
the state and security apparatus of the Soviet zone in Germany. Local administra-
tions were put into the hands of returning émigrés, most of whom had been mem-
bers of the NKFD or active in its orbit, in the antifascist schools, or in some of the 
other organizations mentioned above. Maxim zetkin was among those who 
returned from Moscow to Berlin in 1945, and participated in the construction of 
the Soviet zone’s Central Health Administration. As its vice-president, he was 
responsible for the all-important organizational and personnel matters, as well as 
for liaison with the Soviet Military Administration. zetkin, perhaps even more so 
than Falkenburger, was a useful ‘intermediary’, because he was known in both 
Soviet and German circles. As Max Klesse (a colleague of zetkin’s in Berlin) noted 
in October 1946, ‘from the returning émigrés only the name of zetkin was known 
well by all Germans, even by non-communists, and—this is more important still—
was revered everywhere. Ulbricht, Wandel, and Wintzer, who in spite of their 
intelligence and engagement were not widely known, would have acquired res-
onance, especially among the German proletariat, if associated with zetkin’s 
name.’148
Nor were Soviet initiatives to bring back émigrés and appoint them to key posi-
tions restricted to those in Soviet exile. Officially sanctioned returns included the 
arrival of a large group of KPD functionaries from Scandinavia in January 1946,149 
of communists from Mexican exile in May 1946, and of some communists from 
144 Banac (ed.), Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 20 Nov. 1943, 287. See also meetings recorded on 9 Sept. 
1944 (334), 5 Jan. 1945 (352), 1 Apr. 1945 (365), 6 June 1945 (372), 7 June 1945 (372), 8 June 1945 
(372), and 9 June 1945 (372–3).
145 Banac (ed.), Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, see 29 Mar. 1945 (364), 24 Apr. 1945 (369), 28 Apr. 
1945 (369).
146 Naimark, Russians in Germany, 252. Wolfgang Leonhard, Die Revolution entlässt ihre Kinder 
(Cologne, 2003).
147 Naimark, Russians in Germany, 42.
148 BBAW, Max Klesse to Genosse zetkin, 26 Oct. 1946. He was talking about Walter Ulbricht, Paul 
Wandel (minister for public education and youth), and Otto Winzer (minister for foreign affairs).
149 Michael Scholz, Skandinavische Erfahrungen unerwünscht? Nachexil und Remigration; die ehema-
ligen KPD Emigranten in Skandinavien und ihr weiteres Schicksal in der SBZ/DDR (Stuttgart, 2000).
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Britain in the summer of 1946. Many of the individuals active in the orbits of the 
Free German groups ended up in the Soviet zone/GDR. Heinz Schmidt returned 
from the UK in 1946, together with his Austrian wife Eva Schmidt-Kolmer, who 
joined the Central Health Administration. Rudolf Neumann came back from 
Mexico in 1947, and became Oberarzt at the Hufeland Hospital in Berlin. Kurt 
Winter arrived from Sweden in 1945, and after working as a district physician in 
Teltow directed the Brandenburg public health department and subsequently 
became a vice-president of the Central Health Administration. Felix Boenheim 
returned from the United States and went to Leipzig in 1948, where he became a 
professor for internal medicine and director of the Medizinisch-Poliklinisches 
Institut at the University of Leipzig. Rolf Becker, Carl Coutelle, and Herbert Baer 
all returned in 1948 and worked in the Central Health Administration and in 
other leading capacities in the health service.150 Conversely, those who had to rely 
on support from the British, American, or French authorities often did not return. 
Käte Frankenthal, Franz Goldmann, Alfred Korach, and Heinrich Brieger all 
remained in the United States.151 Lucie Adelsberger also did not manage to get into 
Germany and moved to the United States.152 The only exceptions of émigrés in this 
chapter who flourished in the British or American zones are Robert Kempner, who 
assisted the US chief counsel during the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 
and worked temporarily at the German Foreign Office (but never settled perma-
nently in Germany), and Kurt Glaser, who returned in 1948 and later joined the 
local health service in Hamburg, and later still became a member of the Federal 
Health Council (Bundesgesundheitsrat) in the FRG.153
CONCLUSIONS
At the same time as the Allied governments began to draw up plans for the post-
war period and their dealings with Germany, German émigrés across the world 
tried to take part. In the many branches of the Free German groups, and in count-
less other organizations, they drafted proposals for the reconstruction of Germany 
after the war and lobbied the future occupying powers to be allowed to participate. 
Their relations with the British, American, French, and Soviet authorities were 
consequently often fraught. The Big Four dealt with them very differently. The 
British and American governments formally refused to acknowledge a distinction 
between Germans at large and those who had emigrated, or between different 
150 See Röder and Strauss (eds.), Biographisches Handbuch. Müller-Enbergs et al. (eds.), Wer war wer 
in der DDR?. Pasaremos: Deutsche Antifaschisten im national-revolutionären Krieg des spanischen Volkes 
(Berlin, 1970).
151 See Röder and Strauss (eds.), Biographisches Handbuch. Gerhard Baader, ‘Politisch motivierte 
Emigration deutscher Ärzte’, Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte, 7/2 (1984), 67–84. Kathleen Pearle 
and Stephan Leibfried (eds.), Der dreifache Fluch: Jüdin, Intellektuelle, Sozialistin: Lebenserinnerungen 
einer Ärztin in Deutschland und im Exil (Frankfurt am Main, 1981).
152 See Eduard Seidler, Kinderärzte 1933–1945: Entrechtet, geflohen, ermordet (Bonn, 2000).
153 See Röder and Strauss (eds.), Biographisches Handbuch.
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 sections of the émigré community. They viewed them as ineffective and out of 
touch with developments in Germany, and insisted that cooperation with them 
was politically undesirable. Both the Soviet and the French governments, by con-
trast, proved more willing to differentiate between different kinds of Germans. 
Partly this was a result of émigrés’ closer links with a number of Soviet and French 
political institutions (and the absence of those associations in Britain and the 
United States), and especially in France it reflected internal divisions. To some 
degree it was also a feature of the greater requirement for collaborators by the two 
occupying powers who were most in need of material and political support. As a 
result, the Soviet authorities recognized some émigrés as a potentially useful 
means to advance Soviet aims. French authorities made similar calculations and 
made use of émigrés who supported their policies of separation and decentraliza-
tion in the territory of the Saar, and to a lesser degree in other parts of their occu-
pation zone.
None of the three western occupation zones (apart from the region of the Saar) 
showed great numbers of returning émigrés in leading positions, but this observa-
tion disguises significant differences between them. In the French case it was a 
feature of the disagreements between French and German views on the future of 
Germany, whereas in the other two western zones it was rooted in a blanket rejec-
tion of cooperation with the émigrés and their claim to represent ‘the other 
 Germany’. Conversely, the vast majority of returning émigrés worked in the Soviet 
zone and in the Saar, and in both cases the occupiers had decided early on that the 
émigrés were useful for their own agendas. Where British and American planners 
justified their decisions by pointing to likely tensions between the returning 
 émigrés and the native population, the Soviet and French authorities were most 
concerned about the Germans’ relationships with the occupation authorities, and 
some also saw the potential of émigrés to convert and teach the German popula-
tion. In all four cases, the Allies’ position on German émigrés appeared as a facet 
of their approach to Germany and the future occupation.
All of this is significant, even if during the first year of occupation the stance of 
some American occupation authorities softened and they brought back a number 
of people from exile—such as the SPD politician Wilhelm Hoegner and a group 
of journalists from Switzerland and Britain.154 Such instances notwithstanding, the 
Anglo-American reluctance to work with German émigrés lived on in the restric-
tive repatriation measures. Émigrés who sought to return were in most cases pre-
vented until 1947 or later. The reasons given, such as a lack of transport to Germany, 
often hid a multitude of political considerations. And even after the ban was 
 officially relaxed, a return was often a complicated procedure with endless bureau-
cratic obstacles, which took years to overcome. The consequences for public health 
work of this absence of trusted German collaborators in the first months after the 
war will be examined in Part II.
154 Krauss, Heimkehr in ein fremdes Land.
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4
‘Now, back to our Virchow’:1 German Medical 
and Political Traditions in Post-war Berlin
In these current dark times there are still some rays of light for the German 
people—in spite of all errors and crimes which have been perpetrated in their 
name—they are the rays of hope which arise from the unquenchable spring of 
their intellectual and spiritual past.2
As they arrived in Germany, the Allies were forced to rely on the cooperation of the 
German medical authorities. While Chapter 3 looked at German  émigrés, this 
chapter focuses on those German doctors and health officers who never left the 
country, the large majority in the profession. How did they reflect on the events of 
the previous decade? How did they present their careers and relate to their émigré 
compatriots, some of whom were now returning to  Germany, and the occupiers? 
This chapter focuses on Berlin, which became both the seat of the quadripartite 
Allied Control Council (ACC) and the  capital of the Soviet zone.
Most historians have now abandoned the once-popular idea of a ‘Zero Hour’ 
(Stunde Null ) and a radical transformation of German society after the end of the 
war. This chapter, too, shows that the break after 1945 was not nearly as radical as 
many earlier studies claimed. Berlin is a useful illustration of the many continuities 
in health administration and medical practice: old institutions remained essentially 
unchanged, individuals continued in their old jobs, and long-acquainted groups 
and networks of German doctors survived intact. This continuity of personnel and 
institutions was accompanied by proclamations about the importance of a number 
of positive German traditions, both political and medical. But although continuity 
was an important feature of the reconstruction of the health service after 1945, 
there were fundamental disagreements within the medical profession about their 
history, their tasks, and their future.
This chapter also throws light on the intellectual reconstruction of Germany 
after 1945. A number of studies have investigated the complex identity politics 
in both German states after 1949. Mary Fulbrook, for example, has argued that 
the ‘singing tales of heroes and martyrs’ was a crucial part of the construction of 
national identity in both Germanies: ‘“good” traditions in the past had to be 
1 Prof. Dr Curt Froboese, Rudolf Virchow, = 5.9.1902—ein Gedenk- und Mahnwort an die heutige 
Ärztegeneration 50 Jahre nach seinem Tode (Stuttgart, 1953), 62.
2 [The editors], ‘Zum Geleit’, Medizinische Rundschau: Monatsschrift mit ärztlicher Akademie, 1/1 
(Jan. 1947), 1.
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found and celebrated as forebears of the present, while those responsible for the 
evils of Nazism had to be both identified and dealt with, both in reality (denazi-
fication, restructuring) and in interpretation (the tales told about the nation’s 
history)’.3 As we will see, such a process also occurred in medicine and public 
health, where heroes were indentified, German traditions recounted, and their 
apparent antecedents and origins celebrated. The pathologist Rudolf Virchow 
(1821–1902) was celebrated by different groups of medical officers, but for very 
different reasons. In the context of the post-war trials and debates about blame 
for the war and defeat, celebrations of heroes helped to assert the value of ‘good’ 
German traditions in the past, and thereby isolated the criminality of Nazi 
medicine.
The material presented here also helps us to understand the role of the occupiers’ 
presence in Germany after 1945. German historians have, with renewed vigour 
after 1989, emphasized the permanence of German ideas and practices from the 
nineteenth century to the post-war period. From them we know that after 1945 
many German institutions from the 1920s, the apparent heyday of public health, 
were recreated.4 But even those scholars who specifically look at the 1945–9 period 
tend to blank out the occupiers’ involvement in ‘German’ history. They concen-
trate exclusively on German medical organizations and health personnel, without 
understanding the wider political context of the occupation. They also often 
neglect to consider the role of national self-justification in the post-war debates.5 
This chapter argues that the presence of the occupiers was an important stimulus 
for publicly voiced arguments on history and precedents. Declarations on the via-
bility and desirability of German traditions were often specifically targeted at the 
Allies and German critics, to make the case that Germany was still a great nation 
with a role to play in the world.
Berlin housed two public health offices with different remits: one administered 
health work for the Soviet zone (the Central Health Administration), the other 
operated as part of the city administration (the Health Department of the Magis-
trat of Berlin). Both began to work shortly after the end of the war in offices in 
close physical proximity. While elsewhere in Germany health committees were cre-
ated as advisory bodies for the military governments with few powers of their own 
(such as the British zone’s Zonal Health Advisory Council, and the health group in 
the American zone’s Länderrat), both of the authorities discussed here had execu-
tive powers. Both were composed of German officials, but had to liaise with the 
occupation authorities. Although both were appointed and endorsed by the Soviet 
3 Mary Fulbrook, ‘Re-Presenting the Nation: History and Identity in East and West Germany’, in 
Fulbrook and Martin Swales (eds.), Representing the German Nation: History and Identity in Twentieth-
Century Germany (Manchester, 2000), 177–8.
4 Recent studies include Gabriele Moser, ‘Im Interesse der Volksgesundheit …’: Sozialhygiene und 
öffentliches Gesundheitswesen in der Weimarer Republik und der frühen SBZ/DDR—ein Beitrag zur 
Sozialgeschichte des deutschen Gesundheitswesens im 20. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt, 2002). Ulrike Lindner, 
Gesundheitspolitik in der Nachkriegszeit: Großbrittanien und die BRD im Vergleich (Munich, 2004).
5 Compare with Donna Evleth, ‘Vichy France and the Continuity of Medical Nationalism’, Social 
History of Medicine, 8/1 (Apr. 1995), 95–116.
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authorities, they had radically different political affiliations, outlooks, and ways of 
presenting their own past and the future of German medicine.
THE MAGISTRAT oF BERLIN AND THE BERLIN 
CIT y HEALTH DEPARTMENT
(i) Origins and Composition
The foundations for a joint occupation of Berlin were laid by the European Advi-
sory Commission (EAC) in London during the war, and many details, including a 
division into sectors (one for each of Britain, the United States, and the Soviet 
Union), were agreed by autumn 1944. At the yalta conference in February 1945 
France was also given a share, including its own occupation zone and Berlin sector. 
Berlin was thus designed to be a miniature version of the Allied occupation of 
Germany: each of the occupiers was to administer one Berlin sector, and the four 
city commanders and their staffs were to govern together in the Allied Komman-
datura of Berlin. In practice, these arrangements were complicated by the armies’ 
locations in early 1945. American and British troops were focused on combat in 
the north and west of Germany, while the Red Army, coming from the east, was 
much closer to Berlin. By March 1945, in spite of misgivings, the American and 
British governments agreed to let the Soviet troops conquer Berlin (the French 
were in no position to prevent this), and to move into their own sectors later.6 The 
Soviet Berlin offensive began in mid-April 1945, and on 21 April they entered the 
northern and eastern suburbs. After intense street fighting, German troops in the 
capital capitulated on 2 May 1945, followed a few days later by the formal sur-
render of the Wehrmacht in Reims.
As a result, Berlin was under sole Soviet control from May until early July 1945. 
Until his death in a car accident on 16 June 1945, the administrative and political 
power for the city lay in the hands of the Soviet city commander, Nikolai Berzarin, 
and his staff.7 Soviet officers were allocated to oversee the re-establishment of 
administrations in each city district. Under their watchful eyes, mayors and local 
councils (each with a health department headed by a medical officer) were 
appointed. A city-wide council, the Magistrat, was established as the main city 
authority, to liaise with and take orders from the Allied Kommandatura. When in 
July the British, French, and American forces finally moved into their sectors and 
the Kommandatura took over, the German administration had already been up 
and running for weeks. on 11 July 1945, the Kommandatura’s first order specified 
that all previous Soviet arrangements for Berlin, including the German 
6 Field-Marshall Montgomery was among those who criticized this decision, see Bernhard L. 
Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein (London, 1958), 277 
and 331–2.
7 on Berzarin’s appointment see ‘Befehl Nr.1 des Chefs der Besatzung der Stadt Berlin’, 28 Apr. 
1945, in Senat von Berlin (ed.), Berlin: Quellen und Dokumente (West Berlin, 1964), i. 208–10. 
Georgi K. Zhukov, Reminiscences and Reflections (Moscow, 1985), 410.
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 appointments, were to stay in effect.8 Berlin was governed in this way by both 
Allied Kommandatura and German Magistrat (which from october 1946 con-
tained elected officials) until summer 1948, when clashes between the occupiers 
culminated in the Soviet blockade of Berlin and an end to quadripartite 
cooperation.
Who was working at the Magistrat? The body’s initial composition had its roots 
in the German Communist Party’s (KPD) preparations in Soviet exile. of the 
three groups of German communists sent from Moscow to Germany in spring 
1945, Walter Ulbricht’s was instructed, among other tasks, to find suitable officials 
for Berlin. Immediately after their arrival in Berlin on 2 May, they went about 
finding candidates for the district councils and the Magistrat. General guidelines 
worked out in Moscow specified that the new administrations were to contain a 
broad range of antifascists. Communists were to take a significant part, but were to 
be joined by social democrats, liberals, and politically acceptable ‘specialists’. one 
of the main selection criteria was a positive attitude towards working with the 
Soviet authorities.9
While to Ulbricht it was crucial that communists held key administrative posi-
tions (particularly those enabling the control of personnel policy and education), 
other considerations prevailed for the Health Department. Ulbricht’s first contact 
was the well-known surgeon Ferdinand Sauerbruch. Even though Sauerbruch was 
‘an old German nationalist’, Ulbricht thought it ‘necessary first of all to create 
normal living conditions for the population here in Berlin and to organize the 
health service. Later we can talk about our potential political differences.’10 
 Sauerbruch agreed to Ulbricht’s offer, and, as a result of his recommendations, 
other health appointments targeted leading members of the medical establishment, 
including Erwin Gohrbandt, director of the surgical department of the Robert-
Koch Hospital, and the senior civil servant and medical officer Franz Redeker.11 
The Health Department, and its contrast with other Magistrat departments, tells 
us much about how public health and medicine were being approached by Ulbricht 
and the Soviet authorities. While an immediate resumption of work was vital and 
time could not be wasted in the selection of candidates, the choice of Sauerbruch 
and co. was hardly accidental. It proved highly beneficial to have the great German 
surgeon on their side; his authority helped to recruit the medical establishment to the 
Magistrat’s initiatives and programmes, and ensured their cooperation.
on 13 May 1945, Berzarin approved Ulbricht’s selections to date. The opening 
meeting of the Magistrat’s Constituent Assembly took place a week later on 
8 Wetzel in Christoph Weisz (ed.), OMGUS-Handbuch: Die amerikanische Militärregierung in 
Deutschland, 1945–1949 (Munich, 1994), 381–683. Lucius Clay, Decision in Germany (London, 
1950), 30–2.
9 Dieter Hanauske (ed.), Die Sitzungsprotokolle des Magistrats der Stadt Berlin, 1945/46 (Berlin, 
1995), i. 33–5. Wolfgang Leonhard, Die Revolution entlässt ihre Kinder (Cologne, 2003), 311 ff.
10 Ulbricht in Gerhard Keiderling (ed.), ‘Gruppe Ulbricht’ in Berlin, April bis Juni 1945: Von den 
Vorbereitungen im Sommer 1944 bis zur Wiedergründung der KPD im Juni 1945 (Berlin, 1993), 675.
11 ‘Erste Namensliste für den Berliner Magistrat’, 9 May 1945, lists Sauerbruch and Gohrbandt 
and states that a KPD doctor should still be located. Gerhard Keiderling (ed.), ‘Gruppe Ulbricht’ in 
Berlin, 312, also mentioned in Hanauske (ed.), Die Sitzungsprotokolle des Magistrats, 35.
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19 May, and its first official sitting the following day.12 The Health Department 
began to work immediately. In the bombed-out ruins of Berlin, its central task was 
to direct the district health offices’ urgent epidemic work. It was to organize vac-
cination and disinfection campaigns, and to regulate how officials were to locate 
sources of infection, quarantine infected individuals, organize clean-up operations, 
bury corpses, record and report disease and mortality statistics, and see that the 
rules were enforced. The Health Department was also to supervise and approve 
the appointment of medical directors, consultants, and heads of departments at 
the Berlin hospitals.13 on 19 May, the Health Department called its first meeting 
with the district medical officers. The meetings continued at roughly fortnightly 
intervals.14
Soon two overlapping circles of people came together in the Magistrat’s health 
work. First, a number of its leading members were surgeons, internists, or patholo-
gists who had trained and often worked for a long time at the prestigious Charité 
Hospital in Berlin—some had international reputations in scientific research. 
Second, the Magistrat’s health office had among its ranks medical officers who had 
for many decades worked for the city health administration, most of whose careers 
had flourished during the Nazi regime. It is worth dwelling on who these two sets 
of people were and the connections that existed between them.
Chief among the Charité circle was Ferdinand Sauerbruch, a surgeon with an 
international reputation. By the time of his appointment in 1945, he could look 
back on a long medical career. Born in 1875 in the Ruhr district, he studied natu-
ral sciences at the University of Marburg before switching to medicine at the Uni-
versity of Leipzig.15 In 1903, after a period of private practice and junior surgical 
positions, he joined the surgical department at the University Hospital in Breslau, 
where he began to specialize in thoracic surgery and carried out some pioneering 
experiments. Surgical operations in the thoracic cavity had been considered impos-
sible because of the air pressure involved, but Sauerbruch devised a new method by 
surrounding the patient in an airtight container.16 Sauerbruch’s years in Breslau 
were followed by stints at clinics throughout Germany and Switzerland. After the 
First World War, where he served as an advisory surgeon to the German army, he 
became a professor at the University of Munich. In 1928 he received the chair in 
surgery at the Charité and the University of Berlin, and his reputation continued 
to blossom, unimpeded by his often conservative stance on surgical practice.17 
12 Keiderling (ed.), ‘Gruppe Ulbricht’ in Berlin, Hanauske (ed.), Die Sitzungsprotokolle des Magis-
trats, 56.
13 These and other tasks are described in LAB, C Rep. 118–40, Maron and Sauerbruch to district 
mayors and health offices, 27 June 1945. C Rep. 118–40, Report from Magistrat Health Department, 
8 Aug. 1945.
14 LAB, B Rep. 012/902-5, Sauerbruch to the District Health offices, 19 May 1945. LAB, B Rep. 
012/902-5, ‘Bericht über die von der Abteilung für Gesundheitsdienst veranstaltete Dienstver-
sammlung der leitenden Ärzte und der Amtsärzte der Berliner Gesundheitsämter’, 27 May 1945.
15 See Ferdinand Sauerbruch, Das war mein Leben (Munich, 1951).
16 Jürgen Thorwald, The Dismissal: The Last Days of Ferdinand Sauerbruch (London, 1961).
17 Apparently he had opposed the use of sulfadrugs and an increased specialization in surgery, and 
after 1945 tried to ban the use of penicillin in his clinic. See Thorwald, Dismissal, 39.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 03/21/2015, SPi
100 Allies and Germans
This is an open access publication. Except where otherwise noted, this work is distributed under the terms of a 
 Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence, a copy of which is available 
at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. For enquiries concerning use outside the scope of the licence 
terms, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com.
He became Hindenburg’s personal physician and attended politicians such as 
Hitler, Heydrich, and Mussolini. During the Second World War he worked as the 
Wehrmacht’s surgeon-general, and was a member of the scientific senate of the 
military medical service.18
His fame had declined during the war in Britain and the United States, where 
surgical advances had made his methods obsolete. Elsewhere, however, his name 
was unrivalled among living German surgeons. Particularly in the Soviet Union he 
was still celebrated, and his presence impressed the Soviet officers stationed in 
Germany. General Kuznetsov (head of the Health Department of the Soviet Mili-
tary Administration in Germany (SMAG)) wrote to Marshall Zhukov about the 
German scientific institutions and materials his department had studied.  Kuznetsov 
noted that he had informed the Soviet health ministry and the Academy of Sci-
ences of ‘a series of valuable achievements presenting interest to Soviet science’, and 
proposed the organization of teams of Soviet scientists to come to Germany to 
study and ‘to master these methods and to transmit them to Soviet practice’. He 
highlighted Sauerbruch’s surgical work as of particular interest and importance.19 
In the course of the first post-war months, a string of Soviet officers of all ranks 
consulted Sauerbruch and asked for help with illnesses their own doctors had not 
been able to cure. Under Soviet protection, Sauerbruch received privileges such as 
a car, and food and drink, and apparently a sign was placed outside his house 
which read (in Russian) ‘the great doctor Sauerbruch lives here’, as a safeguard 
against any molestation.20
Sauerbruch, as one of the ‘grand old men’ of the Charité, was in friendly contact 
with other Charité veterans.21 Many of them had not left Berlin and still worked 
in the large hospitals in and around the city; through Sauerbruch’s influence they 
were co-opted into various jobs in the health administration. one such grand old 
man was the pathologist Robert Rössle. A year younger than his old friend 
 Sauerbruch, he had studied under Rudolf Virchow, and from 1929 until 1948 
held Virchow’s famous pathology chair at the Charité. After 1945, he directed the 
Charité’s pathology clinic and the pathological institute at a hospital in 
 Berlin-Tempelhof.22 He also joined a series of health committees and became 
 secretary of the Academy of Sciences, but turned down the offer to work with 
Sauerbruch at the Health Department because of his full workload.23
Another member of this set was the internist Theodor Brugsch, who had trained 
and worked at the Charité until he received a professorship in internal medicine in 
18 Fridolf Kudlien and Christian Andree, ‘Sauerbruch und der Nationalsozialismus’, Medizinhistor-
isches Journal, 15 (1980), 201–22.
19 BAB, Z47F, 7317/56/23, Kuznetsov to Zhukov, 7 Feb. 1946. Sauerbruch was also referred to in 
these terms in Z47F, 7317/56/21, Smirnov to Sokolov, 8 Dec. 1945.
20 See Thorwald, Dismissal, 24.
21 Thorwald, Dismissal, 22.
22 Biographical essay by Wilhelm Doerr, in Herwig Hamperl and Wilhelm Doerr (eds.), Robert 
Rössle in seinem letzten Lebensjahrzehnt, 1946–1956, dargestellt an Hand von Auszügen aus seinen 
Briefen an H. und R. Hamperl (Berlin, 1976), 60–72.
23 Letter from Robert Rössle to Herwig Hamperl, 17 Nov. 1946, in Hamperl and Doerr (eds.), 
Robert Rössle, 6.
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Halle in 1927. In 1935 he retired from his chair following a dispute with his fac-
ulty, and returned to Berlin, where he opened a successful private clinic. In spite of 
his earlier clashes with colleagues and his marriage to a Jewish woman, he was 
consulted by some prominent Nazis.24 In 1945 the Soviet Health Department was 
impressed by his reputation.25 He was appointed to two positions: he ran the First 
Medical Clinic of the Charité; and he became a vice-president of the Soviet zone’s 
Central Education Administration, with responsibility for the medical curriculum 
and medical faculties. In this second capacity he had to liaise with Sauerbruch’s 
department. Brugsch had first met Sauerbruch at a conference in 1922, and had 
maintained friendly contact ever since.26 Apart from a quarrel over the terms of 
Brugsch’s reinstatement at the Charité, Brugsch later thought that his cooperation 
with Sauerbruch after 1945 had been very successful.27
Brugsch had in fact been asked to join the Central Education Administration by 
another acquaintance of this set: the surgeon Erwin Gohrbandt. Born in 1890, 
Gohrbrandt completed his medical training at the Charité in 1914. After service 
as an army medical officer in the First World War, he worked at the Charité’s surgi-
cal clinic until 1928, when he was appointed as consultant (and in 1933 chief 
consultant) at the surgical department of the Urban-Krankenhaus in Berlin. From 
1933 he also worked as a surgical consultant in the youth welfare service. In 1940 
he became director of the surgical department at the Robert Koch Hospital in 
Berlin-Moabit and professor of surgery at the University of Berlin. After 1939 he 
also served as an advisory surgeon of the army, and then of the air force. In 1945 
he joined the Magistrat as Sauerbruch’s deputy, and also continued to work at the 
hospital in Moabit. Later, he rejoined the Charité.28
There were a number of other medical officers at the Magistrat, younger and less well 
known, but comparable in their training and career trajectories. Among them was 
Friedrich Schopohl, born in 1907, a gynaecological specialist at a number of Berlin 
hospitals before joining the Charité gynaecological clinic in 1936. He seems to have 
been a member of the National Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiber Partei (NSDAP) for a 
year in 1930, and again from 1937 until 1945, but was eventually cleared by a denazi-
fication tribunal.29 In 1946, several years before he was cleared, he was made chief 
consultant at the Charité’s gynaecological clinic, and in 1948 was appointed as profes-
sor of gynaecology at the University of Berlin. In 1945 and 1946 he was also co-opted 
to work with the Magistrat Health Department, for example on a committee to 
24 Theodor Brugsch, Arzt seit fünf Jahrzehnten (Berlin, 10th edn. 1978). Wolfram Kaiser, ‘In me-
moriam Theodor Brugsch (1878–1963)’, Zeitschrift für die gesamte innere Medizin und ihre Grenzge-
biete Klinik, Pathologie, Experiment, 33/18 (1978), 641–50.
25 BAB, Z47F, 7317/56/23, Kuznetsov to Zhukov, 7 Feb. 1946.
26 Jürgen Konert, Theodor Brugsch: Internist und Politiker (Leipzig, 1988), 126.
27 Brugsch, Arzt seit fünft Jahrzenhten, esp. 318–27.
28 TNA, Fo 371/46958, Political Intelligence Department German Personalities Report No. 88, 
13 Nov. 1945. Also see biography in Hanauske (ed.), Die Sitzungsprotokolle des Magistrats, vol. ii.
29 LAB, B Rep. 031/01/02-3468, report of the Magistrat’s medical denazification commission, 15 
Aug. 1949. Schopohl denied having joined the NSDAP, and put the fact that his name was listed in 
the membership files (and all the subscription had been paid) down to a prank played by university 
friends, and later another prank by colleagues.
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formulate abortion policy.30 Another example is Kurt Ballowitz, also born in 1907, 
who was a consultant in internal medicine and an infectious disease specialist. In 
addition to his work as district medical officer for Berlin-Mitte, he headed the 
Magistrat’s sub-department on municipal sanitation and hygiene. In December 
1945 he was appointed to the First Medical Clinic of the Charité.31
These ‘grand old men’ and their junior colleagues were also joined by some 
experienced medical officers. Franz Redeker, born in 1891, was recruited as a 
second deputy to Sauerbruch in early July 1945. He had studied medicine at some 
of the most prestigious German medical faculties. Following military service in the 
First World War, he worked at a nerve clinic in Bremen and later as a leading medi-
cal officer at the Thyssen works. After he passed the Prussian examination for dis-
trict medical officers in 1922, he worked at a social hygiene academy in Düsseldorf, 
from 1926 as a medical officer in Mansfeld (West Prussia), and from 1930 as a 
senior civil servant and the head of a medical department in osnabrück. From 
February 1933 until April 1945 he ran the medical department of the Berlin Police 
and a committee on forensic medicine. He also lectured at a state medical acad-
emy.32 In contrast to many members of the Central Health Administration (see the 
second half of the chapter), Redeker belonged to the generation of social hygienists 
who had displayed much closer affinity towards biological models of society, and 
throughout his career had taken an active role in securing the status and rights of 
the medical profession.33
Another experienced health officer was Bruno Harms. He joined the Magistrat 
as Sauerbruch’s successor in July 1946, after spending a year at the Central Health 
Administration of the Soviet zone. Born in 1890, he had studied natural sciences 
and medicine in Berlin. After military service in the First World War, he ran a 
social hygiene department at the Berlin health office. Later, he worked as a medical 
officer and chief of the district health office of Berlin-Tiergarten, until he was dis-
missed in 1933 because of his membership of the German Democratic Party 
(DDP). After 1933, he set up a private practice and worked at a hospital in 
 Berlin-Moabit. From November 1941 until January 1945 he served in the Wehrmacht.34 
30 LAB, B Rep. 031/01/02-3468, Prof. Dr Friedrich Schopohl, ‘Politischer Lebenslauf ’, 22 Feb. 
1949. Also see LAB, B Rep. 012/902-5, ‘Besprechung der Amtsärzte am Donnerstag, den 25 April 
1946’, where Redeker asked him to join a committee to formulate future policy on para. 218 (on 
abortion).
31 Deutscher Biographischer Index, fiche II 62/341–2. He took part at meetings of the Berlin-Mitte 
health officers, see e.g. LAB, C Rep. 131/02-02, ‘Protokoll über die Bezirksamtsbesprechung am 14. 
September 1945’ and following meetings. He also took part at the Magistrat-run meetings of Berlin 
medical officers, see B Rep. 012/902-5, ‘Bericht über die Dienstbesprechung der Amtsärzte am Don-
nerstag, den 23. August 1945’ and following meetings.
32 Deutscher Biographischer Index, fiche II 1049/57. Biography also in Hanauske (ed.), Die Sitzungs-
protokolle des Magistrats. Franz Redeker, ‘Magister in physica: Wo kommen wir her? Wo stehen wir? 
Wohin geht der Weg? Vortrag, gehalten auf dem Tag der Ärzte des öffentlichen Gesundheitsdienstes 
am 9. Juni 1949 in Bonn’, Der öffentliche Gesundheitsdienst, 11/5–6 (Stuttgart, 1950).
33 Moser, ‘Im Interesse der Volksgesundheit …’, 122.
34 Deutscher Biographischer Index, fiche II 524, 296–7, 420–1. Biography also in Hanauske (ed.), 
Die Sitzungsprotokolle des Magistrats. See also BAB, DQ1/1614, Maxim Zetkin, ‘Charakteristik der 
Präsidenten und Abteilungsleiter’, 2 Apr. 1946, 6.
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He knew Sauerbruch from his time as district medical officer and got to know him 
well at the Charité in the early 1930s—so he explained as one of the main support-
ing witnesses at Sauerbruch’s denazification tribunal.35
Georg Wundram was an older, experienced health officer. He was born in 1880 
and had trained in veterinary medicine at the veterinary academy in Berlin. Since 
1924 he had occupied leading positions in the state meat inspection service.36 His 
career, like that of Redeker and the other Charité men mentioned earlier, had 
flourished in the 1930s. From 1945 he worked at the Magistrat, and later also the 
Central Health Administration.37 The last person to be considered here is 
 Karl-Wilhelm Clauberg. Born in 1893, he was professor of hygiene and bacteriology 
at the University of Berlin from 1935, and a long-serving director of the bacteriology 
and serology departments at a number of hospitals, lastly in Berlin-Schlachtensee.38 
In 1945 Sauerbruch’s department appointed him to set up bacteriological laborator-
ies and testing centres in each city district and to coordinate their work.39
There was therefore an important overlap between the Magistrat’s health work 
and the elite of the Charité. Initially, meetings were even physically held in the 
surgical clinic of the Charité, until in mid-July 1945 the Health Department 
received its own offices.40 Sauerbruch’s appointment facilitated the recruitment of 
doctors whose prior contact with health administrative functions had been lim-
ited. A striking feature of this set was their continuous and stable careers, which 
remained untouched by war and political upheaval, and in most cases continued 
to thrive after 1945. Soviet priorities in these appointments did not lie in a strict 
denazification or weeding-out of ‘politically suspect’ individuals. Well into the 
1980s the Charité was known as a haven for former Nazis.41 The communist 
35 LAB, E Rep. 200–48, Witness statement for the denazification commission of Zehlendorf, 18 
Apr. 1946.
36 Zetkin, ‘Charakteristik’, 16.
37 LAB, C Rep. 118–40, Sauerbruch’s report on the organization of the Berlin city health depart-
ment, 8 Aug. 1945. LAB, B Rep. 012/902-5, ‘Bericht über die von der Abteilung für Gesundheits-
dienst veranstaltete Dienstversammlung der leitenden Ärzte und der Amtsärzte der Berliner 
Gesundheitsämter’, 27 May 1945.
38 Deutscher Biographischer Index, fiche II.
39 LAB, C Rep. 118–40, report and instructions from Maron and Sauerbruch to the district health 
offices, 27 June 1945.
40 LAB, B Rep. 012/902-5, the meeting on 12 July 1945 was the first to be held in the new 
Hauptgesundheitsamt.
41 on the Charité’s collaboration with the National Socialist regime, see esp. Sabine Schleiermacher 
and Udo Schagen (eds.), Die Charité im Dritten Reich: Zur Dienstbarkeit medizinischer Wissenschaft im 
Nationalsozialismus (Paderborn, 2008). on its post-war history, see Anna-Sabine Ernst, ‘Die beste 
Prophylaxe ist der Sozialismus’: Ärzte und medizinische Hochschullehrer in der SBZ/DDR, 1945–1961 
(Berlin, 1997); and documents in Heinz David, ‘… es soll das Haus die Charité heißen’: Kontinuitäten, 
Brüche und Abbrüche sowie Neuanfänge in der 300 jährigen Geschichte der Medizinischen Fakultät 
(Charité) der Berliner Universität, i (Berlin, 2004). on the post-war careers of leading members, see 
Udo Schagen, ‘Das Selbstbild Berliner Hochschulmediziner in der SBZ und ihre Verantwortung für 
die Universität im Nationalsozialismus’, in Siegried oehler-Klein and Volker Roelcke (eds.), Vergan-
genheitspolitik in der universitären Medizin nach 1945: Institutionelle und individuelle Strategien im 
Umgang mit dem National-sozialismus (Stuttgart, 2007), 121–44. Andreas Malycha, ‘Institutionelle 
und individuelle Strategien im Umgang mit der Nationalsozialistischen Vergangenheit in der 
Medizinischen Fakultät der Berliner Universität in den Jahren von 1945 bis 1949’, in oehler-Klein 
and Roelcke (eds.), Vergangenheitspolitik, 147–68.
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 surgeon Moritz Mebel remembered that it was popularly referred to as a ‘fascist 
protective wall’ (a pun on the ‘antifascist protective wall’, the official GDR descrip-
tion of the Berlin Wall). Another popular GDR saying was that the power of the 
workers and peasants ended at the gates of the Charité.42
Like their Charité colleagues, continuity also characterized the careers of most 
medical officers now at the Magistrat. When meetings of district medical officers 
resumed, leading officials such as Franz Redeker and Georg Wundram had been 
working in similar positions for decades, just like the majority of medical officers 
in their charge. There were a handful of individuals with a different history, such 
as the socialist and resistance-group organizer Max Klesse, and the Jewish mental 
health specialist Gustav Emanuel, both of whom had been sacked in 1933.43 But 
the majority’s careers had remained steady and consistent throughout the rise and 
collapse of the Third Reich. A significant portion of these medical officers were 
personally acquainted with the Charité grandees and with each other. Many of 
those present at the meetings of medical officers after 1945 had for years been 
meeting the same people, often in the same rooms.44
(ii) ‘The apolitical physician’
Questions of victimization and guilt were debated throughout Germany in a 
number of widely publicized exchanges and dialogues, especially once claims that 
Germans had been the major victims of the Nazis began to grow in volume. In 
spring and summer 1945, a series of open letters to Thomas Mann, still in exile in 
the United States (where he had become an advocate of a ‘hard peace’), appealed 
for him to return and experience the extent of German suffering.45 Germany had 
practically been one big concentration camp, wrote the writer Walter von Molo.46 
A few days later, the novelist Frank Thieß published an open letter on the anguish 
of the ‘internal emigrants’ (innere Emigranten) in Germany: those who had spent 
the years of Nazi rule in spiritual and intellectual isolation, but had not left the 
country. He was concerned that neither the occupiers nor the émigrés distinguished 
between the many silent sufferers and the few active Nazis. Not everyone was able 
42 Moritz Mebel (born 1923) in an interview with the author on 22 June 2003. Also see  Hans-Dieter 
Schütt, Rot und Weiß: Gesprächte mit Moritz Mebel (Berlin, 1999).
43 Max Klesse (born 1896) was district medical officer for Reinickendorf. Gustav Emanuel (born 
1879) was district medical officer for Schöneberg, see Deutsche Biographische Enzyklopädie, iii.
44 e.g. Prof. Clauberg, Dr Schöder, obermedizinalrat Dr Bullerdiek, obermedizinalrat Dr Spranger, 
and oberstadtinspektor Preis were among those present at a meeting of Berlin medical officers in Aug. 
1943, and reappeared at the post-war meetings organized by the new Magistrat. See LAB, B Rep. 
012/902-5, meeting of medical officers and their deputies on 17 Aug. 1943, and compare with later 
attendance lists. on the continuity of medical careers, see also Boris Böhm and Norbert Haase 
(eds.), Täterschaft—Strafverfolgung—Schuldentlastung: Ärztebiographien zwischen nationalsozialistischer 
 Gewaltherrschaft und deutscher Nachkriegsgeschichte (Leipzig, 2008). oehler-Klein and Roelcke (eds.), 
Vergangenheitspolitik.
45 Thomas Mann, Deutsche Hörer: 55 Radiosendungen nach Deutschland (Stockholm, 1945). 
Thomas Mann, War and the Future: An Address (Washington, 1943).
46 open letter from Walter von Molo to Thomas Mann, 13 Aug. 1945, in J. F. Grosser (ed.), Die 
große Kontroverse: ein Briefwechsel um Deutschland (Hamburg, 1963), 18–21.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 03/21/2015, SPi
 German Medical and Political Traditions 105
This is an open access publication. Except where otherwise noted, this work is distributed under the terms of a 
 Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence, a copy of which is available 
at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. For enquiries concerning use outside the scope of the licence 
terms, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com.
to watch the German tragedy unfold ‘from the comfortable seats of foreign coun-
tries’, he wrote.47 Many others joined this chorus, arguing that the question of guilt 
for Nazi crimes was a moral issue to be resolved by each person individually, and 
not one for outsiders to interfere in.48
Doctors had more specific concerns about their future careers. The extensive 
collaboration of the medical profession with the political institutions of the Third 
Reich has been documented and assessed in recent scholarship.49 Nearly half of all 
physicians joined the NSDAP.50 The medical profession faced a huge moral accusa-
tion as investigations into Nazi medicine began to gather momentum. By willingly 
serving the Nazi state, backing initiatives to cleanse German society, and embra-
cing racial science, observers noted, German doctors had disgraced themselves and 
betrayed their professional ethics. The American-organized Doctors’ Trial at 
Nuremberg, which began in December 1946, opened proceedings against twenty-
three leading German physicians who had helped to formulate and execute the 
euthanasia programme, or had conducted experiments on human beings without 
consent. The trial publicized many gruesome details of medical research under 
Nazi rule.51 Even before this trial, local denazification tribunals in all four occupa-
tion zones were busily assessing individual careers and responsibilities.
In this context, doctors and medical officers across Germany tried to defend 
both their own and their profession’s credibility and legitimacy. At the denazifica-
tion tribunals, in newspapers, periodicals, and other publications, the same two 
arguments resurfaced: first, that ‘real’ medicine was outside the reach of politics 
and untouched by it; and second, that the German national heritage in science and 
medicine was as relevant and important in 1945 as it had been decades before. This 
two-pronged argument enabled those who had maintained successful careers to 
claim that the fact of continuity was evidence of their disconnectedness from 
 politics and the permanence of their moral standards, and that they represented 
47 See ‘Die Innere Emigration’, open letter from Frank Thieß to Thomas Mann, 19 Aug. 1945, in 
Grosser (ed.), Die große Kontroverse, 24.
48 Gottfried Stein, Thomas Mann und wir: Zwei Briefe zur deutschen Situation (Essen, 1946). Con-
trast with Gottfried Bermann-Fischer (ed.), Die neue Rundschau: Sonderausgabe zu Thomas Manns 70. 
Geburtstag (6 June 1945).
49 Michael Kater, Doctors under Hitler (Chapel Hill, NC, 1989). Götz Aly, Peter Chroust, and 
Christian Pross (eds.), Cleansing the Fatherland: Nazi Medicine and Racial Hygiene (Baltimore, 1994). 
Robert Proctor, Racial Hygiene: Medicine under the Nazis (Cambridge, Mass., 1988). Charles Roland 
(ed.), Medicine Without Compassion (Hamburg 1992). Christian Pross, ‘Breaking through the Postwar 
Cover-up of Nazi Doctors in Germany’, Journal of Medical Ethics, 17 (Dec. 1991). Ernst Klee, Deut-
sche Medizin im Dritten Reich: Karrieren vor und nach 1945 (Frankfurt, 2001).
50 See Kater, Doctors under Hitler.
51 Alexaner Mitscherlich and Fred Mielke (eds.), Medizin ohne Menschlichkeit: Dokumente des Nürn-
berger Ärzteprozesses (1949; Frankfurt am Main, 1960), English trans. by Heinz Norden, Doctors of 
Infamy: The Story of the Nazi Medical Crimes (New york, 1949). Paul Weindling, ‘Ärzte als Richter: In-
ternationale Reaktionen auf die medizinischen Verbrechen während des Nürnberger Ärzteprozesses im 
Jahre 1946–1947’, in C. Wiesemann and A. Frewer (eds.), Medizin und Ethik im Zeichen von Auschwitz 
(Erlangen, 1996). Paul Weindling, ‘Human Guinea Pigs and the Ethics of Experimentation: The BMJ’s 
Correspondent at the Nuremberg Medical Trial’, British Medical Journal, 313 (7 Dec. 1996), 1467–70. 
Paul Weindling, ‘The origins of Informed Consent: The International Scientific Commission of Medi-
cal War Crimes and the Nuremberg Code’, Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 75/1 (Spring 2001), 
37–71. Ulf Schmidt, Justice at Nuremberg: Leo Alexander and the Nazi Doctors’ Trial (Palgrave, 2004).
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something bigger: the good of old, long-established German medical traditions, 
which long pre-dated the Nazi era.
Sauerbruch’s own public defence is a good illustration. After an American initia-
tive Sauerbruch was dismissed from his office in the Magistrat on 12 october 1945 
to face a denazification tribunal. He had never formally joined the NSDAP or its 
affiliated organizations, but the Americans were suspicious of his financial prosper-
ity and the award (and his acceptance) of the title of privy councillor (Geheimrat) 
by Göring in 1934. But even though Sauerbruch was temporarily removed from 
his administrative post, he was allowed to carry on as chief consultant at the  Charité 
and in other medical capacities. In January 1948, he was elected as head of the 
University of Berlin’s Surgical Society.52
It was thus not so much Sauerbruch’s immediate livelihood that was at stake at 
the tribunal’s hearings as his general credibility and legitimacy. His defence focused 
on the argument that his non-involvement in political life was a necessary, and 
inescapable, fact of his vocation. While he had obviously always been opposed to 
the Nazi regime, he argued, it was of more significance that he had remained true 
to his medical calling, and this precluded any political bias or action. The fact that 
his career had survived all economic, social, and political upheavals was evidence 
enough, he insisted: he had continued to adhere to his medical mission during the 
First World War and the 1918 revolution, during the Hitler regime and the Second 
World War. While the Nazis may have tried to befriend him, he had rejected them 
as he would any political cause. He had carried out his medical duty for the dying 
Hindenburg, and in return for this service (for which he had refused payment) he 
had received the apolitical and honorary title of privy councillor, as a sign of 
Göring’s gratitude. He had spoken to Hitler, Goebbels, and other leading Nazis, 
but only as a doctor and therefore ‘strictly professionally’.53 After several hearings 
the Magistrat denazification commission for doctors eventually accepted this 
defence and, in July 1949, cleared him of any charges of wrongdoing. The com-
mission concluded that as a leading doctor the Nazis had naturally tried to recruit 
 Sauerbruch, but he had never become involved; he had always ‘held back’.54
The reality of Sauerbruch’s involvement was rather more murky. While 
 Sauerbruch had indeed never joined the NSDAP, he had repeatedly demon-
strated his support. He had made a number of speeches in support of the Nazi 
assumption of power in 1933 and later in favour of Nazi policy.55 From 1937 he 
52 D. Tutzke, ‘Zur Wirksamkeit Ferdinand Sauerbruchs (1875–1951) in der Periode der antifas-
chistisch-demokratischen Umwälzung’, Zeitschrift fur die Gesamte Hygiene und Ihre Grenzgebiete, 31/5 
(1985), 318–20.
53 e.g. LAB, E Rep. 200–48, typed statement by Sauerbruch, 1 Nov. 1945, as well as other state-
ments and letters in this file.
54 LAB, B Rep. 031/01/02-5, Berufungsregistrierformular, signed by Dr Borm, 26 July 1949. Also 
see LAB, B Rep. 031/01/02-5, ‘Protokoll der Hauptverhandlung vom 26 Juli 1949 in Sachen Ge-
heimrat Prof. Dr Ferdinand Sauerbruch’.
55 See Marc Dewey et al., ‘Ernst Ferdinand Sauerbruch and His Ambiguous Role in the Period of 
National Socialism’, Annals of Surgery, 244/2 (Aug. 2006), 315–21. Wolfgang U. Eckart, ‘Ernst Fer-
dinand Sauerbruch (1875–1951) und die Charité-Chirurgie 1933–1945’, in Schleiermacher and 
Schagen (eds.), Die Charité, 189–206.
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had been a member of the Reich Research Council (Reichsforschungsrat), and as 
head of its medical section approved research projects involving experiments on 
concentration camp inmates and in asylums. In 1942, as surgeon-general of the 
Wehrmacht, Sauerbruch supported experiments with mustard gas on inmates of 
the concentration camp Natzweiler. As a member of the scientific senate of the 
Military Medical Academy, he took part in discussions about experiments on 
prisoners.56 With the evidence now available it seems undeniable that  Sauerbruch 
endorsed many of the objectives of the Nazi regime, and that he was rewarded 
for his loyalty. Not only was he made privy councillor, he was also decorated 
with the National Prize at the NSDAP Party Congress in Nuremberg in 1937. In 
1942 he was presented with the Knight’s Cross (Ritterkreuz zum Kriegsverdien-
stkreuz) by Karl Brandt, Hitler’s personal physician and a lieutenant general of 
the Waffen-SS, who was later convicted of war crimes at the Nuremberg medical 
trials.57 He was one of the richest doctors in Germany—during the Nazi years his 
annual income ranged between 200,000 and 300,000 Reichsmark58—and 
‘dwelled in mansions, kept expensive horses, and sometimes showered his favour-
ite assistants with miraculous presents such as automobiles’.59 He also wrote 
 petitions for some of his former students and colleagues standing trial in 
Nuremberg.60
Sauerbruch’s case shows that the denazification commissions’ criteria on Nazi 
activity (with their focus on the question of party membership) often proved inca-
pable of identifying and punishing those who had been involved. The case of 
 Sauerbruch’s deputy, Franz Redeker, was very similar. Although the Americans dis-
missed him from his Magistrat office in 1946 because of his suspected Nazi past, 
Redeker was soon cleared and appointed by the British to advise the Hamburg 
health office. Later he worked in the health department of the Interior Ministry 
of the Federal Republic, received an honorary professorship at the University of 
Bonn, before in 1953 becoming president of the Ministry of Health 
( Bundesgesundheitsamt). Redeker was an influential force in the development of 
the West German health service in the 1950s and 1960s. Like Sauerbruch and 
many of their colleagues, he was never forced to engage critically with the medical 
profession’s collaboration with Nazi programmes, or explain his own involve-
ment.61 Part of the problem was that the occupiers were uncertain about how the 
criminality of medicine in the Third Reich was to be defined and by which criteria 
56 See n. 55. Alexander Mitscherlich and Fred Mielke, Das Diktat der Menschenverachtung (Heidel-
berg, 1947), 83–4.
57 Ulrich-Dieter oppitz, Medizinverbrechen vor Gericht: Das Urteil im Nürnberger Ärzteprozess 
gegen Karl Brandt und andere sowie aus dem Pross gegen Generalfeldmarschall Milch (Erlangen, 1999). 
Ulf Schmidt, Karl Brandt, the Nazi Doctor: Medicine and Power in the Third Reich (London, 2007).
58 Dewey et al., ‘Sauerbruch’.
59 Michael Kater, Doctors Under Hitler, 34. Sauerbruch, Das war mein Leben (Munich, 1951), 291, 
372, 385. Rudolf Nissen, Helle Blätter—dunkle Blätter: Erinnerungen eines Chirurgen (Stuttgart, 
1969), 120.
60 Paul Weindling, Nazi Medicine and the Nuremberg Trials: From Medical War Crimes to Informed 
Consent (Houndmills, 2004), 304.
61 Entry for Franz Redeker in Udo Schagen and Sabine Schleiermacher (eds.), CD Rom: 100 Jahre 
Sozialhygiene, Sozialmedizin und Public Health in Deutschland (Berlin, 2005).
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it could be judged, as a result of which men like Sauerbruch escaped without rep-
rimand.62  Disagreements between the Allies on how to proceed and whom to 
punish further undermined denazification.
Sauerbruch’s dismissal and tribunal rallied together many of his colleagues. The 
Berlin mayor hoped that he would at the very least still carry on with his medical 
practice.63 Medical colleagues, among them those whom he had just helped to 
appoint, complained that doctors like them were being misunderstood and mal-
treated. The chief internist at the Gertrauden-Hospital wrote to Sauerbruch about 
his ‘unjust persecution’:
you have saved the true medical profession from the dangers of the past and transmit-
ted it safely into our times. you have ‘lived’ the tradition of true humanity and proved 
it possible to students and doctors alike. If you are therefore being persecuted today—
that is bitter indeed. one forgets that you have reached the highest standards in your 
profession to the benefit not only of Germany but of the whole world, and you have 
done this at a time when politicians only seemed keen on destruction. What would 
people have said if you had, like others, gone into exile: that would have been deser-
tion from our great country which was filled with suffering. By remaining here you 
have helped us all, you have helped us believe in a better future during the terrible, 
hate-filled Nazi time.64
Bruno Harms (a former colleague of Sauerbruch’s at the Charité), and Käthe Hus-
sels (medical officer for Berlin-Zehlendorf and Sauerbruch’s former student and 
Charité colleague) were among those who defended him at his hearings along these 
lines.65 This assessment of Sauerbruch has also survived in much more recent 
accounts. Jürgen Thorwald’s biography takes Sauerbruch at his word, when he 
observes that ‘the question [of political activism] was not one which could be asked 
of Sauerbruch. His egocentricity, personal pride and sense of medical mission were 
coupled with utter naivety in political matters. He simply found it hard to under-
stand how he could ever have figured in politics, ever exerted political 
influence.’66
Later chapters examine the successes and failures of the denazification pro-
grammes in much more detail. What matters here is that Sauerbruch’s repeated 
protests against the charges of political activism and proximity to the Nazi regime 
mirrored those put forward by doctors at denazification tribunals across the coun-
try. Their defences were not novel: most had insisted for decades that the medical 
profession demanded a special and autonomous status. Nor was the ‘apolitical’ 
nature of doctors only asserted in post-war Germany. Nonetheless, these 
62 Weindling, Nazi Medicine, 35. Böhm and Haase (eds.), Täterschaft—Strafverfolgung— 
Schuldentlastung.
63 LAB, C Rep. 118–90, letter from oberbürgermeister to Geheimrat Prof. Dr Sauerbruch, 25 
oct. 1945.
64 LAB, B Rep. 031/01/02-5, Prof. Dr Lauter to Sauerbruch, 24 oct. 1945.
65 LAB, E Rep. 200–48, witness statements by Käthe Hussels and Bruno Harms, both dated 18 
Apr. 1946.
66 Thorwald, Dismissal, 76. For a similar assessment see Wolfgang Genschorek, Ferdinand Sauer-
bruch: Ein Leben für die Chirurgie (Leipzig, 1978). Contrast with Kudlien and Andree, ‘Sauerbruch’.
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 proclamations deserve scrutiny for two reasons. First, the fact that a portion of the 
German medical profession interpreted their work very differently, discussed in the 
section on the Central Health Administration, resulted in clashes and disagree-
ments within the ranks of doctors and medical officers. Second, much more was at 
stake for doctors than had been the case before or elsewhere. Asserting the apoliti-
cal nature of their profession became a crucial means of saving individual reputa-
tions and careers. The people presented here reacted by mobilizing an often 
long-held position, designed to rally the medical profession for a joint defence 
which could limit and contain the damage of the Nazi period. Sauerbruch himself 
had long argued for the apolitical nature of medicine, despite conspicuous con-
trary evidence. In September 1934 he published an open letter to the German 
medical profession, defending a view of medicine as fundamentally independent, 
governed only by medical ethics, and resulting in a godlike perspective and non-
involvement in anything as base as politics.67 But in his post-war job at the Magis-
trat, this argument was now specifically directed towards the protection of himself 
and his colleagues from accusations and blame.
Sauerbruch’s position contributed to the power of his department and the for-
mulation of fundamental tenets. In early summer 1945 he argued successfully that 
medical officers and leading hospital positions must be appointed upon the sole 
recommendation of his department, and only ratified later by the mayor, because 
no one else had the required specialist knowledge. ‘Wrong appointments of medi-
cal officers can lead to a significant disruption of the general and absolutely unified 
leadership of the health office’, he insisted.68 This specialist medical knowledge, 
according to Sauerbruch, included an appreciation of its fundamentally apolitical, 
ethical, and scientific orientation. Nazi party membership, he insisted, had for 
many been a means to guarantee the continuation of their medical work; it was not 
a signifier of political activism, especially not for doctors and medical officers, who 
by their nature were so averse to politics. When in 1945 officials from one Berlin 
district proposed not just to remove leading Nazi doctors from their positions but 
also to sack the Red Cross nurses who had joined the party, Sauerbruch’s protest 
managed to prevent this. This procedure would be unsatisfactory for the mainte-
nance of the population’s health, he argued, and ‘besides, it was not humanly loyal 
to come to such conclusions on the more or less forced and rash act of joining the 
party, particularly by those still young’,69 Similarly, when Robert Rössle argued 
67 originally in Klinische Wochenschrift, 12 (1933), 1551, citation here from reprint in Internation-
ales Ärztliches Bulletin, 1 (Jan. 1934), 3–4. He went on to contradict this argument in the rest of the 
letter (which he had apparently been asked to write by the German government), where he defended 
the Nazi takeover of power and the government’s disregarding of the Versille Treaty, asked German 
doctors to support the new government, and argued that doctors in particular must not get involved 
in the apportioning of blame and guilt. See Kudlien and Andree, ‘Sauerbruch’, 212. Proctor, Racial 
Hygiene, 263 ff.
68 Minutes of the sixth Magistrat meeting on 11 June 1945, in Hanauske (ed.), Die Sitzungspro-
tokolle des Magistrats i. 126. Also see LAB, B Rep. 012/902-5, minutes of meeting on 23 May 1945.
69 LAB, B Rep. 012/902-5, ‘Bericht über die von der Abteilung für Gesundheitsdienst veranstaltete 
Dienstversammlung der leitenden Ärzte und der Amtsärzte der Berliner Gesundheitsämter am Don-
nerstag, den 31.5.1945’, 14 June 1945.
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that the practice of sacking all former NSDAP members from the medical faculty 
of the University of Berlin had to be prevented, Sauerbruch agreed. Among doc-
tors a distinction needed to be drawn, he argued, between the handful of Nazis 
who had committed crimes and the majority of ‘harmless party members’.70
Sauerbruch was an influential promoter of the ‘apolitical doctor’ who simply 
followed his calling, and deserved neither punishment nor regulation. Soon, simi-
lar declarations could be heard everywhere. once licences were granted and medi-
cal journals resumed publication after years of inactivity, they became an important 
forum. In editorials, birthday greetings, obituaries, and biographical notes on past 
German medical heroes, authors combined the portrayal of a depoliticized medi-
cine with an insistence on its autonomy. As J. Kottmaier wrote in the July 1947 
issue of the Medizinische Rundschau: ‘There is no other practical science which is 
less political than that of medicine’. He went on:
Nothing proves more clearly our loyalty to the apolitical ideal of medical care than our 
unfailing devotion to the Sisyphus work of caring for the wounded and sick during 
war, which lies completely above party politics. The doctor always only wished to 
serve. He held his profession sacred and uncontaminated from political dealings—so 
much so, that all the world’s politicians used and abused him and his selfless services 
as a matter of fact. And eventually we had to witness that type of politicised doctor 
who applied his knowledge and services to the planned destruction of human life. We 
were used politically, without being asked, and in this way some of us were seduced 
into political crimes.
To guard against interference from this ‘political type’, doctors had to close ranks 
and fight for their profession’s independence and autonomy.71
A later issue of the same journal reprinted the resolution of the West German 
professional Council of Doctors on the Nuremberg medical trials. It said the trials 
had illustrated what happened when institutions and bureaucracies were allowed 
to impinge on and interfere with medicine. In an explicit reference to the occupa-
tion, the resolution stated that the dangers were not over: ‘yesterday it was the 
National Socialist party and the Wehrmacht who intervened in, corrupted or 
destroyed the freedom of medical work, and tomorrow it can be foreign powers 
and socialist bureaucracy.’ The solution would be to guarantee the medical profes-
sion absolute sovereignty and freedom from political interference:
The basic demand remains—that in the work of providing active help for our 
fellow human beings, the self-reliance and self-responsibility of the doctor must 
remain untouched and that society has to do everything possible to guarantee the 
doctor’s sovereignty. No doctor should ever be given orders, instructions or com-
mands, and he should only follow the demands of his science and his professional 
ethics.72
70 Letter from Sauerbruch to v. Eicken, 21 Sept. 1945, in Kudlien and Andree, ‘Sauerbruch’, 220.
71 J. Kottmaier, ‘Die Friedenssendung des Arztes’, Medizinische Rundschau: Monatsschrift mit ärztli-
cher Akademie, 1/7 (July 1947), 227–8.
72 ‘Aus der Entschließung der Westdeutschen Ärztekammern zum Nürnberger Ärzteprozess’, 
Medizinische Rundschau: Monatsschrift mit ärztlicher Akademie, 1/12 (Dec. 1947), 543.
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Although more careful and cautious, Alexander Mitscherlich and Fred Mielke 
came to similar conclusions about the importance of medical autonomy in their 
report on the Nuremberg medical trials. Mitscherlich was appointed to head the 
German Medical Commission to the American Military Tribunal No. 1 in 
 Nuremberg, and with Mielke he published a report, later expanded to accompany 
a documentary collection on what they had heard. They noted that
[p]hysicians treating patients under a national health insurance are obliged to com-
municate their diagnosis to the government officials there employed. Thus the original 
relationship of trust between the doctor and patient is being more and more overshad-
owed by non-medical considerations. And even today, with the brutal, government-
inspired system of extirpation and eugenics ended, the physician must keep on fighting 
for that freedom of his profession to which the fulfilment of his fundamental duties is 
forever joined. For it seems to be of small moment for the future whether the imposed 
code of contempt for the dignity of man issues from bureaucratic indifference or ideo-
logical aggression.73
Most of these commentaries focused on general medical practice and the inde-
pendence of private physicians and medical researchers. But repeated references to 
bureaucratic influence, and Mitscherlich’s concerns about insurance doctors, show 
that autonomy was also seen as crucial to medical officers and state-employed doc-
tors. Given their proximity to the state, they were, in fact, identified as needing 
special protection from political interference.
In some features, Mitscherlich’s argument differed from that of other commen-
tators. He pointed to the dangers of a mechanistic view of disease and medical care, 
and argued that one of the central problems underlying Nazi medical abuses was 
that doctors had adopted overtly utilitarian aims. An ethically (rather than scien-
tifically) driven method had to rescue medical practice and restore the doctor–
patient relationship. It was not just a handful of doctors standing trial at Nuremberg, 
he insisted, but the ‘dubious ethics of unbridled medical experimentation’ much 
more generally.74 Despite such differences, Mitscherlich and other German observ-
ers agreed on one thing: the betrayal of the physicians’ ethic had been caused by 
the intrusion of the state into the medical profession, and it was essential that its 
freedom was guarded and protected from further interference. The diagnosis that 
an overpowering and manipulative state bureaucracy was at the heart of Nazi med-
ical abuses was often shared by American and British observers, keen to highlight 
the similarities between what they saw as the totalitarian states of Nazi Germany 
and the Soviet Union. In fact, Kottmaier’s abhorrence of the ‘political type’ and his 
reference to ‘socialist bureaucracy’ both point to another element in this analysis—
that Nazi doctors and health officers were in essence of the same type as  communist 
73 Mitscherlich and Mielke (eds.), Doctors of Infamy, 163–4. Also see later fuller edition Mitscher-
lich and Mielke translated from German by James Cleugh (formerly attached to the office of the 
Chief Counsel for War Crimes, Nuremberg), The Death Doctors (London, 1962).
74 But as Weindling observes, Mitscherlich was an outsider in the German medical establishment 
not just politically, but also professionally, e.g. in his commitment to psychosomatic medicine. 
 Weindling, Nazi Medicine and the Nuremberg Trials, 269.
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or socialist doctors and medical officers: both apparently subordinated medical 
work to their political agendas, threatened and harmed the medical profession’s 
unity and independence, and both had to be prevented from exerting any future 
influence.
Apart from advocating a ‘return’ to a depoliticized, rescientized, and independ-
ent medicine, a second rallying point in these proclamations concerned the German 
national medical heritage. Commentators suggested, at times explicitly, that 
intruding foreign powers threatened a noble German heritage, especially when 
they attempted to make judgements about Germans’ past crimes and misdemean-
ours. The people presented here regularly reminded both their German and Allied 
colleagues of the importance of their training, their past work experience, and their 
way of doing things. Many complained about foreign interference, particularly 
that by Soviet officers. In November 1946, Robert Rössle wrote in irritation: ‘There 
are constant Russian visitors with questions and suggestions. As though we are 
academic novices! Again, we are being put “into line”, “Attention! Eyes East-
wards!” ’75 Leading German officials protested about Soviet complaints that they 
lacked initiative in the fight against epidemics. To them, the expertise and resource-
fulness of German doctors and officials were beyond reproach. ‘The problem was 
not that doctors were lacking knowledge or understanding,’ they insisted, ‘but that 
organisational issues had not been solved (for example, the refusal to grant petrol, 
the stealing of our cars and bicycles, and so on). And incidentally, the local Russian 
commanders were only rarely sticking to the orders they had received from the 
Soviet administration.’76
others were more optimistic about being able to reassert the German heritage. 
Franz Redeker observed that the Soviet authorities had more or less given them a 
free hand in the reorganization of the health service. At a meeting of the Berlin 
district medical officers in July 1945, he reminded those present that in matters of 
public health organization and health insurance the German experience was unique 
and should be replicated and redeveloped. He ‘explained that the idea of a health 
insurance is alien to the Russian state and is not known there. The care for the sick 
and their provision with medicine and treatment in hospitals are the responsibility 
of the state. on the other side we have the way the Americans handle it: “Everyone 
on his own”. Germany has previously stood in between. The Red Army has now let 
us decide how to solve the problem. Hence we can once more revive the idea of a 
health insurance.’77
These arguments on the importance of an autonomous medical profession were 
different in tone from those on the freedom of science and medicine from state 
control advanced elsewhere. In Britain and the United States, internationalism was 
75 Letter from Robert Rössle to Herwig Hamperl, 17 Nov. 1946, in Hamperl and Doerr, 
Rössle, 6.
76 BAB, DQ1/1338, ‘Bespechungsniederschrift über die Sitzung der Leiter aller Provinzial- u. 
Landesgesundheitsämter der sowjetischen okkupationszone in der Zentralverwaltung für das 
 Gesundheitswesen am 2. oktober 1945’, 11. The name of this speaker was not identified in the min-
utes, but it was probably Sauerbruch, who was identified as a speaker earlier on the same page.
77 LAB, B Rep. 012/902-5, ‘Versammlung der Amtsärzte am 12. Juli im Hauptgesundheitsamt’.
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asserted as a key ingredient of scientific freedom.78 Henry Dale, president of the 
Royal Society, addressed an anniversary meeting in November 1945 in just these 
terms. The Royal Society had as its primary duty, Dale argued, to ensure that sci-
ence was conducted within ‘the framework of international collaboration which 
had been constructed between the wars’. He continued, ‘[i]f we are to achieve 
anything really to meet that need [of science today], we must somehow get rid of 
barriers which hinder the scientists of different countries from meeting simply as 
scientists, for the frank and informal interchange and friendly criticism of each 
others’ observations and ideas, in complete freedom from any national inhibitions 
or restrictions.’79
At the same time as Dale was lecturing on the virtues of scientific international-
ism, in Germany this internationalist rhetoric still lay in its infancy. Here, nation-
alism coloured much of the discussion. Those who argued for an apolitical, ‘free’, 
and scientific medicine often also claimed past German manifestations, accom-
plishments, and developments as this ideal’s best realization. The resulting contra-
diction between a resentment of state control and a celebration of German state 
institutions remained unresolved, even unidentified. In the discussions in the 
German medical journals, the statement that some form of international coopera-
tion was necessary, was invariably followed by an insistence that past German find-
ings and traditions were of special value and deserved special protection. Even in 
the current ‘dark times’, as a January 1947 editorial put it, two centuries of German 
culture and traditions testified to the special qualities of German knowledge and 
scholarship, and were ‘rays of light’ for the present. It went on:
Just as the German people have to build new homes and houses out of the rubble and 
ruins of their old buildings by making use of the old stones that have survived the fires, 
we as free German doctors also want to gather the old, tried and tested stones of our 
science, so that they can be cleansed, and together with new materials combined in a 
harmonious international construction of the most noble, honourable and compas-
sionate humanity which knows no national bounds.80
Although neither science nor its humane orientation knew national boundaries, spe-
cifically German building blocks were to be provided for its reconstruction. In similar 
language, the biochemist Emil Abderhalden argued a few months later that  Germany 
had to be recognized as an important member of the new international community 
and deserved equal rights, particularly because of its many past contributions in 
medicine and science. ‘The German doctor’, Abderhalden wrote, ‘looks with pride at 
the valuable contributions of German researchers. They remain unforgettable. 
78 For the British ‘freedom lobby’, see e.g. J. R. Baker, Science and the Planned State (New york, 
1945). J. R. Baker and A. G. Tansley, ‘The Course of the Controversy on Freedom in Science’, Nature, 
158 (oct. 1946), 574–6. Michael Polanyi, The Contempt of Freedom (London, 1940). Also see Jessica 
Reinisch, ‘The Society for Freedom in Science, 1940–1965’, MSc Diss., Imperial College London, 
Sept. 2000.
79 Henry Dale, ‘Address of the President, Sir Henry Dale, o.M., G.B.E., at the Anniversary Meet-
ing, 30 November 1945’, repr. in Proceedings of the Royal Society, B, 133, (1946), 123–39, at 133–4.
80 [The editors], ‘Zum Geleit!’, Medizinische Rundschau: Monatsschrift mit ärztlicher Akademie, 1/1 
(Jan. 1947), 1–2.
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The German people should and must be inspired by them and recover through 
them. They can be assured that these cultural and scientific contributions will have a 
favourable effect and will in the near future be generally accepted again.’81
This chorus by doctors and writers on the value and permanence of ‘good’ 
German medical traditions served specific purposes in the present: to absolve the 
profession from the accusation of collaboration with the Nazis and any crude politi-
cal involvement. The mental gymnastics they performed were in some ways very 
successful, as we will see in later chapters. By blaming troubles on the intrusion of 
politics into medicine they removed themselves from the scene of the crime. By 
maintaining that Nazi medicine had subordinated medical and scientific demands 
to political ends, that it had made medicine a tool for politicians, they found sup-
porting evidence for their argument on the profession’s need for independence.82 By 
decrying their left-wing medical colleagues as politically corruptible and equating 
their agendas with those of the Nazis, they cast themselves in a favourable light and, 
knowingly or not, found common ground with some of their occupiers. They were 
not, of course, ‘non-political’, but remarkably adept at protecting their status while 
adapting to new regimes and political agendas—skills they had already demon-
strated in the 1930s. Their allusions to the golden fruits of old German traditions, 
intellectual strength, and cultural achievements signalled to the occupiers not to 
meddle, and not to impose new orders or new ways of doing things.
(iii) Rudolf Virchow (version 1)
Another expression of this self-awareness of past German achievements can be 
found in the many newly published, or reprinted and amended, biographies and 
biographical essays on famous doctors and scientists. They identified older and 
positive German traditions and called for their application in the present. In writ-
ing about their famous teachers or colleagues, doctors and medical scientists cele-
brated German idols as the founding fathers or forebears of current good medical 
practice, and presented themselves as evidence of this heritage’s survival. These 
heroes now reminded them that, after all, not everything about German history 
was to be regretted. Although these figures often had significant international rep-
utations, and in many cases had worked abroad for a long time and with foreign 
collaborators, in these accounts their German ancestry was seen as most crucial.
The famous pathologist Rudolf Virchow became a favourite icon of the post-war 
years. A wealth of articles and biographies celebrated his revolutionary scientific 
81 Emil Abderhalden, ‘Ärzte an die Front’, Medizinische Rundschau: Monatsschrift mit ärzlicher 
Akademie, 1/9 (Sept. 1947), 313–15. Michael Kaasch and Joachim Kassch, ‘Die Auseinandersetzung 
des XX.Leopoldina-Präsidenten und des Schweizbürgers Emil Abderhalden um Eigentum und 
Entschädigung mit der sowjetischen und der amerikanischen Besatzungsmacht (1945–1949): Ein 
Beitrag zur Erforschung der letzten Lebensjahre von Emil Abderhalden’, Acta Historica Leopoldina, 36 
(2000), 329–84. Wolfram Kaiser and Werner Piechocki, ‘Theodor Brugsch als Direktor und klinischer 
Lehrer an der Medizinischen Universitätsklinik Halle’, Zeitschrift für die gesamte innere Medizin und 
Ihre Grenzgebiete, 25/22 (1970), 1028–34.
82 [The editors], ‘Besinnung und Konzentration’, Ärztliche Forschung: Zeitschrift über die Forschung-
sergebnisse der gesamten Medizin, 1/1 (25 Feb. 1947), pp. i–ii.
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 findings, his healthy patriotism, his apolitical dedication to pure medicine, his 
humane medical practice, his civic-mindedness, his battle against outmoded German 
structures and institutions, his application of scientific principles to public health—
in short, his status as a German role model.83 By 1953, his image had been built: in 
a speech commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of Virchow’s death, Curt Froboese, 
director of the pathological institute at Berlin-Spandau, declared that the medical 
profession must once again learn to follow the example of ‘the great German and 
truly democratic man of science!’84 Virchow was ‘our greatest pathologist’, Froboese 
proclaimed. He had contributed the ground-breaking conception of cellular pathol-
ogy and was an authority in many other medical fields, but above all came Virchow’s 
contributions to practical and ‘pure’ medicine.85 Virchow’s contemporaries from 
across the world had recognized his unique intellectual force, and many thought that 
he was at least as influential on medical practice as Hippocrates.
But more recently, Froboese went on, Virchow’s name had been tarred by negative 
propaganda. Unfortunately ‘[t]oday and after the recent decades’ upheavals . . . still 
not all doctors are defending the true and just position, which Virchow’s impeccable 
character, his physically and intellectually fearless nature and his extensive use of self-
criticism, deserves.’86 The whole German medical profession must celebrate Virchow 
as their true scientific and ethical role model and father, Froboese insisted. The young 
generation of doctors, particularly, had to learn to appreciate his scientific impor-
tance, his personal integrity, and true patriotism. ‘May the young ones be led to 
Virchow!’, Froboese proclaimed, ‘May others, who over the course of the years have 
distanced themselves from Virchow (deliberately or not) be led back to him! May we 
all resolve to leave this extraordinary man out of the play of wild passions and instead 
bestow on him the honour and justice he deserves as a seeker of truth!’87
In these accounts Virchow’s participation in the revolution in 1848 in Berlin was 
presented, if at all, as a very marginal episode. of the 307 pages of Helmut Unger’s 
1953 biography, roughly two deal with Virchow in 1848. Unger concluded that ‘Vir-
chow’s participation at the short-lived revolution was relatively insignificant . . . And 
even when he was involved in his politics, Virchow never neglected his pathological 
courses for a single day.’88 Unger was a press officer for the Nazi Doctors’ League and 
active in the circle of doctors around Hitler who urged him to adopt a euthanasia 
83 Edith Heischkel, ‘Rudolf Virchow als Publizist’, Medizinische Rundschau: Monatsschrift mit Ärzt-
licher Akademie, 1/7 (July 1947), 230–3. Hellmuth Unger, Virchow: Ein Leben für die Forschung 
(Hamburg, 1953). Rössle’s memorial speech at the celebration of the 125th anniversary of the birth of 
Virchow in oct. 1946 in Unger, Virchow, 8. Compare with the different assessments in Erwin Ackerk-
necht, Rudolf Virchow: Doctor, Statesman, Anthropologist (Madison, 1953).
84 Deutscher Biographischer Index, 2nd ser., fiche 411/121 and LAB, C Rep. 118/105, ‘Verzeichnis 
der ärztlichen Leiter und Chefärzte der Berliner Krankenanstalten’, 1.IV.1948, 17. In 1952/3, 
Froboese was head of the German Society for Pathology, which had been founded by Virchow.
85 Prof. Dr Curt Froboese, Rudolf Virchow, = 5.9.1902—ein Gedenk- und Mahnwort an die heutige 
Ärztegeneration 50 Jahre nach seinem Tode (Stuttgart, 1953), 8.
86 Froboese, Virchow, 13.
87 Froboese, Virchow, 62.
88 Unger, Virchow, 161–2. Kiessling points out that Unger was influential in the formulation of racial 
hygiene programmes, see Claudia Sybille Kiessling, Dr. med. Hellmuth Unger (1891–1953), ein Dichter-
arzt und ärztlicher Pressepolitiker in der Weimarer Republik und im Nationalsozialismus (Husum, 1999).
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programme. Before this latest work on Virchow, in the 1930s Unger had published a 
novel which promoted euthanasia, as well as popular accounts of Robert Koch’s and 
Emil von Behring’s achievements.89 Now, in the post-war years, Unger’s and Froboese’s 
analyses stood in great contrast to the assessments of Virchow which are presented in 
the second half of this chapter ((iii) Rudolf Virchow (version 2), and which focused 
almost exclusively on Virchow’s revolutionary engagement. Froboese’s mention of 
various recent attempts at blackening Virchow’s name, of the ‘play of wild passions’, 
and that not all German doctors appreciated Virchow in the right manner should be 
understood as references not just to leading Nazis’ condemnation of Virchow but also 
to communist assessments of him as one of the important revolutionaries of 1848.
Along with Virchow, figures such as Robert Koch, Emil von Behring, and Paul 
Ehrlich were turned into public favourites and portrayed in a similar celebratory 
light.90 Behring had for some time featured as an icon in National Socialist litera-
ture, and Hellmuth Unger and the bacteriologist Heinrich Zeiss had celebrated 
him in a series of publications in the 1930s. But now, as positive German national 
traditions were to be rescued, the Jewish doctor Ehrlich was fitted onto this canvas. 
Ehrlich’s former secretary Martha Marquardt republished her memoirs of Ehrlich 
with a new preface and postscript, and proclaimed:
only the shining examples of great men can save us from discouragement and faintheart-
edness in the face of inhuman atrocities and destruction which have surrounded us—
only the examples of a man like Ehrlich, a man who dedicated and sacrificed his whole 
life to the welfare and healing of mankind, never failing in his idealism, his optimism 
and his faith . . . To Ehrlich nothing on earth mattered except scientific research aimed at 
overcoming suffering and disease, and increasing the happiness of mankind.91
A series of 1947 advertising flyers by the chemical concern Hoechst made use of 
these icons (see Fig. 4.1). Much of this output was not just popular, but also had 
important pedagogic functions: through biographies of German idols and repub-
lished textbooks by the Charité grandees, and their lectures at the universities, 
there was an opportunity for the younger generation, who had not actually experi-
enced pre-1933 German medicine, to take on the mantle for themselves.92
89 Weindling, Nazi Medicine and the Nuremberg Trials, 256.
90 E. F. Podach, Robert Koch (Berlin, 1947). Hellmuth Unger, Robert Koch: Roman eines grossen 
Lebens (1936; Hamburg, 1947). Wilhelm von Drigalski, Im Wirkungsfelde Robert Kochs (Hamburg, 
1948). Robert Möllers, Robert Koch: Persönlichkeit und Lebenswerk, 1843–1910 (Hanover, 1950). 
Richard Bochalli, Robert Koch: Schöpfer der modernen Bakteriologie (Stuttgart, 1954). Hellmuth Unger, 
Emil von Behring (Hamburg, 1948); previous edn. Unvergängliches Erbe: das Leben Emil von Behrings, 
(oldenburg, 1942). Richard Bieling, Der Tod hat ein Nachsehen: Emil von Behring, Gestalt und Werk 
(1941; Bielefeld, 1954). Martha Marquardt, Paul Ehrlich als Mensch und Arbeiter: Erinnerungen aus 
dreizehn Jahren seines Lebens (1902–1915) (1924; Berlin, 1951) (English edn. 1949). Hans Loewe, 
Paul Ehrlich: Schöpfer der Chemotherapie (Stuttgart, 1950).
91 Marquardt, Paul Ehrlich, 250.
92 Brugsch’s famous textbook of internal medicine was republished in its 11th edn. in 1947. Theo-
dor Brugsch, Lehrbuch der Inneren Medizin (11th and 12th edns., Berlin, 1947). Berlin University 
(later Humboldt University) was reopened on 29 Jan. 1946. on lecture schedules for Berlin, see e.g. 
Friedrich v. Bergmann, ‘Der neue Studienplan für Mediziner’, Das Deutsche Gesundheitswesen, 1/4 (28 
Feb. 1946), 64–8. on the ‘post-war surgeries’ of medical textbooks (i.e. the deletion of offending 
 passages from republished textbooks) see Proctor, Racial Hygiene, 303–6.
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Figure 4.1. Farbwerke Hoechst advertising flyer [1947]
This material is not covered by the Creative Commons licence terms that govern the reuse 
of this publication. For permission to reuse please contact the rights holder directly.
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THE CENTRAL HEALTH ADMINISTRATIoN 
oF THE SoVIET ZoNE (ZVG)
(i) Origins and Composition
In offices not far from the Magistrat, continuities of a very different kind were 
advanced by the Central Health Administration (Zentralverwaltung für das 
Gesundheitswesen, ZVG). This organization had its roots in the Soviet order 
No. 17 of 27 July 1945, which created a number of ‘central administrations’ for 
different functions. In the other zones administrations were established only at 
the local and provincial level, but from the beginning the Soviet authorities 
focused on centralized administrations, or quasi-ministries, charged with a range 
of functions for the whole of the Soviet zone.93 Demands for a central health 
ministry had been voiced regularly throughout the 1920s and 1930s, and formed 
a central feature of many German émigrés’ plans for the future public health 
service.94 Its creation in the Soviet zone meant that for the first time in Germany 
there was to be an institution responsible for the whole of the public health and 
medical services.
on 24 August 1945 the ZVG began its work under two social democrats, Paul 
Konitzer and Ignatz Zadek, supervised by the Health Department of SMAG.95 It 
was directly responsible for the running of the health service in the Soviet zone, a 
task which involved issuing directives and instructions to German doctors on how 
to interpret and implement the Soviet orders; coordinating the public health work 
of Land and provincial departments; appointing medical officers and evening out 
surpluses and shortages of personnel by relocating officials and doctors; collecting 
and compiling medical statistics; and long-term planning work.96 on 15  September 
93 BAB, DQ1/2, ‘Befehl des obersten Chefs der Sowjetischen Militär-Administration und 
oberkommandierenden der sowjetischen Besatzungstruppen in Deutschland, den 27. Juli 1945, Nr. 
17’, Marshall Zhukov, Lieutenant-General Bokov, Colonel Kurasov, Lieutenant ognev. BAB, 
DQ1/1554, ‘Zusammenstellung der Vorschriften allgemeiner Bedeutung auf dem Gebiete des 
 Gesundheitswesens nach dem Stande vom 1. März 1948’ for a list of other Soviet orders concerning 
public health.
94 See e.g. ‘Aufbau eines demokratischen Gesundheitswesens in Deutschland’, in Ursula Langkau-
Alex and Thomas Ruprecht (eds.), Was soll aus Deutschland werden? Der Council for a Democratic 
Germany in New York, 1944–1945: Aufsätzte und Dokumente (Frankfurt, 1995), 230–47. TNA, Fo 
371/46885, ‘Plan for the reconstruction of the German Health organisation’, Hugo Freund, 26 oct. 
1945. Kurt Glaser, Vom Reichsgesundheitsrat zum Bundesgesundheitsrat: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des 
deutschen Gesundheitswesens (Stuttgart, 1960).
95 on Konitzer and Zadek, see Martin Broszat and Hermann Weber (eds.), SBZ Handbuch 
(Munich, 1990), 244–52. For some of the Soviet medical faculties and institutes represented, see 
BAB, Z47F 7317/56/23, ‘List of workers recommended for scientific work in the Soviet occupation 
Zone of Germany’, signed by Deputy People’s Commissar of Health of the USSR, Milovidov, attached 
to a report from Kuznetsov to Zhukov, on the work of the Health Department of SMAG for Dec. 
1945, 14 Feb. 1946.
96 Moser claims that the ZVG was involved in the drafting of some of the most significant orders 
on public health in the Soviet zone, which hitherto had been considered to be of Soviet origin. See 
Moser, ‘Im Interesse der Volksgesundheit …’, 260, 341. She is referring to BAB, DQ1/1406, letter from 
the legal department of the ministry of health of the German Democratic Republic to Minister Steidle 
and State Secretary Matern, 12 July 1951.
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1945 Soviet officials approved the ZVG’s initial appointments as well as a draft of 
its statute which was to guide the future work of the zone’s health service.97
For the first few years after its establishment the ZVG had around 170 staff. It 
was divided into three administrative and approximately ten specialist departments 
(see Tables 4.1–4.3). It was headed by a president, and by December 1945 three 
vice-presidents had also been appointed, each overseeing three or four depart-
ments. In contrast to the Magistrat Health Department, in this organization uni-
versity professors, doctors, and medical experts whose careers had been interrupted 
by the Nazi rise to power in January 1933 (through loss of positions, emigration, 
imprisonment, or involuntary periods spent in other work) made up a significant 
portion of senior posts.
Who were the people working at the ZVG? Much of post-war life in Germany, 
and German contacts with Allied officials, revolved around political parties, so 
they form a useful way of identifying and demarcating different groups and net-
works. It was a primary aim of the occupation, repeatedly asserted at the wartime 
conferences, to cleanse Germany of all Nazi influences, and as a result German 
political organizations were officially dissolved by the end of the war. But just over 
a month into the occupation, the Soviets had encouraged the re-formation of 
German political parties—some time before their French, British, and American 
counterparts. Soviet order No. 2 of 10 June agreed to the establishment of ‘anti-
fascist parties and trade unions’ in the territory of Berlin and the Soviet zone.98 The 
Communist Party (KPD) reconstituted itself on the following day, the Social 
Democrats (SPD) a few days later, and over the next few weeks the Christian 
Democrats (CDU) and Liberal Party (LPD) followed.99
Many activists had worked within their party circles for decades, and it is pos-
sible to distinguish between three roughly drawn groups of people working at the 
ZVG. Social democrats were one group, and in the immediate post-war period 
were the majority among executive officials. Many had been involved in municipal 
public health in the 1920s and 1930s. The communists were another group, and 
their numbers increased from late 1945 onwards due to the staggered return of 
émigrés to the Soviet zone. Most of them had also worked in the German public 
health service before 1933. Although well represented in the ZVG, both KPD and 
SPD members were a small minority among doctors and health officers in the 
Soviet zone overall.100 A third group consisted of a number of people who did not 
belong to any political party. Maxim Zetkin described some of them as ‘politically 
blank slates’,101 while others had long military-medical careers or some  involvement 
97 BAB, DQ1/2, ‘Statut der Zentralverwaltung für das Gesundheitswesen in der sowjetischen 
okkupationszone’, Sokolov, 15 Sept. 1945. BAB, DQ1/2, ‘Satzungen der Deutschen Zentralverwal-
tung für das Gesundheitswesen auf dem Gebiet der sowjetischen okkupationszone Deutschlands’, 12 
Sept. 1945, Kuznetsov, approved by Serov.
98 Printed in Berliner Zeitung, 10 June 1945, 1.
99 Hanauske (ed.), Die Sitzungsprotokolle des Magistrats, i. 27–8.
100 See esp. Anna-Sabine Ernst, ‘Die beste Prophylaxe’.
101 Klaus Blömer (born 1921) and Hans-Jürgen Behrendt (born 1917) were described by Zetkin in 
this way, Zetkin, ‘Charakteristik’.
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Table 4.1. Heads of Department in the Central Health Administration of the Soviet occupation Zone, october to December 1945
OCTOBER 1945 DECEMBER 1945
President Dr Paul Konitzer (Aug. 45–Feb. 47)  
SPD
President Dr Paul Konitzer (Aug. 45–Feb. 47) SPD
1st Vice-president Dr Ignatz Zadek (Aug.–Nov. 45)  
SPD
1st Vice-president Dr Maxim Zetkin (Dec. 45–49) KPD
2nd Vice-president Dr Fritz Leo/Lettow KPD  
(Aug. 45–?)
2nd Vice-president Dr Ignatz Zadek (Dec. 45–Feb. 46) SPD
3rd Vice-president None 3rd Vice-president Dr Bruno Harms (Dec. 45–July 46)  
DDP/LPD
Administration Dr Paul Konitzer SPD General Administration Dr Joseph Schölmerich (Scholmer) KPD
1. Sciences Dr Friedrich v. Bergmann 1. Sciences Dr Friedrich v. Bergmann
2. Secretariat Dr Werner Holling 2. Secretariat/Legal Department Dr Werner Holling
3. Human Resources Dr Fritz Leo/Lettow KPD 3. Human Resources Dr Fritz Leo/Lettow KPD
4. Economy & Finances Dr Erich Taeger 4. Finances & Economy Dr Erich Taeger
5. Mother & Child Dr Anneliese Hamann KPD 5. Mother & Child Dr Anneliese Hamann KPD
6. Preventive Medical Care Dr Fabian SPD 6. Preventive Medical Care Dr Max Klesse SPD
7. Social Care Dr Alfred Beyer SPD 7. Social Care Dr Alfred Beyer SPD
8. Medical Affairs Dr Hermann Bermann 8. Medical Affairs Dr Hermann Bermann
9. Food & Consumption Hygiene Dr Georg Wundram 9. Nutritional & Food Hygiene Dr Georg Wundram
10. Free Health Professions Dr Kurt Hess 10. Pharmaceutical Industry Willi Mueller
11. Free Health Professions Dr Kurt Hess
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Table 4.2. Heads of Department in the Central Health Administration of the Soviet occupation Zone, April to September 1946
2 April 1946 1 September 1946
President Dr Paul Konitzer (Aug. 45–Feb. 47) SPD President Dr Paul Konitzer (Aug. 45–Feb. 47) SPD/SED
1st Vice-president Dr Maxim Zetkin (Dec. 45–49) KPD 1st Vice-president Dr Maxim Zetkin (Dec. 45–49) KPD/SED
2nd Vice-president Dr Alfred Beyer (Mar. 46–Nov. 48) SPD 2nd Vice-president Dr Alfred Beyer (Mar. 46–Nov. 48) SPD/SED
3rd Vice-president Dr Bruno Harms (Dec. 45–July 46) LDP 3rd Vice-president Dr Barbara v. Renthe-Fink (Feb. 47–June 48) 
SPD/SED
General Department Dr Joseph Schölmerich (Scholmer) KPD
Deputy: Robert v. Radetzky
1. Sciences Dr otto Jäger
1. Sciences Dr Friedrich v. Bergmann  
no deputy
2. organization Dr Carl Coutelle KPD/SED
2. Secretariat Dr Werner Holling, now SPD  
Deputy: Dr Marie Schulte-Langforth
3. Medical Profession Dr Joseph Schölmerich (Scholmer) KPD/SED
3. Human Resources Dr Fritz Leo/Lettow KPD  
Deputy: Dr Carl Coutelle KPD
4. Economy & Finances von Bargen
4. Economy & Finances Dr Erich Taeger  
Deputy: Martin Wende
5. Internal Administration Josef Lenz
5. Mother & Child Dr Anneliese Hamann KPD  
no deputy
6. Medical Care Dr Erich Schäfer
6. Preventive Medical Care Dr Max Klesse SPD  
Deputy: Dr Wladimir Lindenberg
7. Preventive Health Care Dr Max Klesse SPD/SED
7. Social Medicine Dr Ernst Holstein  
no deputy
8. Hygiene & Epidemic  
Control
Dr Hermann Bermann
8. Medical Affairs Dr Herman Bermann  
Deputy: Dr Herbert Baer KPD
9. Nutritional & Food  
Hygiene
Dr Georg Wundram
9. Food Inspection & Control Dr Georg Wundram  
Deputy: Dr Rudolf Meyer
10. Medical Industry Willi Mueller
10. Pharmaceutical Affairs Willi Mueller  
Deputy: Theodor Kluge
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Table 4.3. Heads of Department in the Central Health Administration of the Soviet occupation Zone, September 1947 to october 1948
September 1947 October 1948
President Dr Karl Linser (Feb. 47–Nov. 48) President Dr Karl Linser (Feb. 47–Nov. 48)
1st Vice-president Dr Maxim Zetkin (Dec. 45–49)  
KPD/SED
1st Vice-president Dr Maxim Zetkin (Dec. 45–49)  
KPD/SED
2nd Vice-president Dr Alfred Beyer (Mar. 46–Nov. 48)  
SPD/SED
2nd Vice-president Dr Alfred Beyer (Mar. 46–Nov. 48)  
SPD/SED
3rd Vice-president Dr Barbara v. Renthe-Fink  
(Feb. 47–June 48) SPD/SED
3rd Vice-president Dr Kurt Winter (June 48–49)  
KPD/SED
1. Sciences Dr otto Jäger 1. General Department Dr Walter Axel (Fräser) Friedeberger 
SPD/SED
2. organization & Planning Dr Rudolf Neumann KPD/SED 2. Training & Personnel Dr Carl Coutelle KPD/SED
3. Medical Profession Dr Carl Coutelle KPD/SED 3. Medical & Preventive Health Care Dr Erich Schäfer
4. Finances & Economy Feuerboether 4. General Hygiene & Epidemic 
Control
Dr Johannes Kathe
5. Statistics & Information Dr Eva Schmidt-Kolmer KPÖ/SED 5. Medical Research & Training Dr Richard Wegener
6. Medical Care Dr Erich Schäfer 6. Pharmaceutical Affairs Dr Konstantin Pritzel SPD/SED
7. Preventive Health Care Dr Erwin Marcusson KPD/SED
8. Hygiene & Epidemiology [?]
9. Food Inspection & Control Dr Georg Wundram
10. Medical Industry &  
Pharmaceutical Affairs
Willi Mueller
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in Nazi medicine behind them. Some insisted on their aloofness from politics, and 
a number of them were also active in the Magistrat Health Department.
This third cluster was not a coherent group but rather an assembly of a range of 
backgrounds and mindsets. The SPD and KPD members, by contrast, shared simi-
lar biographies, and many were personally acquainted with each other. Most came 
from bourgeois or petty-bourgeois backgrounds; those who were Jewish came from 
assimilated families. The older generation among them, those born in the mid-
1880s and 1890s, made up the majority of health officers.102 Having grown up in 
Wilhelmine Germany they were contemporaries of the leading officers among the 
occupiers.103 Most of them had fought in the German army in the First World 
War.104 A younger generation, those born in the first decade of the twentieth cen-
tury, was also well represented.105 They had come of age during the crises of the 
aftermath of the First World War and the early years of the Weimar Republic. 
Many were later active on various Second World War fronts, but unlike their 
 Magistrat colleagues few of them fought in the Wehrmacht.106 A third generation, 
those born after 1910 and who qualified under the Nazis, made up only a handful 
of people in the ZVG.107
The majority of the SPD and KPD groups had studied medicine at major 
German universities, and a significant portion ended up in Berlin for their final 
102 Herbert Baer (born 1898), Alfred Beyer (born 1885), Walter Friedeberger (born 1898), Anne-
liese Hamann (born 1894), Max Klesse (born 1896), Katharina Klingelhöfer (born 1889), Paul 
Konitzer (born 1894), Erwin Marcusson (born 1899), Rudolf Neumann (born 1899), Ignatz Zadek 
(1887), Maxim Zetkin (1883). Felix Boenheim (born 1890) was active in other parts of the SBZ 
health service. Helmut Lehmann (born 1882) had many contacts with it in his position as vice- 
president of the central administration for work and social security. Friedrich Wolf (born 1888) shares 
many similarities with individuals there. Many at the ZGV who were not part of the KPD and SPD 
sets were also of this generation, e.g. Bruno Harms (1890), Erich Taeger (1884), Georg Wundram 
(1880), Martin Wende (1894), Josef Lenz (1889), Hugo Holthöfer (1883), Else Deckert (1893).
103 e.g. the four commanders-in-chief: Montgomery was born in 1887, Eisenhower in 1890, 
Zhukov in 1896, Koenig in 1898.
104 Alfred Beyer had been seriously wounded, Deutscher Biographischer Index, 2nd ser., fiche 
118/25–8. Felix Boenheim was excluded from the army after two years’ service for insulting the War 
Ministry, see Thomas Michael Ruprecht, Felix Boenheim: Arzt, Politiler, Historiker: Eine Biographie 
(Hildesheim, 1992). on Erwin Marcusson, see Müller-Ensberg et al. (eds.), Wer War Wer in der DDR? 
(2001). on Maxim Zetkin, see BBAW, Zetkin Nachlass, ‘Lebenslauf ’ [1947].
105 Rolf Becker (1906) was head of a department of the Ministry of Health in Sachsen-Anhalt; Carl 
Coutelle (1908); Fritz Lettow/Leo (1904); Hermann Redetzky (1901) was a leading official in the 
health administration of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, and present at meetings of the regional health 
offices; Kurt Winter (1910). From outside the KPD and SPD sets, to this generation belonged e.g. 
Werner Holling (1909), Friedrich von Bergmann (1907), Hermann Bermann (1900), Willi Mueller 
(1906), Marie Schulte-Langforth (1903), Wladimir Lindenberg (1905), Ernst Holstein (1901), Theo-
dor Kluge (1904), Edmund Döring (1905).
106 The Spain veterans (Becker, Coutelle, Baer, Winter, Zetkin) make up a group in themselves. 
Becker, Coutelle, and Baer also fought at the Burmese front, while Zetkin was with the Red Army. 
Hermann Redetzky and Paul Konitzer fought in the Wehrmacht. For Redetzky see BBAW, Nachlass 
Redetzky, Beförderungsurkunde, 5 oct. 1943; for Konitzer see Schagen and Schleiermacher (eds.), 
CD Rom: 100 Jahre Sozialhygiene. Members of the Wehrmacht outside the two party sets included 
Bruno Harms, Wolfgang Cyran, Friedrich Bentzin, Edmund Döring, and Hans-Jürgen Behrendt. For 
Harms, see Deutscher Biographischer Index, 2nd ser., fiche 524/296–7 and 420–1. For Cyran, Bentzin, 
Döring, and Behrendt see Zetkin, ‘Charakteristik’.
107 Eva Schmidt-Kolmer (1913); Joseph Schölmerich (1913). From outside the sets, Klaus Blömer 
(1921), Wolfgang Cyran (1911), Hans-Jürgen Behrendt (1917), Friedrich Bentzin (1912).
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semesters or practical year of clinical training. Most then worked for the municipal 
health system, particularly in municipal hospitals or as district medical officers. 
Felix Boenheim, for example, had spent a short period at the Moabit Hospital in 
Berlin before being drafted into the army. After the end of the First World War he 
worked at the municipal hospitals in Rostock, Nuremberg, and Stuttgart, before 
continuing his career at the Hufeland Hospital in Berlin.108 Similarly, Erwin 
 Marcusson had been a junior doctor at the municipal hospital in Berlin-Neukölln, 
after having worked as a school medical officer in Altenburg.109 Ignatz Zadek, 
whose father was a well-known SPD social hygienist, had until 1933 also worked 
at the municipal hospital in Neukölln.110 Maxim Zetkin had worked at the muni-
cipal hospital in Augsburg before the First World War, and from 1918 until his 
move to Moscow in 1920 at the municipal hospital in Berlin-Schöneberg.111
Alfred Beyer, one of the oldest members of the ZVG, had since 1919 worked at 
the medical departments of the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Wel-
fare.112 Many others had been employed as doctors by local or municipal authori-
ties. Anneliese Hamann was a welfare service doctor in Berlin from 1924 to 1933. 
From 1926 until 1934, Max Klesse was both a school and district medical officer.113 
After a period at the Charité and at an infant clinic in Berlin-Halensee, Katharina 
Klingelhöfer worked as a school medical officer in Berlin until 1945.114 Paul 
Konitzer entered the public health service in 1921, and worked as an SPD city 
councillor and senior medical officer in Magdeburg.115 Hermann Redetzky worked 
as a junior doctor in a proletarian district of Berlin, and in 1930 joined the city 
health office.116 Walter Friedeberger was a superintendent of the insured health 
centres (Ambulatorien) in Berlin, while Helmut Lehmann was involved in running 
the Berlin insurance funds.117 The case of Friedrich Wolf, the German writer in 
Soviet exile, is also relevant here. By 1945 he had given up his medical career, but 
he exhibits some of the shared features of these biographies. He had been a medical 
officer in Remscheid, and later worked as a doctor for an insurance fund in Stutt-
gart. Here he became active in the opening of maternity and antenatal clinics. 
108 Ruprecht, Felix Boenheim. Bod. SPSL, 471/2, questionnaire filled in by Felix Boenheim, dated 
12 oct. 1934. Werner Röder and Herbert Strauss (eds.), International Biographical Dictionary of Cen-
tral European Emigres (Munich, 1980–3), i.
109 Müller-Ensberg et al. (eds.), Wer war wer in der DDR?
110 Biographischer Index, 2nd ser., fiche 1142, 26. on his father Ignatz Zadek (1858–1931), see 
‘Personenregister’ in Barbara and Günter Albrecht (eds.), Diagnosen: Ärzteerinnerungen aus dem 20. 
Jahrhundert (Berlin, 1977).
111 BBAW, Nachlass Zetkin, ‘Lebenslauf ’, 1946.
112 Deutscher Biographischer Index, 2nd ser., fiche 118, 25–8. Zetkin, ‘Charakteristik’. Müller- 
Ensberg et al. (eds.), Wer War Wer in der DDR?
113 Zetkin, ‘Charakteristik’, 12.
114 Degeners Wer ist’s?, 12th edn. 1955; Zetkin, ‘Charakteristik’.
115 BAB, DQ1/1614, pamphlet about Dr Konitzer entitled ‘Volksgesundheit statt Rassenwahn’, 
[undated]. Also see Zetkin, ‘Charakteristik’, 12. Short biography in Moser, ‘Im Interesse der Volksge-
sundheit …’, 373.
116 BBAW, Nachlass Redetzky, ‘Beglaubigte Abschrift’, 21 June 1943. Also BBAW, ‘In Memoriam 
Hermann Redetzky’, Humanitas: Zeitung für Medizin, 8 (13 Apr. 1978).
117 Müller-Ensberg et al. (eds.), Wer War Wer in der DDR?, and Gerhard Baader, ‘Politisch motivi-
erte Emigration deutscher Ärzte’, Berichte der Wissenschaftsgeschichte, 7/2 (1984), 67–84.
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In his 1929 pro-legalized abortion drama Cyankali, he painted a grim picture of 
working-class living conditions, exacerbated by the lack of education and contra-
ception and the existing moralistic abortion legislation. He was arrested in 1931 
for carrying out illegal abortions.118
As we have seen, some of their non-political colleagues had also worked in the 
public health service.119 But in other respects they differed from the political 
groups. A shared feature of KPD and SPD health officials was that their medical 
careers had been intertwined with their political work. Many had become involved 
in party politics in the years after the First World War. Some of the KPD set, in 
particular, had been involved in the short-lived workers’ and soldiers’ councils and 
had supported the Bavarian Socialist Republic of 1918. Felix Boenheim, just after 
he was expelled from the army for insulting the War Ministry (and narrowly missed 
a court martial), began to receive the Political Letters of the Spartacus group. In 
1918, he joined the workers’ and soldiers’ council in Stuttgart, participated in the 
abortive Munich Republic, and was, briefly, minister for cultural affairs in the 
Munich cabinet. After fleeing Munich in the aftermath of the Republic, he became 
involved with the KPD.120 After his military service Erwin Marcusson participated 
in the Spartacist uprising in Berlin and joined a workers’ and soldiers’ council.121 
Friedrich Wolf joined both the Independent Social Democrats (USPD) and the 
workers’ and soldiers’ council in Saxony in April 1918. Later, while working as a 
medical officer, he moved on to the KPD.122
The KPD and SPD members had been influenced by the changes to the political 
landscape that occurred in post-First World War Germany, particularly the increas-
ing divisions within the SPD (since 1912 the largest party in the Reichstag123). By 
April 1917, disagreements triggered partly by the fact that the party majority had 
supported the government’s request for funds at the outset of war, led a group of 
left-wingers directed by Hugo Haase to form the USPD. Haase was a famous 
lawyer who had defended leading personalities of the Left in a series of high-profile 
cases. He was also Felix Boenheim’s uncle.124 Further to the left, a small group of 
118 Röder and Strauss, International Biographical Dictionary of Central European Emigrés, vol.1, and 
Emmi Wolf and Klaus Hammer (eds.), Cyankali (para. 218) von Friedrich Wolf: eine Dokumentation 
mit dem berühmtem Theaterstück gegen den ‘Abtreibungsparagraphen’ (Berlin, 1986).
119 Bruno Harms was medical officer in Tiergarten since 1922, and lectured on social hygiene. 
Hermann Bermann passed the Prussian district medical officer’s examination in 1931, and became an 
assistant at the Hygiene Institute in Landsberg. From the early 1920s, Georg Wundram directed the 
state meat inspection service. Wladimir Lindenberg worked at the Institute of Clinical Psychology in 
Bonn. Ernst Holstein was active in occupational medicine since 1928. Else Deckert worked at the 
Reichsgesundheitsamt. Edmund Döring briefly worked at the Institute of Clinical Psychiatry, then at 
the Land insurance company in Saxony, before becoming a troop doctor. Cyran, Bentzin, and 
 Behrendt all had military medical careers as troop doctors.
120 on this episode of Boenheim’s life, see Ruprecht, Felix Boenheim, 55–90.
121 Müller-Ensberg et al. (eds.), Wer War Wer in der DDR?
122 Biographical essay on Friedrich Wolf in Wolf and Hammer (eds.), Cyankali.
123 Volker Berghahn, Modern Germany: Society, Economy and Politics in the Twentieth Century 
(Cambridge, 1995), 20.
124 Ernst Haase (ed.), Hugo Haase: Sein Leben und Wirken, mit einer Auswahl von Briefen, Reden und 
Aufsätzen (Berlin, 1929). Ernst Haase (Hugo Haase’s son) and his cousin Felix Boenheim were both 
doctors, worked together at the hospital in Moabit, and were later active in the Council for a 
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militant revolutionaries had formed around Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht 
and constituted themselves into the Spartacus League, from the remnants of which 
the KPD was created.
Both the SPD and KPD members of the ZVG received their formative political 
education in this political context. Maxim Zetkin and Helmut Lehmann, the 
oldest members of the ZVG, had already joined the SPD at the beginning of the 
century. Zetkin was also involved in post-First World War developments. As a 
teenager and junior doctor he carried out secretarial work for his mother, Clara 
Zetkin (who played a leading role in the Spartacus circle and the founding of the 
KPD), and had accompanied her on trips and congresses abroad.125 In 1917 he left 
the SPD to join the USPD, and two years later the newly founded KPD. The 
younger health officers, particularly those without family links to political parties, 
had in many cases come into the orbit of political groupings in the early years of 
the Weimar Republic, while at university.126 Surrounded by post-war hunger and 
dire economic conditions they criticized the detachment of their parents, and 
began to focus on the link between disease and social conditions, and the role of 
health policy in social reforms. Their politicized view of not just disease but the 
doctor’s tasks was at odds with the majority of the medical profession in Germany. 
Even after the First World War, when it became clear that social democracy was 
going to be an even stronger force in German life, it found little support among 
members of the profession.127
Most of these politically active health officers in the ZVG had been active in 
political-medical organizations. The communists had been involved in groups such 
as the Proletarian Health Service, the Working Group of Communist Doctors, and 
International Workers’ Aid. Some of the communist doctors had in 1921 submit-
ted, via the Communist Party, motions on health policy to the Prussian State Par-
liament and the Reichstag. Here, and in other programmes, they demanded the 
unification of the health and welfare services under a central ministry, and the 
financing of the system from public funds. other priorities were the reform of 
tuberculosis hospitals, new treatment centres for venereal diseases, maternity clin-
ics, and the revision of abortion legislation. Many travelled to the USSR in the 
1920s and wrote glowing reviews on the successes of the newly nationalized Soviet 
 Democratic Germany in New york. See ‘Declaration of the Council for a Democratic Germany’ of 
3 May 1944, in Langkau-Alex and Ruprecht (eds.), Was soll aus Deutschland werden?, 155–63. 
 Ruprecht maintains that Hugo Haase had great influence on Felix Boenheim’s formative years, see 
Ruprecht, Felix Boenheim, 21, 51–2, 64. Boenheim returned to Germany, but Ernst Haase seems to 
have stayed in the USA.
125 BBAW, Zetkin Nachlass, ‘Lebenslauf ’, 14 Jan. 1951, and ‘Lebenslauf ’, 7 Mar. 1947. on Clara 
Zetkin, see Gilbert Badia, Clara Zetkin: Eine neue Biographie (Berlin, 1999).
126 SPD members: Beyer since 1918; Friedeberger since 1921; no dates for Klesse, but Zetkin de-
scribed him as an ‘old USPD and SPD man’; Klingelhöfer since 1921; Konitzer since 1923; Lehmann 
since 1903; Redetzky since 1930; Zadek since 1911, and his father had been an SPD delegate since 
1892. KPD members: no dates for Baer; Boenheim associated with it since 1918; Hamann since 1926; 
Kolmer in Austrian communist youth organizations; Lettow since 1930; Marcusson since 1919; 
Winter in communist student group, then 1937 KPD; Zetkin since 1919; Schölmerich in communist 
youth group, then 1930 KPD; Coutelle since 1930; Neumann since 1927.
127 Moser, ‘Im Interesse der Volksgesundheit …’, 69–70.
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health system. Consequently, some work on health policy also took place in a series 
of German–Soviet friendship organizations.128
Several of the social democrats had been involved in the Social Democratic 
Doctors’ Union, which Ignatz Zadek’s father had co-founded in December 1913.129 
In 1919 this was renamed the Association of Socialist Doctors; in 1923 members 
of the right wing of the SPD left to form a separate group, triggered by fights over 
the doctors’ strikes and the workings of the insured health centres in Berlin. The 
association subsequently contained both social democrats and communists and 
became the biggest grouping of socialist doctors, a number of whom were present 
in the ZVG in 1945.130 While in general SPD members had dominated the asso-
ciation, the largest and most multi-party group had operated in Berlin. Some of 
the association’s health policy demands had included campaigns for birth control, 
the abolition of paragraph 218 (which prohibited abortion), the creation of a cen-
tral health ministry, the creation of chairs in social hygiene at the major universi-
ties, and its compulsory inclusion in the medical syllabus. The association also 
became one of the most vocal opponents of Nazi racial hygiene. Their programme 
showed that differences existed between factions within the KPD and SPD, par-
ticularly on issues such as the desirability of bringing public health under munici-
pal (rather than state) control, and the role of eugenically oriented measures in 
health reform.131 Factions of both parties sometimes found substantial common 
ground.
Although SPD and KPD members had successfully worked together, both 
party sets had also been moulded by the irreconcilable split between the far Left 
and the majority of the SPD. years of fierce opposition had escalated during the 
KPD campaign which branded the SPD ‘social fascists’ and had as their main 
aim its destruction. This tactic, begun in 1928, only ended after the Nazis had 
taken power and Stalin changed to a popular front strategy, but their relation-
ship barely improved after the abrupt 1935 Comintern emphasis on building 
united antifascist fronts. In 1945, when both parties had to negotiate the pitfalls 
of Soviet occupation, and when members now joined the same institutions, this 
was important baggage.
128 The Society of Friends of the New Russia was founded in 1923 to facilitate exchange of ideas 
between German and Soviet intellectuals. Felix Boenheim was one of the co-founders. Boenheim was 
also active in the International Committee of the Friends of Soviet Russia (based in Berlin and with 
branches in London and Paris), and worked as an advisory doctor to the Soviet trading mission in 
Berlin.
129 on this and the role of Ignatz Zadek senior, see Florian Tennstedt, Christian Pross, and Stephan 
Leibfried (eds.), Internationales Ärztliches Bulletin: Beträge zur Nationalsozialistischen Gesundheits- und 
Sozialpolitik, vol. vii (Berlin, 1989), p. ix.
130 Active members included Felix Boenheim, Erwin Marcusson, Friedrich Wolf, Ignatz Zadek. 
Hamann and Klesse were probably members. other active members who later did not return from 
exile included Minna Flake (KPD/KPo/SAP), Max Hodann (KPD), Käthe Frankenthal (SPD/SAP), 
Ernst Haase (SPD?). Kurt Glaser (SPD), former head of the Chemnitz Branch of the Association, 
returned from exile in the USA to the British Zone in Feb. 1948.
131 Alfons Labisch and Florian Tennstedt, Der Weg zum ‘Gesetz über die Vereinheitlichung des Gesund-
heitswesens’ (Düsseldorf, 1985). Paul Weindling, Health, Race and German Politics Between National 
Unification and Nazism, 1870–1945 (Cambridge, 1989).
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Set against this antagonism was the shared disruption of their careers after 1933 
and the persecution of those involved in socialist health politics, many of whom 
were also Jewish. Almost all of the politically active members of the ZVG lost their 
positions after 1933. Some moved on to private medical practice: Alfred Beyer was 
sacked from the Ministry of the Interior in February 1933 because of his SPD 
membership, and set up his own practice after 1939. Anneliese Hamann was dis-
missed in 1933 for communist activities, and from 1934 worked in her own prac-
tice. Max Klesse, too, opened a practice after being sacked in 1934. Klingelhöfer 
was dismissed for six months in 1933, but then re-employed as school medical 
officer. Paul Konitzer, who was sacked in 1933 ‘for political reasons’, set up a prac-
tice in Dresden and was drafted into the Wehrmacht in 1939.132 Zadek established 
himself as a specialist for internal diseases after being dismissed in 1933.133 Redetzky 
resigned from his Berlin office in July 1933, and became a specialist in internal 
diseases.134
Some were involved in underground work, and some were imprisoned: Fritz 
Leo was arrested by the Gestapo in 1935, and then spent two years in prison in 
Zwickau and eight years in four different concentration camps. Helmut Lehmann 
was sacked and arrested in March 1933, and once again in 1935 as head of a resist-
ance group of SPD members and trade union officials in Berlin. Following the July 
1944 plot he was arrested again and sent to Tegel prison, from where he was liber-
ated in April 1945.135 Klesse was involved in the North Berlin-based resistance 
group Mannhart. Schölmerich, too, apparently worked illegally for the KPD after 
a short period in Swiss exile, and as part of this work infiltrated the NSDAP.136
Some emigrated and only returned to Germany after 1945. Zetkin had already 
moved to Moscow in 1920. Baer left in 1935, and went first to Spain, then to 
China and Burma. Coutelle emigrated to Moscow in 1934, and later also went on 
to Spain and Burma. Friedeberger emigrated to France in 1935 after he was dis-
missed and briefly arrested in 1933. Following two years of internment in Morocco, 
he then emigrated to the United States in 1941. In 1934, Marcusson emigrated to 
Switzerland after he had been arrested in April 1933, and then moved on to Moscow 
in February 1936. Neumann also emigrated to Switzerland, then to France in 
132 Entry for Paul Ignaz Konitzer, in Schagen and Schleiermacher (eds.), CD Rom: 100 Jahre 
Sozialhygiene.
133 For Beyer, Hamann, and Klesse, see Zetkin, ‘Charakteristik’, and DQ1/1634, Max Klesse, 
‘Werdegang’, 6 Sept. 1946. For Klingelhöfer, see Wer ist Wer? 12. Ausgabe von Degeners Wer ist’s? For 
Konitzer, see Müller-Ensberg et al. (eds.), Wer War Wer in der DDR? For Zadek, see Wer ist Wer? 1948, 
Deutscher Biographischer Index.
134 BBAW, Nachlass Redetzky, Prof. Dr Walter to Herrn Präsidenten Höcker, 2 July 1946, where 
Walter recommended Redetzky as his successor.
135 Müller-Ensberg et al. (eds.), Wer War Wer in der DDR?
136 Fritz Lettow, Arzt in den Höllen: Erinnerungen an vier Konzentrationslager (Berlin, 1997). Days 
after the liberation of Bergen-Belsen in Apr. 1945, he changed his name from Leo to Lettow, see after-
word by Gerhard Leo, 257. See Karen Bellin, ‘Ein Leben im Dienste des Menschen: oMR Dr Fritz 
Lettow, Arzt im Widerstand und Aktivist der ersten Stunde’, Zeitschrift für die gesamte Hygiene und 
ihre Grenzgebiete, 35/7 (1989), 442–3. For Schölmerich, Zetkin, ‘Charakteristik’, and Martin Broszat 
and Hermann Weber, SBZ Handbuch. For Klesse, Rainer Sandvoß, ‘In Berlin gab es auch Wider-
stand’, Berlinische Monatsschrift, 9 (2000), 48–58.
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1933, later to Mexico. Friedrich Wolf, who was arrested over the abortion scandal 
in 1931, travelled to Moscow following his release, working for an Agitprop thea-
tre group of the KPD.137 After years of touring many countries in 1938 he was 
interned in France and escaped to Moscow in 1941. Kurt Winter emigrated to 
Switzerland in 1935, later to Spain and Sweden. In exile, members of the future 
ZVG were active in the Free Germany groups discussed in Chapter 3.
A significant portion of the communist set also joined the International Bri-
gades during the Spanish Civil War. Rudolf Neumann was one of the first foreign 
volunteers to arrive in Spain, and some have credited him with organizing and 
directing the International Brigades’ medical service. Rolf Becker arrived in Spain 
in 1936, and worked as chief medical officer of the Eleventh Brigade until 1938. 
Maxim Zetkin also arrived in 1936, when he became an advisory surgeon to the 
Republican Army. Baer, Coutelle, and Winter all arrived in Spain in 1937 and 
fought until the end in 1939. Friedrich Wolf left Moscow for Spain in 1938, and 
after the disbandment of the International Brigades was interned in France.138
The social democrats and particularly the communist doctors could perhaps be 
described as ‘medical mercenaries’ or ‘missionaries’. They all had worked on a suc-
cession of political projects that needed doctors: in city slums during the interwar 
economic crisis, in émigré groups, in the International Brigades in Spain, at the 
Sino-Japanese war front, or in the Red Army. For them post-war Germany was, at 
least in part, another item on the political agenda. Eva Kolmer was one who made 
this link explicitly in retrospect. She returned from British exile to her native 
Vienna, before she joined her husband Heinz Schmidt in Berlin in August 1946 
and began work for the ZVG. She remembered that life in the Soviet zone was far 
from easy, with small rations, lack of heating, and poor health conditions, ‘but the 
force of our political conviction and our feeling regarding the responsibilities of 
communists, as well the stamina, toughness and resourcefulness which us few sur-
vivors had learnt during illegality and war, all gave us the strength to take on party 
missions and to fulfil them’.139
In sum, the SPD and KPD sets in the ZVG overlapped biographically in a series of 
subsets and intersecting circles, which bound them together and set them apart from 
their other colleagues. Some had met as Berlin medical officers or at the muni cipal 
hospitals; others had worked together in the Association of Socialist Doctors, the exile 
groups, or the International Brigades. And even those who had not actually met in 
137 Mobile theatrical ‘agitation—propaganda’ ensembles that took up political causes and trans-
lated them into popular performance language.
138 For Becker, Coutelle, and Baer, TNA, Fo 371/46844, 29 Nov. 1945, correspondence with 
China Medical Aid Committee. For Kurt Winter, Müller-Ensberg et al. (eds.), Wer war wer in der 
DDR? For Zetkin, see BBAW, ‘Lebenslauf ’. For Neumann, Pasaremos: Deutsche Antifaschisten im 
 national-revolutionären Krieg des spanischen Volkes (Berlin, 1970); Arno Lustiger, ‘German and Austrian 
Jews in the International Brigades’, Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook, 35 (1990), 297–320. For Wolf, Atina 
Grossmann, Reforming Sex: The German Movement for Birth Control and Abortion Reform, 1920–1950 
(oxford, 1995), 184; Emmi Wolf and Walter Pollatschek, Wolf: Ein Lesebuch für unsere Zeit (Berlin, 
1974).
139 BAB, Sgy 30/2237, Eva Kolmer, ‘Entwurf: Erinnerungen an Lehr- und Wanderjahre in Sachen 
Gesundheitsschutz für Mutter und Kind (1949 bis 1961)’, manuscript dated 22 Nov. 1986, 2. Many 
thanks to Charmian Brinson for giving me a copy.
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person before 1945 could easily place and assess each other on the basis of shared pat-
terns. Moritz Mebel was immediately able to identify Kurt Winter as a ‘comrade in 
the struggle’ when they eventually met at the Charité in the late 1950s.140
(ii) The political physician
These biographical patterns are important for a number of reasons. First, the gath-
ering of socialist doctors and ‘medical missionaries’ made the ZVG qualitatively 
different from other institutions in the German health service; there was nothing 
like it anywhere else. Elsewhere, individual communists were appointed to public 
health administrative posts, but they were isolated and often had difficult relation-
ships with the occupiers.141 In the ZVG, politically active doctors made up the 
majority, and communists occupied some of the key administrative positions: 
those in charge of appointments, personnel policy, and organization.142 Second, 
the composition of the ZVG (the SPD and KPD factions and the third group) 
resulted in obvious clashes, not just between the two party sets but also between 
them and their non-political colleagues.
The old animosities between the KPD and SPD sets survived, after April 1946, 
when the Socialist Unity Party (SED) was created in the Soviet zone by the enforced 
merger of both parties. The way in which they presented themselves at meetings 
and during discussions with other health officers in the immediate post-war years 
demonstrates the survival of their party identities. At a meeting of health officers 
from the Soviet zone, Lehmann introduced himself with the words ‘I am speaking 
here as a representative of the social democrats’.143 At similar meetings, Zetkin at 
times defended the ‘socialists’ position’.144
Tensions and open disagreements between SPD and KPD people ranged from 
contrary assessments of the political situation to frustrations about personnel poli-
tics. The social democrat Max Klesse, a vociferous letter writer, was often critical of 
communist (and Soviet) strategies. In a letter to Zetkin, he criticized the KPD’s 
proclamations on the extensive German support of the Hitler regime and the lack 
of any real resistance. As somebody who had spent all twelve years of Nazi rule 
inside Germany, he wrote, he had experienced how ‘even old communists and 
socialists, trembling with anxiety, had taken our flyers to the Gestapo or refused to 
140 ‘Kampfgefährte’, Moritz Mebel interview with the author, held on 22 July 2003 in Berlin.
141 In the British zone, Friedrich Dettmann (born 1897) was temporarily head of the health depart-
ment at the Hamburg Senate; Emil Matthews (born in 1895) was minister of public health for 
 Schleswig-Holstein. Both were members of the KPD. NA, Fo 1082/4 ‘Who’s who in the British Zone 
of Germany, with biographical notes on 300 Germans in key positions’, 1946. In 1950, the Hamburg 
Senate ordered Dettmann’s arrest following his participation in a demonstration. Walther Killy (ed.), 
Deutsche Biographische Enzyklopädie, ii (Munich, 1995).
142 Leo/Lettow, Schölmerich, and Coutelle were all in charge of personnel. Schölmerich, Coutelle, 
and Neumann were in charge of organization and planning. No non-KPD member occupied either 
position.
143 BAB, DQ1/1338, ‘Diskussion zum Referat von Dr Holling auf der dritten Tagung der Leiter 
der Landes- und Provinzial-Gesundheitsämter am 10. November 1945’.
144 BAB, DQ1/1338, ‘Diskussion zum Referat DrDr Harms auf der 4.Tagung der Leiter der 
Landes- und Provinzial-Gesundheitsämter am 12./13. Januar 1946’.
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hide typewriters or copy machines even for one day, or who refused to house Jews 
for a single night’. And he knew that ‘the nerves of the people had already been 
shattered by the bombing campaigns, they had no strength left to actively resist or 
fight an illegal battle against Hitler and as a result they gave in to the Nazi terror 
without resistance!’ The SED may have realized this by now, he wrote, but to 
Marxists, who were able to distinguish between the ruling and the ruled, this mis-
understanding of the guilt question should not have arisen in the first place.145
Apart from general disagreements, personnel policy was an issue that frustrated 
the social democrats, not least because they suspected favourable treatment of their 
KPD colleagues by the Soviet forces. The reality was more complicated. As Naimark 
has shown, ‘Soviet commandants carefully nurtured the other parties and involved 
them in local government. They aided the SPD, in particular, more scrupulously 
than the KPD would have liked, creating the impression among some social- 
democratic leaders that the Soviets actually preferred working with SPD politi-
cians.’146 Moreover, in the ZVG the situation was skewed by the fact that Zetkin 
was not just a communist, but one of those few Germans with Soviet citizenship, 
who blurred the line between Soviets and Germans in charge.147
The case of Paul Konitzer was also not typical for the treatment of social demo-
crats. As first president of the ZVG, the Soviets had approved Konitzer’s appoint-
ment, and had listened to and respected him,148 until he was arrested in February 
1947 and apparently hanged himself in prison in April 1947, while awaiting his 
trial. What had happened? Following his career as public health activist and social 
hygienist and his dismissal in 1933, Konitzer had been drafted into the Wehr-
macht in 1939. From 1941 he worked as a chief staff surgeon in Wehrkreis IV 
(Dresden, Saxony) and was the doctor in charge of a PoW camp in Zeithain, 
Saxony. Zeithain was liberated by the Red Army on 23 April 1945. In 1946 the 
Soviet authorities discovered the bodies of tens of thousands of Russian PoWs, 
who had perished as a result of typhus and other epidemics which were rampant in 
the camp. An investigative commission reported over 35,000 bodies in mass graves, 
and the Soviet authorities held Konitzer responsible.149 The Soviets said that the 
145 BBAW, Zetkin Nachlass, Max Klesse to Genosse Zetkin, 26 oct. 1946. Klesse to Zetkin, 27 
oct. 1946.
146 Norman Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Occupation Zone, 1945–
1949 (Cambridge, 1997), 272.
147 Naimark, Russians in Germany, 292ff. Apart from Zetkin, two individuals which are hard to 
place in this way include Wladimir Lindenberg (1905) and Robert von Radetzky (1899): both were 
born in Moscow, but had trained and lived in Germany for decades.
148 on 28 Aug. 1946 the SMAG decorated him for ‘successful work in the democratic reconstruc-
tion of local administrations’, see Udo Schagen, ‘Kongruenz der Gesundheitspolitik in der  Sowjetischen 
Besatzungszone?’, in Wolfgang Woelk and Jörg Vögele (eds.), Geschichte der Gesundheitspolitik in 
Deutschland: Von der Weimarer Republik bis in die Frühgeschichte der ‘doppelten Staatsgründung’ (Berlin, 
2002), 397.
149 ‘Das Russengrab bei Zeithain: Präsident Konitzers Kriegdienste’, Der Spiegel, 1 Mar. 1947, 4. 
Also see Jens Nagel, ‘Das Massensterben sowjetischer Kriegsgefangener 1941 bis 1944: Zur Rolle des 
Wehrmachtarztes im Wehrkreiskommando IV Dresden Dr Paul Konitzer (1894–1947)’, in Böhm 
and Haase (eds.), Täterschaft—Strafverfolgung—Schuldentlastung, 93–118. Peter Schneck, ‘Paul 
Konitzer (1894–1947): Hygieniker, Amtsarzt, Sozialmediziner, Gesundheitspolitiker’, NTM: 
Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Wissenschaften, Technik und Medizin, 12/4 (Sept. 2004), 213–32.
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deaths of their own citizens was not an issue on which a compromise could be 
made, even if in this case it concerned a German political ally.150
Konitzer’s fate stands out. Social democrats also directed other central adminis-
trations, and none died in such ambiguous circumstances. A number of social 
democratic doctors later left the Soviet zone and resumed their careers in the West, 
while others continued to thrive and prosper in the Soviet zone/GDR. Alfred 
Beyer, for example, had a dazzling career as one of East Germany’s most celebrated 
social hygienists. However, tensions between SPD and KPD members were far 
from negligible in the ZVG’s personnel politics. That Konitzer, before his death, 
was right at the heart of it, is revealed in a letter by Zetkin to the SED’s central 
committee on his worries about Konitzer’s reliability. Schölmerich had reported on 
Konitzer’s openly anti-Soviet views, Zetkin wrote. Konitzer had apparently com-
plained that ‘he could not agree with Russian personnel policy, nor Russian policy 
generally. A main factor was that they were badly advised, especially by people like 
comrade Ulbricht. This situation had to end, this much had been agreed in his 
close circle.’ Zetkin suspected sabotage when Konitzer suddenly changed his mind 
on issues that had already been agreed, and had an ‘of course unproven—suspicion 
that K. wanted to demonstrate that the personnel policy of the Soviet Military 
Administration will lead to our organisation’s standstill’. It was also suspicious, 
Zetkin wrote, that Klingelhöfer and her husband, both of whom were active social 
democrats, were apparently meeting with Konitzer in private.151 Zetkin wanted to 
inform the Soviet authorities that in spite of pro-Soviet statements, Konitzer could 
not be seen as reliable: ‘K.’s heart is not with us’. He asked the central committee 
to find a party comrade who could, should it become necessary, take over, although 
he noted that Konitzer probably had to stay for now for reasons of political expedi-
ency.152 That letter was written in November 1946. In early January 1947, Zetkin 
was speculating in a note to Klesse about an imminent change in the ZVG’s leader-
ship. on 18 February 1947 Konitzer was sacked and arrested, and by 22 April he 
was dead.
As real as these divisions were, those between the SPD and KPD members 
and their non-political colleagues were often deeper. Minutes of meetings and 
private correspondence contain details of repeated disagreements and open 
hostilities. We have seen above that those upholding the apolitical ideal of 
medical practice essentially equated ‘Nazi medicine’ with that of the commu-
nists and socialists. To both the KPD and SPD sets this equation was 
unacceptable.
A good illustration is an exchange at a meeting in November 1945 on the issue 
of doctors becoming organized within the new trade unions. The debate centred 
on the question of whether the majority of German doctors were ready for this 
150 Moser, ‘Im Interesse der Volksgesundheit …’, 269 n. 863. Ernst, ‘Die beste Prophylaxe’.
151 Katharina Klingelhöfer’s husband was Gustav Klingelhöfer, who in 1945 ran the political office 
of the Berlin SPD and from 1946 headed the economic department of the Berlin Magistrat, see Dege-
ners Wer ist’s? (12th edn. 1955).
152 BAB, DQ1/1614, handwritten letter ‘an das ZK der SED’, signed by Zetkin, 20 Nov. 1946.
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kind of organization, and whether ex-Nazi Party members should be allowed to 
join. Max Klesse countered objections by saying: ‘It is not that all doctors have to 
join the trade union. Why urge the Nazis anyway? It is crucial that especially the 
left-wing doctors (Linksärzte) are admitted to the trade unions as quickly as pos-
sible, because they are those who are most fed up. We have not had any representa-
tion since the one that cancelled Marxist doctors’ salaries. We urgently need our 
representation now.’ Hermann Bermann, the head of the medical affairs depart-
ment, warned about Klesse’s proposals: the splitting of the medical profession into 
those in and those not in the trade unions had to be prevented by all means; ‘[i]f 
and when we join, we must all join’.153 To Klesse’s outraged reply that there could 
be no compulsion, Bermann answered: ‘There must be a compulsory organization, 
otherwise nothing will ever be achieved for the doctor.’ To Klesse, whose political 
allegiances came before the membership of any professional club, this unity of the 
medical profession was a myth, at least since 1933.154 In contrast, the non-political 
doctors thought that ‘by joining trade unions they would be sucked into the mine-
field of far-left politics’.155
Klesse’s letters also reveal regular run-ins which were often not even about spe-
cific issues so much as a more general kind of loathing. In May 1946 he com-
plained to Zetkin and Schölmerich about Friedrich von Bergmann, who had since 
1938 been active as a doctor of the Sturmabteilung (SA) and now headed the sci-
ences department of the ZVG.156 Klesse suspected that the delays and seeming 
incompetence of Bergmann’s department masked a deliberate boycott and sabo-
tage of the ‘progressive’ doctors’ input. Bergmann, he wrote, ‘who systematically 
sabotages our work, slows it down or messes it up, must in my opinion be replaced 
soon if Dept. 1 is to achieve anything. If it was not for my duty as a socialist to help 
you and hold out for your sake in this outfit, at least until enough new socialists 
can be found, I would have long preferred to re-open my practice instead of being 
annoyed all the time by this damn bourgeois and harmful windbag. At any rate, he 
probably arranges things deliberately (or out of stupidity?) in such a way that we 
look bad.’157
on this particular occasion, Klesse explained in a letter to Konitzer, Bergmann 
and others had made snide comments on his ‘Marxist tendencies’, and, more 
153 Hermann Bermann (born 1900) had worked at Hygiene Institute in Landsberg until 1933, was 
sacked as ‘non-Aryan’ but given a licence to practise. He joined the SPD for the first time after 1945, 
and was not part of the SPD described here. Zetkin classified him as a ‘petty-bourgeois reactionary’ 
who openly criticized communism and socialism. See Zetkin, ‘Charakteristik’, 15.
154 BAB, DQ1/1338, ‘Diskussion zum Referat von Dr Hess auf der 3.Tagung der Leiter der Landes- 
und Provinzialgesundheitsämter am 11. November 1945 in der ZV.Gesundheitswesen’, 7, 9.
155 Dr Gysi in BAB, DQ1/1338, ‘Protokoll der 4. Tagung der Leiter der LGA vom 12./13.1.1946’, 
375. The professional organization of doctors in the Soviet zone is discussed by Ernst, ‘Die beste 
Prophylaxe’. on doctors on the FDGB, see BAB, DQ1/1524, ‘Neuaufbau des Gesundheitswesens’, 
Deutsche Volkszeitung, 18 Nov. 1945.
156 Friedrich Ernst von Bergmann: born 1907 into a famous doctor family. His father was Ernst 
von Bergmann (1836–1907), a famous German surgeon. Friedrich worked at pharmacological insti-
tutes in Munich and Berlin from 1932, from 1938 he was a doctor with the SA. Zetkin, ‘Charakter-
istik’, 8.
157 BBAW, Zetkin Nachlass, Max Klesse to Vice-Presidents Zetkin und Schölmerich, 23 May 1946.
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 seriously, had boycotted his proposals for creating new courses in social pathology. 
Bergmann’s work methods and his ‘constant sabotage of any kind of education of 
doctors according to socialist principles’ had driven Klesse to open dispute. 
 Bergmann’s behaviour in the past, he said, had been ‘at the same time petty-minded 
and unreasonable as much as stupid and arrogant, as only a bourgeois can be!’ 
Klesse also resented that ‘the bourgeois Bruno Harms’ had tried to take sides 
 (obviously not Klesse’s), since Harms ‘can hardly comprehend the disagreements of 
a socialist with a bourgeois’.158 At exactly the same time Harms gave evidence for 
Sauerbruch and joined the Magistrat Health Department (see above).
In March 1946, Klesse informed Zetkin that he would resign from the ZVG. 
While he had enjoyed working with the comrades, he wrote, the daily frustra-
tions caused by the regular clashes were becoming too much. He wanted to 
inform Zetkin in advance so that a socialist could be found as his replacement. 
People like Harms, Bergmann, and Friedrich Bentzin (a long-standing military 
doctor who now headed a sub-department and was a friend of Bergmann’s159) 
must not, Klesse insisted, be allowed to gain the upper hand: ‘apart from you 
[Zetkin],  Schölmerich, Lettow and Lindenberg I cannot see any determined 
men who could when necessary stand against these growing reactionary cir-
cles’.160 To fill important positions with ‘active army officers à la Benzin [Bentzin] 
is absolutely unacceptable from the socialist perspective, since they will change 
the character of the whole ZVG, first only in individual departments, but increas-
ingly also in its entirety’.161 on this occasion Zetkin persuaded Klesse to stay, 
and told him that he could not afford to lose any socialists. In January 1947, 
when Klesse actually resigned, Zetkin reiterated that it was important that ‘we 
have as many socialists in the system as possible’, given that in the impending 
reorganization following Konitzer’s demise a non-socialist might take over as 
president of the ZVG.162
In contrast to the Magistrat personnel, the KPD and SPD health officers of the 
ZVG wrote and thought very differently both about their past careers and present 
responsibilities. Magistrat health officers characterized their ideal medicine as 
stripped of all party politics, and detected antecedents of this apolitical medical 
practice in their own careers and in German medical traditions. In contrast, the 
SPD and KPD personnel identified a history of German political-medical activism 
which was also in part exemplified by their own careers. While working as medical 
158 BBAW, Zetkin Nachlass, Max Klesse to the President (Konitzer), 23 May 1946.
159 Friedrich Bentzin (born in 1912), military doctor from 1936 until 1945, had been in the Stahl-
helm. See Zetkin, ‘Charakteristik’.
160 Wladimir Lindenberg (born 1905 in Moscow), trained and worked in Germany. He took his 
medical examination in Bonn in 1927, from 1930 to 1936 worked on the specialist ward for brain 
damage and at the Institute of Clinical Psychology, both in Bonn. He was arrested in 1937 and spent 
several years in prison and one year in a concentration camp. From 1941 to 1945 he worked for a 
private firm as scientific adviser. After 1945, Zetkin classified him as an ally of the KPD. Zetkin, 
‘Charakteristik’.
161 BBAW, Zetkin Nachlass, Max Klesse to Genosse Zetkin, 3 Mar. 1946.
162 BBAW, Zetkin Nachlass, Zetkin to Klesse, 8 Jan. 1947. The new president—the dermatologist 
Karl Linser (born 1895)—was indeed a ‘non-socialist’.
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officers, many had argued that the doctors, the natural advocates of the sick and 
needy, had to tackle not just the symptoms but also the social causes of illness and 
disease. In 1928 Friedrich Wolf argued that the living conditions in the proletarian 
inner-city districts of Berlin were directly responsible for their high rates of tuber-
culosis and infant mortality. Because these living conditions were a reflection of 
their economic situation, Wolf insisted that the engaged doctor’s job could not 
simply consist in vaccinating or handing out drugs. Doctors had to educate the 
working class, press for both smaller and more substantial social reforms, and ulti-
mately help to bring about a proletarian revolution.163 of course, there were disa-
greements on whether they were primarily to represent the revolutionary proletariat, 
the socialist state, or insurance schemes, but all had clearly identified political, not 
merely medical, responsibilities.
Their argument on the political role of doctors acquired a new dimension with 
the rise of Nazism, often articulated in articles of the International Medical 
 Bulletin—a journal founded by a long-term member of the Association of Socialist 
Doctors, Ewald Fabian, and published in Prague from 1934 until the annexation of 
the Sudetenland in 1938, then in Paris from 1938 until mid-1939.164 Apart from 
reports on the persecution of Jewish doctors and the dismantling of progressive 
welfare and health institutions in Germany, the journal published clear statements 
on the political dimension of doctors’ work. Its first issue contained a manifesto, 
which proclaimed: ‘Socialist doctors want to contribute to making the proletariat 
physically and psychologically fit for the struggle of its liberation. The feeling of soli-
darity drives the socialist doctors to the side of the struggling proletariat, which has 
in capitalism seen the deepest misery and wretchedness and which wants to liberate 
humanity from this monstrous system by fighting for socialism.’ The socialist doc-
tors now had to prevent the expansion of the Hitler regime, to educate people on 
the dangers of fascism, and to fight against Nazi pseudoscience.165
The same issue published an outraged reply to Sauerbruch’s open letter of 1934 
(see section on the Magistrat), signed by a group of German social democratic doc-
tors in Czechoslovakia and some other organizations from across the world. 
 Sauerbruch had written on the apolitical task of doctors, and had urged the ‘nation-
ally rooted’ German medical profession to support the new Nazi government. 
Compassion and helpfulness rather than political judgement must be doctors’ only 
motivation, he had said. Their task was to ensure that the German government 
could continue to work in peace. The émigrés replied: ‘we socialist doctors of all 
countries have always believed in the cultural ties of the people. Compassion and 
helpfulness are not only the motor of our profession but also of our political drive, 
and we have always wanted peace. We have done more: by working within the 
socialist parties we have served peace, have furthered the understanding of nations 
163 Friedrich Wolf, ‘Was erzählen diese Zahlen?’ (1928), in Wolf and Hammer (eds.), Cyankali, 78.
164 Ewald Fabian, born 1885 in Berlin; SPD since 1912; 1919 joined Spartacus, USPD, and then 
KPD; 1926, expelled from KPD, joined KPD(o); 1931 founder member of SAP; 1933, emigration 
to Czechoslovakia. See Tennstedt, Pross, and Leibfried (eds.), Internationales Ärztliches Bulletin.
165 ‘Was wir wollen!’, Internationales Ärztliches Bulletin, 1 (Jan. 1934), 2–3.
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with all our strength and have worked for friendship with the German people, 
have stood for the study and acceptance of German medical achievements and the 
German health system.’166 The battle lines drawn here persisted in debates after 
1945. The socialist doctors unequivocally condemned the Nazi corruption of sci-
ence and medicine and other doctors’ and scientists’ embrace of the Third Reich, 
but unlike Sauerbruch and co. they did not agree that politics had to disappear 
from the realm of medicine per se, just the wrong kind of politics.
This last passage also hints at another part of their self-characterization after 1945. 
Not only were they political agents, but like Sauerbruch and Redeker they also saw 
themselves as part of a specifically German heritage. This was expressed at meetings 
and in debates, where they regularly reminded each other of the importance of their 
past work in public health administration. At the beginning, the social democrats 
were most vocal in this, and Konitzer and others often emphasized their past profes-
sional experience on specific issues under discussion.167 on one occasion, Konitzer 
complained that the press coverage of issues such as federalism and regional self-
administration was unsatisfactory. These reports would be much more useful, he 
said, if they were to remind people of the rich administrative experience and many 
useful older studies dating from before 1933, some of which he had helped to carry 
out. In contrast, ‘[t]he ladies and gentlemen who are now entering the administra-
tion of the health service for the first time cannot know these things as well’.168
The importance of their identity as German health administrators was also made 
clear by Helmut Lehmann in reply to what he perceived to be his colleagues’ over- 
reliance on Soviet power to get their proposals ratified. In a debate about the rela-
tionship between regional and central administration of public health Lehmann 
was concerned about the constitutional basis of giving the ZVG the power to 
interfere in Land health departments. Holling responded that he could not see any 
constitutional problems, since these proposals were fully in accord with Soviet 
orders.169 Lehmann replied in frustration: ‘If you are only relying on Soviet orders, 
then you are right. But we are Germans and not Russians. We want to present here 
our views and opinions on local government. This is what I have done, I do not 
have to represent Russian viewpoints.’170
In post-war analyses of the state of the public health service in the Soviet zone, 
many SPD health officers maintained that it had become possible to pick up, 
improve, and expand many progressive ideas from the 1920s. In an article  celebrating 
166 ‘offene Antwort auf den offenen Brief des Herrn Geheimrat Prof. Dr E. F. Sauerbruch’, 
 Internationales Ärztliches Bulletin, 1 (Jan. 1934), 4–7, at 5.
167 e.g. Konitzer in BAB, DQ1/1338, ‘Protokoll der 2. Tagung der Leiter der Landes- und Provin-
zialgesundheitsämter im Sowjetischen okkupationsgebiet in der Deutschen Zentralverwaltung für 
das Gesundheitswesen am 2. und 3. oktober 45–2. Sitzungstag’, 11. ‘Diskussion zum Referat von Dr 
Holling auf der dritten Tagung der Leiter der Landes- und Provinzial-Gesundheitsämter am 10. 
 November 1945’, 4.
168 BAB, DQ1/1338, ‘Besprechung der Leiter der Landes- und Provinzial-Gesundheitsämter am 
12. und 13.1.46’, 12.
169 Max Holling (born 1909) was a lawyer.
170 BAB, DQ1/1338, ‘Diskussion zum Referat von Dr Holling auf der dritten Tagung der Leiter 
der Landes- und Provinzial-Gesundheitsämter am 10. November 1945’, 9.
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the anniversary of the creation of the ZVG, Alfred Beyer argued that this organiza-
tion was a direct continuation of initiatives and schemes put forward by German 
medical officers in the 1920s, often not put into practice at the time. He argued that 
the role of the Soviet authorities and their orders consisted, apart from the early 
provision of food and vehicles, primarily in having made possible the implementa-
tion of these German concepts.171 More subtly, Beyer’s argument was also designed 
to enlist sceptical doctors in the reconstruction of the health service, and to exoner-
ate it from the accusation of having been imposed by Soviet officials.172
Chief among the new features that were explained as the realization of older 
German schemes were the polyclinics: outpatient facilities available to the general 
population, housing a range of medical specialists. The social democrat Hermann 
Redetzky, who as head of the health department in Land Mecklenburg presided 
over the founding of the first polyclinic in Schwerin in 1946, argued that the idea, 
the structure, and even the term had all been developed before the Nazi era.173 
other articles also presented the polyclinics as part of the German heritage. Dec-
ades earlier the reorganization of medical treatment had been discussed by medical 
officers and social hygienists, wrote Edmund Döring.174 It was agreed then that 
medical care would improve if outpatient institutions, equipped with modern 
apparatus (which, because of cost, were not easily available to individual practi-
tioners), were opened. The Nazi period had interrupted this development, but 
fortunately it could be taken up again after 1945.175
In a much later article, but in similar terms, Hermann Redetzky and the 
 communist Kurt Winter reflected on the early post-war years. In the first decades of 
the twentieth century, they argued, the standard of German medical science had 
been high and a number of progressive ideas had been advanced, but in most 
instances they could not be implemented. However, after 1945 ‘we in Germany 
could base our efforts on a quite impressive tradition of ambulatory treatment. 
Leading German social hygienists such as Grotjahn, Gottstein, and Lennhof had for 
decades insisted that the scientific and technical development in medicine urgently 
demanded the creation of polyclinics. In 1923 and 1924 the Berlin health insurance 
funds had created over 40 insured health centres which worked excellently.’176
171 Alfred Beyer, ‘Ein Jahr Deutsche Zentralverwaltung des Gesundheitswesens’, Das Deutsche 
 Gesundheitswesen, 1/21 (31 oct. 1946), 641–4.
172 Moser also makes this point, ‘Im Interesse der Volksgesundheit …’, 176.
173 Hermann Redetzky, ‘Eine “allgemeine Poliklinik” in Schwerin’, Das Deutsche Gesundheitswesen, 
1/12 (15 June 1947), 392–3.
174 Edmund Döring (born 1905) worked at the Institute of Clinical Psychology, 1935–7 worked 
for an insurance fund, during the war was a military doctor. He joined the SA in 1934, 1938 Parteian-
wärter, but was ‘blamelessly rehabilitated as an anti-fascist’. After 1945, he headed a sub-department 
in the ZVG. Zetkin, ‘Charakteristik’.
175 E. Döring, ‘Vom Sinn und Zweck der Polikliniken’, Das Deutsche Gesundheitswesen, 1/11 (1 June 
1947), 358–60.
176 Hermann Redetzky and Kurt Winter, ‘Über die Anfänge des Gesundheitswesens nach 1945’, 
Zeitschrift für Ärztliche Fortbildung, 53/19 (1959), 1150–8, at 1157. Hermann Redetzky, Entwicklung, 
Vereinheitlichung und Demokratisierung des öffentlichen Gesundheitswesens (Berlin, 1950). Hermann 
Redetzky, ‘Zur Geschichte der organisation des Gesundheitswesens’, in Lehrbuch für Sozialhygiene 
(Berlin), 50–62; manuscript in BBAW, Nachlass Redetzky.
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Polyclinics were just one of several ‘German’ ideas that were rediscovered after 
1945. In a volume dedicated to the role of Soviet orders in the reconstruction of 
the public health system, the editor Redetzky and many of the contributors agreed 
on one point in particular: Soviet officials had not imported new ideas but helped 
to create conditions where older German health policy conceptions could flourish. 
of greatest significance had been the Soviet initiatives to find and appoint those 
antifascist German doctors to the health service who knew the country and were 
familiar with the German heritage.177 Another major achievement of the Soviet 
officials was the establishment of the ZVG. overall, Redetzky argued, ‘[w]e have 
had in Germany, at least since the 1920s, a good and progressive tradition in medi-
cine with regard to social hygiene, the treatment of occupational diseases and the 
training of medical officers. In those years, a series of progressive medical and wel-
fare officers active in social hygiene had been achieving great things in the lowering 
of infant mortality and in the battle against TB and VD.’ Infant mortality rates, 
TB, and VD were all of renewed importance in the disaster conditions after the 
end of the war. Thus, these older approaches were given a new lease of life after 
1945, not least because the German medical officers had been able to work closely 
together with their Soviet colleagues, publishing together and exchanging ideas. In 
fact, Redetzky thought that ‘among our Soviet colleagues we have for long had a 
good name in these disciplines’.178
This theme of German approaches and tools was also taken up by the commu-
nists.179 Although communists and social democrats agreed on the significance of 
their German heritage, the communist perspective was fraught with problems not 
shared by the SPD set. In their past political careers they had embraced a party 
culture which included a commitment to Marxist-Leninist theory and the com-
munist cause, and loyalty to the Soviet Union. In practical terms, during the 1920s 
and 1930s the Soviet Union had come to exert an increasing authority over the 
KPD, and, as Weitz put it, ‘Moscow set overall strategy and broke and made KPD 
leaderships’. Most KPD functionaries had received their technical and political 
training at one of the various institutes attached to the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union (CPSU), the Comintern, or the Red Army. Even before the extensive 
177 Redetzky, ‘Über die gesundheitspolitische Bedeutung der Befehle der Sowjetischen Militärad-
ministration Deutschlands nach 1945’, in Ministerrat der DDR, Die Bedeutung der Befehle der SMAD 
für den Aufbau de sozialistischen Gesundheitswesens der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik: Dokumen-
tation aus Anlaß des 50. Jahrestages der Großen Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution (Berlin, 1967), 4–11.
178 Redetzky, ‘Gründung und Aufbau des Zentralinstituts für Sozial- und Gewerbehygiene—Befehl 
der SMAD Nr.78 om 28.IV.48’, in Ministerrat der DDR, Die Bedeutung der Befehle der SMAD, 
21–2.
179 It became a major historiographical focus in the GDR, see Irina Winter, ‘Der Verein Sozialis-
tischer Ärzte: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Ärztestandes’, Zeitschrift für Ärztliche Fortbildung, 58/19 
(1964), 1140, 1143. Irina Winter, ‘Zur Geschichte der Gesundheitspolitik der deutschen Arbeiterbe-
wegung’, NTM: Schriftenreihe für Geschicht der Naturwissenschaften, Technik und Medizin, 5/11 
(1968), 93–100. Kurt Kühn (ed.), An der Seite der Arbeiterklasse: Beiträge zur Geschichte des Bündnisses 
der Deutschen Arbeiterklasse mit der medizinischen Intelligenz (Berlin, 1973). Barbara and Günter 
 Albrecht (eds.), Diagnosen. Lothar Büttner and Bernhard Meyer (eds.), Gesundheitspolitik der revolu-
tionären deutschen Arbeiterbewegung: vom Bund der Kommunisten bis zum Thälmannschen ZK der KPD 
(Berlin, 1984).
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Stalinization of the KPD, German communists had looked to the Russian revolu-
tion as the model that Germany would have to follow, and support of the Soviet 
Union was a litmus test of loyalty.180 To the officials presented here, the Soviet 
Union was more specifically a bastion of progressive and socialized public health 
care. Felix Boenheim, Friedrich Wolf, Erwin Marcusson, and Maxim Zetkin had 
all travelled to the USSR in the 1920s and 1930s, and had upon their returns writ-
ten glowing appraisals of the Soviet health system.
In 1945 a number of contradictory facets shaped the discussions among com-
munists. Soviet loyalties were strengthened by the fact that Soviet troops had 
helped to defeat the Hitler regime; many German communists also believed that 
under Soviet occupation their long-held visions could finally be fulfilled. But con-
versely, comrades’ primary loyalties to the Soviet Union were tested. Many of those 
in Soviet exile had first-hand experience of the Stalinist purges. Erwin Marcusson 
had spent 1938–40 in NKVD imprisonment.181 Even for convinced German com-
munists it was not always easy to support and justify Soviet actions in Germany, 
associated as they were with raping and pillaging by out-of-control soldiers, the 
arbitrary use of power by local commandants, and a policy of reparations and eco-
nomic dismantlement. And on a personal level, Soviet support of deserving com-
rades often seemed to be lacking.
Despite the KPD’s often inherent Soviet worship, there was a nationalist com-
ponent to its early post-war work. Throughout the previous decade, it had 
attempted (both out of political conviction and for reasons of political expediency) 
to present the party as the leaders of an antifascist and national front, and their 
preparations had emphasized their role as defenders of the German nation. Stalin 
himself had pointed to the strategic importance of this position. According to 
Dimitrov, he had for years argued that communist parties across the world should 
loosen their ties with the Communist International and turn themselves into 
‘national parties’: ‘What matters is that they put down roots in their own peoples 
and concentrate on their own proper tasks. They ought to have a Com[munist] 
programme; they should proceed on a Marxist analysis, but without looking over 
their shoulders at Moscow; they should resolve the concrete problems they face in 
the given countries independently. And the situation and problems in different 
countries are altogether different. In England there are certain ones, in Germany 
there are different ones, and so forth.’182
The dissolution of the Comintern (officially in May 1943), Stalin argued, would 
strengthen their role as ‘national working-class parties’.183 In June 1945, when the 
KPD tried to present a kind of socialism that would be acceptable to the German 
population, Stalin advised Dimitrov and the German comrades on exactly these 
lines. A diary entry by Dimitrov stated: ‘Stalin proposed: declare categorically that 
180 Eric D. Weitz, Creating German Communism, 1890–1990: From Popular Protests to Socialist 
State (Princeton, 1997), 234–5.
181 Müller-Ensberg et al. (eds.), Wer war wer in der DDR?.
182 Entry for 20 Apr. 1941, quoting Stalin, in Ivo Banac (ed.), The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov 
 1933–1949 (New Haven, 2003), 156.
183 Entry for 21 May 1943, in Banac (ed.), Diary, 276.
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the path of imposing the Sov[iet] system on Germany is an incorrect one; an 
 antifascist democratic parliamentary regime must be established. The Com[munist] 
Party proposed a bloc of antifascist parties with a common platform. Don’t speak 
so glowingly of the Sov[iet] Union, and so on.’184
Given these contradictions, there was considerable fluidity in debates of the 
early post-war years. Some in the KPD insisted that the primary task was the 
immediate construction of a socialist Germany along the Soviet model. But, at 
least until 1948 (and as we have seen with Stalin’s support), leading party officials 
supported a strategy which emphasized the particularities of the German situation. 
A KPD appeal of 11 June 1945 (a few days after Dimitrov’s diary entry above) 
called for the establishment of an antifascist, democratic Germany, and stated that 
the Soviet model was, for the moment at least, inappropriate. A new way had to be 
found to take account of the national peculiarities of Germany. The failed German 
revolution of 1848 should become the new point of reference, and should be, 
almost a hundred years later, finally completed.185
In an article in early 1946, the leading KPD official Anton Ackermann devel-
oped the concept of a ‘special German road to socialism’. Using references to Marx, 
Engels, and Lenin, he argued that socialism in Germany could be achieved with-
out the military confrontations and accompanying civil war of the october revolu-
tion. There could be a distinctively German path of development.186 In language at 
least in part designed to soothe the worries of those who feared the coming of a 
Soviet Germany, he explained on a later occasion: ‘The culture of a nation cannot 
and should not be exported to a different country . . . As a result, the culture of a 
future socialist Germany will not be a copy of other nation’s cultures, but take its 
own specific national form.’187 In presentations of this German communism, the 
historical reference point was no longer the Bolshevik revolution, but the failed 
German revolutions of 1919 and 1848.
In August 1948, as the differences between the occupiers had widened and the 
Cold War was in full swing, the SED abandoned the ‘German road’ and its propa-
ganda fell in line behind the Soviet model.188 Nonetheless, the strategic importance 
of the attempt to convince the German population of the viability of a German 
communist programme can hardly be overstated. It was particularly important 
184 Entry for 7 June 1945, quoting Stalin, in Banac (ed.), Diary, 372.
185 Hermann Weber (ed.), DDR: Dokumente zur Geschichte der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 
1945–1985 (Munich, 1986). Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory: The Past in the Two Germanies (Cam-
bridge, 1997), 30–2.
186 Anton Ackermann, ‘Gibt es einen besonderen Deutschen Weg zum Sozialismus?’, Einheit: 
Monatsschrift zur Vorbereitung der SED, 1 (Feb. 1946) (Berlin), 22–32.
187 Ackermann, Marxistische Kulturpolitik: Rede auf dem ersten Kulturtag der Sozialistischen Einheits-
partei Deutschlands am 7.Mai 1948 (Berlin, 1948), 22. Also see Ackermann, ‘Unsere kulturpolitische 
Sendung’, in Wilhelm Pieck and Anton Ackermann, Unsere kulturpolitische Sendung: Reden auf der 
Ersten Zentralen Kulturtagung der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands vom 3. bis 5. Februar 1946 
(Berlin, 1946).
188 Ackermann had to do penance and was demoted. See Weitz, Creating German Communism, 
346; David Pike, The Politics of Culture in Soviet-Occupied Germany, 1945–1949 (Stanford, 1992), 
414 ff.
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baggage for the KPD officials in the ZVG. Like their SPD colleagues, they 
 emphasized the importance of their German heritage, and continued to do so after 
1948. For public health and medicine, they argued, German traditions, rather 
than a sudden Soviet orientation, were most crucial. But in terms often not shared 
in this form with the SPD doctors, they explained that their own interpretations 
of the political-medical mission had in fact continued a much older, but until now 
always marginalized, tradition of political medical engagement in Germany. While 
Redetzky and Konitzer primarily focused on the achievements of the 1920s, to 
communists such as Winter and Boenheim the failed German revolution of 1848 
now became the crucial orientation point. often this was only a difference of 
emphasis—of course, the communists also commemorated the 1920s ‘progressive’ 
advances, and on occasion Beyer and others also wrote about the symbolic signifi-
cance of 1848 (see (iii) Rudolf Virchow (version 2)). But even if the social demo-
crats could sympathize, for the communists the uncompleted revolution of 1848 
became a particularly crucial marker.
(iii) Rudolf Virchow (version 2)
Early versions of an emphasis on 1848 can be found in the International Medical 
Bulletin. In a 1935 article, Ewald Fabian (writing under the pseudonym of E. Silva) 
analysed the role of doctors in past struggles for freedom. In the Austrian freedom 
movement of 1848, in the Bolshevik revolution, and now in Spain, he claimed, 
doctors had always taken leading parts. Although German doctors were now fail-
ing miserably, in 1848 heroic figures such as Rudolf Virchow had risked their lives 
for ‘great historical progress’. These figures, Fabian went on, must become role 
models for German doctors of the present, and inspire them to fight against the 
Nazi dictatorship.189 An anonymous article from 1936 presented Rudolf Virchow 
as a fighter for truth, freedom, and enlightenment: in the early 1880s, as anti-
Semitism in Berlin was rife, Virchow was one of the organizers of a well-attended 
rally against anti-Semitism, which demanded equality and an end to religious 
hatred.190
After 1945, celebrations of the revolutionary Rudolf Virchow were particularly 
pervasive among communist members of the ZVG. In striking contrast to the 
portrayals discussed earlier, studies and biographical essays focused almost exclu-
sively on Virchow’s role in the 1848 revolution in Berlin. Two examples of publica-
tions from the early 1950s sum up the communist assessment.
First, Kurt Winter’s biography of Rudolf Virchow celebrated Virchow as a great 
revolutionary role model and idol.191 Virchow lacked proper Marxist understand-
ing of the historical role of the working class, Winter admitted, but he still had 
189 Dr E. Silva, ‘Ärzte im Freiheitskampf ’, Internationales Ärztliches Bulletin, 2/7 (Sept. 1935), 
85–7.
190 ‘Rudolf Virchow: Gegen den Antisemitismus’, Internationales Ärztliches Bulletin: Zentralorgan 
der Internationalen Vereinigung Sozialistischer Ärzte, 3/1 (Jan. 1936), 15–16.
191 Kurt Winter, Rudolf Virchow (Leipzig, 1956).
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fought for the rights of workers and against Prussian feudalism, demonstrating 
that his heart was in the right place. Early in 1848, Winter wrote, Virchow had 
been appointed by the Prussian government to investigate an outbreak of typhoid 
fever in Upper Silesia. His subsequent report blamed the social and material condi-
tions of the Silesian population and government neglect for the outbreak. Eight 
days after his return from Silesia, Virchow fought in the Berlin uprising. Winter 
thought both points worth celebrating. ‘It is an honour not just to Virchow but to 
German sciences as a whole’, Winter argued, ‘that one of its greatest representatives 
had the courage to support the just cause of the Polish people . . . It has to be the 
doctor’s task to do all he can in the solution of social problems, especially through 
an active participation in the struggles for the maintenance of peace.’192 Virchow 
had been a proud representative of German science and a real patriot, but he had 
realized that real patriotism meant an appreciation of other peoples. In his report, 
Virchow demonstrated ‘the close association between politics and medicine. With 
contempt he turned against all those who hid behind their science, against all those 
“only”-scientists who had no courage to support a just cause because this might 
involve personal sacrifices.’193 Winter argued that Virchow’s political interest and 
his appreciation of social hygiene and social policy issues were particularly closely 
intertwined, and his demands were only finally fulfilled in the East German social 
security system.194
Second, Felix Boenheim’s biographical essay on Virchow contained a similar 
kind of analysis, in a more measured and critical tone.195 Unlike Winter, Boenheim 
saw Virchow’s revolutionary engagement as a brief, but crucial, episode in his life. 
The government had suspended him from his post at the Charité following the 
March rising, but he was soon reinstated and also found another position in 
 Würzburg. By 1849, Boenheim argued, Virchow had returned to ‘bourgeois secur-
ity’. He had not studied or understood the implication of Marxist teachings, and 
as a result his arguments on social reform had ultimately been superficial. Never-
theless, Boenheim agreed that Virchow in his early career had been a revolutionary. 
Virchow, along with other progressive or humanist doctors, had been led to poli-
tics because of his patients’ social misery. They had realized that the fulfilment of 
their medical tasks demanded participation in politics and a solution to social 
problems. As a result, he was one of the liberal bourgeois men who fought in 1848 
and acted as advocate of the working classes, however briefly, and showed faith in 
the oppressed people of Silesia. Virchow had recognized the link between social 
and medical conditions by understanding that medical reforms always had to 
involve social and political reform. All this had been particularly obvious in his 
investigation of the Polish health question, Boenheim thought, where he had not 
shied away from drawing explicitly political conclusions. Although he then sold 
out, Virchow’s ideals and his courage lived on in the workers’ movement.
The difference in emphasis between communist and social democratic interpre-
tations of Virchow becomes clear if we look at Alfred Beyer’s portrayal of Virchow 
192 Winter, Virchow, 33.   193 Winter, Virchow, 36.   194 Winter, Virchow, 38.
195 Felix Boenheim (ed.), Virchow: Werk und Wirkung (Berlin, 1957).
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as a representative of true social democracy.196 In an article from February 1946, 
published in the ZVG’s journal, Beyer argued that the meaning and significance of 
democracy, unclear in many Germans’ minds, could be illustrated by the ‘fighting 
democrat’ Virchow. His character had been so fundamentally democratic and 
threatening to authoritarians, Beyer claimed, that Virchow had not only been 
unpopular with the older generation of German medical researchers at the time, 
but the Nazis had denounced him in a popular film.197 In his report on Upper 
Silesia, Virchow had not recommended purely medical measures, but political 
cures, such as democracy, education, freedom, and prosperity.198 He had demanded 
broad social reforms: full employment, the construction of streets and factories, 
fairer taxes, and better nutrition. All in all, Beyer proclaimed, this was ‘a truly 
democratic programme, and one which is still of relevance today!’199
During the 1848 revolution in Berlin, Beyer went on, Virchow had worked for 
a democratic reform of the out-of-date university constitution, and the creation of 
a central health ministry, the introduction of hygiene as part of the medical cur-
riculum, the creation of insurance funds, and an eight-hour working day. As a true 
patriot and a fighter for the freedom of the whole German people, Virchow later 
demanded from Bismarck that Junker power must be curbed. His democratic con-
ception was also evident in his scientific theories, Beyer claimed. Virchow had 
shown that cells were the basic unit of life, but he had also demonstrated that cells 
could not exist on their own—groups of cells formed organs, and groups of organs 
formed organisms. All this was mirrored in society, where individuals as the most 
basic unit also could not exist on their own, and therefore came together in a 
democratically governed and ordered state. overall, Beyer proclaimed, Virchow’s 
‘life was dedicated to his people. He worked, taught, lived and strove as a model 
for true democracy; unwavering and incorruptible, brave, tireless and selfless.’200 
And his model of social democracy was of particular relevance for today: ‘Given 
the incomparably heavier burden which we have to carry today, given the hard to 
appreciate variety and the importance of the tasks which we have to tackle quickly 
and decisively if we want to carry on living, democracy is the best type of state, 
since it survives particularly long-lasting, difficult and almost hopeless struggles 
most securely.’201
A few months later, the same journal contained an article by Robert von 
Radetzky which talked about Virchow in very similar terms.202 Virchow was the 
196 Alfred Beyer, ‘Rudolf Virchow: ein kämpferischer Demokrat’, Das deutsche Gesundheitswesen, 
1/4 (28 Feb. 1946), 93–6.
197 Beyer probably referred to the film ‘Robert Koch, der Bekämpfer des Todes’ by Paul Josef Crem-
ers and Gerhard Menzel (1939), which presented Virchow as a devious and manipulative figure who 
had tried to denounce Robert Koch in an effort to save his own career. See ‘Emil Jannings als Robert 
Koch: Der Bekämpfer des Todes’, Illustrierter Film-Kurier, 2983 (1939).
198 Compare with Ackerknecht, Virchow.
199 Beyer, ‘Virchow’, 94.
200 Beyer, ‘Virchow’, 95.
201 Beyer, ‘Virchow’, 96.
202 Robert von Radetzky, born in Moscow in 1899, studied and worked in Germany. Zetkin saw 
him as an active antifascist who had worked illegally during the war, see Zetkin, ‘Charakteristik’.
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Figure 4.2. Top: Stamps from the series Personalities in politics, the arts and science (Deutsche 
Post, German Democratic Republic, 1952). Virchow features here among grandees of 
German Communism such as Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, August Bebel and G. W. Hegel.
Bottom: Stamps from the series 150 years Humboldt University – 250 years Charité (Deut-
sche Post, German Democratic Republic, 1960)
Virchow also featured in other commemorative stamp series, such as Men from the history of 
Berlin (Deutsche Post Berlin, 1952; and Deutsche Bundespost Berlin, 1957)
This material is not covered by the Creative Commons licence terms that govern the reuse 
of this publication. For permission to reuse please contact the rights holder directly.
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voice of the ‘German democratic medical profession’ today, Radetzky argued, since 
he had ‘crowned the designs of a healthy social policy with the concept of a social 
health policy’, and he stood for the aims of the failed 1848 revolution which were 
now finally going to be fulfilled.203
This emphasis on a German heritage, demonstrating a close connection between 
medical and political engagement, was crucial for several reasons. It was a means for 
recruiting apolitical German doctors and medical officers to work with the ZVG on 
the basis of these shared traditions, and of exonerating it from the accusation of 
Soviet influence. Conversely, it also highlighted the frictions between the socialist 
health officers and other German doctors. For many in the SPD or KPD the lack of 
such political-medical engagement served as a yardstick to judge German doctors’ 
involvement in the Nazi regime. Friedrich Wolf ’s response to doctors who argued for 
‘the rights of the unborn’ in the debate about abortion legislation after 1945 made 
this particularly clear: ‘Where were these doctors, my colleagues,’ Wolf asked,
in the years 1933–1945 when ‘Germanic sciences’ demanded and barbarically prac-
tised the sterilization of thousands of political or ‘racial’ enemies—Germans, slave 
 labourers from Poland, Czechoslovakia, yugoslavia, Russia, and even France? Did 
those doctors who are so sensitive and ethical today raise their voices and defend the 
‘sanctity of life’ and ‘the right of the unborn’? These philistines! In the face of the medi-
cal crimes in Dachau, Hadamer, Ravensbrück, etc. I deny my German colleagues the 
right to use those arguments unless they had the courage and the conscience to use 
them during the Nazi regime!204
This political-medical emphasis also had an educational dimension. It was seen as a 
useful tool both for teaching the population at large about socialist programmes, 
and for training young doctors (particularly those who had only recently completed 
their medical training and who still lacked professional experience) in the aims and 
advantages of a particular conception of medicine and the German heritage.205
CoNCLUSIoNS
The German medical profession was deeply divided when the Allies arrived in 
Germany, and these divisions became more acute through the Allied presence and 
the political context of the post-war years. Perhaps nowhere were these divisions as 
visible as in a contrast of the two very different health offices presented here: 
 Sauerbruch, Gohrbandt, and Redeker on the one side and Zetkin, Konitzer, and 
203 Robert v. Radetzky, ‘Virchow und die Gesundheitspolitik’, Das deutsche Gesundheitswesen, 1/7 
(15 Apr. 1946), 190–2. ‘Rudolf Virchow zum 125.Geburtstag am 13.oktober’, Das deutsche Gesund-
heitswesen, 1/19 (30 Sept. 1946), 569.
204 Friedrich Wolf, ‘Vom Rechte, das mit uns geboren ist …’, Der Rundfunk, Berlin, 6–19 Apr. 
1947, repr. in Wolf and Hammer (eds.), Cyankali, 341.
205 Advertisement for young doctors: Das Deutsche Gesundheitswesen, 1/1–2 (Jan. 1946), 26. Also 
see Die Schriftleitung, ‘Unsere neue Zeitschrift’, Das deutsche Gesundheitswesen, 1/1–2 (Jan. 1946), 3. 
Dr R. Neubert (Hygiene Museum Dresden), ‘Der Arzt als Erzieher’, Das deutsche Gesundheitswesen, 
1/3 (15 Feb. 1946), 58. Moser, ‘Im Interesse der Volksgesundheit . . .’, 153.
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Klesse on the other. They had fundamentally dissimilar perspectives on their jobs, 
medical and public health practice, and German history and traditions. The self-
proclaimed non-political doctors argued that they had remained true to scientific 
values and medical ethics and were uncontaminated by political concerns. While 
the Nazi regime may have corrupted medicine by subordinating it to crude politi-
cal aims, this, they insisted, was all the more evidence for the need to guarantee 
that the medical profession stayed free from future political interference. The polit-
ically engaged doctors and medical officers, on the other hand, argued that they 
had never lost touch with social reform efforts, which had to form a central com-
ponent of any medical work. The post-war programmes had to attempt to 
 re-educate the German population, remove its militarist and fascist elements, tackle 
social inequalities, and build a new kind of German society—and doctors were 
crucial for the fulfilment of these tasks. These competing portrayals partly reflected 
different biographies, careers, and interests, but particularly for the first set this was 
often also a convenient way of absolving individuals from any question of guilt or 
responsibility, and defending the existing status quo and medical establishment.
In Berlin, these clashes were particularly potent. Under sole Soviet control until 
July 1945, the bulk of reappointments took place without any input from the 
other three occupiers. The appointments document a dual Soviet strategy of deal-
ing with German doctors: one of appeasement, allowing them to operate with little 
interference and few reprisals for their pasts; and the other of re-educating and 
remoulding German institutions, and advancing those Germans who were sup-
portive of Soviet aims. The first approach could help to reduce the economic 
burden of the occupation and aid the Soviet exploitation of German science and 
medicine; the second had political and security benefits, as growing insecurity over 
the future of Allied relations began to change Soviet priorities. As Part II will show, 
the other occupiers, too, shared contradictory approaches to German doctors and 
health officials. The coexistence of these strategies ultimately represented the break-
down of planners’ assumptions and the failure of vital occupation agendas. While 
Berlin was intended to stand for the quadripartite occupation by the Allied victors, 
it soon became a symbol of their disunity.
German doctors and health officers had radically competing ideas and attempted 
to influence the occupiers accordingly. They fought over the governance of the 
medical profession, the function of public health, and the future of their work. But 
they had things in common. Where the non-political doctors represented German 
medical dynasties (especially by having trained with famous individuals or having 
taken on their university chairs), the socialist doctors stood for German political 
dynasties (as in Boenheim’s, Zadek’s, and Zetkin’s families, but also in their party 
allegiances). Despite significant differences, they all shared a focus on German 
developments before 1933. They identified national traditions and a particular 
German way of doing things, and pointed to German founding fathers. Even 
among those Germans who were vocal supporters of the Soviet occupation there 
was a strong sense of German identity, and Soviet role models were often scarce.
The biographies of figures such as Rudolf Virchow that were newly published or 
rereleased after 1945 were partly attempts by the medical profession to protect 
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itself and its public image. The writers tried to find legitimate past traditions and 
presented themselves as the best representatives of those traditions. But although 
they shared idols such as Virchow, they were seeing something very different in this 
past: where the communists detected the beginnings of bourgeois social reform 
and proletarian German revolution, the social democrats identified the seeds of 
social democracy, while the medical men of the Charité celebrated the peak of 
‘apolitical’ German bacteriological science. For all, it demonstrated that the Nazi 
period was an ‘aberration’, and that the portrayal of the German people as  inherently 
militarized, authoritarian, and undemocratic was wrong.
Despite such claims on the aberration of the Nazi years, there was considerable 
continuity across the 1945 divide. In the realm of public health a number of insti-
tutions and their personnel survived the defeat utterly unchanged, often in spite of 
vocal protests to the contrary. Jeffrey Herf and others have written about the nature 
of post-war German memory and the construction of narratives. Herf has argued 
that, faced by the crisis of defeat and social collapse, the restoration of past tradi-
tions offered Germans the ‘possibility of making sense of the chaos and confusion 
around them’.206 This chapter shows that the significance of these German tradi-
tions extended far beyond the realm of individual psychology. To the medical pro-
fession, which had so much to lose following the publicity of Nazi medical crimes, 
the identification and celebration of good German traditions had the double pur-
pose of presenting a new starting point which radically broke with the Nazi 
 so-called interlude, and of absolving the carriers of this tradition from any tarnish. 
These positive traditions became a crucial instrument of the profession’s legitimacy 
and credibility.
206 Herf, Divided Memory, 11.
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PArt I I
ComPromIsEs AND 
CoNFroNtAtIoNs, 1945–1949
Each Allied army brought with them a mixed set of expectations, and an  ambiguous 
and ultimately limited collection of plans for how to proceed after defeat. many 
questions had been left out entirely, other policies were vague or contradictory. 
manuals instructed troops to be strict in their dealings with the Germans, and 
were reinforced by images from the liberated concentration camps and other gruel-
ling discoveries, confirming the extent of German barbarity. But these sentiments 
combined with war fatigue, a realization of the scope of destruction in Germany, 
and a budding sense of sympathy with the defeated, to form an incongruous and 
unpredictable mix. In the first months and years of their existence the military 
governments in all four zones operated in openly contradictory terms: officers in 
some departments set out to deindustrialize, demilitarize, and denazify, just as 
their colleagues in others tried to reconstruct, motivate, and re-educate, or at least 
provide the bare necessities of life.
Four years later, priorities had changed radically, and most of these contradic-
tions had disappeared, or been pushed aside. The western zones had become a 
bulwark against communism, while the soviet Union had deepened its control in 
the east. In this mobilization both sides discarded their more restrictive and puni-
tive policies and replaced them with new objectives. The American-led reorienta-
tion of economic policy resulted in the marshall Plan package, announced by 
secretary of state George marshall during a speech at Harvard University on 
5 June 1947. After attempts to mediate between East and West and build a part-
nership with the soviet Union, France’s decisive shift to the American camp was 
sealed by the provision of marshall aid, in return for which it acquiesced with 
American policy to create a strong, centralized, and rearmed West Germany, tied 
into the Western European community.1 soviet economic policy for Germany, 
too, changed and was accompanied in september 1947 by the creation of the 
Cominform. marshall sokolovsky, commander-in-chief of the soviet forces in 
Germany, walked out of the Allied Control Council (ACC) in march 1948, but 
joint quadripartite rule had in reality collapsed many months before: the new 
1 see robert Gildea, France Since 1945 (oxford, 2002), 13 f.
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American occupation directive JCs 1779, the creation of the Bizone and its central 
political executive, the collapse of negotiations on reparations, and the plans for a 
western currency reform, had already dealt it fatal blows. The foundation of the 
Federal republic of Germany (FrG) in may 1949 and the German Democratic 
republic (GDr) in october 1949 sealed and confirmed these divisions.
But what happened in the time before the fronts were redrawn? What did these 
developments mean to British, American, soviet, and French occupation officers 
on the ground? The following four chapters contrast public health work in the four 
zones in this period from the end of the war to the escalation of the diplomatic 
conflict between the former Allies. They begin with the products of the wartime 
plans, brought to Germany as both concrete policies and implicit ideas about the 
occupation tasks, and track how initial assumptions and plans unravelled. In all 
four zones, public health was caught directly between contradictory priorities, 
which persisted even after the new political fronts emerged. There was no shortage 
of paradoxes: a denazification of the medical profession was to be achieved at a 
time when German doctors were to prevent an epidemic crisis in the centre of war-
ravaged Europe. A realization of the extent to which Nazi ideology had permeated 
the medical establishment resulted in calls for tight Allied control, but nonetheless 
a system of only indirect, second-hand supervision of German health authorities 
was to be maintained. Germany was to be dismembered or decentralized, precisely 
at a time when health crises presented the strongest case for central coordination. 
German industry was to be dismantled, but in the interests of Allied taxpayers the 
German economy, and health system, was to remain self-sufficient. The enemy 
population, which had grown fat on the loot of Europe, was not to be fed any 
longer, but turned out to be among the most needy.
The following chapters document how some of these contradictions played out 
in the course of the first occupation years (and how some of them just would not 
go away), and show that health was at the heart of central questions about German 
reconstruction, renewal, and reform. They overcome a problem that has for a long 
time limited our understanding of the occupation era, namely a lack of compari-
son and contextualization of the different occupation regimes.
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5
Public Health Work in the  
British occupation Zone
‘FIrst tHINGs FIrst’ was the motto when military Government first 
raised its sign in Germany. ‘Give me that gun, Fritz.‘—‘Put that man behind 
the wire.’—‘Clear the rubble.’—‘mend the drains.’—‘Get some roads open, 
some railways running.’—‘Food? Yes we will get you food but tighten your 
belt.—‘Pull yourself together, man. You look bomb happy.’—‘Get your roof 
mended.’—‘There is a school open down the road. send that boy to school.’1
[t]he psychological state of the majority of Germans is at present such that 
their judgment and statements cannot be trusted in the least; in addition to 
which they remain as opinionated as ever, and are thus impervious to 
advice.2
Pl ANs
The British arrived in Germany with a number of plans. Influenced by military 
 priorities and prevailing ideas of what the Germans were like, they assumed that 
functioning local and regional (and perhaps even central) German administrations, 
fully or near-fully staffed with experienced officials, would be taken over and super-
vised by the military government. For both practical and pedagogic reasons, work 
at all levels was to be done by the Germans themselves. For the sake of justice, as 
much as for military and economic expediency, the German population was not to 
benefit from imports which would raise their standard of living beyond that of their 
war-wrecked neighbours. These premises had specific consequences for public 
health operations. Health officers were given a twofold task: to ensure that basic 
health procedures and precautions were carried out by the Germans under their 
control, while at the same time implementing more fundamental parts of the Allied 
programme, including the denazification and demilitarization of the state 
bureaucracy.
The first of these tasks seemed simple enough. The reactivated German health 
organization would be responsible for the bulk of all public health work, and so 
1 tNA, Fo 1050/46, ‘The Year of Genesis’, British Zone Review: A Fortnightly Review of the Activ­
ities of the Control Commission for Germany (B.E.) and Military Government, 1/8 (5 Jan. 1946), 1.
2 tNA, FD 1/418, quoting robert mcCance, Alt. ‘Interview with Professor r. A. mcCance and 
Dr Elsie Widdowson’, 27 Aug. 1947.
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British health officers’ input was going to be limited. ‘our job is to control them, 
not to do the work for them’, W. H. Boucher (director of the British Control 
Commission’s Public Health Branch) reminded his officers in January 1945.3 They 
were to check that medical supplies were distributed evenly across the zone, to give 
warning of anything which might affect the health of the occupation army, and to 
advise military government on wider nutritional, sanitary, or housing problems.4 
The main principle, restated again in the latest handbook issued by sHAEF to the 
public health officers, was that ‘[a]ll actual furnishing of medical services should be 
by indigenous personnel’.5
The numbers of health officers in the British zone reflected the intention to 
institute a system of ‘indirect control’.6 The British team responsible for health 
among the German population in the British zone was very small: in July 1945 the 
British military government employed just thirty-three public health officers, 
eleven sanitary officers, and ten royal Army medical Corps (rAmC) officers for 
public health and sanitation work.7 They were to supervise the reactivation of the 
health system for a population of well over 22 million people, among them  millions 
of German refugees.8 This was the smallest group among the four occupying 
powers, and contrasts with the otherwise comparatively vast British Control 
 Commission machinery, initially bigger than any of its counterparts.9
3 BAK, Z45F, 3/169-2/159, ‘minutes of the meeting convened by Chief, Public Health Branch, 
G5 Division, sHAEF, for discussion of military government public health plans and operations’, 
15–16 Jan. 1945, 15. on Boucher, see Fo 1050/757, lt. Gen. B. G. Horrocks (30 Corps District, 
BAor) to Pm Balfour, 12 sept. 1945 and ‘Welfare of old Folk: Country Conference’, Durham 
County Advertiser, 18 June 1948. He later became assistant secretary of the ministry of Health and was 
member of the British delegation to the World Health Assembly in mexico in 1955, see ‘medical 
Notes in Parliament’, British Medical Journal, 30 Apr. 1955, 1104.
4 tNA, Fo 936/90, Deputy Commissioner ( (military), CCG(BE), Norfolk House) to the Under 
secretary of state for War (DsD), War office, 8 sept. 1944. Fo 371/46804, ‘report on the Achieve-
ment of military Government in the British Zone up to date’, Francis D. W. Brown (Political Divi-
sion, CCG), 14 July 1945, printed 30 July 1945, forwarded by William strang to Anthony Eden.
5 sHAEF, military Government of Germany, Technical Manual for Public Health Officers 
 (Washington, 1945), cited in Wilfried Harding, ‘reorganisation of the Health services in the British 
Zone of Germany’, The Lancet, 254/6576 (10 sept. 1949), 483.
6 tNA, Fo 936/90, Establishment Division, CoGA to Public Health Branch on the proposed 
war establishment, 8 sept. 1944. Fo 936/90, C. H. Wilcox (treasury Chambers) to H. C. rayner 
(Enemy Branch), 21 sept. 1944. The Public Health Branch, IA&C Division, CCG(BE) was respon-
sible for health issues affecting the German population in the zone, whereas the Director of medical 
services, HQ, BAor was responsible for army and DP health. UNrrA teams assisted military gov-
ernment in the care of DPs, but did not get involved in German health care. tNA, Fo 936/90, Chief 
of staff, BAor to HQ, Corps Districts, 31 Aug. 1945.
7 Fo 371/46804, ‘report on the Achievement of military Government in the British Zone up to 
date’, Francis D. W. Brown.
8 Figure according to oct. 1946 census of the German population by Ausschuß der deutschen 
statistiker für die Volks- und Berufszählung 1946, Volks­ und Berufszählung vom 29. Oktober 1946 
(Berlin, 1949), 2–6, cited in michael Balfour, ‘Four-Power Control in Germany, 1945–1946’, in 
michael Balfour and John mair, Four Power Control in Germany and Austria, 1945–1946 (oxford, 
1956), 191.
9 There are competing and incomplete estimates of the sizes of the four military governments, but 
some rough comparisons are possible. A British document from Feb. 1946 stated that the ‘total estab-
lishments of the Control Commission/military Government (BE) now total some 35,000 British per-
sonnel and these continue to grow’. [NA, Fo 1050/50, circular from Deputy military Governor, 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 03/19/2015, SPi
 The British Occupation Zone 153
This is an open access publication. Except where otherwise noted, this work is distributed under the terms of a 
 Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence, a copy of which is available 
at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. For enquiries concerning use outside the scope of the licence 
terms, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com.
But in addition to supervising the existing public health machinery, health 
 officers also had to implement other, more fundamental military government poli-
cies, particularly in relation to the denazification of German public life.10 The 
Handbook for Military Government stated that ‘[u]nder no circumstance shall active 
Nazis or ardent sympathisers be retained in office for the purpose of administrative 
convenience or expediency’.11 In the British as in the other zones, sHAEF’s general 
denazification criteria and categories (set out in the early directives and confirmed 
at Potsdam), applied equally to German doctors.12 Denazification was not only 
about the punishment of criminals, but also concerned the ‘arrest and remov[al] 
into internment [of ] those Nazis or militarists who are judged to constitute a 
threat to the security of the Allied occupation Forces or military Government’; 
military government had ‘to dismiss or exclude from office and from any position 
of influence in Germany those other Nazis or militarists who, while not coming 
within the first category, had wilfully contributed to the maintenance in power of 
the Nazi regime’.13 The most dangerous categories of individuals, particularly the 
higher ranks of the Nazi Party, were to be interned. All current holders of and 
future candidates for public posts were to be screened on the basis of question-
naires (Fragebögen) on their past activities.14
research on war crimes and medical atrocities intensified when British investi-
gators went to Germany to gather evidence on the nature of Nazi medicine. The 
more they and their American colleagues saw of what was left of the wartime 
research establishment, ‘the more they became convinced of criminality and the 
sheer craziness of the Nazis’.15 There was a widespread tendency to see Nazi  medical 
11 Feb. 1946]. Balfour estimated that the CCG(BE) establishment in 1946 totalled 25,813 people, 
compared to 12,000 personnel in American military government in Dec. 1945, which sank to 7,600 
by Apr. 1946. In Dec. 1946, when demobilization had already reduced the sizes of both the British and 
American continents, the French still had 11,000 personnel engaged in military government; by late 
1946, the French had the highest density of occupiers in western Germany (18 per 10,000  Germans), 
followed by the British (10 per 10,000), whereas the Americans only had 3 per 10,000. (Balfour, ‘Four 
Power Control in Germany’, 1026.) For the soviet zone, Naimark states that in Nov. 1946 there were 
49,887 members of smAG, but this included a great number of soldiers, not counted in the other 
zones’ estimates. He also states that by Jan. 1946, 12,992 people had been sent from the soviet Union 
to the zone as cadres/specialists to work in military government. (see Norman Naimark, The Russians 
in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945–1949 (Cambridge, mass., 1997), 239.)
10 tNA, Fo 936/90, W. H. Boucher (Director, Health Branch, Norfolk House) to J. K. Donoghue 
(Civil Establishments), 26 sept. 1944.
11 Quoted by scheele in BAK, Z45F, 3/169-2/159, ‘minutes of the meeting’, 15–16 Jan. 1945, 15.
12 tNA, Fo 1013/636, draft of a circular, 29 may 1945, amended in July 1945, listed 5 categories: 
(a) mandatory arrest, (b) mandatory removal (both of which were to be effected automatically), 
(c) removal or arrest after evaluation of questionnaire and investigation, (d) suspension pending 
further investigation, (e) approved.
13 tNA, Fo 1050/46, ‘The Year of Genesis’, British Zone Review, 1/8 (5 Jan. 1946).
14 Field security and Counter-Intelligence units were responsible for investigating, arresting, and 
interning dangerous persons. military government public safety officers were to scrutinize information 
provided in the questionnaires. In view of the pervasiveness of Nazi activism, competences for denazifica-
tion could not rest with Germans at the beginning; only from spring 1946 onwards was some German 
advisory function allowed. German denazification tribunals eventually took over the vetting process.
15 Paul Weindling, Nazi Medicine and the Nuremberg Trials: From Medical War Crimes to Informed 
Consent (Basingstoke, 2004), 27.
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research as separate from ‘normal’ German medical practice (a tendency which 
persists to this day), but their research began to demonstrate just how integrated 
the concentration camp research stations were in the wider networks of German 
state-sponsored medicine, and the extent to which leading members of the medical 
profession had exploited Nazi priorities to benefit their own careers.16 These medi-
cal abuses were now to be punished.
The obvious war criminals were therefore only one problem. Nazis were to be 
weeded out from any public responsibilities, primarily on the basis of criteria such 
as length of their party membership and the ranks they had occupied within it. 
membership from 1 April 1933 or earlier, uninterrupted and increasing salaries, 
and prospering careers were all considered as suspect.17 ‘There will be certain indi-
viduals who will be removed automatically,’ health officers were told in preparation 
for their duties. ‘others will be removed as a matter of principle, because they hold 
particular offices.’ In general, ‘military Government officers should look with sus-
picion on the chief health officers holding important posts at high levels. It is likely 
that the Party has appointed its staunchest supporters to these posts. subordinate 
health officers at high levels and principal health officers in the smaller stadtkreise 
[city districts], landkreise [rural districts], and Gemeinden [parishes] are less likely 
to be ardent Nazis, but one can’t be sure of this. Individual doctors will have to be 
considered separately.’18
Although the cleansing of the health service of former Nazi party members 
formed a major focus of preparations, the question of who was to replace those 
dismissed was only raised in passing. At the sHAEF conference of public health 
officers in January 1945, lieutenant Colonel scheele from the American Preven-
tive medicine section argued that professional qualifications ought to be the main 
priority. ‘When it becomes necessary to appoint new doctors as health officers’, he 
said, it was ‘highly desirable that the men chosen meet the standing German quali-
fications, namely (1) they should be doctors of medicine, (2) they should hold 
certificates showing that they have had special public health administrative train-
ing …, and (3) they should have been practicing for five years.’ ‘obviously’, he 
added, ‘individuals will be appointed in many, possibly in most instances, who do 
not have those qualifications, but it will be worth trying to meet them whenever 
possible.’19 specific guidelines on appointments were promised, but never 
materialized.
This lack of guidance crippled all parts of the occupation machinery. The con-
cept of ‘indirect control’ relied on the availability of German personnel, but crite-
ria by which to assess the suitability of candidates remained vague.20 At the sHAEF 
16 Paul Weindling, ‘medicine and the Holocaust: The Case of typhus’, in Ilana löwy (ed.), Medicine 
and Change: Historical and Sociological Studies of Medical Innovation (london, 1993), 447–64, at 455.
17 tNA, Fo 1030/382, second Army to mil Gov 20 Corps main, 28 may 1945, discussed the 
‘mandatory dismissal’ category. A definite criterion was membership from or before 1 Apr. 1933, but 
it was unclear whether connections to the sA should also be included.
18 BAK, Z45F, 3/169-2/159, ‘minutes of the meeting’, 15–16 Jan. 1945, 15.
19 BAK, Z45F, 3/169-2/159, ‘minutes of the meeting’, 15–16 Jan. 1945, 16.
20 Balfour, ‘Four-Power Control in Germany’, 65.
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conference in January 1945, scheele complained that the terms of ‘active Nazi’ and 
‘ardent sympathiser’ had not been clarified, and an ‘objective method of classifying 
Nazi medical personnel’ was needed.21 Even the officials responsible for the screen-
ing process were confused about its criteria and exact purposes.22
What ideas on the selection of Germans did the British have at their disposal? 
some were formulated by an influential group of army psychiatrists and psycholo-
gists, who were recruited as advisers to the British military authorities. Prominent 
among them was Henry Dicks, a psychiatrist based at the tavistock Clinic and the 
British Directorate of Army Psychiatry.23 In 1944 and 1945 he compiled a series of 
papers for the Control Commission, based on his work with German PoWs. In 
these, Dicks provided a peculiar psychological assessment of the problem of Nazism 
and the selection of suitable candidates. The ‘idea, in its original crude form’, one 
paper explained, ‘which was familiar to psychiatry at least since 1933, was that fas-
cism is a mass psychosis; the particular problem, as it appeared in 1945, was how 
to prevent the recurrence of this psychosis in post-war Germany and to encourage 
a more healthy outlook’.24 Given that adherence to Nazism was a psychiatric con-
dition, issues such as the selection and denazification of Germans demanded psy-
chological methods.25
Psychological insights, according to Dicks, were useful not just in the diagnosis 
of aberrations from the norm, but had a wider application—even in stable, demo-
cratic societies.26 By 1945, the British military authorities were already familiar 
with the claim that psychological insights could aid British public life and admin-
istration. Against growing concerns about the mental fitness of British officers, one 
existing product of these psychological doctrines was the new War office selection 
Boards (WosB), introduced in spring 1942, which supplemented the standard 
physical tests for the selection of army officers with psychological assessments.27 
21 BAK, Z45F, 3/169-2/159, ‘minutes of the meeting’, 15–16 Jan. 1945, 15.
22 tNA, Fo 1050/336, ‘Joint Public safety weekly conference—extract from memoranda drawn 
up by the Director, Public safety Branch, U.s.Group C.C. for consideration at the first meeting to be 
held on 22 Jan. 1945, at Flat 107, Ashley Gardens’, lt. Col. I. H. t. Baldwin, soI, 20 Jan. 1945. Fo 
1050/336, Public safety Branch to Chiefs of Divisions of the Control Commission for Germany 
(British Element), subject ‘removal and appointment of German officials’, 17 Jan. 1945.
23 Henry V. Dicks, Fifty Years of the Tavistock Clinic (london, 1970). Henry V. Dicks, ‘Personality 
traits and National socialist Ideology: A War-time study of German Prisoners of War’, Human Rela­
tions, 3/2 (1950), 111–54. Henry V. Dicks, Licensed Mass Murder: A Socio­Psychological Study of Some 
SS Killers (New York, 1972). After the war he worked on the psychology of international relations, see 
e.g. UNEsCo, Documents and Publications, sEm/sEC.II/3/ED, ‘Personality development in rela-
tion to international understanding—lecture given by Dr Henry V. Dicks, University of leeds at the 
summer seminar on Education for International Understanding, sèvres, France’, 25 Aug. 1947.
24 tNA, Fo 1032/1464, ‘The German Personnel research Branch: A Brief Historical sketch and 
summary of Findings’, 31 Dec. 1946.
25 WA, GC/135/B1, H. V. Dicks, ‘National socialism as a Psychological Problem’, Jan. 1945.
26 tNA, Fo 1032/1464, lt. Col. H. V. Dicks, ‘selection and re-education of German Prisoners of 
War’, sent to Air Commodore Groves (PWE) and sir Desmond morton (Director of Army Psychia-
try), 10 Feb. 1945, 1.
27 Jeremy A. Crang, ‘The British Army as a social Institution, 1939–1945’, in Hew strachan (ed.), The 
British Army: Manpower and Society into the Twenty­First Century (london, 2000), 20. F. H. Vinden, ‘The 
Introduction of War office selection Boards in the British Army: A Personal  recollection’, in Brian Bond 
and Ian roy (eds.), War and Society: A Yearbook of Military History, ii (london, 1977), 119–28. Philip Vernon 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 03/19/2015, SPi
156 Compromises and Confrontations
This is an open access publication. Except where otherwise noted, this work is distributed under the terms of a 
 Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence, a copy of which is available 
at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. For enquiries concerning use outside the scope of the licence 
terms, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com.
Each board included military testing officers, a psychiatrist, and a psychologist; the 
latter were recruited from the tavistock Clinic, which dominated British army 
psychiatry during and after the war.28 one element of the new selection process 
was the ‘leaderless group task’, formulated by the psychiatrist Wilfred Bion: the 
group of candidates were given a practical task (such as building a bridge), en abling 
observers to assess their interactions with each other and their attempts to organize 
or guide the group.29 The boards were credited with introducing a more merito-
cratic and democratic system of selection (not least since those attending them 
were required to conceal their rank), and with improving efficiency.30 Under pres-
sure from the Foreign office and treasury, the Civil service selection Boards also 
adopted similar procedures.31
And now these procedures could be adapted to assist the occupiers. The recom-
mendations by Dicks and others had important implications for British procedure 
in Germany. Dicks insisted that Nazis were to be removed from administrative and 
responsible positions, since the ‘influence of such individuals approximates in 
importance to that of a magnet in a field [of ] iron fillings’.32 This was hardly con-
tentious. But he warned against simply replacing them with self-declared ‘anti-
Nazis’ or ‘non-Nazis’. Anti-Nazis—whether the émigrés who lobbied the Foreign 
office for support, or social democrats and liberals still in Germany—were to be 
approached only with caution.33 regardless of political allegiance, Dicks argued, 
many Germans were fundamentally totalitarian in their character and psychologi-
cal make-up, and therefore even ‘the men diagnosed as non-Nazi types’ often 
shared ‘some of the characteristic shortcomings (from an Allied point of view) of 
the national psychology’.34 Dicks restated later that ‘not all who are anti­Nazi are 
and John Parry, Personnel Selection in the British Forces (london, 1949). many thanks to Nafsika Thalassis for 
background on the selection boards, which she has dealt with in her PhD thesis, ‘treating and Preventing 
trauma: British military Psychiatry during the second World War’, University of salford, 2004.
28 other tavistock men who advised the British Army and/or occupation forces included Brigadier 
John rawlings rees (who assessed rudolf Hess’s capability of standing trial for war crimes), ronald 
Hargreaves (assistant director of Army Psychiatry), Wilfred Bion, and roger money-Kyrle. see roger 
money-Kyrle, Psychoanalysis and Politics: A Contribution to the Psychology of Politics and Morals 
(london, 1951). roger money-Kyrle, ‘The Development of War’, British Journal of Medical Psychol­
ogy, 17 (1937), 219–36. John r. rees and Henry Victor Dicks, The Case of Rudolf Hess: A Problem in 
Diagnosis and Forensic Psychiatry (london, 1947). J. r. rees, The Shaping of Psychiatry by War (london, 
1945). W. r. Bion, ‘The War of Nerves’, in E. miller and H. Crichton-miller (eds.), The Neuroses in 
War (london, 1940), 180–200. W. r. Bion, ‘Psychiatry in a time of Crisis’, British Journal of Medical 
Psychology, 21 (1948).
29 Gérard Bléandonu, Wilfred Bion: His Life and Works, 1897–1979 (london, 1994), 54–9. Wilfred 
Bion, ‘The leaderless Group Project’, Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 10 (may 1946), 77. Also see Wilfred 
Bion, All My Sins Remembered: Another Part of a Life, and the Other Side of Genius (Abingdon, 1985).
30 Jeremy A. Crang, ‘The British Army as a social Institution, 1939–1945’, in Hew strachan (ed.), 
The British Army: Manpower and Society into the Twenty­First Century (london, 2000), 21.
31 richard A. Chapman, The Civil Service Commission, 1988–1991: A Bureau Biography (london, 
2004), 53 f.
32 tNA, Fo 1032/1464, H. V. Dicks, ‘memorandum on the applications of social psychology to 
the needs of the control commission’, 9 June 1945.
33 WA, GC/135/B1, lieut.-Colonel H. V. Dicks, War office (DA Psych.), ‘German political attitudes: 
an analysis and forecast of likely reactions confronting the Allies in occupied Germany’, oct. 1944.
34 tNA, Fo 1032/1464, H. V. Dicks, ‘An experimental establishment for selection and  re- education 
of Germans’, 24 Feb. 1945.
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also non­authoritarian. In other words, it is quite possible that new teachers, judges, 
administrators will—however sincere their anti-Nazism—nevertheless be so satu-
rated with certain undesirable German characteristics that in the end authoritari-
anism will again flourish as the expression of German institutional life.’35
The problem of selecting Germans was therefore ‘not one of discovering opin-
ions held, but of assaying character and fitness to be a bearer of new responsibili-
ties’.36 Psychological rather than political criteria had to guide the German 
appointments. The challenge was not going to be one of identifying the ‘obvious, 
100 per cent Nazis’, since ‘[a]ny experienced interrogator could spot these’.37 But 
while ‘the fascist, Nazi sort of man’ could be easily identified, there were ‘a large 
number of intermediary types—the great majority—whom one cannot classify as 
falling clearly into a Nazi or non-Nazi character group, irrespective of their politi-
cal ideology. some anti-Nazis have nearly all the traits of Nazis except their politi-
cal allegiance, and some Nazis do not fit their ideological classification in 
psychological terms.’38 only psychological tests could assess whether individuals 
‘can live together, can create social order, and what kind of order, spontaneously, in 
however, humble a sphere. What tone will they set? The proof of their anti-Nazi 
pudding is in the eating, the action.’39 In sum, a psychologically oriented method, 
Dicks and others maintained, ‘could bypass the opportunists, ingratiating pre-
tences of friendliness and anti-Nazi professions of various unknown, unlabelled 
persons. By the use of special tests we can distinguish the marks of the fascist, 
authoritarian type from his opposite without his being aware that he is disclosing 
his deeper attitudes.’40 In appointments to the public health system, too, neither 
political orientation nor practical qualifications could take precedence over an 
acceptable psychological make-up.
These ideas characterized some of the occupation staff’s initial assumptions, and 
became an explicit element of the British Control Commission in Germany. occu-
pation officials were to conduct psychological vetting with the assistance of the 
newly founded German Personnel research Branch (GPrB), established in Febru-
ary 1945, initially under the aegis of the Public Health Branch.41 Henry Dicks was 
loaned by the Directorate of Army Psychology to be the unit’s main adviser.42 
35 tNA, Fo 1039/129, ‘German Personnel research Branch, Assessment Centres’, 8 Feb. 1946.
36 tNA, Fo 1032/1464, H. V. Dicks, ‘selection and re-education of German prisoners of war’, 10 
Feb. 1945.
37 tNA, Fo 1032/1464, H. V. Dicks, ‘selection and re-education of German prisoners of war’, 10 
Feb. 1945.
38 tNA, Fo 1032/1464, H. V. Dicks, ‘An experimental establishment for selection and re- education 
of Germans’, 24 Feb. 1945.
39 tNA, Fo 1032/1464, H. V. Dicks, ‘selection and re-education of German prisoners of war’, 10 
Feb. 1945.
40 tNA, Fo 1032/1464, H. V. Dicks, ‘memorandum on the applications of social psychology to 
the needs of the control commission’, 9 June 1945.
41 tNA, Fo 936/90, Deputy Commissioner (military) to Under secretary of state for War, the 
War office, 20 Feb. 1945, subject: ‘Public Health Branch, IA&C Div, War Establishment’. on treas-
ury approval for the GPrB, see Fo 936/90, Aynsley to Winnifirth, 25 Feb. 1945.
42 tNA, Fo 1032/1464, IA&C Division memorandum ‘German Personnel research section’, 
14 June 1945; Commissioner’s office (Norfolk House) to Assistant military Governor, 16 June 
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While still in Britain, the GPrB prepared a psychological testing procedure to be 
used in Germany. on the basis of the War office and Civil service selection 
Boards, it was to organize selection boards throughout the British zone, aimed at 
detecting German psychological shortcomings. In February 1945 work was delayed 
by several months because of Dicks’s illness.43 In June 1945, however, the GPrB 
was enlarged to include more experimental testing staff, and it devised methods of 
grading German psychological traits on the basis of tests conducted among German 
PoWs.44
The GPrB moved to Germany in the autumn of 1945, where it was housed 
with the Intelligence Division in British zone headquarters. Its main task was ‘to 
select for key positions in the German civil service, such Germans as are reasonably 
free of psychological authoritarianism, so that the new departments in law, educa-
tion, police, finance etc. shall not again be moulded by “Fuehrers” of an undemo-
cratic type’.45 Its first task was to test inmates of the ministerial Collecting Centre 
near Kassel, an internment camp for high-ranking Nazis. Dicks had high hopes for 
an enlargement of the GPrB to enable it ‘to “vet” all German candidates for the 
principal appointments in the new German structure, e.g. in the legal, Educa-
tional and high level Administrative organisations’.46 tests were designed to give 
each German an ‘employability rating’, measuring ‘the degree to which a candidate 
possesses undesirable mental or moral qualities which are connected with Nazism 
or German nationalism (such as overbearing behaviour, militarism, aggressiveness, 
over-emphasis on discipline and submissiveness)’.47 Under the guidance of GPrB, 
the British selection of Germans was to be overseen by a series of ‘assessment cen-
tres’ dotted throughout the British zone.48 one such centre seems to have been in 
operation by mid-september 1945, and more were planned.49
However, this approach, while influential, never represented a consensus of 
opinion. rival proposals on the selection of Germans included a Foreign office 
research Department (ForD) paper from December 1943, which stated that 
1945. The GPrB’s Controller General was Wing Commander oscar A. oeser (rAF), who took a 
chair in psychology in melbourne in 1946 (where the Psychology Department had a strong tradition 
in social psychology), see Alan Barcan, Sociological Theory and Educational Reality: Education and 
Society in Australia Since 1949 (New south Wales, 1993). other GPrB members included Geoffrey 
Gorer, Colonel richard rendel, major W. Gumbel, and major A. N. Brangham.
43 tNA, Fo 1032/533, HQ (IA&C Division, Ashley Gardens) to Public Health Branch, 27 Apr. 
1945.
44 tNA, Fo 936/90, Deputy military Governor, (CCG(BE), Norfolk House) to Under secretary 
of state for War (War office), 16 June 1945.
45 tNA, Fo 1032/1464, A. H. Albu (Deputy President of the Governmental sub-Commission, 
office of the Deputy military Governor, CCG(BE), Adv HQ, Berlin) to lt. Gen. sir Brian robertson 
(Deputy military Governor).
46 tNA, Fo 1032/1464, major General lethbridge (mGI, Intelligence Group, CCG(BE) ) to 
Chief of staff (British Zone), 6 sept. 1945.
47 tNA, Fo 1039/129, ‘Assessment Centres’, 8 Feb. 1946, and extended version in Fo 1032/1464, 
19 June 1946, sent by Controller General (GPrB, Bad oeynhausen), to A. H. Albu, (Governmental 
sub-commission, HQ, CCG(BE), Berlin).
48 tNA, Fo 1039/129, ‘Assessment Centres’, 8 Feb. 1946.
49 tNA, Fo 1032/1464, Private office of the Chief of staff, British zone (Adv HQ, CCG(BE), 
Berlin), to mGI, 11 sep. 1945. Fo 1065/11, lt. Col. Gs, 12 oct. 1945.
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‘natural leaders of the community’ should be appointed, and that it would be 
‘ne cessary to allow many public servants to remain in office, since it would be 
impossible to replace them’.50 some British officials argued that the criterion of 
‘functional suitability’ (i.e. the ability to do the job) was at least as important as ‘the 
special security aspect’ and the ‘extent of Nazi affiliations’.51 A ‘system of vetting’ 
had to be evolved, they insisted, ‘which would permit the normal life in the country, 
and therefore of Government, to continue without serious or prolonged interrup-
tion’.52 There was an implicit but widely held assumption that the British occupiers 
had to impart democratic methods and practices to the Germans, and to put in 
place a democratically oriented system of administration and government. But even 
these statements assumed that the denazification and the restaffing of the German 
authorities could proceed more or less in tandem, and that a thorough denazifica-
tion was not only necessary, but also possible to achieve. Although the army psy-
chiatrists never represented a majority opinion, they articulated sentiments which 
were crucial to the initial British approach, in the realm of health as elsewhere. since 
even antifascist Germans were not free from totalitarian traits and their claims could 
not be taken at face value, British soldiers entered Germany with the idea that there 
were no obviously trustworthy Germans on whom they could rely.
ComPromIsEs
Things turned out rather differently. After some initial enthusiasm, Dicks’s propos-
als, and even the more general guidelines, were discarded. The conditions encoun-
tered by British detachments making their way into Germany were quite 
unexpected. Hitler’s scorched-earth policy had left its traces, and the Allied bomb-
ing raids had caused serious destruction. In an Observer feature in early April 1945, 
George orwell noted that ‘[a]s the advance into Germany continues and more and 
more of the devastation wrought by the Allied bombing planes is laid bare there are 
three comments that almost every observer finds himself making. The first is: “The 
people at home have no conception of this.” The second is: “It’s a miracle that 
they’ve gone on fighting.” And the third is: “Just think of the work of building this 
all up again!” ’53
First impressions suggested that conditions were dire. large parts of cities and 
towns had been destroyed, and populations lived in cellars and bomb shelters.54 
railways were not running, bridges were destroyed, roads were unusable. In many 
50 tNA, Fo 371/39116, ‘some Aspects of the Post-War Administration of Germany’, ForD, 30 
Dec. 1943.
51 tNA, Fo 1050/336, lecture on vetting of legal personnel by Colonel G. H. r. Halland, 27 Jan. 
1945.
52 tNA, Fo 1050/336, meeting held in DIG, C&D sections office, 24 Jan. 1945, on the subject 
of the vetting and purging of German officials.
53 George orwell, ‘Future of a ruined Germany: rural slum Cannot Help Europe’, Observer, 8 
Apr. 1945, in: Orwell: The Observer Years (london, 2003), 40.
54 W. G. sebald’s essay ‘Air War and literature: Zürich lectures’, in W. G. sebald, On the Natural 
History of Destruction (1999; london, 2003).
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areas there were no working telephone connections, no post, no fuel for cars or 
buildings, and local communities were isolated and uninformed. Central and most 
regional government had dissolved and the administrators had fled or disappeared; 
only atomized clusters of local administration remained. Basic amenities had 
stopped working. stocks of food, medical materials, and drugs were being looted 
and in ever-shorter supply. Industrial production had almost completely stopped. 
sewers had burst, corpses were rotting in rivers and on the streets, the main water 
pipes were broken, and many places did not have any supply of unpolluted drink-
ing water. The food problem soon crystallized as particularly urgent. The British 
relief worker Francesca Wilson observed that food shortages entailed a series of 
critical medical problems: ‘[i]t must never be forgotten’, she wrote in a 1945 
manual on relief work in post-war Europe, ‘that a famine of food involves a famine 
of everything else. The typhus-carrying body louse flourishes in famine areas 
because where there is no food there is also no soap and often a scarcity of fuel for 
heating water.’55 Germany now formed a potent breeding ground for epidemics.
These conditions were worsened by the enormous population movements at the 
end of the war. The geographer malcolm Proudfoot, a lieutenant colonel in charge 
of sHAEF’s refugee department in Germany, estimated that over 60 million 
 Europeans had been involuntarily moved from their homes during the war or 
immediate post-war period.56 more recently, mark mazower calculated that 
between 1939 and 1948 in Eastern and Central Europe alone some 46 million 
people were uprooted through flight, evacuation, resettlement, or deportation.57 
Germany was geographically and politically central to these movements: disbanded 
soldiers and prisoners of war, city inhabitants evacuated to rural areas, ethnic 
 Germans expelled from their homes in Eastern Europe, liberated slave labourers, 
and concentration camp inmates; all now tried to return home, settle somewhere 
new, or wandered the countryside aimlessly. The realization dawned that simply 
keeping the ex-enemy population alive from day to day was going to be a major 
task. A Sunday Times editorial from 6 may 1945 noted that ‘the civilian problems 
in Germany are going to be far harder than was expected a year ago, owing to the 
disappearance of almost every landmark in German life’. Whereas unconquered parts 
‘had to be harried and ravaged, their railways crippled and their bridges destroyed’, 
in the newly occupied areas everything had to be quickly repaired and rebuilt.58
Apart from shocking destruction, the Germans themselves turned out not to be 
quite as expected. ‘Propaganda, and especially their own propaganda, has taught us 
to think of them as tall, blond and arrogant’, orwell wrote. But in Germany he 
actually saw ‘smallish, dark-haired people, obviously of the same racial stock as the 
55 Francesca Wilson, Advice to Relief Workers (london, 1945), 14.
56 see Chauncy D. Harris and Gabriele Walker, ‘The refugee Problem of Germany’, Economic 
Geography, 29/1 (Jan. 1953), 10. malcolm Proudfoot, European Refugees, 1939–1952: A Study in 
Forced Population Movements (Evanston, Ill., 1956). Also see Proudfoot’s ‘liaison notes’ in tNA, Fo 
1052/302, Director of DP Branch to HQ, Combined Displaced Persons Executive (CDPX), BAor, 
1 sept. 1945.
57 mark mazower, Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century (london, 1998), 217.
58 BAK, Z45F, 44-45/1/7, ‘What Next?’, The Sunday Times, sunday 6 may 1945.
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Belgians across the border, and in no way extraordinary’.59 The British army doctor 
D. A. spencer was surprised that although ‘liberated’ and ‘ex-enemy’ civilians had 
always been talked about in very different terms, ‘[i]t was very difficult to tell the 
difference between a German refugee and a Polish refugee in the part of Germany 
that I was located in. I didn’t know which was which.’60 In addition (and the frat-
ernization ban notwithstanding), troops soon discovered that German women 
appeared to be ‘just as amenable to their charms as the women of France, Belgium 
and Holland . . . like the women of the liberated countries they soon realised the 
economic worth of the liberators, reckoning on the men being a source of real 
coffee and cigarettes.’61
Different detachments often had very different experiences which coloured their 
outlook. michael rowntree, who ran the Friends Ambulance Units (FAU) from 
the British zone’s headquarters, remembered that ‘[s]ome of the [FAU] teams had 
some very horrendous times dealing with the concentration camp inmates and the 
results of the concentration camps, and I can’t help thinking that their views of 
Germans must have been somewhat different from those of us who perhaps hadn’t 
seen quite so much of that active horror and evil’.62 Whereas those involved in the 
liberation of concentration camps had their worst expectations of German behav-
iour exceeded, those without such experiences were often quite optimistic. Colonel 
Gibson, deputy commander of the military government in the British zone’s 
 Westphalia district, thought that ‘they really were very nice people. I knew the 
Germans quite well, in that I had studied German at school, and I had lived in 
Germany en famille and attended a German grammar school for a term when I was 
about 17. so, there is no doubt they are Prussian in outlook and conduct, but on 
the whole, they by now had realised that they had definitely been taken for a ride 
by Hitler and they were very sorry for themselves.’63 With so many different kinds 
of people to be organized, the army often found German civilians among the easi-
est to deal with. The anticipated Werwolf resistance did not happen, and many 
Nazi leaders had run away, committed suicide, or gone into hiding by the time the 
Allies arrived. so, although the arrest of serious Nazi activists and troublemakers 
had been listed as one of the first and most urgent British tasks, active Nazis ‘proved 
in the formal sense to be no problem at all’—they ‘did not stay behind to be 
 “eradicated” by the Allies; they scarcely waited to be turned out by their fellow 
countrymen; they simply melted away’.64
The British military authorities argued that much more urgent was the need 
to impose control on the gangs of displaced persons (DPs) roaming the country. 
59 George orwell, ‘Creating order out of Cologne Chaos: Water supplied from Carts’, The 
Observer, 25 mar. 1945, in Orwell: The Observer Years, 39.
60 IWm sound Archive, 2993/3, interview with D. A. spencer, recorded by Thames tV in 1972.
61 sean longdon, To the Victor the Spoils: D­Day to VE­Day, the Reality Behind the Heroism (london, 
2004), 93.
62 IWm sound Archive, 10883/8, interview with michael rowntree (born 16 Feb. 1919), recorded 
by IWm on 7 Aug. 1989.
63 IWm sound Archive, 12183/22, interview with leonard Gibson (born 4 Dec. 1911), recorded 
by IWm in 1991.
64 Balfour, ‘Four-Power Control in Germany’, 65.
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These were primarily Polish, russian, and Baltic former slave labourers and foreign 
workers who, so countless British reports described, were out for revenge—shooting 
their former masters, ransacking food stores and farms, breaking into houses, killing 
policemen who tried to intervene.65 Even if it was not part of the British brief to 
protect Germans from such attacks, the importance of preventing DPs from caus-
ing havoc and using up scarce supplies was quickly recognized. local Germans were 
often unexpected, but obvious, allies. The military authorities’ dislike of DPs ampli-
fied their sympathy with the seemingly much more civilized local population.66
An unexpectedly urgent problem which detracted attention from German civil-
ians was army discipline. In the last days of the war, discipline in many commands 
had broken down. The officer in charge of 503 military Government Detachment 
despaired not just about DPs, but also about the ‘ill discipline of troops and total 
disregard of all notices placing a room or building out of bounds’. soldiers had 
broken into the telephone exchange, post office, and police station, he reported, 
and left a trail of broken property behind.67 Colonel Gibson remembered, in dis-
paraging terms, that ‘the military government had been infiltrated with the most 
low-down variety of army rubbish. And they all had to be sorted out, they were 
misbehaving there in Germany and not thinking much about their job, just think-
ing about how much they could get out of it. They were more or less looting, and 
behaving with the German secretary girls . . . and so we had an awful job getting all 
this sorted out.’68 By contrast to DPs and drunken soldiers running wild, German 
civilians often made pleasant first impressions on the occupation staff.
In this context, the wartime plans had become inappropriate in a number of 
ways. The stark distinction between Allied operations in liberated and in ex-enemy 
territory seemed to be unhelpful and unrealistic to soldiers on the ground. As they 
moved from France and Holland into Germany, they found that little in their 
work changed. troops encountered similar kinds of confusion and disorganization 
in the villages and towns on either side of the borders, and deployed similar prac-
tices and procedures. They appointed mayors and charged them with assembling 
teams to ensure that basic functions—police and public safety, repair of buildings, 
sanitation, quarantine—were carried out.69 Doctors were appointed, generally on 
the new mayor’s recommendation, to take charge of health matters. overall, 
‘knowledge of local conditions’, ‘willingness to assist mil. Gov’, familiarity with 
the job, good standing in the community, or, often, the simple lack of anyone else 
available, were the major factors in these selections.70 Because of their ‘professional 
standing’, doctors, along with teachers and priests, were also popular choices for 
general administrative duties.71
65 For anecdotes on the British army’s encounter of DPs, see longdon, To the Victor the Spoils, e.g. 88.
66 on British and American views of DPs from Eastern Europe, see Paul Weindling, Epidemics and 
Genocide in Eastern Europe, 1890–1945 (oxford, 2000), 396–7.
67 tNA, Fo 1030/382, 503 mil Gov Det to 30 Corps main mil Gov, 18 mar. 1945.
68 IWm sound Archive, 12183/22, interview with leonard Gibson.
69 tNA, Fo 1030/382, 503 mil Gov Det to mil Gov 30 Corps, 7 mar. 1945.
70 tNA, Fo 1030/382, 213 mil Gov Det to mil Gov 30 Corps main HQ, 11 mar. 1945.
71 tNA, Fo 1030/382, list of recent appointments, sent by oC 213 mil Gov Det to mil Gov 2 
Cdn Corps, 10 mar. 1945.
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In these early days, British detachments on the ground often decided that it was 
‘better to appoint a party member who is a good organiser and check his activities, 
than to appoint a non party member who has to be supervised and almost carried 
in order that some semblance of order can be restored. An incompetent Burgomaster 
is obviously worse than having no official at all.’72 While Field security did, as 
planned, conduct basic screenings, this usually happened after the appointments 
had been made. The files document the chaotic nature of these arrangements: basic 
information on the officials appointed (accompanied by their questionnaires and 
generally glowing testimonials from other locals) was sent to headquarters, and 
from there to Field security, who checked the names against mandatory dismissal 
lists, card indices, and whatever other records were to hand. This slow process only 
improved marginally after may 1945, and continued to suffer from tensions 
between the public safety officers (responsible for the evaluation of questionnaires) 
and those who made, confirmed, and approved selections. By the summer of 1945, 
higher municipal officials were also appointed in this manner.
on occasion, there were some mild echoes of the manuals on how to handle the 
Germans. ‘This Det. made everyone realise at the outset that the British came as 
CoNQUErors and that as conquerors our orders had to receive implicit obedi-
ence’, wrote one commander.73 Another one recommended ‘a firm, just and 
uncompromising attitude’, but added that this should be ‘combined with reason-
able attention to the requirements and welfare of the people’.74 Despite such pro-
fessed views, detachments everywhere protested when, after media reports on the 
British liberation of Bergen-Belsen, the guidelines were to be restricted even fur-
ther. An army directive on 21 April 1945 instructed: ‘Brit[ish] Press already very 
sensitive about retention in any official capacity of any members of Nazi Party. 
Belsen atrocities certain to accentuate tense attitude. Political antecedents of any 
person recommended for civil adm[inistration] appointments will be scrutinised 
closely. No repeat no person actively connected with Nazi Party or who held any 
office in Nazi Party or who was a member before 1 April 33 is eligible for office in 
civ adm[inistration] incl[uding] police.’75
Detachments resented these calls for blanket dismissals, since they made their 
own jobs so much harder. They argued for a more practical and flexible approach 
to former Nazi Party membership, taking into account individual cases and local 
circumstances. Former ‘inactive’ Nazis and ‘harmless types’ should be utilized, one 
major wrote—especially when they were otherwise ‘cooperative, willing, and to 
my mind, a member of the Nazi Party by compulsion and not choice’. ‘The diffi-
culty at the moment’, wrote another major, ‘is the production of a substitute with-
out introducing a certain amount of chaos’.76 This argument was not always 
72 tNA, Fo 1030/382, oC 222 Det mil Gov to mil Gov 30 Corps main HQ, 14 mar. 1945.
73 tNA, Fo 1030/382, 213 mil Gov Det to 30 Corps main, 11 mar. 1945.
74 tNA, Fo 1030/382, 214 mil Gov Det to HQ 30 Corps, 18 mar. 1945.
75 tNA, Fo 1030/382, main second Army to 1 Corps main 8, Corps, rear 12 Corps, main 30 
Corps, 21 Apr. 1945. see also follow-up telegram from main second Army, 24 Apr. 1945.
76 tNA, Fo 1030/382, 611 l/r Det mil Gov to 30 Corps main HQ, 16 may 1945. 505 mil Gov 
Det to mil Gov 30 Corps rear, 24 may 1945.
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appreciated by the higher levels of military government, let alone in Whitehall. ‘It 
would appear that [the operating commander of ] 803 Det[achment] may not be 
adopting a sufficiently strong attitude towards German officials’, complained one 
brigadier.77 And a British corps commander told William strang (political adviser 
to Field marshall montgomery, the British commander-in-chief ) later that ‘if our 
military Government officials had a fault, it was that some of them were so keen 
on getting their areas into working order that they tended to forget that the people 
they were dealing with were Germans’.78
It was not just local detachments who argued that the rules had to be bent or 
abandoned. For health officers, the prescribed reliance on existing German author-
ities proved quite impracticable. Wilfried Harding, a British public health officer 
of German origin, now stationed in the ruhr district, remembered that when the 
British arrived and began to organize health operations, ‘they almost always found 
that the [German] public-health staff, along with most other public servants, had 
abandoned their posts, and that there was no “established health organisation to be 
utilised”. some local doctor might be told to act as an emergency public-health 
executive and to coordinate the local medical services. But the reorganisation of a 
proper public-health organisation had generally to start from scratch.’79 The direc-
tives’ limitation that any work was to be solely based upon German resources and 
personnel proved unworkable; it seemed absurd amidst the rubble and ruins. There 
was no functioning German health service, and the extent of chaos and destruction 
demanded much greater involvement in health operations than had been antici-
pated and prepared for.
Health officers focused initially on the containment of infectious diseases, and 
the isolation or removal of the sources of infection. But even after their initial 
measures, the situation continued to be grave. Far from having to put a ceiling on 
the German standard of living, they found that additional work and resources 
would have to be invested to prevent it from crashing any further. ‘[A]lthough 
there is all-round determination not to pamper the Germans’, an Observer article 
noted, ‘it is clear that food and labour conditions must nowhere be allowed to fall 
below a standard which might result in epidemics or unrest.’80 Even proceeding 
within the limited terms of ‘preventing disease and unrest’—the mantra of the 
sHAEF handbooks—demanded substantial effort and resources. In this context, 
British public health officers were particularly effective in formulating an authori-
tative and persuasive argument on the need for a pragmatic disregard of prepared 
approaches. otherwise, they argued, catastrophes would inevitably follow,  affecting 
the occupation troops as much as Germans, and damaging the occupiers’ 
77 tNA, Fo 1030/382, second Army main HQ to 30 Corps main, 5 may 1945.
78 William strang, Home and Abroad: An Autobiography (london, 1956), 234.
79 Wilfried Harding, ‘reorganisation of the Health services’. Harding (Hoffmann) was born in 
Berlin in 1915; he left Germany in 1933 to go to a Quaker school in Birmingham. He worked for the 
British military government 1947–8. see WA, 1828V, The royal College of Physicians and oxford 
Brookes University, Wellcome medical sciences Video Archives, ‘Dr Wilfried Harding CBE in inter-
view with max Blythe’, 27 Apr. 1990.
80 BAK, Z45F, 44-45/1/7, ‘Generals ready to run Germany’, Observer, sunday 6 may 1945.
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 international reputations. Health staffs also argued that while the protection of 
Allied troops stationed in Germany obviously was a major priority and demanded 
health operations in its own right, unsettled, bored, starving, or sick Germans 
themselves could only harm British and Allied interests. This health argument 
lasted through the first occupation years, long outliving the initial days of chaos.
At the start, demands were focused specifically on a campaign to prevent epi-
demics and other health crises in the winter of 1945–6. Health officers and survey 
teams were sent ‘into the field’ to learn about ‘the magnitude of the problems to 
be tackled’ and to compile plans for the autumn and winter months.81 They 
recorded incidence rates of diseases and monitored them for increases or fluctua-
tions. Based on the resulting estimates of what shape epidemics would take, 
quotas were set for hospital beds to be made available for civilian use in each 
region. Emergency hospital accommodation had to be found and made habitable. 
The ‘winter emergency programme’ also focused on the mobilization of medical 
supplies, which health officers saw as particularly problematic, even after taking 
over Wehrmacht and other stores, and earmarking stockpiles of basic drugs, vac-
cines, and sera for emergency use.82 There just did not seem to be enough of 
anything. In reports to their superiors in Germany and in london, British health 
officers argued that imports would have to be contemplated, at the very least in 
the event of an epidemic.83 In response, the War office released some equipment 
from British army resources (stretchers, palliasses, blankets) and stored it for 
emergency use, but even this additional supply was often adequate only for cur-
sory demands.84
This public health-led call for winter mobilization was taken up and adapted by 
many sections of the military government apparatus. Under the guise of this quite 
specific programme for epidemic work, many began to argue that only a far-reaching 
reconstruction of Germany could prevent health disasters. Although ‘[s]ound 
medical organisation, including carefully devised emergency arrangements, can do 
much to limit the spread of serious disease and to mitigate its effects’, one report 
stated, ‘it must be emphasised that the only effective bulwark against real disaster 
in the field of public health would be a speedy and substantial improvement of 
food supplies and the energetic pursuit of a policy of alleviating the deplorable 
housing conditions prevailing in big centres of population. Without the basic safe-
guards of health, the doctor, the nurse and all others engaged in the health services, 
however thorough their plans, will be fighting a battle against overwhelming 
odds.’85 ‘A substantial improvement’ in German conditions was presented as strictly 
81 tNA, Fo 1050/757, miss lawson (714 (P) mil Gov Det) to W. H. Boucher, 19 Aug. 1945; 
HQ, IA&C Division, CCG(BE), lübbecke to Director Public Health Branch, 22 Aug. 1945.
82 tNA, Fo 1050/757, ‘minutes of meeting on planning for winter epidemics’, held in lübbecke 
on 29 Aug. 1945.
83 tNA, Fo 1050/757, draft ‘Plan for dealing with major epidemics’, [8 sept. 1945], released as 
‘military Government Instruction on Winter Epidemics’ on 17 sept. 1945.
84 tNA, Fo 1050/757, Commander-in-Chief Field marshall montgomery to the Undersecretary 
of state, War office, subject: plan in case of major epidemics in Germany, 4 sept. 1945.
85 tNA, Fo 1050/757, draft ‘Plan for dealing with major epidemics’, [8 sept. 1945].
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 03/19/2015, SPi
166 Compromises and Confrontations
This is an open access publication. Except where otherwise noted, this work is distributed under the terms of a 
 Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence, a copy of which is available 
at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. For enquiries concerning use outside the scope of the licence 
terms, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com.
in the ‘medical interest’—and, it was stated elsewhere, ‘necessary for the protection of 
Allied troops’ and ‘essential to the public health and to good order in Germany’.86
These arguments could also easily be turned on their head. Not only was the 
reconstruction of Germany vital for preventing health crises (and for reducing the 
cost of the occupation to British authorities and taxpayers), but poor public health 
could harm programmes for the reconstruction and democratization of Germany. 
In a directive from August 1945, Field marshall montgomery noted that ‘unsettled 
living conditions’ (of which poor public health was a central, but on this occasion 
implicit, component) presented ‘much fertile soil for the seeds of trouble’. The 
‘German people have had National socialism and Nazi doctrine pumped into 
them for many years’, and as a result there were ‘few ordinary Germans alive who 
are used to thinking for themselves’. It was crucial that Germans learnt about 
democratic methods and concepts. ‘Democracy on the widest possible basis 
requires that every man and woman should think for themselves and should be 
taught and encouraged to understand that everything in their local and national 
life concerns them vitally and that they and each of them are responsible for their 
governments at each successive step upwards.’ But, and this was the crux, this was 
doomed to failure if the Germans were ‘apprehensive about food, about housing 
and about the general unsettled conditions’. living conditions were vitally impor-
tant, since ‘[i]dleness, boredom and fear of the future are the best allies of Nazism 
past and present’.87
Apart from supply questions and bed targets, which took up much of the health 
officers’ time, the problem of medical personnel (both German and British) was 
ever present. Newly appointed German mayors and local health officers were 
instructed to keep trained nurses ready for urgent epidemic work. local German 
medical organizations were enlisted to help in case of emergency.88 Epidemic 
urgency was used as a persuasive reason to relax the restrictions on the use of for-
merly active members of the NsDAP. The winter programme was also used to 
justify changes in the British health organization in Germany. ‘The existing Public 
Health Establishment was based on the assumption that the Internal Affairs and 
Communications Division would control the German ministry of the Interior,’ 
the Public Health Branch wrote to the British treasury in autumn 1945, but ‘[t]he 
latter ministry did not exist at the end of the war and, due to this and the fusion 
of Control Commission with military Government, the duties of Public Health 
Branch have increased.’89 That alone made the set-up inadequate for effective epi-
demic work, but problems did not end there. The establishment of (by then) 
thirty-four medical officers was ‘pretty exiguous, as you can well appreciate’, wrote 
86 see arguments used in tNA, Fo 1050/737, United states Proposal for the Allied Health 
 Committee, ‘measures for the Control of Narcotic Drugs in Germany’, 3 Dec. 1945.
87 tNA, Fo 1030/387, Directive from Commander in Chief, ‘Administration, local and regional 
Government and the Public services’, [23] Aug. 1945.
88 tNA, Fo 1050/757, Col. D. W. Beamish (Public Health, HQ mil Gov, Hanover region) to the 
Public Health officers at 117, 120, 504, 604, 611, 613, 821, 914 l/r Det. mil Gov, Aug. 1945, 
subject: preparations to meet winter epidemics.
89 tNA, Fo 936/90, ‘New establishment for CCG(BE), Public Health Branch’, 15 oct. 1945.
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Boucher to the ministry of Health in september, ‘but fortunately at the moment 
all the posts are filled. Between December and may, however, it looks as though we 
may lose no fewer than 20 of the present strength through demobilisation, or on 
the termination of the period of engagement of those who volunteered for 12 
month service.’90
An october 1945 report drawn up by the Public Health Branch proposed that 
the numbers of both British health officers and their clerical staff should be 
increased. This increase was particularly ‘necessary in view of the risk of a sudden 
outbreak of epidemics’.91 other proposals dating from this period of winter mobi-
lization called for new British survey teams, particularly ‘nutrition teams’, whose 
job it would be to ‘provide, for the information of the Chief of staff, reports on the 
nutrition state of the German civilian population and [to] advise on measures that 
require to be taken to maintain, if possible, an adequate standard of health’.92 Both 
these demands—increases in the Public Health Branch and the establishment of 
new survey teams—were granted.93
true, the increases were relatively modest: forty-seven health officers were to 
work in the zone, assisted by fifty-four clerical staff. And recruitment to fill the 
positions was far from simple, since work in post-war Germany was not a particu-
larly attractive option to qualified British health officers. Boucher’s suggestion to 
look among retired health staff had little success,94 and problems persisted even 
after advertisements had been placed in a number of medical journals.95 Another 
problem was that demobilization was proceeding at rapid speed, and by November 
1946 a number of military government public health teams had closed, many at 
district level.96
In spite of these problems (often shared by other fields), the health argument 
was enormously successful. one example was health officers’ wages. Initial plans 
had already agreed that leading health specialists should be paid relatively high 
rates.97 Following the winter programme and its ensuing recruitment drive, even 
lower-ranking health officers’ salaries were raised. The Public Health Branch argued 
that it was ‘in serious difficulty about recruiting the Hygiene specialists it requires’, 
and an urgent question was ‘fixing rates of pay which will suffice to attract recruits’. 
90 tNA, mH 76/333, W. H. Boucher (Director of Health Branch, IA&C Division, CCG(BE), 
main HQ, Bünde, BAor) to F. Bliss (ministry of Health, Caxton House), 18 sept. 1945.
91 tNA, Fo 936/90, ‘New establishment for CCG(BE), Public Health Branch’, 15 oct. 1945.
92 tNA, Fo 936/90, ‘Establishment Proposal for Nutrition teams’, from office of the Deputy 
military Governor and Chief of staff (British Zone) to HQ (BAor), 31 oct. 1945.
93 tNA, Fo 936/90, H. l. Jenkyns to r. W. Barrow (War office), 25 oct. 1945.
94 tNA, mH 76/333, minute from mr Williamson to mr Neville, 10 Dec. 1945.
95 tNA, mH 76/333, mr Williamson to sir George Elliston, 25 Jan. 1946. Advertisements 
appeared in the Medical Officer on 2 Feb. 1946 and in Public Health on 4/5 Feb. 1946. Harding 
remembered that ‘establishments were never filled, and the British supervisory organisation suffered 
all along from a persistent dwindling of staffs’. Harding, ‘reorganisation of the Health service’, 483.
96 Hans-Ulrich sons, Gesundheitspolitik während der Besatzungszeit: Das öffentliche Gesundheits­
wesen in Nordrhein­Westfalen, 1945–1949 (Wuppertal, 1983), 33.
97 tNA, Fo 936/90, G. A. Aynsley to A. J. D. Winnifrith (treasury Chambers), 25 Nov. and 18 
Dec. 1944. Ernest Cowell (Principal medical officer) was to get £1,500 per annum so as to beat 
UNrrA’s pay scale of £1,000 to £1,300 for this grade.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 03/19/2015, SPi
168 Compromises and Confrontations
This is an open access publication. Except where otherwise noted, this work is distributed under the terms of a 
 Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence, a copy of which is available 
at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. For enquiries concerning use outside the scope of the licence 
terms, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com.
They had, it argued, ‘now reached a stage at which it can be asserted categorically 
that there is no hope whatever of securing the specialists required at rates falling 
within the ordinary civilian equivalents of the s.o.1 and s.o.2 military grade’.98 
The new rates were to be equal to those of the highest paid military government 
officers, namely those in the Economic Division.99 The increase in basic salary rates 
(in addition to which board and lodging were free) was a reflection not simply of 
the rising esteem in which public health officers and their work were held, but of 
the success and power of their argument on epidemic urgency.100
This health argument was at its most effective and far-reaching on the utilization 
of German health officials. Under pressure from many departments who wanted to 
make use of Germans whom the Allied guidelines deemed unacceptable, the psycho-
logical approach was not systematically applied. Dicks and his staff soon discovered 
that it was not that the occupation officers necessarily disagreed with them about 
German national psychology, but that they did not consider their vetting procedures 
to be practical. ‘one of the early difficulties encountered’, a GPrB paper recounted, 
‘was when certain branches of Control Commission, at their wits’ end to find enough 
Germans to carry out the most urgent tasks of reconstruction, began to resent a bad 
report on a candidate whose technical abilities they held in high esteem. And since 
GPrB’s function was purely advisory, they tended to avoid the dilemma of employ-
ing “fascist” characters or no-one by refusing to send candidates to GPrB at all.’101
objections came from a range of quarters. The Political Division complained 
that since psychological categories did not explicitly take political leanings into 
account, they could be too lenient: ‘we cannot agree’, major storrs explained, ‘that 
assessment, by psychological means, of the suitability of German officials to hold 
key positions be considered as final or exclusive tests. There may well be political 
or personal grounds which would render the appointment of a psychologically 
suitable candidate objectionable to us.’102 A year later, Kit steel from the Political 
Division thought almost the opposite was true. Psychological methods, he wrote 
to the GPrB, were not in tune enough with German political ideas and traditions. 
Even some German features that were quite different from British forms, could be 
acceptable. For example, there were some ‘very definite differences, which do not 
render German democracy any less genuine . . . I hope, therefore, that your friends 
really know a good bit about Germany as well as about psychology.’103
98 tNA, Fo 936/90, Wood (Norfolk House) to H. l. Jenkyns (treasury Chambers), 18 Dec. 1945.
99 tNA, Fo 936/90, Jenkyns (treasury Chambers) to Wood (Norfolk House), 12 Jan. 1946.
100 The basic salary ranged from £800 to £1,200; for officers in charge of corps districts from 
£1,200 to £1,400. tNA, mH 76/333, letter and draft, 31 Dec. 1945. Fo 936/90, reply from Jenkyns 
to Wood, 12 Jan. 1946. lower-ranking members of nutrition teams were to be paid as follows: 
 clinicians £600 to £800, dieticians £400 to £600, basic technicians £250. see Fo 936/90, Director 
General (Health Branch, IA&C, rear HQ, Nevern mansion) to G. K. Wood.
101 tNA, Fo 1032/1464, ‘The German Personnel research Branch: A Brief Historical sketch and 
summary of Findings’.
102 tNA, Fo 1032/533, major Peter storrs (Political Division) to major Jewitt (Intelligence 
 section), 17 July 1945.
103 tNA, Fo 1049/535, Kit steel (Political Division) to major General lethbridge (Intelligence 
Group), 14 Feb. 1946.
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some made use of the psychological insights to support their practical purposes. 
since the psychologists argued that membership of a political party opposed to the 
Nazis was not sufficient to establish whether a person was ‘non-authoritarian’ or 
‘democratically-inclined’, their methods could also be used to demonstrate the 
opposite: that Nazi party membership was no indication of an individual’s mental 
state or suitability; even active Nazis should not be rejected out of hand. An officer 
from Post and telecommunications (P&t) Branch recounted how some German 
officials ‘seemed destined for dismissal because they had been members of the Nazi 
Party since 1933’. But, he went on, ‘[i]n our opinion it did not seem right to dismiss 
these people on purely a rule of thumb examination of their Fragebogen, especially 
as, in view of the result of many enquiries which we ourselves instituted, we were 
reasonably satisfied that they had not been more than nominal Nazis’. The psycho-
logical tests confirmed this opinion, and therefore, ‘[i]n some instances, a test by 
GPrB would probably afford the only means at the disposal of an individual of 
proving that he was not, in fact, more [than] a nominal Nazi’.104 It was clear even to 
the psychologists that conditions in Germany led ‘the staff of GPrB to pay less 
attention to the negative qualities of their subjects and seek rather to find positive 
characteristics, to reject more and more the policy of excluding the unfit in favour 
of one which would direct the energies of the “greys” into useful channels’.105
The reaction of the Economic Division came closest to that of the Public Health 
Branch. Their main objection was that the use of psychological vetting would limit 
their freedom of action. Colonel merry explained that, ‘[b]earing in mind the large 
number of important jobs that have to be filled in the economic administration of 
Germany and the relatively small number of politically and technically acceptable 
personnel available, the scheme under review appears to me somewhat “luxurious” 
and perhaps a little too ambitious’.106 He did not disagree with Dicks’s findings or 
methods, he wrote; the problem was simply that they clashed with the ‘practical 
point of view’. He concluded that any selection procedure which was too strict or 
inflexible would lead to a ‘considerable delay’ in filling important positions. ‘If we 
go all the way and apply the very severe and rather scientific selecting  procedure, . . . 
we might well experience a considerable delay in staffing our various German 
 economic organisations’.107
Following a reduction in the manpower ceiling of the Intelligence Division 
(which housed the psychologists), the GPrB was abolished with effect from 31 
December 1946.108 Even now, people were keen to stress that the unit had been 
104 tNA, Fo 1032/1464, l. G. semple (P&t Branch, IA&C Division, main HQ, CCG(BE), Bad 
salzungen) to Brigadier E. s. B. Gaffney (HQ, IA&C Division, Bünde), 22 June 1946.
105 tNA, Fo 1032/1464, ‘The German Personnel research Branch: A Brief Historical sketch and 
summary of Findings’.
106 tNA, Fo 1039/129, Col. A. F. merry to major H. reade (Assistant Controller, P & I Branch, 
Economic Division Advance HQ), 19 Feb. 1946.
107 tNA, Fo 1039/129, Col. A. F. merry to major H. reade, 19 Feb. 1946.
108 tNA, Fo 1032/1464, o. A. oeser (GPrB, Intelligence Group, CCG(BE), main HQ, Bünde) 
to A. H. Albu (Deputy President, Governmental sub-Commission, Adv. HQ, Berlin), 5 June 1946. 
Fo 1032/1464, major General lethbridge to A. H. Albu, 12 June 1946, as well as subsequent letters 
in this file.
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useful. ‘[Y]ou will see that the reasons for closing down are not . . . that insufficient 
use is being made of it’, wrote major General lethbridge from the Intelligence 
Division. ‘It has carried out useful work, and I hope that it will have completed its 
outstanding assessments by the end of the year.’109 The engineer and labour politi-
cian Austen Albu (deputy president of the Governmental sub-Commission in the 
British zone) even thought that it represented some of the most important British 
contributions to social science. ‘I have always considered’, he wrote, ‘that social 
and political objectives of the occupation needed the application of modern social, 
psychological methods, particularly in the fields of Intelligence, Education and 
Public relations.’ An ‘organisation like GPrB represent[s] a specifically modern 
British contribution not only to the benefit of Intelligence but to the whole process 
of Government’.110 In this context it is also noteworthy that throughout its exist-
ence, members of the GPrB, too, were well paid.111
Nonetheless, ‘[i]n view of the difficulty of finding a sufficient number of 
 Germans acceptable to ourselves and our Allies’,112 both psychological and political 
restrictions on appointments proved unpopular with many occupation officials, 
and particularly with the health staff. While a general argument on the importance 
of practical considerations and compromises had been made, the health argument 
was especially powerful, successful, and pervasive. From the beginning, health 
officers argued that because of epidemic urgency there was no time to punish or 
dismiss German doctors. They largely got their way. There are several features of 
this development which deserve comment.113
The intention was that the general denazification criteria and categories were to 
apply to doctors and medical staff. Initially, many British public health officers 
seemed to be aware that a large percentage of German doctors had joined, and 
often taken an active part in, the NsDAP. Boucher was already convinced in 
 september 1944 that ‘Nazi doctrine permeates the whole public health structure’, 
and demanded ‘[r]egimentation of a fairly strict kind’.114 Wilfried Harding (a 
public health officer in the ruhr district) also thought that ‘the majority of German 
public-health administrators were willing tools of the party, with a fair number 
of ardent Nazis among them, and only very few managed to maintain some 
109 Fo 1032/1464, Intelligence Group HQ (CCG, lübbecke) to Presidential Governmental sub-
commission, office of the deputy military governor, Adv HQ, 12 June 1946.
110 tNA, Fo 1032/1464, A. H. Albu to Brian robertson, DmG, 20 June 1946.
111 tNA, Fo 936/40, H. l. Jenkyns (treasury Chambers) to P. t. lyver (Control office), 23 Feb. 
1946. At the branch, controllers were paid £1,200 to £1,400, deputy controllers £900 to £1,100, 
assistant controllers £700 to £900, assistants £700 to £900, deputy assistants £450 to £700. At the 
assessment centres, controllers were paid £1,000 to £1,200, deputy controllers £800 to £1,000, psy-
chiatry and psychology specialists £700 to £900, testing officers £450 to £700, civilian psychological 
assistants £300 to £450.
112 tNA, Fo 1039/129, Brigadier E. Bader (HQ Economic Division, Adv HQ, CCG(BE), Berlin) 
to General lethbridge (Intelligence Group HQ, main HQ, CCG(BE), lübbecke), 22 Feb. 1946.
113 see Clemens Vollnhals (ed.), Entnazifizierung: Politische Säuberung und Rehabilitierung in den 
vier Besatzungszonen 1945–1949 (munich, 1991), and Hans-Ulrich sons, ‘ “Bis in die psychologischen 
Wurzeln”: Die Entnazifizierung der Ärzte in Nordhein-Westphalen’, Deutsches Ärzteblatt, 79, (1982).
114 tNA, Fo 936/90, W. H. Boucher (Director, health branch, Norfolk House) to J. K. Donoghue 
(Civil establishments), 26 sept. 1944.
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 independence in their outlook, which, in any case, they were never able to translate 
into action’.115 When the internment camps were filled in the course of the initial 
waves of arrests, a rate of one doctor to fifty other inmates was not uncommon.116
This left the health officials with an ‘insoluble problem’: not only were many 
senior medical officials now interned, but many of the remaining trained staff were 
ineligible according to the denazification criteria. ‘our only chance’, argued Harding, 
‘was to invoke the risks which the prolonged disruption of the health services 
would cause—risks which would affect the occupiers no less than occupied.’ In 
addition, British health officers argued that party membership, or even having held 
high ranks within the party, was no evidence that these individuals were dangerous 
or convinced Nazis. ‘In the same way in which the British doctor is given a com-
mission as soon as he joins the Forces,’ Harding pointed out, ‘many a German 
doctor had been given relatively high rank in the party organisation by virtue of his 
appointment as medical officer to one of its formations.’ British staffs tried to get 
those in the arrest or dismissal categories recategorized as ‘harmless politically’.117 
In this they were helped by the fact that many German doctors revived old scien-
tific and medical contacts abroad. Numerous references and recommendations 
came in from British and American universities and hospitals, saying that the 
person in question had never been interested in political matters and surely could 
not have been ‘more than a nominal Nazi’.
Partly upon Public Health Branch recommendation, an early ruling that GPs 
were not to be considered as holding public office eased some problems. Doctors 
who had had their licence for work in the public health service or in hospitals 
withdrawn were allowed to practise privately (and earn a substantial living).118 But 
staffing hospitals and health administrations remained difficult. The acute short-
ages of qualified candidates who were acceptable to British guidelines was exacer-
bated by the fact that administrative jobs were unpopular among German doctors, 
not least because private practitioners’ incomes tended to be much higher. Faced 
with these problems, British health officers argued that denazification had to pro-
ceed slowly in view of the likely increase in infectious diseases during the winter. 
Doctors who fell into removal categories were to be kept on ‘in the interim’ until 
suitable replacements could be found, a process that could take years.
In some regions the replacement clause was soon refined. Health officials were 
among those who expressed concern about the practice of classifying appoint-
ments as ‘acting’ or ‘temporary’, because it gave ‘a sense of insecurity to the office 
holder and . . . detract[ed] from his authority’. It was resolved that ‘the term “Acting” 
shall be used only for appointments which have not yet been confirmed by the 
competent authority. The term “temporary” will not be used at all’.119 As a result, 
115 Harding, ‘reorganisation of the Health services’, 483.
116 Number quoted in Harding, ‘reorganisation of the Health services’, 483.
117 ‘reorganisation of the Health services’, 483.
118 tNA, Fo 1012/533, Allied Kommandatura of Berlin, Public Health Committee, [Apr. 
1946].
119 tNA, Fo 1013/636, Administration & local Government branch (IA&C Div, main HQ, 
CCG, Bünde, BAor) to various P and l/r detachments, 10 Nov. 1945.
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it became much easier to employ ‘unacceptable’ individuals for as long as was 
 considered necessary, and it was even reported that a premature release from intern-
ment could be obtained for those willing to work in public health.120 Even when 
in February 1946 ACC order No. 24 attempted to tighten up procedures regard-
ing the removal of former Nazis from public offices, compromises continued to be 
made, and both British officials and regional German medical committees success-
fully argued for a growing list of exemptions.121
An example of the flexibility of the replacement idea is the case of Hans schreus, 
professor of dermatology at the medical academy in Düsseldorf, and long-standing 
member of the NsDAP. In september 1945, when he was a candidate for rector of 
the academy, his questionnaire was returned ‘with the comment “not to occupy a 
position of trust” ’—which meant he was to be removed from his present chair and 
job at the university clinic. In response, Public Health Branch asked for his ‘tem-
porary retention’ because of the need for dermatologists in the coming winter. 
There was, they said, ‘no sufficiently well qualified or experienced doctor to replace 
him’. It did not hurt that schreus’s work was cited favourably in the British medical 
literature.122 They obtained a ruling that their decision could override that of public 
safety, and schreus was ‘allowed to continue his work at the Hospital and to lecture 
but not to occupy the position of rektor’. When, over a year later, another derma-
tology professor became available to replace him, the medical academy insisted on 
the retention of schreus. The rector argued that there were ‘many members of the 
NsDAP, who joined the Party in the time from 1933 to 1937 and who are still in 
their positions’, so his dismissal was no longer warranted.123 When schreus was 
eventually dismissed, and his appeal failed to overturn the ruling, it was less because 
of his support of the Nazis than because of his unpopularity with military govern-
ment. one official explained that ‘Dr schreus deserves little consideration since, 
on his original Fragebogen, he deliberately evaded certain questions. It is difficult 
to believe that a man of his eminence is unable to recollect dates when he travelled 
abroad or the salary he has earned during the past 10 years. If he is not prepared to 
deal honestly [with] military Government he has no right to expect that more 
consideration should be given to his case than to that of normal, honest 
people.’124
Nonetheless, the case of schreus demonstrates that the threat of epidemics was 
used to more lasting effect than just a securing of basic epidemic personnel. Con-
cerning university lecturers, Public Health Branch argued, ‘the importance [of ] 
120 sons, Gesundheitspolitik, 40.
121 lAB C rep. 118-58, Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany, 5 (31 mar. 1946), 
printed Directive No. 24 in full.
122 e.g. Frank Hawking, ‘recent Work on the Pharmacology of sulphanomides’, British Medical 
Journal, 1/4397 (Apr. 1945), 505–9. Frank Ellis and Basil A. stoll, ‘Herpes Zoster after irradiation’, 
British Medical Journal, 2/4640 (Dec. 1949), 1323–8.
123 tNA, Fo 1013/304, rektor der medizinischen Akademie Düsseldorf, to regional Commis-
sioner (mr Asbury), 2 Dec. 1946.
124 tNA, Fo 1013/304, H. J. Walker (Controller, Education Branch, mil Gov NrW [North rhine-
Westphalia]) to Public Health, 24 Dec. 1946; J. G. Gill (Principal Control office, Public Health 
department, HQ land North-rhine Westphalia) to regional Government officer, 8 Jan. 1947.
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realising that the majority of lecturers and teachers are active clinicians with the 
responsibility of the treatment of the patients in their respective departments’, and 
‘[t]he removal of a specialist from a clinic without suitable replacement will 
undoubtedly reflect to an appreciable measure on efficient treatment, and may also 
prolong hospitalisation’. In areas already ‘so depleted of hospital beds’ the effects 
would be disastrous. Public health officers insisted that ‘in the circumstances where 
the spread of infectious diseases may occur, or adverse criticism in relation to the 
treatment and wellbeing of patients may be reported as a result of the removal of 
specialists, P.H. cannot accept the responsibility’.125
Hampered by patchy and restrictive preparations, British occupation officials 
were quick to develop compromises, which reinterpreted or even completely 
 abandoned existing rules on the selection and appointment of German personnel. 
British and German health officers were essential to this process and were extremely 
successful at securing financial and administrative concessions. These compromises 
outlived the threatening winter crisis, and—under pressure from demobilization—
smoothed the path towards an increasing handover of responsibilities from British 
to the German authorities, and a real scenario of ‘indirect control’. German 
de nazification panels advised local public safety officers in the British zone from 
July 1946 onwards, until in october 1947 denazification responsibilities was 
handed over to the Land governments.126
CoNFroNtAtIoNs
The existence of GPrB during the early years of the occupation suggests that the 
much-celebrated British pragmatism was less successful, and less ‘pragmatic’, than 
has generally been accepted. The widespread acceptance of the GPrB’s findings, 
even if not acted upon consistently, shows that even when making practical 
 compromises for the sake of expediency the British did not simply abandon their 
earlier outlooks entirely or effortlessly. The baggage with which British officials 
arrived in Germany was much harder to shake off, and compromises were much 
harder to achieve.
At one level, conflicts arose because the focus of the health operations was con-
cerned with the protection of occupation troops and neighbouring countries, and 
where compromises were made, they were always ‘in the interests of mil Gov.’127 
In the British zone, just as in the other zones, this led to confrontations, such as 
those concerning the British allocation of drugs, vaccines, or other supplies for 
explicitly Allied, or British, priorities. German doctors complained regularly that 
the British focus on the eradication of venereal diseases diverted attention from 
other urgent medical problems. In German eyes, one British report noted, the 
125 tNA, Fo 1013/304, minute from J. Donelly (HQ mil Gov North-rhine-Province) to 
 Controller (IA&C Division, HQ mil Gov North-rhine-Province), 15 June 1946.
126 Balfour, ‘Four-Power Control in Germany, 1945–1946’, 178 f.
127 tNA, Fo 1030/382, 825 (K) mil Gov Det to mil Gov second Army main, subject: Appoint-
ments civ adm, 26 may 1945.
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‘main medical problem’ was the shortage of the new wonder drug, because penicil-
lin was ‘in most places only available for the protection of occupation troops 
against V.D. and cannot be found for the cure of such things as infantile sepsis’. 
German doctors resented such allocations.128
Denazification, too, caused resentment. As the British Information services 
reported, a common joke among Germans was that the ‘denazification plans have 
fulfilled Hitler’s wish for the 1000 year reich: 12 years of Nazism, 988 years of 
denazification’.129 on the whole, both British and German health officials were 
equally interested in obtaining concessions for individuals to make their jobs easier 
and more efficient, and among both there was a widespread conviction that doctors 
were fundamentally apolitical and hard done by as a result of the denazification 
clauses. In their new pragmatism the occupation authorities sometimes even pre-
vented German efforts to cleanse personnel and make a more radical break with the 
Nazi regime. When in December 1945 rudolf Amelunxen (German president of 
the Westphalian Provincial Government) argued that there were too many former 
party members in his administration, and began a ‘clean-up of the Public Adminis-
tration from former members of the NsDAP’, he was pulled sharply into line by the 
occupiers. The British authorities noted tersely that ‘Dr A’s enthusiasm for denazifi-
cation tends to cut across [Regierungsbezirk] mil Gov and [Regierungspräsident] local 
arrangements’, and asked him to ‘refrain from making any further inquiries as to the 
political suitability of officials in these establishments’.130 These tensions continued 
even after denazification responsibilities had been transferred to German authori-
ties. In spring 1947, a German denazification panel even resigned in protest when 
a dentist, Dr schröer—apparently ‘well-known in the area as a very active Nazi’—
was released from internment and cleared from all wrongdoing by a British review 
Board. With his new ‘category five’ allocation, he was permitted to take up employ-
ment without any restriction. If ‘schröer was a category V case,’ the German panel 
said, then ‘there were no such people as Nazis.’131
similar conflicts existed in all zones. But in the British zone, more than in the 
others, the basic discord was amplified by more fundamental questions on what 
the Germans were really like. Could their demands, or the medical data they pro-
duced to back them up, be trusted? Did they deserve health and relief imports 
128 tNA, Fo 1005/1926, CCG(BE), Information services Control Branch, German reaction 
report No. 1 for period ending 29 Dec. 1946.
129 tNA, Fo 1005/1926, CCG(BE), Information services Control Branch, German reaction 
report No. 11 for period ending 29 Dec. 1946.
130 tNA, Fo 1013/636, transit sheet, minutes from secretariat, 6 Jan. 1946. Fo 1013/636, 
C. A. H. Chadwick (DDmG, HQ mil Gov Westfalen region) to rudolf Amelunxen (Prov. Civ. Adm 
Westfalen), 9 Jan. 1946. Fo 1013/636, Amelunxen to his Police President, 4 Dec. 1945; Amelunxen 
to 307 (p) mil Gov Det, Adm & lG Branch, 20 Jan. 1946. For examples concerning doctors, see Fo 
1013/304, Chamber of Doctors (North-rhine Province) to Dr med. richter (Chairman of the Asso-
ciation of Doctors, Essen), 24 Nov. 1945. The reply from Dr J. H. Donnelly (Chief health officer, HQ 
mil Gov NrP), 10 Dec. 1945, told the doctors that ‘no removal can be ordered by a German 
authority’.
131 on the schröer case, see tNA, Fo 1013/304, Public safety for Commander (HQ mil Gov, 
land lippe and rB minden, 507 HQ CCG) to Deputy Inspector General (Public safety Branch, 
HQ mil Gov North rhine Westphalia, 714 HQ CCG), 29 may 1947.
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beyond those absolutely necessary? Could they be left to govern their own affairs, 
as originally conceived? German doctors’ assessments and demands clashed with 
British priorities on two (related) subjects in particular: nutrition, where the ade-
quacy of rations, the necessity of food imports, and medical data on the popula-
tion’s nutritional state were debated throughout the occupation; and tuberculosis, 
where German and British doctors disagreed about its relative importance, and 
how highly it should feature on the agenda of health programmes. Whether or not 
German claims were objectively justified is less interesting than how the British under-
stood and debated them: German demands were often exaggerated, but the British 
understanding was shaped by a complex mix of economics, justice, and merit.
These moral problems were not confined to British rule. shortages and financial 
limits were endemic everywhere, and food provision and disease-prevention 
touched on difficult moral criteria. The basic principle of treating different popula-
tions differently was well established. As an ex-enemy country, Germany had been 
barred from the support of organizations such as the United Nations relief and 
rehabilitation Administration (UNrrA), and had, symbolically, been sent to the 
end of the world queue for aid.132 ‘German organisations must make known the 
critical food situation which they have brought upon the whole world,’ a British 
agricultural expert wrote in June 1945, and ‘in the unlikely event of any surplus 
becoming available they will inevitably be last on the list to get it’.133
A practical extension of this idea was widely practised in all zones, which made 
clear the moral judgement it contained. Food rations were given to different civil-
ian population groups in Germany not simply according to physical requirements. 
The non-German DPs received comparatively high rations and were entitled to 
assistance by international relief programmes. In November 1945, when the offi-
cial German ration for the normal consumer was 1,700 calories, the minimum 
basic ration in DP camps was apparently 2,300 calories per person per day.134 
Among the German population, rations were set primarily on the basis of need 
either by employment (miners and heavy manual workers got the highest alloca-
tion) or by condition (children, pregnant, and nursing women all received extra 
milk allocations), but they also reflected other considerations. In all zones, Jews, 
concentration camp survivors, and other ‘victims of fascism’ received a higher 
ration allocation than was dictated by their occupational or physical category. In 
september 1945 the Allied Kommandatura of Berlin decided that ‘[a]ll authentic 
victims of Nazi persecution whose health has suffered as a result of such  persecution 
132 Bod., sPsl 138/1, ‘Aid in recovery: growing burden on UNrrA’, The Times, 12 Apr. 1945: 
‘Under the resolution of the council, UNrrA activities in enemy and ex-enemy are sharply limited, 
unless specific action is taken by the council authorising the type of relief to be provided in a specific 
country. At the request of sHAEF, UNrrA is assembling a large staff, at least 200 teams of 13 mem-
bers each, to aid in the care and repatriation of the 8,500,000 United Nations nationals in Germany.’ 
Also see Bod., sPsl archive, 138/1, correspondence with UNrrA.
133 William Gavin, ‘report on Food situation in Northern Germany’, 9 June 1945, quoted by James 
tent, ‘Food shortages in Germany and Europe, 1945–1948’, in Günter Bischof and stephen Ambrose 
(eds.), Eisenhower and the German POWs: Facts Against Falsehood (Baton rouge, la., 1992), 103.
134 Bl, s.F.801/23, military Government of Germany, ‘Public Health and medical Affairs: monthly 
report of military governor, U.s. Zone’, No. 4, 20 Nov. 1945, 16.
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will be given a ration card in one group higher than that to which their work enti-
tles them’, and Germans were instructed to ‘ensure that one scale higher in rations 
is fairly awarded to all victims of Fascism, according to existing rulings’.135 A few 
months later, the Kommandatura ordered that all victims of fascism be given the 
highest possible allocation for the next three months.136 In the British zone, 
German officials were instructed that additional food be given to ‘certain classes of 
ex-inmates of German Concentration Camps and other victims of oppression’.137
A version of this principle was practised everywhere, and it always caused prob-
lems. ‘The question of trying to arrange for all those inside Germany who claim to 
have been throughout the enemies of Fascism to receive extra food raises serious 
difficulties,’ Philip Noel-Baker, a minister at the Foreign office, explained, since 
there were many ‘who claim without any real justification to have engaged in active 
opposition. You can imagine how difficult it is for military Government in Ger-
many, with the staff at their disposal to sift the genuinely deserving cases from the 
remainder unless the evidence, e.g. imprisonment in a concentration camp, is 
overwhelming.’138 It was also seen as problematic when the German authorities on 
occasion applied the principle to groups at the other end of the moral scale. In July 
1945 the Berlin magistrat prescribed that former members of the NsDAP were to 
be put into the lowest of the five ration groups, regardless of work category.139 
Allied officials feared that this would not be conducive to public order, and the 
Allied Kommandatura of Berlin ordered the magistrat to change the regulation. 
The proposal that former members of the NsDAP should be forced to donate 
blankets and clothes was also dropped.140 There were other proposals, too. The 
magistrat welfare office explained that although ‘worthiness of the welfare recipi-
ent is under German law no precondition for the receipt of public welfare’, it had 
always been specified that ‘anti-social persons’ were to get 70 per cent of the cus-
tomary support. And so, until welfare regulations were changed more substantially 
in 1947, ‘former members of the NsDAP and its associated organisations were 
classified as anti-social persons’.141
135 BAK, Z45F, 44-45/6/9, Col. Frank Howley to Deputy military Governor, Us Zone, 29 sept. 
1945. The Allied food committee proposal was made on 25 sept. 1945. lAB, C rep. 131/04-31, 
Ernährungsamt Berlin-mitte, ‘Bericht über die situng am 8.11.1945 beim magistrat’, 8 Nov. 1945.
136 lAB, C rep. 131/04-31, magistrat der stadt Berlin (Abteilung für Ernährung), subject: 
 ‘Versorgung der anerkannten opfer des Faschismus’, 12 Feb. 1946.
137 Fo 1050/46, Public Health Branch (IA&C Div, CCG, Bünde, BAor) to secretariat (HQ, 
IA&C Div), 3 April 1946, paraphrasing Zonal Policy Instruction No. 20 of Dec. 1945; ‘Questions for 
Background Pamphlet for Information of German officials’, office of the Deputy military Governor 
(main HQ, CCG(BE), secretariat), to all Divisions, 27 mar. 1946.
138 tNA, Fo 371/46806, Philip Noel-Baker to t. l. Horabin mP, 3 oct. 1945.
139 Dieter Hanauske (ed.), Die Sitzungsprotokolle des Magistrats der Stadt Berlin 1945/46 (Berlin, 
1995), i. 71. Doctors were particularly opposed. At a meeting in July 1945, Berlin medical officers 
complained that former Nazi doctors were given the lowest rations, but had to work day and night. 
see lAB, B rep. 012/902-5, ‘Amtsarztsitzung vom 12. Juli 1945, 16 Uhr—Versammlung der 
 Amtsärzte am 12. Juli im Hauptgesundheitsamt’, Dr redeker.
140 lAB, B rep. 012/902-5, ‘Besprechung der Amtsärzte am Donnerstag, d. 6.Dezember 1945’, 6 
Dec. 1945.
141 lAB, C rep. 118–1099, m. Ehlert (magistrat, Abteilung für sozialwesen) to Wilmer Froistadt 
(Chief of Public Welfare Branch, omGUs, Berlin sector, steglitz), 2 Dec. 1947.
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These tensions prevailed in all zones, but debates in the British zone were often 
particularly fierce and betrayed deeper roots—as became visible in the arguments 
about food. Conditions in Germany were worse than expected, and the British 
economy was also undergoing a sharp downturn. reports on the dire conditions in 
the British zone reached london. ‘It is not true . . . that there are large food stocks 
in the British Zone’, one testified: most stocks had been consumed by the time the 
British arrived. In some places delivered rations were as low as 800 calories. The 
situation was unlikely to improve, since the harvest was expected to be far below 
average and further aggravated by severely restricted transport.142 Alarming reports 
also reached the Foreign office from journalists, politicians, and other British citi-
zens who visited Germany. Conditions were ‘so appalling’, one couple wrote, ‘it 
seems certain that, if drastic action is not taken immediately, millions of men, 
women and children will perish this winter from starvation, exposure and dis-
ease’.143 ‘There is very little doubt that the risk of very heavy mortality this winter 
in Germany is a grave one’, confirmed Noel-Baker following a visit to Germany to 
collect information for a report to the Cabinet on the risk of epidemics.144 ‘It is 
clear to me’, he continued in a letter to Brian robertson, deputy military governor 
of the British zone, ‘that you are going to need much greater latitude than you at 
present possess as regards the types of goods, including raw materials, which you 
may programme for import into Germany.’145
But it was not that simple. Although no one tried to put a policy of pastoraliza-
tion into effect (of the kind which Henry morgenthau had had in mind), the 
concept of limiting the German standard of living persisted, and, in combination 
with domestic shortages, dictated the British approach. At meetings of the ACC, 
the forum where the four Allies met and decided joint policy for Germany, the 
standard of living concept was discussed at great length, particularly in connection 
with reparations from German industry. But regarding nutrition, too, this concept 
was influential. In september 1945, an ACC report on the standards of food 
rationing to be adopted for the German population reasserted that rations could 
only be agreed after data had been collected on food consumption in the rest of 
Europe, ‘so that food consumed in Germany will not exceed the average pertaining 
in European countries’.146
Among occupation officials stationed in Germany, attitudes often changed in 
the course of their time in the country. In autumn 1945, Colonel rees-Williams, 
who until a few weeks earlier had been a military government officer in Germany, 
142 tNA, Fo 371/46806, ‘Food situation in the British zone’, report by 21 Army Group, Civil 
Affairs Branch, circulated for the meeting of the Combined Deputy military Governors Us/UK/Fr on 
3 Aug. 1945. Fo 371/46806, William strang to Foreign office, 11 Aug. 1945.
143 tNA, Fo 371/46885, maurice Butcher, mrs Butcher, and mr Price to Foreign office German 
Department, 16 sept. 1945.
144 tNA, Fo 371/46885, Noel Baker (Foreign office) to Prime minister, 19 sept. 1945.
145 tNA, Fo 371/46885, Noel Baker (Foreign office) to Brian robertson (lübbecke, BAor), 20 
sept. 1945.
146 e.g. tNA, Fo 46885, William strang (Berlin) to Foreign office, 1 oct. 1945. Fo 371/46885, 
‘report by the Internal Affairs and Communications Directorate on Nutrition of German Civil Popu-
lation’, 20 sept. 1945.
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explained at a meeting with Prime minister Clement Attlee that ‘he had gone to 
Germany as an advocate of a hard peace, but had soon been converted by his expe-
riences’. Gerald Gardiner, a long-standing member of the Friends Ambulance Unit 
who had also served in Germany, explained that ‘[i]t was his impression that the 
military Government officers in the British zone were willing and able to do more 
than they were doing at present to relieve distress’, but they were still ‘restrained by 
apprehension of criticism from home’.147 or as a Control Commission officer later 
put it: ‘The trouble is that, when nearly all the world is suffering from acute short-
ages of goods . . . it is difficult to arrange, or to defend, that Germany should come 
anything but last.’148
German complaints about food shortages were often buttressed by testimonials 
from doctors. German doctors were particularly angered when, shortly after the 
reduction of official rations in the British zone in march 1946 to 1,550 calories per 
normal consumer per day, military government interfered with their authority to 
make clinical diagnoses of malnutrition and hunger oedema. They were instructed 
that only ‘clinically proven’ cases, i.e. those confirmed by laboratory tests, could be 
called ‘oedema’. to avoid false diagnoses, all suspected cases were to be reported to 
the local British health officials responsible, who would carry out their own tests. 
German doctors would be punished severely for making a diagnosis not subse-
quently confirmed.149
In october 1945 a Zonal Health Advisory Council was established, contain-
ing one German medical representative for each province, to advise on health 
problems affecting the British zone, but without any formal legislative or execu-
tive powers.150 This, and, after march 1946, the Zonal Advisory Council (ZAC), 
became a platform for German complaints.151 Professor rudolf Degkwitz, a 
paediatrician and health officer in Hamburg, who had spent several years in 
Gestapo imprisonment, was active in both groups and regularly voiced his con-
cerns about the German state of health and the apparent lack of interest among 
147 tNA, Fo 371/46885, John Addis (10 Downing street) to mr Giles (Foreign office), 25 oct. 
1945, summarizing the prime minister’s meeting with the deputation led by Beveridge. Also see tNA, 
Fo 371/46885, Victor Gollancz to Ernest Bevin, 9 oct. 1945, forwarding ‘resolutions’ which urged 
HmG to allow voluntary relief efforts in Germany.
148 tNA, Fo 371/55724, CoGA minutes, 12 Feb. 1946. Also see John Farquharson, ‘ “Emotional 
but Influential”: Victor Gollancz, richard stokes and the British Zone of Germany, 1945–1949’, 
Journal of Contemporary History, 22 (1987), 501–19, at 511.
149 letter from public health officer Gill to Dr Pusch, 6 mar. 1946, and statement by Brigadier 
Barraclough (HQ CCG(BE) ), 14 Aug. 1946, both cited in, sons, Gesundheitspolitik, 109–12. 
 mitteilungsblatt der Ärztekammer Nordrhein-Westfalen, July 1947, cited in stefan Kirchberger, 
‘Public Health Policy in Germany, 1945–1949: Continuity and a New Beginning’, in Donald W. 
light and Alexander schuller (eds.), Political Values and Health Care: The German Experience 
 (Cambridge, mass., 1986), 185–238, at 229.
150 tNA, Fo 1050/657, ‘German Health services Advisory Committee: second conference 
between committee and representatives of the health branch of the control commission held at Bünde, 
on 12th, 13th and 14th December 1945’, Health Branch (IA&C Div, main HQ) to P Detachments, 
18 Dec. 1945.
151 Neither the Zonal Health Advisory Council nor ZAC were comparable to the soviet zone’s 
Central Health Administration (ZVG), since both were purely advisory and lacked executive or legis-
lative powers. on ZAC health policy, see Anneliese Dorendor (ed.), Der Zonenbeirat der Britisch 
Besetzten Zone: ein Rückblick auf seine Tätigkeit (Göttingen, 1953), 90–106.
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the occupation authorities.152 malnutrition was widespread and worsening, he 
argued, and responsible for the reduced resistance to infectious diseases. many 
diseases (particularly tuberculosis) were more often fatal than they were before. 
In a similar vein, robert lehr, Oberpräsident of the North rhine province and 
a prominent member of the ZAC, complained that ‘[a]t the Nuremberg trials, 
the starvation in Nazi concentration camps was given much prominence. But 
one could also starve outside a concentration camp. 1,550 calories was not 
enough to work on and the latest cuts to 1,014 were more than disastrous.’153
In highly emotional tones, a resolution passed at the founding meeting of the 
new federal medical association/chamber of physicians (the Bundesärztekammer) 
on 15 June 1947, appealed ‘to the conscience of the world not to tolerate any 
longer the alarming decline of the German people’s health’. Conditions were 
unbearable, and the majority of Germans was ‘living on a scale of rations amount-
ing to not more than one third of the minimum of food recognised by interna-
tional authorities’. official rations were bad enough, but they were rarely supplied 
in full, and ‘the German public, facing the discrepancy between ration scales and 
rations issued, has completely lost its confidence both in the German and the 
Allied authorities responsible for the supply and distribution of food’. The resolu-
tion went on to describe the pervasiveness of hunger and starvation. ‘The direct 
victims of the famine are numerous whereas the number of those indirectly affected 
is much greater and still defies an exact statement. The whole people, once vigor-
ous and healthy, has been weakened by starvation and is now utterly incapable of 
work and is on the verge of manifest infirmity.’154 These complaints were always 
accompanied by demands for more food imports and a more constructive approach 
to the reconstruction of German agriculture and industry.155
some British citizens also took up the German cause. The publisher, writer, and 
political activist Victor Gollancz wrote a series of pamphlets on the German situa-
tion, in which he urged the occupiers to improve conditions. The Germans had 
only few people ‘to appeal in their name to the decency of the world’, Gollancz 
argued, but the British people, ‘as nationals of an occupying power that had 
152 tNA, Fo1028/4, ‘Who’s who in the British Zone of Germany’, Aug. 1946. Fo 1050/657, 
second meeting of German health services advisory committee, 13–14 Dec. 1945. rudolf Degkwitz, 
Das alte und das neue Deutschland (Hamburg, 1947). Hendrik van den Bussche (ed.), Medizinische 
Wissenschaft im ‘Dritten Reich’: Kontinuität, Anpassung und Opposition an der Hamburger Medizinischen 
Fakultät (Hamburg, 1989), esp. 422–9.
153 tNA, Fo 1032/1495, ‘Confidential report on Joint meeting of representatives of the Zonal 
Advisory Council and the regional Government Co-ordinating office (länderrat) at stuttgart on 
3 April 1946’, 16 Apr. 1946, quoting lehr. Also printed in ralph Uhlig (ed.), Confidential Reports 
des Britischen Verbindungsstabes zum Zonenbeirat der britischen Besatzungszone in Hamburg 
(1946–1948)—Demokratisierung aus britischer Sicht (Frankfurt am main, 1993), 55. on the sPD’s 
food policy, see ‘Erklärung der sPD zur Ernährungskrise’, Sozialistische Mitteilungen der London­ 
Vertretung der SPD, issued by the london representative of the German social Democratic Party, 
london, Nr. 98/99, Apr./may 1947, 2–3.
154 tNA, FD 1/418, ‘The German medical Profession on the state of Nutrition in Germany—
meeting of the German Chamber of Physicians at Bad Nauheim, June 15th 1947. resolution passed 
by the German Physicians on the Present state of Nutrition in Germany’, Dr Helmich (Chairman, 
Nutrition Board of the German medical Profession) to sir Edward mellanby (mrC), [Aug. 1947].
155 ZAC meeting 30 Apr. 1947, Akten, ii. 331.
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enforced unconditional surrender’, ‘had a very special responsibility before the 
bards of history and of our own conscience’. He argued that ‘if every German was 
indeed responsible for what happened at Belsen, then we, as members of a demo-
cratic country and not a fascist one with no free Press or parliament, . . . are respon-
sible individually as well as collectively for refusing to tolerate anything that might 
be considered even remotely comparable with Belsen, if only by way of rhetoric’.156 
Gollancz made several visits to the British zone. He met rudolf Degkwitz and 
others, and his pamphlets made use of Degkwitz’s data. As many as 100,000 
oedema cases were hospitalized in Hamburg alone, Gollancz maintained, and 
those represented only a small fraction of cases overall.157
on the surface, the battle lines were simple: German demands for food were 
counterweighted by British financial and political considerations. But confronta-
tions went deeper, particularly when the British authorities began to contest 
German assessments. They had been sceptical of exaggerated German appraisals 
from the start, and continued to question the German ability, authority, and legiti-
macy to make demands throughout the post-war years. This state of affairs contin-
ued, and even worsened, when, at the beginning of 1947, administrative matters 
(including nutrition and public health issues) were handed over and the ‘indirect 
control’ plan finally implemented. British officials’ lack of confidence in the 
German doctors under their charge led some to question the practicability of any 
real indirect control. And although there were important financial reasons for 
monitoring rations and keeping them as low as possible, older diagnoses of the 
German mentality helped to justify such interventions.
Following the particularly severe winter of 1946–7, made worse by the cancel-
lation of many imports from abroad, a number of nutritional scientists sponsored 
by the medical research Council (mrC) were asked to report on German condi-
tions. Their reports demonstrate how much, in British eyes, the issues of German 
ability and legitimacy to make medical claims were intertwined. robert mcCance 
and Elsie Widdowson, both British nutritional scientists of some standing, were 
among those who conducted nutrition research in Germany throughout 1946 and 
1947.158 ‘It is quite possible’, wrote mcCance after returning in 1947, ‘that in sub-
jects which are not remotely connected with nutrition, the German may be sound 
enough, but I am certain, he is quite incapable of taking an objective view of any 
156 Victor Gollancz, In Darkest Germany (london, 1947), 1718. on Gollancz’s post-war relief 
work, incl. the ‘save Europe Now’ campaign, see WUl, mss/157/3/sEN/1/1-7, mrs Peggy Duff, 
‘save Europe Now, 1945–1948: 3 Years’ Work’, [1948] and other documents in the Gollancz papers. 
Also see matthew Frank, ‘The New morality: Victor Gollancz, “save Europe Now” and the German 
refugee Crisis, 1945–6’, Twentieth Century British History, 17 (2006), 230–56.
157 letter to The Times, 30 oct. 1946, printed in Gollancz, In Darkest Germany, 24. Victor Gol-
lancz, Is It Nothing to You? Photographs of Starving German Children (london, 1945).
158 Widdowson researched whether white flour could be made as nutritious as wholemeal flour by 
adding B vitamins and iron. When this research question came up, she recalled that Edward mellanby 
said to me ‘There must be a lot of hungry children in Germany. You go and find out about the truth 
of all this.’ see margaret Ashwell (ed.), McCance & Widdowson: A Scientific Partnership of 60 Years, 
1933 to 1993 (london, 1993), 36. Elsie m. Widdowson, ‘Adventures in Nutrition over Half a Cen-
tury’, Proceedings of the Nutrition Society, 39 (1980), 293–306. robert mcCance, Reminiscences, 
(Cambridge, 1987).
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subject into which he can, by any stretch of imagination, introduce an nutritional 
element.’159 When in spring 1947 mcCance and Widdowson interviewed German 
doctors and inspected malnutrition cases in hospitals, they came to the conclusion 
that although the official rations were low, ‘there seem to be so many ways in which 
some extra rations can legitimately be obtained that there may be relatively few 
people who are living on this diet alone’. As a result, ‘[i]n the opinion of the 
oxford Nutrition survey team there is not much evidence of malnutrition among 
the ordinary civilian population. They say that the Germans may have lost some 
weight, but even now they are heavier than their English counterparts.’160 In short, 
although there was some malnutrition in Germany, the German doctor’s argument 
on the effects of inadequate rations was highly questionable.161 ‘You cannot be sug-
gesting’, one British consultant responded to the Germans, ‘that this is a famine of 
Chinese or Indian proportions.’162
mcCance’s researches in Germany caused controversy in another way. In June 
1946, mcCance sent out a request to German doctors to allow him to carry out 
kidney function tests on terminally ill babies with certain abnormalities, through 
an examination of their blood and urine. mcCance selected these babies because 
he was uncertain whether these tests were safe, but crucially he failed to ask for the 
parents’ consent. News of this work emerged as the prosecution at the Nuremberg 
medical trial presented evidence on German medical experiments on human 
beings, and proved a considerable embarrassment both for mcCance and the British 
health authorities who had let it happen. Even though mcCance insisted that these 
tests did not constitute ‘human experiments’, the German defence used them as an 
example of Allied human experimentation.163 At least as far as his career was con-
cerned, the damage was only temporary. There was no criticism of mcCance’s 
methods from the mrC, whom he represented in Germany, and he became a 
Fellow of the royal society in 1948; a few years later the mrC even asked him to 
talk about ethics of human experimentation.164 But the confrontations between 
German and British health officers seemed to become more entrenched than ever.
Another nutritional scientist now in Germany was A. P. meiklejohn. In 1946 he 
was appointed as senior lecture in nutrition at Edinburgh University’s Department 
of medicine. Until 1947 he was also a nutritional adviser to UNrrA, and in that 
capacity he was sent to Bergen-Belsen concentration camp shortly after its  liberation 
by British troops, and supervised the feeding of the many severely malnourished 
159 tNA, FD 1/418, r. A. mcCance to Edward mellanby, 30 June 1947.
160 tNA, FD 1/418, ‘opportunities and Facilities for research in Germany’, by robert mcCance 
and Elsie Widdowson, [mar. 1947?]
161 tNA, FD 1/418, interview with Professor r. A. mcCance and Dr Elsie Widdowson with 
A.l.t., 27 Aug. 1947.
162 Cited in Kirchberger, ‘Public Health Policy’, 201. ‘report of the results of the Combined 
Nutritional Committee of April 1947’, British Medical Journal, 17 may 1947, pp. 684–5.
163 Weindling, Nazi Medicine and the Nuremberg Trials, 202–3.
164 richard Nicholson, ‘Why the EU Clinical trials Directive? The Ethical History Behind the 
Development of Good Clinical Practice and Directive’, in EU Directive on Clinical Trials, Its Interpre­
tation in UK Law and Its Impact on Non­Commercial Trials, Ethical, legal and methodological train-
ing series—Infectious Disease research Network, 2001.
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and dying inmates.165 He, too, was asked by the mrC to report on the German 
state of health, and came to similar conclusions to mcCance and Widdowson. He 
had examined over 2,000 Germans, he explained in his report, but had seen ‘no 
undoubted cases of famine oedema’. He thought that German health may have 
benefited from the shortages. ‘The Germans particularly in the south are inclined 
to regard obesity as a sign of health and grace, particularly among women. Its rarity 
now may be one reason why they consider themselves underfed.’ However, ‘[a]s in 
the U.K. many adults are likely to have benefited from losing excess weight and its 
complications of high blood pressure, diabetes and gall stones.’166
‘[E]xaggerated statements’ were made ‘both by the Germans and their friends’, 
meiklejohn insisted, and could only be answered by ‘exact scientific Information 
about the state of Nutrition’. He was ‘particularly unfavourably impressed by writ-
ten statements prepared for us by German Public Health officers in Nuremberg 
and Hamburg. These statements were obvious propaganda bearing little relation to 
the true medical facts’. A Dr Aschoff, he reported, had recently published a paper 
which sought to ‘prove that Germans in the British zone are now worse of[f ] than 
the inmates of Buchenwald concentration camp’. And a Dr otto schmidt, German 
medical officer of health in Frankfurt in the American zone, had in march 1946 
‘prepared a document . . . grossly exaggerating the nutritional problems of the pop-
ulation’. In sum, meiklejohn maintained, it was ‘clear that the Germans are now 
grossly exaggerating the effects of the food shortage. The danger is that they may 
come to believe their own misrepresentations. Hence the need for precise objective 
investigations’. leading British public health officers in Germany had agreed that 
they ‘placed no reliance on the figures’.167
These attacks focused on German analyses of malnutrition and starvation, but 
even the British nutrition survey teams, established to investigate the state of health 
among the zone’s population, came under fire.168 Following the ration cuts in 
165 meiklejohn (1909–61) supervised a group of volunteer medical students after his arrival in 
Belsen on 29 Apr. 1945. tNA, Wo 222/201, ‘Belsen Camp Accounts given to royal society of medi-
cine by Brigadier Glyn-Hughest, Colonel lipscomb and lieutenant Colonel Johnston’, [July 1945]. 
WA, rAmC/792/3, ‘Administrative report—Belsen Concentration Camp’, J. A. D. Johnston, lt. 
Col. rAmC, oC 32 (Brit) CCs, rAmC, 15 June 1945. WA, rAmC/792/3, ‘Field Work in medical 
Nutrition—Instructions to medical officers on Nutrition survey teams regarding records of Exami-
nations and laboratory work’, from UNrrA, health division, [undated]. WA, rAmC/792/3, 
‘UNrrA, European regional office, Press Conference, 7 June 1945—Account of the Activities of 
london medical students at Belsen Concentration Camp, may 1945 by Dr A. P. meiklejohn’, 7 June 
1945. Also see UN Archives, s-1021-0019-06, Dr A. P. meiklejohn, ‘Final report of the Nutrition 
section, Health Division, UNrrA’, 28 Feb. 1947. His obituary in British Medical Journal, 24 June 
1961, 1834–5.
166 tNA, FD 1/418, ‘Personal notes on the work of the Combined Nutrition Committee by 
Dr A. P. meiklejohn’, notes on the eighth committee meeting on 12–13 oct. 1947.
167 tNA, FD 1/418, ‘Personal notes on the work of the Combined Nutrition Committee by 
Dr A. P. meiklejohn’.
168 tNA, Fo 936/90, ‘Establishment proposal for nutrition teams’, office of the Deputy military 
Governor and Chief of staff (main HQ, lübbecke) to HQ BAor, 31 oct. 1945. The Combined 
Nutrition Committee was set up in August 1945 to examine German nutrition and health conditions 
in the three western zones. It made its first report on 13 Aug. 1945. tNA, FD 1/418, draft letter by 
Dr sinclair to lord Pakenham, undated [June 1947]. Also see r. H. Kampmeier, ‘Germany:  Nutrition 
surveys in 1945’, Nutrition History Notes, 23 (summer 1985).
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spring 1946 they reported signs of health deterioration, and after the winter of 
1946–7 they testified that health conditions were worsening. A report from may 
1947 argued that large parts of the population were ‘in decidedly poor condition 
to withstand any further decrease in food intake’, and that, particularly regarding 
diseases such as tuberculosis, the situation was ‘potentially threatening in view of 
the nutritional state of the population’.169 But their reports, British critics now 
argued, had relied too heavily on German data. As meiklejohn explained, a large 
part of the ‘dis-satisfaction is due to the control of survey teams by Germans’. The 
British teams had been open to German manipulation, he believed, primarily 
because of their lack of ‘direction and internal criticism from an experienced and 
senior medical officer with special knowledge of nutritional problems’.170 mcCance 
agreed that the British teams came up with questionable data because they con-
sisted of ‘medical people with no special knowledge of nutrition’. And in the 
American zone it was even worse, mcCance reported, since the Americans had 
‘entrusted the investigations there to Germans, and are just having their legs 
pulled’.171
An exchange which spelled out the British position concerned the work of 
Werner Klatt, a German émigré who arrived in Britain in may 1939, and, after 
being interned and eventually naturalized, worked for the Political Intelligence 
Department of the British Foreign office. From 1946 he was director of the Food 
and Agricultural section of the london Control office, and queried some details 
in meiklejohn’s report.172 Following some German doctors, he suggested that per-
haps some comparison could legitimately be made between the food received by 
prisoners detained in Germany during the war and the current situation, and in 
this light he had to agree with the Germans that the prisoners had received more 
food. Generally, he believed that ‘the arithmetic of the food consumption on and 
off rations as applied in the calculations of the 8th Nutrition survey [which had 
been advised by meiklejohn] was somewhat shaky’, and would only harm the British 
case. ‘As you know’, he wrote, ‘I am appalled by German inaccuracies and generali-
sations, but it seems to me that the British case is weakened if mistakes are made 
on this side which in case the report is published will be taken up and challenged 
by German nutritionalists immediately and which, as far as I can see, cannot be 
fully defended.’173
169 tNA, FD 1/418, ‘report of the seventh Combined Nutrition survey’, 6 may 1947.
170 tNA, FD 1/418, ‘Personal notes on the work of the Combined Nutrition Committee by 
Dr A. P. meiklejohn’.
171 tNA, FD 1/418, interview with Professor r. A. mcCance and Dr Elsie Widdowson with Alt, 
27 Aug. 1947.
172 Klatt (born 1904) emigrated to switzerland in 1939, and shortly afterwards to the UK. 
1946–51 he was director of the Food and Agriculture section of the london Control office; 
from 1951 to 1966 he was economic adviser to the Foreign office, to the Ilo and FAo. He 
retired in 1966, but in 1967 took up a rockefeller grant to study economic development in Asia. 
see Werner röder and Herbert A. strauss (eds.), International Biographical Dictionary of Central 
European Émigrés (munich, 1983), i. Werner Klatt, Food Prices and Food Price Policies in Europe 
(london, 1950).
173 tNA, FD 1/418, W. Klatt (Foreign office) to meiklejohn, [11 Nov. 1947].
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meiklejohn exploded with fury. In his reply, he disagreed that the Germans had 
the right to be granted help. ‘I am frankly amazed’, he wrote, ‘that you are prepared 
to make a favourable comparison between this ration for prisoners and the present 
rations for German civilians. You know very well that the Germans, unlike their 
prisoners during the war, are free to supplement their ration from black-market 
sources.’ moreover, meiklejohn went on, ‘I question the right of the Germans to 
make [this comparison]’. many of their prisoners had been British, and there could 
‘be no question that many of our men depended for their survival on the red 
Cross parcels sent out from this country. If you doubt this, I would be glad to put 
you in touch with some friends of mine who were P.o.W.s in Germany; also I 
know a doctor who personally inspected many P.o.W. camps on their first libera-
tion; I am sure that he would be glad to enlighten you.’
If any problems did exist, meiklejohn argued, it was because of the ‘inability or 
unwillingness of the German authorities to control the black market and to direct 
indigenous food into rationed channels’, rather than any actual lack of food:
I was myself concerned in the relief of Belsen Concentration Camp. There I saw 
17,000 people in the last extremity of starvation and thousands of others dead and 
unburied on the ground. We had no difficulty in raising 2,000 litres of milk daily from 
surrounding farms to feed the starving, and could have raised 10,000 litres if we had 
had a few more days to collect enough containers. At that time I also saw the German 
population in the neighbouring town of Celle; if . . . slimness is fashionable among 
German women, Celle was certainly a most unfashionable place.
The ‘essential point’, he went on, was that ‘the Germans frequently starved their 
prisoners, whereas the great majority of Germans are now adequately fed’.
Because our points of view are so obviously different, you will probably think that my 
attitude towards the Germans is vindictive. That is not the case; I believe that we 
should consider their problems with scrupulous fairness, but I also believe that the 
people of this country, who are making great sacrifices to support the Germans, are 
entitled to know the truth. I therefore resent most strongly all efforts to misrepresent 
the truth or to obtain for the Germans a better deal than the facts warrant. You say 
that you are ‘appalled by German inaccuracies and generalisations’. I, on the other 
hand, am infuriated by their deliberate falsification of the facts.
He added that after visits to six other Central and southern European countries 
during the previous year, he knew that, ‘by comparison, the Germans have been 
very fortunate in their post-War standards of nutrition’.174 Writing to Edward 
 mellanby at the mrC, he complained that ‘[t]his erstwhile German, now working 
in the Food and Agriculture Division at Norfolk House, seems to need someone to 
tell him where he “gets off ” ’.175
The confrontation between German and British health officials about tubercu-
losis was similar to the argument about food. It only erupted properly in late 1947, 
but the positions had been fixed several years before. The actual data is perhaps less 
174 tNA, FD 1/418, meiklejohn to Klatt, 12 Nov. 1947.
175 tNA, FD 1/418, meiklejohn to mellanby, 13 Nov. 1947.
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interesting than the nature of the confrontations: British health officials empha-
sized the problems of venereal diseases and other acute epidemic conditions as 
most urgent, but to the Germans tuberculosis was of greater political, social, and 
symbolic significance.176 German doctors argued that current conditions (inade-
quate nutrition, bad housing, lack of heating) meant more people were dying from 
this condition than even at the height of the war. rudolf Degkwitz, the Hamburg 
medical officer of health, was again among those who repeatedly warned about the 
rise of tB. He founded the ‘Central Committee for the Fight against tuberculosis’, 
and reported regularly on the increasing numbers of cases, for whom not nearly 
enough hospital beds were available.177 like complaints about lack of food, tB also 
featured in the meetings of the ZAC, and doctors helped formulate the ZAC’s 
position that the population’s state was poor and worsening, and insufficiently 
appreciated by the occupiers.178
once again, these claims were met with great scepticism. A British observer of 
the ZAC meetings noted with disdain that the ‘deterioration of health among the 
population has become so much a platform point among politicians that none 
would dare countenance any suggestion to the contrary’.179 The Germans had 
vastly exaggerated both the incidence and the death rates, British observers argued, 
which were deliberately intended to attract world sympathy.180 meiklejohn pointed 
out that exaggerated incidence rates were a result of the new German instructions 
for granting additional rations to tB patients, and that doctors were ‘conniving’ 
with their patients. These instructions ‘provide a simple way by which members of 
the public can get extra food with the connivance of their local doctor. We were 
told that already 400,000 people in Bavaria get such extra rations and the numbers 
are rapidly increasing.’181 The Americans were once again duped by their German 
colleagues.
In september 1947, the British health authorities ordered an investigation into 
the situation. Philip D’Arcy Hart and marc Daniels, two members of the mrC’s 
scientific staff, found that contrary to German claims, the tuberculosis rate was 
roughly the same as in Britain, and in decline. specific disagreements focused on 
the German methods of reporting cases and measuring rates. Daniels and Hart 
176 W. Eckart, ‘Öffentliche Gesundheitspflege in der Weimarer republik und in der Frühgeschichte 
der BrD’, Das öffentliche Gesundheitswesen, 51 (1989), 213–21. Dagmar Ellerbrock, ‘Gesundheits-
politik in der amerikanischen Besatzungszone 1945–1949’, in Wolfgang Woelk and Jörg Vögele (eds.), 
Geschichte der Gesundheitspolitik in Deutschland: Von der Weimarer Republik bis in die Frühgeschichte der 
‘doppelten Staatsgründung’ (Berlin, 2002), 313–46.
177 Gollancz also got involved in this campaign. letter to The Times, 30 oct. 1946, printed in 
 Gollancz, In Darkest Germany, 24.
178 tNA, Fo 1037/64, Confidential report No. 17 on the 19th meeting ending 26th Feb.1948 
(25–6 Feb. 1948), dated 8 mar. 1948. on the sPD policy on tB, see Hugo Freund, ‘sozialistische 
Gesundheitspolitik’, Sozialistische Mitteilungen: News for German Socialists in England, 108 (Feb. 
1948), 7–8.
179 tNA, Fo 1037/64, Confidential report No.14 on the sixteenth meeting ending 13 Nov. 1947 
(12/13 Nov. 1947), 20 Nov. 1947.
180 tNA, Fo 371/70888, Public Health Branch (IA&C Div), press release on the Daniels and 
Hart report.
181 tNA, FD 1/418, ‘Personal notes on the work of the Combined Nutrition committee by 
Dr A. P. meiklejohn’.
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suspected that the data was manipulated deliberately. ‘We must refer here to the 
regrettable fact’, they concluded, ‘that German officials (some non-medical) have 
repeatedly during the past year issued to Allied journalists and other visitors mis-
leading and sometimes even false information regarding the tuberculosis situation 
in Germany. These statements have had the effect of putting tuberculosis in 
 Germany unjustifiably on the level of a sensational news item. moreover, since it 
is generally known that tuberculosis figures are a sensitive index of social condi-
tions, sweeping conclusions as to these conditions have been drawn from errone-
ous data.’182 An mrC report confirmed these findings, and agreed that ‘a great 
mass of propaganda is always emanating from Germany’. In fact, the ‘German 
medical press takes part in this and brochures have been put out by firms and by 
medical organisations which are frankly intended by gross exaggeration to create 
an atmosphere of sympathy for suffering which may sometimes be imaginary.’183 
overall, the ‘authentic Control Commission view’ was that ‘while the majority of 
Germans are not being fed as well as of old, they have suffered little, if at all, in 
health, and that the minority, while suffering to a greater or lesser extent in health 
and vitality, has not suffered sufficiently to affect the vital statistics, the death rate, 
the infant mortality and the birth rate: that, indeed, no damage has been done to 
the health of the people as a whole.’184
The British preparations for the occupation of Germany had therefore mis-
judged the situation in their belief that it was possible to implement a system of 
‘indirect control’. This was not just because of a shortage of German administra-
tors: once a series of compromises had enabled the restaffing of German authori-
ties, indirect control could theoretically proceed. But, in fact, British officials 
showed considerable reluctance to implement indirect control.185 The British 
authorities were more compelled to rely upon Germans in public health matters 
than in most other fields; public health even merited the establishment of one of 
the first zonal advisory bodies.186 But here, too, tensions and conflicts persisted. 
The British remained the most aloof of the occupiers, with the least trust in, and 
willingness to rely on, local administrators.
In part this was caused by British psychological analyses of what the Germans 
were like, which led some British officials to question the German character’s 
182 m. Daniels and P. D’Arcy Hart, Tuberculosis in the British Zone of Germany, with a Section on 
Berlin—Report of an Inquiry made in September–October 1947 (london, 1948), 21. The investigation 
was ordered by Dr W. strelley martin (Public Health Adviser to the British military Governor) and 
Dr r. W. ryan (Deputy Public Health Adviser). This report was attacked by Ickerts and the Zentral-
komitee zur Bekämpfung der tuberkulose in der Britischen Zone, see Franz Ickerts, Tuberkulose in der 
Britischen Zone (Hamburg, 1948).
183 tNA, FD 1/418, s. J. Cowell, r. A. mcCance, J. H. sheldon, mrC report on the German 
 situation, [Dec. 1947].
184 This statement was based on extracts from Background letter No. 15 of 23 Feb. 1948. tNA, 
Fo 1037/64, Confidential report No. 17 on the 19th meeting ending 26th Feb. 1948 (25–6 Feb. 
1948), 8 mar. 1948. Also printed in Uhlig (ed.), Confidential Reports, 180.
185 For example, they were last of the occupiers to pass denazification responsibilities to the 
 Germans. A. Königseder in Wolfgang Benz (ed.), Deutschland unter alliierter Besatzung, 1945–1949/55: 
Ein Handbuch (Berlin, 1999), 116.
186 tNA, Fo 1050/757, ‘military Government Instruction on Winter Epidemics’, 17 sept. 1945.
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potential for being re-educated and reformed. In their eyes, German doctors’ 
demands for food and supplies that were not due to them, and their use of appar-
ently distorted or falsified medical data, suggested that they had not changed at all. 
As a GPrB paper stated in December 1946, their research had demonstrated that 
among the Germans a ‘sense of responsibility for the past seemed to be a condition 
for a creative, hopeful attitude towards the future; those who had no conscious 
guilt tended to be apathetic or bitter; those conscious of guilt tended to be opti-
mistic or constructive’.187 The lack of both sense of responsibility and conscious 
guilt worried British officials throughout their time in Germany. British and 
German confrontations about the significance of malnutrition and tuberculosis 
touched on exactly what a German ‘sense of responsibility’ for the past should 
involve and what hope there was for a future democratic Germany.
In contrast to the other occupiers, the British seemed to lack a sense of mission 
in Germany. Unlike the French, their occupation was not a way of rethinking their 
place in the world—and unlike the soviets and Americans, it did not herald a 
major new set of responsibilities in world affairs. Weighed down by concerns about 
occupation costs, the British found Germany disconcertingly dissimilar from the 
colonies they were used to administering, and the Germans themselves confusing 
and disturbing. Global political imperatives soon overtook them, and by the time 
the Federal republic of Germany was founded in may 1949, these old worries 
seemed to have become ancient history. But in truth British concerns about 
 Germany, its character and legitimacy, have survived for longer than the divided 
country.
187 tNA, Fo 1032/1464, ‘History of the German Personnel research Branch’.
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6
Public Health Work in the American 
Occupation Zone
Pl ANs
Many features of the American approach to the occupation resembled those of the 
British. They had jointly prepared within the sHAEF organization, and so had 
similar general orientations, and public health was a subject on which American 
and British plans were particularly closely coordinated. In January 1945, Colonel 
William l.Wilson, deputy director of sHAEF’s G5 Division (and later deputy 
chief of the American Public Health Branch in Germany), reminded his staff of 
the ‘impossibility of separating American and British public health operations 
into strict national areas’, and asked them to ensure close coordination.1 sHAEF’s 
Public Health Branch was led by Major General Warren F. Draper (drafted from 
the United states Public Health service), and his deputies, the American Colonel 
Wilson and the British Brigadier Thomas F. Kennedy.2 Initial American assump-
tions were similar to those we encountered in Chapter 5: they, too, insisted that 
Allied input into German reconstruction was to be strictly limited and no imports 
were to be made available; that any work was to ‘be based upon a program whereby 
the Germans are made responsible for providing for themselves, out of their own 
work and resources’.3 American guidelines also spelled out, just as the British had 
done, that existing German administrations were to be taken over and supervised 
indirectly, and health officers were instructed to supervise the German health 
system while also denazifying it.4 In september 1944, General Eisenhower’s 
proclamation No. 1 to the German people stated that the Americans intended to 
1 BAK, Z45F, 3/169-2/159, ‘Minutes of the Meeting convened by Chief, Public Health Branch, 
G-5 Division, sHAEF, for discussion of military government public health plans and operations’, 
15–16 Jan. 1945.
2 Richard R. Taylor (ed.), Preventive Medicine in World War II, viii. Civil Affairs/Military Govern-
ment Public Health Activities (Washington, 1976).
3 JCs 1067, ‘Directive of the United states Joint Chiefs of staff to the Commander-in-Chief of 
the United states Forces of Occupation regarding the military government of Germany’, Apr. 1945, 
repr. in Beate Ruhm von Oppen (ed.), Documents on Germany under the Occupation, 1945–1954 
(london, 1955).
4 BAK, Z45F, 3/153-3/15, ‘Chart indicating functional relationships between Ministries, Control 
Commissions/Councils and staff Agencies’, UsGCC (Mil Gov Div B, Displaced Persons section) to 
Director (Division B), 5 Nov. 1944. This chart listed the Ministry of the Interior, Dept IV and the 
Reich Public Health Office as the German health bodies that future health officials of the occupation 
authorities would have to liaise with and supervise.
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5 Eisenhower Proclamation No. 1, Amtsblatt der Militärregierung Deutschlands, Amerikanisches 
Kontrollgebiet, quoted in Christoph Weisz (ed.), OMGUS-Handbuch: Die amerikanische Militär-
regierung in Deutschland 1945–1949 (Munich, 1994), 9.
6 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (london, 1948), 471, 473.
7 e.g. A. Königseder in Wolfgang Benz (ed.), Deutschland unter alliierter Besatzung, 1945–
1949/1955: Ein Handbuch (Berlin, 1999), 114–15.
8 Quoted in Paul Weindling, Nazi Medicine and the Nuremberg Trials: From Medical War Crimes to 
Informed Consent (Houndmills, 2004), 39. Many thanks to Paul Weindling for information about 
Rosen’s role in compiling this pamphlet.
take over and revive the existing administrative machinery, and ordered all German 
officials to remain in place and continue to work.5
Until 14 July 1945, when sHAEF was dissolved, the British and Americans 
shared and combined their plans for German occupation and military govern-
ment. Thereafter the Allied forces were broken up into their national elements, and 
Eisenhower became commander only for the American troops. He was in charge 
of UsFET (United states Forces, European Theater), and from March 1947 of 
EUCOM (United states, European Command). ‘separation meant’, Eisenhower 
explained, ‘that we had to sort out all our complicated and highly integrated staffs, 
organisations, and procedures in order to meet the new requirements of national 
administration and responsibility.’6 From this, some notable differences between 
the British and Americans began to emerge. Most important for the early occupa-
tion period was that denazification in the American zone was both more ambitious 
in scope and less flexible in operation than that attempted elsewhere. The UsFET 
directive of 7 July 1945 stated that everyone in a position of public responsibility 
had to be vetted through a questionnaire (the infamous Fragebogen) on their past, 
which would lead to a classification into one of five categories:7 the removal of 
those in the first group from their positions was mandatory; the removal of those 
in the second and third groups was discretionary and rested with the military gov-
ernment officer responsible; the fourth group either faced ‘no objection’ to their 
employment or simply a lack of evidence to the contrary. Only for the fifth group 
would employment be recommended.
As a rule of thumb, mandatory removal would be warranted for anyone who 
joined the NsDAP before 1 May 1937––a considerable number. In september 
1945––some time after a relaxation of denazification regulations had begun in the 
British zone—an American directive extended this procedure into the previously 
unaffected fields of industry and economy. The scope of the denazification grew 
even wider as American investigators uncovered further evidence on the involve-
ment of doctors in medical war crimes. In May 1945, the Civil Affairs Guide on 
Denazification of the German Medical Profession (partly compiled by the American 
Jewish medical historian George Rosen), estimated that roughly half of all German 
doctors were ‘proven Nazis’. The worst offenders were to be identified and brought 
to trial as soon as possible, the guide stated, but those trials should not absolve or 
remove suspicion from the rest of the medical profession. All German physicians 
would have to undergo a thorough denazification programme. Allied officers, the 
guide stated, would have to assess ‘the degree of culpability of the individual physi-
cian or member of the auxiliary medical profession’.8
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However, these formulations lacked definitions and specific guidelines. The 
denazification adviser to the Office of Military Government for Bavaria noted in 
1950 that ‘[l]ike the rest of military government, denazification planning suffered 
from Washington indecision, Morgenthau plan influence, and Roosevelt’s decision 
not to plan at all’.9 The Americans, just like the British, lacked a detailed policy for 
dealing not just with the perpetrators of medical crimes, but also with the much 
larger number of those who had supported the Nazi regime. The problem was not 
simply that military government officers were ‘temperamentally interested in “get-
ting things done”, not in tearing down—and standing by’, as required by the occu-
pation policy set out in JCs 1067/5,10—but that this document itself contained 
contradictions and blank spots. The denazification clauses in JCs 1067 called for 
the removal of those who had been more than ‘nominal Nazis’, but provided no 
formal definition of what this category involved, or explanation of how, and 
according to what criteria, allocation into the five categories was to proceed. There 
was a similar absence of instructions on which candidates would be suitable to 
work for the new authorities, and who could be trusted to work with, and for, the 
Americans, in the interim. There were more naturalized German émigrés among 
the American than the British troops, but most of them did not end up working 
for the budding German administrations. Rather, they tended to go to Germany 
as Us citizens, and left again once their military service had come to an end.11
The American approach to denazification was shaped by a paradox not shared 
by the other occupiers. On one hand, Americans, too, shared a psychological 
understanding of Nazism, and had begun to explain fascism as a psychological or 
psychiatric condition. The prominent and well-funded Berkeley project on the 
psychology of anti-semitism, for example, had turned the concept of an ‘authori-
tarian personality’ into a popular explanatory device for the causes and conse-
quences of Nazism.12 The conference on ‘Germany after the war’, held at Colum-
bia University in spring 1944 after an initiative by the Joint Committee on 
Post-War Planning, built on the Berkeley project’s findings to analyse the German 
character and its possibilities for re-education. It was attended by a number of 
government advisers and future military government staff.13 Once in Germany, the 
American authorities presumably had some contact with the German Personnel 
Research Branch (GPRB) discussed in the Chapter 5. The GPRB’s first project in 
the Ministerial Collecting Centre near Kassel lay in the territory of the American 
zone. Individuals active within the GPRB included men such as Geoffrey Gorer, 
long-time resident in the United states and adviser to the American government.14 
9 William E. Griffith, ‘Denazification in the United states Zone of Germany’, Annals of the 
 American Academy of Political and Social Science, 267 (Jan. 1950), 68–76, at 68.
10 Griffith, ‘Denazification’, 68.
11 e.g. Klaus Mann, The Turning Point: The Autobiography of Klaus Mann (1942; london, 1987). 
For other examples see Marita Krauss, Heimkehr in ein fremdes Land: Geschichte der Remigration nach 
1945 (Munich, 2001).
12 Theodor W. Adorno et al., The Authoritarian Personality (1950; New York, 1982), p. viii.
13 TNA, FD 1/6046, ‘Report of a Conference on Germany after the War’, [undated].
14 Gorer’s first OWI study was published as Japanese Character Structure and Propaganda 
(New York, 1942), ‘Themes in Japanese Culture’, Transactions of the New York Academy of 
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Many American occupation officials, like their British counterparts, had been 
 exposed to this kind of analysis.
But from the start, these prevalent psychological diagnoses of Nazism were 
partly undermined, ultimately perhaps even cancelled out, by the fact that the 
American authorities were much more outspoken than the British about a second 
conclusion: the occupation had to be used to spread American, or ‘Western’, values 
and ideas about democracy. The Psychological Warfare  Division (PWD) of sHAEF 
spent most of its time devising ways to popularize democratic ideals and institu-
tions in Germay, rather than on the removal of unsuitable Germans. lucius Clay, 
Eisenhower’s deputy and head of the zone’s policy-making body, the United states 
Group Control Council (UsGCC), remembered in his memoirs that books, mag-
azines, radio, cinema, theatre, and music were all soon enlisted to convince the 
German population about the attraction of American-style ‘freedom’ and ‘federal 
democracy’, and, ultimately, the ‘American way of life’. In this context, rigid psy-
chological schemes about the German mentality were of little use, Clay insisted: 
‘We had much advice from those who professed to know the so-called German 
mind,’ he wrote. ‘If it did exist, we never found it; German minds seemed to us to 
be remarkably like those elsewhere.’15
‘Unfortunately for all concerned’, Carl J. Friedrich (a Us occupation officer and 
professor of political science at Harvard of German origin) wrote in 1950, ‘the 
term “democratisation” had divergent connotations for the Western Allies and the 
soviet Union. Agreements, such as the Potsdam Agreement of 1945, embodying 
this phrase “democratisation”, were therefore in reality no more than compromises 
in terms of a formula.’ Even the Western Allies disagreed about the nature and 
implications of a future German democracy. As Friedrich observed, ‘each demo-
cratic nation inclines to identify the concept of democracy with its own outlook. 
Hence, throughout this period, the free market economy, the compatibility of 
socialism with a free society, the position of the civil service, and similar issues have 
been focal points of controversy.’16 And yet the democratization agenda soon 
became most central to the American occupation, and eventually helped to over-
ride some of the problems which weighed down British officials. Even though a 
clash between a strict interpretation of denazification criteria and an insistence on 
the democratization purpose of the American occupation hampered the work of 
the American authorities, compromises eventually smoothed the path. How was 
this possible?
 Sciences, ser. 2, 5 (1943), 106–24, and ‘The special Case of Japan’, Public Opinion Quarterly, 
7/4 (Winter 1943), 267–82. see also Geoffrey Gorer, Burmese Personality (New York, 1943). 
After GPRB was closed, Gorer returned to the Us and worked on Us-based research projects 
such as studies in soviet Culture, coordinated by the American Museum of National History. 
Weston la Barre, ‘Columbia University Research in Contemporary Culture’, Scientific Monthly, 
67/3 (sept. 1948), 239. see also Geoffrey Gorer, ‘The British Zone of Germany’, Fortnightly 
(Dec. 1946), 281–7.
15 lucius Clay, Decision in Germany (london, 1950), 281–2.
16 Carl J. Friedrich, ‘Military Government and Dictatorship’, Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, 267 (Jan. 1950), 1–7, at 4.
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COMPROMIsEs
When American troops entered German territory in the autumn of 1944, their ini-
tial reactions were similar to those of the British. The destruction in their zone was 
not as extreme as that confronted by many British units, but here, too, civilian life 
was severely disrupted, particularly in cities and larger towns. Administrative con-
fusion was exacerbated by the zonal boundary with the French territory in the west, 
only finalized after endless diplomatic and military wranglings, which cut through 
existing infrastructures and administrative units. Many American commanders 
soon realized that even merely proceeding within their limited instructions con-
cerning the ‘prevention of starvation or widespread disease or such civil unrest as 
would endanger the occupying forces’, would demand a more far-reaching involve-
ment by military government than they had anticipated or prepared for.17
In many areas army officials began to collaborate with local Germans.18 Here, 
too, relations with the Germans were coloured by the expectations and experiences 
detachments brought with them. some officers in Bavaria were dismayed to find 
that their area had escaped damage, even though, as George Orwell and others 
noted, the ‘Nazi movement actually started in this part of Germany, and there can 
be no question about the enormity of the crimes it has committed’. American 
generals, like the British, believed that although Prussia was the seat of German 
militarism, Bavaria had nourished Prussian ambitions, and, unlike Prussia, it 
seemed to have escaped punishment.19 Us troops liberated Dachau, a concentra-
tion camp near Munich, in April 1945. like other Allied troops who had partici-
pated in the liberation of concentration camps, those who had been there tended 
to judge the local population in the light of the sights, sounds, and smells of exter-
mination and decay they had experienced, while those who had not found rela-
tions with the Germans much more straightforward and cordial. The British war 
correspondent Tom Pocock, who visited Belsen concentration camp shortly after 
its liberation, thought that ‘the liberators, the victors and indeed, all who had been 
involved with the opening of the concentration camps had, to some degree, been 
infected by them and it was not with typhus’.20 American soldiers were just as 
marred by this infection as the British, soviets, and French.
But such sentiments were often neutralized, not just by many GIs’ fundamental 
lack of interest in politics and history, but also by a growing sense of sympathy for and 
familiarity with the defeated. General George s. Patton, always a loose cannon, was 
widely quoted for saying that ‘[t]his whole Nazi thing is just like a Democrat-Republican 
17 JCs 1067, ‘Directive’, Apr. 1945.
18 Popular histories of the last war months and the Allied armies’ first contact with the Germans 
include Max Hastings, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany, 1944–1945 (london, 2004), and Barry 
Turner, Countdown to Victory: The Final European Campaigns of WWII (london, 2004). Also see 
 Richard Bessel, Germany 1945: From War to Peace (london, 2009).
19 George Orwell, ‘Bavarian Peasants Ignore the War: Germans Know They Are Beaten’, Observer, 
22 Apr. 1945, repr. in Orwell: The Observer Years (london, 2003), 46.
20 Tom Pocock, The Dawn Came Up Like Thunder (1945; london, 1983), 88. Turner, Countdown 
to Victory, 341 ff. The Us Third Army liberated Buchenwald in Apr. 1945; the seventh Army troops 
liberated Dachau on 29 Apr. 1945.
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election fight’, much to the outrage of the American press.21 But similar responses 
came from others. William Robertson, an American army doctor, remembered that 
‘[w]e didn’t like the German troops, but we didn’t particularly dislike the German 
civilian population. They were quite obviously suffering.’22 leon standifer, a young 
GI stationed in Germany, later wrote that ‘[t]hose ss kids weren’t very bright and had 
been taught some strange racial ideas, but they were ordinary boys. I was finding that 
I liked the German people more than I had the French or English . . . I blamed Hitler 
and the Nazi Party for massive atrocities, but they were dead or in prison.’23 shocked 
by the destruction and misery, many Americans also began to discover similarities 
and compatibilities between American and German culture. Even if any ethnic con-
sciousness among the heterogeneous German-Americans had been on the wane,24 
German-born migrants and their descendants were, as late as 1950, more numerous 
than any other group of first- and second-generation Americans.25 This is one 
reason why many American soldiers seemed to relate so quickly and easily to the 
ex-enemy population: culturally, socially, and ethnically they did not seem very dif-
ferent from the folks at home. Even their supreme commander, Dwight D. Eisen-
hower, was of German Mennonite stock.26 In the light of Americans’ rediscovery of 
familial and cultural ties to Germany, any real distinction between Germans (good or 
bad) and the Americans thus became increasingly difficult to articulate and uphold in 
practice.
This blossoming sympathy with the German plight was accompanied by the 
familiar problems of military discipline, and a move away from Washington’s pre-
scribed guidelines and priorities. Apart from ‘souvenir hunting’ and a thriving 
black market, it was soldiers’ disregard of the fraternization ban which initially 
21 George s. Patton, War as I Knew It (1948), in Martin Blumenson (ed.), The Patton Papers, 
ii. 1940–1945 (1974). Also quoted in leon C. standifer, Binding Up the Wounds: An American Soldier 
in Occupied Germany, 1945–1946 (Baton Rouge, la., 1997), 71.
22 IWM sound Archive, Dr William Robertson, ‘An American doctor talking on conditions in 
Germany at the end of the war’, Thames TV interview recorded in 1972.
23 standifer, Binding Up the Wounds, 146–7. Also see leon C. standifer, Not in Vain: A Rifleman 
Remembers World War II (Baton Rouge, la., 1992).
24 leslie V. Tischauser, The Burden of Ethnicity: The German Question in Chicago, 1914–1941 
(New York, 1990)—one of many regional studies of Germans in the UsA, points out that German-
Americans had not experienced a revival like other ethnic groups in the Us ‘because the building-
blocks of an ethnic consciousness, language and loyalty to the old homeland, were lost between 1914 
and 1941’, 261.
25 Kathleen Neils Conzen, ‘Germans’, in stephan Thernstrom (ed.), Harvard Encyclopedia of Amer-
ican Ethnic Groups (Cambridge, Mass., 1980), 405–25, at 406. There is a large historiography of 
German immigrants and their descendants in America, see e.g. Frank Trommler (ed.), Amerika und 
die Deutschen: Bestandsaufnahme einer 300jährigen Geschichte (Opladen, 1986). laVern J. Rippley, 
The German-Americans (Boston, 1976). Albert B. Faust, The German Element in the United States, 
2 vols. (1909; New York, 1969).
26 ‘Eisenhower: a factual sketch’, Time, 7 Apr. 1952. An early biography of Eisenhower narrates 
how Eisenhower’s ancestors first arrived in America, see Francis Trevelyan Miller, Eisenhower, Man and 
Soldier (Philadelphia, 1944); while another discusses the Eisenhower family ancestry at length but 
focuses almost exclusively on religion, see Kenneth sydney Davis, Soldier of Democracy: A Biography of 
Dwight Eisenhower (New York, 1946). Among more recent biographies are Carlo D’Este, Eisenhower: 
A Soldier’s Life (london, 2002); Douglas Kinnard, Eisenhower: Soldier-Statesman of the American 
 Century (Washington DC, 2002); stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President (1990; 
new edn. london, 2003).
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caused the greatest headaches.27 As one American put it a few years after his return 
from Germany: ‘Here were the people who had once been renowned for their 
Goethe and their schiller; now they offered to the world Dachau and Buchenwald. 
Their kitchens were still spotless, and the brown bread smelled delicious to soldiers 
tired of government issue white bread; their crematories were also spotless, and the 
barrels of human ashes stunned men who had seen death a hundred times on the 
battlefield.’28 But if those soldiers who had seen the death camps saw non- 
fraternization as a reasonable policy, many of those who had not, together with 
growing numbers of American visitors to Germany, questioned the logic of the 
policy. ‘Non-fraternization’ included a range of prohibited forms of contact, such 
as shaking hands or eating and drinking with Germans, giving or receiving gifts, 
playing games or sports, sharing accommodation, as well as any form of sexual 
relations.29 Earlier assumptions about the need for the rule—that it would protect 
Allied troops from German attempts to indoctrinate them with Nazi propaganda, 
and that it would demonstrate to the Germans the irreversibility of their defeat30—
just did not seem to apply any longer.
At a press conference in the American zone in May 1945, one participant 
 criticized the lack of a distinction between different kinds of Germans which was 
at the heart of the ban. ‘Is there going to be any modification made in the non-
fraternisation policy?’, he asked. ‘What I mean is, is there going to be any distinc-
tion drawn between Germans who were keeping people in Concentration Camps 
and Germans in Concentration Camps?’ Clay did not have a good answer. He 
admitted that the ban had not been modified to date, nor did he know of any plans 
to change or abandon it. The non-fraternization rule, he said, related to ‘the 
 question of [the] regeneration of the German people’ and a decision about when 
Americans would be ‘ready to accept any part of them on any other basis than of a 
conquered country, which will be treated as it has earned the right to be treated’. 
The answer was clearly: not yet.31 A month later, Parker Buhrman from the zone’s 
Political Division similarly questioned the policy. He pointed out that it ‘would 
seem to contain some serious misconceptions, particularly . . . relating to the “gulf 
between occupying armies and the Germans” ’, and it was ‘certainly wanting in 
judicious objectiveness’: ‘If ever the present physical evidence of destruction, the 
destruction of the German armies, the loss of private property and resources, eco-
nomic  hardship and the specter of starvation does not convince the Germans of 
defeat,’ Buhrman added, it was ‘not likely that the emphasis on the “separation 
gulf ” and “non-fraternisation” will do so.’ Moreover, there was
27 Robert Engler, ‘The Individual soldier and the Occupation’, Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, 267 (Jan. 1950), 82.
28 Engler, ‘Individual soldier’, 82.
29 BAK, Z45F 44-45/4/6, ‘Policy and instructions on relations with the Germans of Allied Armed 
Forces and Control Commission staffs in the initial period of control’, [21 Dec. 1944] and subsequent 
documents in this folder. On the fraternization policy and reality, see Maria Höhn, GIs and Fräuleins: 
The German-American Encounter in 1959s West Germany (Chapel Hill, 2002); Robert  Moeller, Protect-
ing Motherhood: Women and Family in the Politics of Postwar Germany (Berkeley, 1993).
30 e.g. BAK, Z45F, 44-45/4/6, lt. Muelder to Col. Calder, 26 May 1945.
31 BAK, Z45F 44-45/1/6, press conference report, 16 May 1945.
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no sound basis in human conduct or experience that would justify this policy. It risks 
turning the defeatism, frustration and possible hatred of their false leaders and 
 government against us and is the best foundation upon which under-cover activities 
and rabble-rousers can build. If we are afraid to or unable to associate with these 
people in the normal, formal, practical, common sense way in the accomplishment of 
our mission, which is primarily to govern in a manner which leads to the establish-
ment of a cooperative democratic state, the fault would seem to lie in us and the mis-
sion will in all likelihood be a failure.32
There were also dissenting voices. The purpose of the non-fraternization rule was 
to prevent soldiers from getting too close to the defeated, and a number of Ameri-
cans noted with concern that breaking it had had precisely the anticipated effects. 
Other OMGUs officials thought that even if the policy was eventually discarded, 
it had been necessary and useful at the start of the occupation. Robert Murphy 
argued that it had at least ‘served the useful purpose of bringing home to many 
Germans something of which I do not believe they were really conscious, notwith-
standing the devastation of their country and their personal sufferings. That is the 
state of world opinion regarding them.’33 But just a few months into the occupa-
tion this analysis became increasingly unpopular. Buhrman’s colleague, Colonel 
Carter, insisted that fraternization was ‘so intimately bound up with the full con-
duct of our Military Government in the Zone, and will so largely determine the 
“tone” of Us Military Government, that we should re-examine our whole position 
in the matter in the light of Military Government objectives and necessities’.34 
Many officers thought that it was just not ‘common sense’ to prevent Americans 
from having social contacts with local Germans, and, at any rate, Germans were 
impossible to avoid.
Health officers were among the first to warn about the ban on fraternization. 
Even before occupation began, they voiced concerns that it would seriously affect 
the control of venereal diseases among Allied troops. A soldier’s infection with VD 
was unquestionable evidence of his ‘fraternization’ with German women, and fears 
of punishment would mean infected soldiers would not seek treatment and further 
exacerbate the spread of VD.35 ‘It is known beyond doubt to all who are engaged 
in this work, whether in the medical, sociological or administrative field,’ Boucher 
explained at a joint meeting, ‘that there is no prospect whatsoever of achieving 
 success in the battle against V.D. through the seemingly easy course of automati-
cally making sexual intercourse by V.D. sufferers, or the transmission of the dis-
ease, a criminal offence.’ ‘Indeed it is highly probable’, he went on, ‘that it [such a 
32 BAK, Z45F 44-45/4/6, minute by Parker Buhrman (Political Division) to Colonel Carter and 
Robert Murphy, 15 June 1945. Parker Wilson Buhrman was Us consul general in Munich, 1945–6, 
following a long career as an American diplomat.
33 BAK, Z45F 44-45/4/6, minutes by Colonel Henry Carter and Robert D. Murphy, 23 June 
1945. Compare to Murphy’s critical assessment of the non-fraternization rule later on, Murphy, 
 Diplomat Among Warriors (london, 1964).
34 BAK, Z45F 44-45/4/6, minute by Colonel Henry Carter (Acting Chief, Office of the secretary 
General) to General Milburn, 23 June 1945.
35 BAK, Z45F 3/169-2/159, Colonel scheele (Chief of the sHAEF Preventive Medicine section) 
at the public health meeting of 15–16 Jan. 1945, p.16.
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policy] has tended to produce the very evil which frustrates all workers in this 
field—viz, that of driving the disease underground.’36 since the Health Branch’s 
‘main object’ was ‘to induce people to come forward for treatment’, they objected 
to ‘any sufferer being deterred from coming forward by the thought that disclosure 
of the disease will disclose an offence’.37
This health argument effectively undermined the fraternization ban even before 
political arguments about the value of American soldiers’ contacts with the German 
population first came to be heard. It was strengthened by the availability of penicil-
lin, which made the treatment of venereal diseases faster and more efficient. Under 
pressure from health officers, in June 1945 an order from Eisenhower conceded 
that ‘disciplinary and punitive measures’ would not be taken for the contraction of 
venereal diseases (‘except in instances of wilful concealment of infection’), and that 
contraction of VD would ‘not be used, directly or indirectly, as evidence of frater-
nisation or as evidence of violation by the individual on non-fraternisation with the 
inhabitants of Germany’.38 In July 1945, German children were exempted from the 
ban, and in October the policy was officially, if quietly, abandoned.39 As a result of 
the combined effects of pressure from the health officers, the availability of  penicillin, 
and the growing fallout between the former wartime allies, fraternization between 
Americans and Germans ‘was no longer framed primarily as a threat to the health 
of Allied troops but as a welcome solidification of Cold War alliances’.40
As American relations with the local populations flourished in many areas, their 
contacts with non-German Displaced Persons (DPs) proved less tranquil and 
helped to cement the new bonds between Americans and Germans. DPs were 
disliked by occupation officials and locals alike, both because their presence exacer-
bated chaotic conditions and because they appeared to receive comparatively dis-
proportionate international support. Occupation staffs begrudged DPs as a burden, 
especially since they felt that UNRRA, the international body responsible for their 
care, was unwilling or unable to pull its weight.41 Even if this criticism of UNRRA 
overlooked the fact that the organization’s remits dictated close cooperation with 
military authorities in occupied areas, American officers’ relations with UNRRA 
officials and DPs were fraught.42 leon standifer remembered how one of his ser-
geants spoke about them: ‘They’re getting plenty of food, the same rations as you, 
36 TNA, FO 1050/10, W. Boucher to PM Balfour, 3 Dec. 1945.
37 TNA, FO 1050/10, legal Branch (Mil Gov Hannover) to legal Division (CCG (BE)), Dec. 1945.
38 BAK, Z45F 44-45/4/6, order from Eisenhower to commanding generals, 4 June 1945.
39 BAK, Z45F 44-45/4/6, order from Eisenhower to all members of UsFET, 27 sept. 1945.
40 Annette F. Timm, The Politics of Fertility in Twentieth-Century Berlin (New York, 2010), 189.
41 e.g. TNA, FO 371/51418, Rt. Hon. P. J. Noel-Baker, MP (Minister of state) to Clement Attlee 
(PM), 13 Dec. 1945. The Red Cross teams nicknamed UNRRA ‘You Never Really Relieved  Anybody’, 
see Caroline Moorehead, Dunant’s Dream: War, Switzerland and the History of the Red Cross (london, 
1998), 506. Also see TNA, FO 1050/10, D/Chief (IA&D Div, Bünde) to Boucher (Director, health 
branch, Bünde), 6 Nov. 1945.
42 e.g. IWM 12511 02/49/1, Frederick Morgan’s diary—written while he was director of opera-
tions in Germany for UNRRA (1 sept. 1945 to 27 Aug. 1946), includes accounts of visits to DP 
camps and meetings with UNRRA and military personnel. A sanitized account appears in a chapter 
of his autobiography, lieutenant-General sir Frederick Morgan, Peace and War: A Soldier’s Life 
(london, 1961).
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but keep stealing. Every bunk in the barracks has a box of stale bread and  rotting 
food that they’re saving in case the supply runs out. These people are like ani-
mals!’43 DPs were blamed for increases in petty crime, venereal diseases, and gen-
eral unrest. An American military government report from October 1945 stated 
that during september ‘[t]he chief source of unrest and lawlessness continued to be 
found in the large mass of displaced persons’, and that, by contrast, ‘the German 
population in the U.s. Zone continued to be generally orderly, and crime rates 
were low’.44 OMGUs health officials felt that German civilians were living on 
‘starvation rations’, while DPs were apparently getting overweight from the food 
parcels and welfare packages sent to them from abroad.45 In the American zone, 
just as in the British, German civilians made rather good first impressions, at least 
compared to other groups.
That made the job of public health officers much easier. To them, non- 
fraternization was all the more contradictory since their plans had specified that 
German administrators were to carry out the bulk of necessary tasks. like their 
colleagues in the other occupation zones, the American military government had 
neither sufficient personnel nor experience to take over the collapsed German 
administrations themselves, and were compelled to find and appoint German 
executives. At first glance, the appointment of German health officials was less 
urgent than in the British zone. The initial staff allocation to the Us zone’s Health 
Branch was much more generous than the British, and it even increased in the first 
months: in August 1945 136 military government medical personnel were work-
ing in the American zone on German health matters.46 In september this increased 
to 145,47 and in October it rose further to 170.48
But although the allocation of health personnel was more generous, personnel 
pressures soon turned into a similar problem to that in the British zone. Plans had 
provided for the rapid redeployment of American troops to the war in the East, 
and then, after VJ Day, back to the United states. The October 1945 health report 
stated that around half of all military medical personnel were to be released by 1 
January 1946, and their responsibilities to be taken over by Us civilians and 
appointed Germans. ‘Under the deployment program,’ it stated, ‘65 of the 145 
personnel now on duty could return to the United states by 1 January 1946 and 
105 by 1 April 1946.’49 A temporary delay to the deployment of ‘certain essential 
43 standifer, Binding Up the Wounds, 22.
44 TNA, FO 371/46992, Monthly Report of Military Governor, Us Zone, No. 3, 20 Oct. 1945, 
sent to the Foreign Office for information.
45 ‘Public Health and Medical Affairs: a supplement to the Monthly Report of the Military Gover-
nor, U.s. Zone’, No. 4, 20 Nov. 1945, 16, noted that the minimum ration of 2,300 calories per person 
per day was provided in DP centres, and Red Cross packages and other non-rationed foods created an 
additional surplus. see also table ix, ‘comparison of adult weight data, 1945, United states Zone’, 16.
46 ‘Public Health and Medical Affairs’, No. 2, 20 sept. 1945, 1, and table i: Distribution of Military 
Government Medical Personnel, U.s. Zone of Germany, 1 sept. 1945, 8.
47 ‘Public Health and Medical Affairs’, No. 3, 20 Oct. 1945, 1 and table ii: shortages of Medical 
Means, Military Government of United states Zone, 1 Oct. 1945, 10. The same number appears in 
BAK, 5/331-1/6 in a memorandum to Major General stayer, 9 Oct. 1945.
48 ‘Public Health and Medical Affairs’, No. 4, 20 Nov. 1945, 2.
49 ‘Public Health and Medical Affairs’, No. 3, 20 Oct. 1945, 1.
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individuals’ among the medical officers was granted in December 1945, but only 
until early April 1946, when all redeployments were to be completed ‘unless they 
specifically expressed their willingness to remain in Germany’.50
Because demobilization was scheduled to take place earlier and faster than in the 
British zone, it became urgent to ensure that sufficient Germans were available to 
take control of public health operations. The British problems stemmed from an 
inadequately sized Health Branch at the outset, whereas American difficulties 
reflected the hasty disbandment of existing personnel, but the results were similar. 
Of 165 military government medical personnel in the American zone on 31 July 
1945, only 77 remained three months later. By November 1945, two out of the 
three million American troops in the zone had gone home.51 Problems were made 
more acute by the limitations dictated by the denazification regulations on which 
Germans could be appointed. In the American zone, just as in the British, medical 
officers’ petitions to relax denazification criteria, and make use of even politically 
suspect German doctors, proved particularly effective and successful.
In the American zone, too, an initial vehicle for highlighting the importance of 
‘public health’ (with the prioritization of money and personnel this entailed) was 
a campaign to recognize the dangers of the coming winter months and to mobil-
ize all possible resources to prevent a crisis. Health officers had their own interests 
in emphasizing the reality of health crises and the importance of public health, 
but everyone agreed on the need for more supplies, money, and personnel. At a 
press conference in August 1945, Eisenhower explained that the most urgent 
question was ‘this winter and what are we going to do about it. Naturally it was 
not the concept of a Government to annihilate Germany. We have to keep them 
this winter in order to do anything about rehabilitating them later and to this end 
they must be fed, and all of our staffs of all units are struggling in various ways 
with the problems of fuel, housing and feeding.’ Deflecting criticism from 
 concerned taxpayers at home, he added: ‘[b]y feeding I do not mean any fancy 
menus. I mean merely on the existence level, and that is all I do mean.’ For that 
to happen, more supplies would have to be brought into the zone. ‘That does not 
mean I am going to get them fat, but it is inescapable that they must be fed this 
winter.’52
While a demand for more resources united all departments, health teams were 
able to move to the front of the queue by showing that their problems—above all 
the spread of infectious diseases, but also the inadequate living conditions which 
facilitated their proliferation—demanded urgent attention. In August 1945, the 
monthly health report for the American zone noted that extensive damages to 
utilities, water supply, sewage disposal, and housing had led to ‘disrupted living 
conditions’ that caused ‘many small epidemics of dysentery, typhoid and typhus fever’.53 
It urged that immediate preparations be made in order to prevent worse to come. 
50 ‘Public Health and Medical Affairs’, No. 5, 20 Dec. 1945, 2.
51 Balfour, ‘Four Power Control in Germany’, in Balfour and Mair, Four Power Control in Germany 
and Austria, 104. Clay, Decision in Germany, 239–40.
52 e.g. BAK, Z45F, 44-45/1/6, notes on the Press Conference held on 30 Aug. 1945.
53 ‘Public Health and Medical Affairs’, No. 1, 20 Aug. 1945, 1.
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Undamaged hospitals were overflowing with patients, and many operated in dam-
aged buildings, and without electricity, water supply, or fuel to get them through 
the winter. Although it was ‘imperative that repairs be made as rapidly as possible 
in order to increase the number of hospital beds and to conserve fuel’, health offi-
cers complained, both ‘necessary building materials and labor’ were  unavailable. 
‘With lack of fuel, shelter, and food, and the crowding that exists,’ the report went 
on, ‘illness and the danger of epidemics will increase the problem with the onset of 
cold weather.’ There was only one solution: resources would have to be made avail-
able immediately to prevent an epidemic crisis during the winter months—poten-
tially threatening the whole world.54 such a prospect was surely too dire to be 
ignored by Washington.
The health teams’ call to mobilize for the winter involved not only material 
resources and American imports, but also the ever-important demands for person-
nel, both the numbers of available staff and their qualifications, salaries, and pro-
fessional status. This required the freedom to disregard the denazification rules. 
American health officers, like their British counterparts, soon insisted that any 
strict interpretation of the denazification regulations prevented them from appoint-
ing Germans to the most important health operations and building a functioning 
health service, and so harmed occupation objectives.
Months into occupation it was still not clear whether officers were to be allowed 
to bend the rules. In October 1945, the monthly denazification report for the 
American zone acknowledged that, ‘[i]n view of the great number of individual 
cases involved’, it had become vital ‘to establish some rapid means of determining 
whether former members of the Nazi Party were more than nominal participants 
in Party activity’. But the old rules remained in force. ‘As a rough guide,’ the report 
explained, ‘those who joined the Party before 1 May 1937 are considered manda-
tory removal cases, while those who joined later are given a further investigation.’ 
This procedure had been criticized for its inflexibility and lack of discrimination, 
the report observed, and it had necessarily resulted in the unfair treatment of some 
individuals. Nonetheless, it went on, ‘most of the Germans who deny their  complicity 
in Nazi Party activity’ were ‘undoubtedly . . . merely attempting to obscure the facts 
and evade responsibilities for their actions’. After all, ‘our policy of mass dismissal 
is not designed to please the German public. It has as its purpose the prompt 
removal of Nazi influence from public life. By virtue of its mandatory provision, 
some unjust arrests and removals are certain. Nevertheless, these can be corrected 
by individual review at a later date when our main purposes have been accom-
plished.’55 Although the exact dates of party membership which mandated suspi-
cion might be up for discussion, the classification of individuals into pre scriptive 
categories persisted, and—health officers argued—severely restricted any ‘prag-
matic’ room to manoeuvre.
54 Military Government of Germany, ‘Public Health and Medical Affairs: monthly report of 
 military governor, U.s. Zone’, No. 2, 20 sept. 1945, 5.
55 TNA, FO 371/46992, ‘Denazification: Monthly Report of Military Governor, U.s. Zone’, 
No. 3, 20 Oct. 1945, sent to the Foreign Office for information.
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Initially, even when it came to public health, it appeared that the restrictions 
were going to be strictly enforced. The August 1945 health report stated that the 
internment camp in Kassel alone held forty-six former officials from the German 
Health Department, and the number was rising with each new wave of arrests.56 
An UsFET directive from October 1945 confirmed health officers’ fears, saying 
that in the search for Germans ‘who might be suitable for employment in Public 
Health operations in administrative or teaching positions’, no leniency could be 
tolerated. ‘No names should be submitted’, this directive stated, ‘for individuals 
who came into discretionary removal, mandatory removal or arrest categories 
under present policy directed against Nazis, militarists or persons who held high 
public office under the Nazi regime.’ In addition to fulfilling the political criterion, 
candidates should also ‘possess the following qualifications: a. Administrative abil-
ity and leadership qualities of a high order. b. Professional qualifications of a high 
order. c. Physical and mental qualifications which would fit the individual into a 
responsible and difficult reconstructive task’. Overall, ‘great care must be exercised 
in nominating these persons’.57
The Americans soon acquired the reputation of being the occupier who took 
denazification most seriously. A number of high-profile cases seemed to confirm 
this perception. American officials were behind the dismissal of people such as 
Ferdinand sauerbruch and Franz Redeker from the Berlin Magistrat, while the 
other occupiers were content to let them remain. Despite this, there were  American 
medical officers who argued vocally and influentially that strict denazification was 
not in the interest of public health and welfare, as well as impractical and impos-
sible to carry out. In early July 1945, one official noted that thirteen of the German 
doctors he had appointed had been found to be politically unacceptable, but that 
they had to remain in office ‘because suitable replacements are lacking’; there was 
no point in pretending otherwise.58 The August health report argued that since 
Nazi membership had been compulsory for holding public office, the denazifica-
tion ambitions were entirely unfeasible, at least for doctors, since ‘all but a few 
Amtsärzte (local official physicians) were Reich employees’, and ‘nearly all physi-
cians were compelled to be members of the Ns Ärztebund’. According to initial 
estimates, over 90 per cent of Bavarian veterinary officials would have to be 
 discharged. Given the scale of the problem, ‘the replacement of the incumbent 
 Amtsarzt by a politically acceptable and technically capable physician’ would 
‘require a long and thorough search for personnel’.59
A month later, the health report stated that while some formerly active Nazis had 
been dismissed, and some replacements had been found, ‘many replacements have 
been found to be inexperienced or too old and inactive’. Over half of the German 
health staffs appointed by the American military government had not been vetted, 
56 ‘Public Health and Medical Affairs’, No. 1, 20 Aug. 1945, 1.
57 BAK, Z45F, 5/331-2/6, Adcock (HQ, UsFET) to Director of Military Government Western 
Military District, 3 Oct. 1945.
58 BAK, Z45F, 5/331-2/6, Colonel W. l. Wilson (Chief, PHB, sHAEF) to PHWB, IA&C, 
UsGCC, subject: Information Concerning German Physicians in Official Capacity, 10 July 1945.
59 ‘Public Health and Medical Affairs’, No. 1, 20 Aug. 1945, 1.
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the report observed, and those who had been assessed and found unacceptable still 
remained ‘due to operational necessity’. After all, ‘[m]aintenance of health is essen-
tial even if denazification is less rapid than desired’. The report went on to say that 
it was ‘possible that much of the present typhoid incidence in Bavaria is due to the 
appointment of inexperienced Amtsärzte and other public health officials to replace 
experienced officials who were dismissed for political reasons’.60 A month later, in 
October 1945, frustrations were growing. ‘Obtaining denazification without 
impairment of health operations continues to be a tedious and hazardous function’, 
and the most arduous obstacles included the ‘suitable interpretation of nominal 
categories, times at which their removals are mandatory, obtaining acceptable and 
qualified replacements and disposition of those removed’.61
Calls for a relaxation of denazification came from medical officers (both German 
and American) in all parts of the zone. As one appeal stated, compromises were 
‘[u]rgently needed in the interest of the medical care for the civilian population’.62 
A German doctors’ organization argued that, after a review of the questionnaires 
from the doctors practising in their area, it was clear that the American proposal to 
exclude all those physicians from practice who had joined the NsDAP before 1937 
would be disastrous. ‘The execution of the planned measure would be the end of 
the medical providing [sic] for the population,’ it argued, ‘as substitutes, ready for 
use, are not sufficiently available.’63 Other German doctors complained that the 
lack of physicians hampered the operations of hospitals, and pointed to the ‘antici-
pated hateful reaction of the population when the sick suffer or perish unattended 
because a doctor, although only a passive Party-member, has been dismissed’.64
The American Public Health Branch tended to agree. ‘If actual hazard to health 
is involved’, one official wrote, it was necessary that ‘non-medical Military Govern-
ment Officers be prevented from indiscriminate removals of the nominal categories 
until suitable replacements can be found and placed on duty’.65 In December 1945, 
General stayer explained in a letter to the Denazification Policy Board that it was 
‘imperative that adequate staffs with experienced chiefs of services be maintained 
in hospitals, that public health offices be occupied by well trained physicians, and 
that there be an adequate number of capable doctors to care for the people. Other-
wise there will be increased sickness, more hospital beds will be required, and these 
will be occupied for unnecessarily longer periods’. The rules themselves were 
impractical and unjust, he insisted: ‘Reliable anti-nazi [sic]  physicians have stated 
that under the Nazi regime it was impossible to obtain appointment to or promo-
tion in a medical school or hospital without first joining the party and that, as 
presently applied, the policy of denazification is unduly penalising the German 
60 ‘Public Health and Medical Affairs’, No. 2, 20 sept. 1945, 1/2.
61 ‘Public Health and Medical Affairs’, No. 3, 20 Oct. 1945, 1.
62 e.g. BAK, Z45F, 5/331-2/6 (fiche 3), request for release of Dr Albrecht Borsche, 18 Dec. 1945. 
Borsche was a German POW held in a camp in Ostholstein.
63 BAK, Z45F, 5/331-2/6, Dr l. schuchardt (German doctors’ organization) to Colonel litton 
(Darmstadt, OMGUs), 14 sept. 1945. Their translation.
64 BAK, Z45F, 15/108-1/48, ‘The German View: a report for counter-intelligence’, HQ UsFET, 
Military Intelligence service Centre, 19 Nov. 1945.
65 BAK, Z45F, 5/331-1/6, 2 Oct. 1945, on the lack of civilian qualified health officers.
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people and is increasing the burden on doctors, hospitals and public health offic-
ers.’ stayer and his staff insisted that the dateline of 1 May 1937 was ‘arbitrary’, and 
‘many who joined the Party before that date had been ignorant or idealistic while 
many who joined after 1937 were opportunists . . . [N]either the date-line, 1 May 
1937, nor membership in NsDAP or one of its affiliate organizations are of them-
selves reliable indications of a man’s belief or share in Nazism. This Branch sug-
gests, therefore, that the date-line of 1 May 1937 be abolished and that each case 
be judged on its own merits, unfettered by this false criterion.’66
The British and Americans had developed their denazification programmes 
together, and in general developments were similar. But it took significantly longer 
for American medical officers’ urgency argument to have an effect; the British 
willingness to relax denazification began rather sooner. When in November 1945 
the British War Office collected information on the staffing situation in the public 
health operations in the western occupation zones, British health officers already 
reported that a decision had been made to ‘re-employ . . . nonactive members of the 
NsDAP’. In the same survey, the American Health Branch, by contrast, were 
unsatisfied with the lack of expediency in their own zone, especially with regard to 
denazification. While the British reported that the number of German medical 
personnel in their zone was slowly becoming ‘adequate’, both for present and for 
potential epidemic conditions, the Americans stated that their available German 
personnel was not adequate for either.67
Things did begin to change. A draft of a new policy directive from August 1945 
suggested that the ‘practical needs’ of the occupation officers in charge of industrial 
issues and reparations ought to be acknowledged. ‘situations have arisen’, it stated, 
‘in which it becomes desirable to make use of the technical skills and experience of 
certain German specialists, found to be in arrest categories, in the re-establishment 
of permitted German industrial undertakings when their skills are essential to the 
operation of such industries and where acceptable personnel with the necessary 
qualifications are unprocurable.’ The relevant division head should be allowed to 
make a case for using these people to the Public safety Division, including the 
‘duties to be performed and qualifications of the individual which appear to make 
him indispensable’, and no such persons were to be used ‘except in cases of abso-
lute need’, and only temporarily.68 Although still relatively strict, such formula-
tions began to allow for the possibility of circumventing restrictions if the circum-
stances dictated it, and thereby opened the door to more substantial reinterpretations. 
Health officers used precisely this language to argue that the retention or 
 re-employment of German doctors in dismissal or arrest categories was ‘absolutely 
necessary’, and that their qualifications did indeed make them ‘indispensable’.
66 BAK, Z45F, 5/331-1/6, Major General M. C. stayer (Chief, Public Health Branch) to the 
 Denazification Policy Board, 21 Dec. 1945.
67 TNA, FO 1050/10, Chief of staff, British Zone (lt. Col. B. Robertson) to Under-secretary of 
state for War (War Office, london), [Nov. 1945].
68 BAK, Z45F, 44-45/8/18, draft ‘Policy regarding use of German technical specialists and 
 government technicians who are in arrest categories’, Major T. J. Bee, (Asst. Adjutant General) to 
Commanding General of UsFET, 30 Aug. 1945.
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In the British zone, doctors dismissed from public employment (such as those 
working at hospitals or as medical officers) were allowed to practise privately, since 
their medical licences remained untouched by the denazification procedures. By 
contrast, in the American zone there was significant opposition to allowing them 
to continue to work. In July 1945, one health officer argued that doctors to be 
dismissed ought to lose their licences completely. It was known, he noted, ‘that 
Doctors, Dentists, Nurses and etc. who previously occupied positions of impor-
tance in the Nazi Party and affiliated organisations, when dismissed from their 
positions, acquired private practices’. since ‘their public contact can be considered 
as vitally significant’, he argued, ‘[r]emoving this category of personnel from public 
life without delicensing them is only partly divorcing them from extensive public 
contact’. He ‘recommended that the delicensing of this category of personnel 
should be included in the decisions where the directives indicate mandatory 
dismissal.’69
However, the shortages of qualified personnel, both of medical practitioners and 
health administrators, prevented the systematic application of such ideas. The 
zone’s authorities gave out temporary licences to maintain a basic network of medi-
cal care.70 Just as in the British zone, compromises focused on recruitment into 
unpopular positions in hospitals and administration, where it was difficult not 
only to find politically acceptable doctors but also to tempt them to take the job. 
The American health report from July 1946 noted that a major deficiency was the 
lack of sufficient numbers of qualified health officials, and said that this could, at 
least in part, be explained by their ‘inadequate salaries’.71 Others also maintained 
that in these conditions, jobs in the health administration had to be made more 
attractive to private practitioners. In Bavaria, the German head of the Bavarian 
Health Department apparently received a monthly salary of ‘some 800’ Reichs-
mark, while ‘an average successful private practitioner’ earned ‘in the average some 
1,000 RM. This situation is general throughout all public health administrative 
positions and to a great extent tends to keep any qualified individuals from offering 
themselves for public office.’72
That recruitment compromises and increased salaries were considered necessary 
in Bavaria is all the more remarkable because in the whole country, it had the greatest 
quantity of doctors and the highest ratio of doctors per head of population. During 
the war, many doctors from across Germany had settled in the comparatively 
69 BAK, Z45F, 5/331-2/6, Marvin linick (PHO, 3rd Detachment, HQ) to GO 3rd Medical 
Group, subject: delicensing of Nazi medical personnel, 20 July 1945. see also subsequent correspond-
ence in this file.
70 e.g. Z45F, 5/331-2/6, Oscar A. Nelson (Captain MC, Public Health Officer) to The Office of 
AC of s, G2, Bremen Port Command, 17 Jan. 1946, discussed the case of Martin schlütz: dismissed 
on 9 Nov. 1945 from his post as director of the homeopathic centre at the city hospital in Bremen 
because of his early entry (Apr. 1933) into the NsDAP, but was given a temporary licence and  returned 
to his former position, ‘The reason being that according to subject, he could not be replaced.’ On 
temporary licences, see lt. Col. Philip D. Beckjord (Chief Public Health Branch) to Director (De-
nazification Division, Attention Major Darlock), 27 Aug. 1946.
71 ‘Public Health and Medical Affairs’, No. 12, 20 July 1946, 2.
72 BAK, Z45F, 5/331-2/6, J. Pappas (Chief, Public Health Branch, IA&C Division) to Director 
OMG Bavaria, 15 July 1946.
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unspoilt Bavarian towns and villages. The resulting surplus was increased further 
when, in the wake of the Red Army’s advance into Germany, many doctors fled to 
Bavaria from what was soon to become the soviet-occupied zone. The severe short-
ages there were matched by Bavarian surpluses. ‘At present there are far more doctors 
in Bavaria than there are available practices,’ one American official noted in May 
1946, ‘Therefore, on the expiration of temporary settlement licenses granted during 
the war, the Ärztekammer is refusing permanent settlement licenses to refugee doc-
tors in this area. These people are thus forced to return to their home provinces.’73 
However, the high density of private practitioners was not matched by an adequate 
supply of medical officers working for the health service, and American and German 
authorities thus argued that a relaxation of denazification was necessary.
The archives document the kind of procedure that was widely practised. Requests 
were put to the zone’s authorities for the retention or re-employment of individuals 
in the dismissal or arrest categories, occasionally by American medical officers, but 
usually by German officials or authorities (whether health offices, hospitals, medi-
cal faculties, or clinics). These requests were generally granted ‘if no military objec-
tion exists’, and usually none did.74 Although American officials sometimes grum-
bled about the ‘administrative burden’ of these demands (requests had to travel up 
the military chain of command, and decisions back down again), they generally 
seemed to ‘appreciate the desire to bring back friends [of ] accepted established 
administrations’, and did their best to facilitate this process.75 The requests were 
often justified by claims that although the individuals found themselves in a sus-
pect category, they had never been interested in Nazi propaganda or any political 
causes. The American authorities soon developed and internalized German argu-
ments on why any denazification of the medical profession was unwarranted. As 
one German doctors’ organization put it, ‘the German physicians showed an 
unpol itical attitude indeed, even during the years of the Nazi government—apart 
from a few exceptions. These few exceptions proved their political interest by enter-
ing the Ns-party already before it had come to power and being really active in the 
party or in its organisations. The physicians at large desist from those elements and 
leave them alone.’76
These claims of medics’ aloofness from politics often confirmed American 
health officials’ own instincts. They regularly supported demands for the appoint-
ment of apparently suspect individuals with recommendations from former 
73 e.g. BAK, Z45F, 5/331-2/6, Byron Waksman (Captain, MC, Acting Chief Public Health & 
Welfare Branch, OMG Bavaria) to OMGUs, Attention Colonel Wilson, 3 May 1946. BAB, DQ1/92, 
Kreisarzt in Memmingen to health office, 9 Jan. 1946—he quotes a directive from the Bavarian state 
Ministry of the Interior, according to which all non-Bavarian doctors who did not have a licence to 
practise in Bavaria on 1 Jan. 1939 were to be sent back home, or if they came from the newly annexed 
territories they were to go to saxony or Thuringia in the soviet Zone.
74 e.g. BAK, Z45F, 5/331-2/6, discussion of the case of Professor schaupp, who was requested by 
the Medical Faculty of Tübingen University, 26 Oct. 1945, and following letters.
75 BAK, Z45F, 5/331-2/6, James P. Pappas (Chief, Public Health Branch) to District Public Health 
Officer (Western Military District), subject: Release of German Physician PW in British Camp, 13 
Nov. 1945.
76 BAK, Z45F, 5/331-1/6, Dr l. schuchardt (German doctors’ organization) to Colonel litton 
(Darmstadt, OMGUs), 14 september 1945. Their translation.
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research  colleagues in the United states or Britain. In september 1945 Health 
Branch  officers were delighted when a Dr O’Brien from the Rockefeller Founda-
tion contacted the military government in response to a request for information 
on a number of German doctors and medical researchers, all of whom he 
 recommended warmly. Among them were the ‘outstanding’ neurologist Georg 
schaltenbrand; the surgeon Wilhelm Tönnis, who had given ‘friendly help’ to 
Allied prisoners; and the biochemist Professor lenhardtz—a ‘non-party man’, 
who had maintained, O’Brien wrote, ‘a pretty strict scientific attitude about his 
work’. In all three cases contact had broken down during the war, and in reality 
O’Brien knew little about their activities during the Nazi regime, but all three had 
been Rockefeller fellows in the past and were therefore presumed to be suitable for 
reappointment.77
In the absence of reliable testimonials and productive ideas on which Germans 
were suitable for employment (rather than those who were not), health officers 
welcomed such recommendations, even if this contradicted the judgement of the 
denazification branches of military government. schaltenbrand’s past was at best 
murky, despite his own protestations to the contrary: Paul Weindling has docu-
mented some of his medical experiments without consent on mentally disabled 
persons during the war, which on several occasions had killed his test subjects.78 
But his medical colleagues in Britain and American rallied to his support. When 
the British scientist E. B. strauss toured universities in the French and American 
occupation zones in the summer of 1946, he said there could be ‘no possible doubt’ 
that schaltenbrand ‘was a consistent anti-Nazi’—even if it was unfortunately true 
that, ‘in order to be permitted to continue with his . . . work’, schaltenbrand had in 
1943 ‘allowed his name to appear on a list of local party-members’. ‘The conse-
quences of this have been tragic’, strauss argued: not only was schaltenbrand’s 
house requisitioned, leaving him, his wife, and four children homeless, but he was 
also sacked from his post at the University Hospital in Würzburg.79 But while 
 British and American scientists argued for his innocence, those in the denazifica-
tion branches were unconvinced. When the Allied Field Information Agency 
(FIAT) commissioned him to write a survey of the state of neurology in Germany, 
77 BAK, Z45F, 5/331-2/6, Howard Hansen (PHWB, UsGCC, HQ) to Colonel Wilson (G5, 
UsFET, PHW), 20 sept. 1945. On schaltenbrand see n. 78; on Tönnis, see Paul Weindling,  ‘Akteure 
in eigener sache: Die Aussagen der Überlebenden und die Verfolgung der medizinischen Kriegsver-
brechen nach 1945’, in Carola sachse (ed.), Die Verbindung nach Auschwitz: Wissenschaften und 
 Menschenversuche an Kaiser Wilhelm-Instituten (Göttingen, 2004), 255–84.
78 Weindling, Nazi Medicine, 188–9; and Paul Weindling, ‘ “Out of the Ghetto”: The Rocke-
feller Foundation Confronts German Medical sciences after the second World War’, in  William 
H. schneider (ed.), The Rockefeller Foundation and Biomedicine: International Achievements and 
Frustrations from World War I to the Cold War (Bloomington, Ind., 2002), 208–22. Ernst Klee, 
Deutsche Medizin im Dritten Reich: Karrieren vor und nach 1945 (Frankfurt, 2001). schalten-
brand categorically denied the criminality of medical experiments conducted during the Nazi 
years, see W. Villinger and G. schaltenbrand, ‘Erklärung’, Der Nervenarzt, 24/11 (July 1953), 
362–4.
79 TNA, FD1/2483, E. B. strauss, ‘Observations and suggestions: Report on his visit to certain 
Universities in the American and French Zones, August 1946, by E. B. strauss, M.A., D.M. (Oxon.), 
F.R.C.P.’ [Aug. 1946].
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he was removed from his hospital post.80 The lack of a consensus between different 
parts of the occupation machinery could hardly have been more striking.
The files contain many other cases of tarnished reputations and Allied attempts 
to save them, such as that of Professor Carl von Hindelang, who, as a ‘son of a well-
known Nazi activist’ and with ‘a history of considerable Nazi activity with decora-
tions’, found himself in the ‘non-employment mandatory’ category. The bishop of 
Chichester wrote a recommendation, explaining that although Hindelang had ‘put 
his trust in Hitler’, in fact ‘Germany was to him much greater than Hitler’. He had 
been uncomfortable with some Nazi policies, ‘particularly with regard to the Jews’. 
Hindelang had already ‘repented of his Nazism before the war, and at real cost to 
himself ’. In addition, the bishop went on, Hindelang was ‘a brilliant doctor, and it 
would be a real tragedy if he were permanently prevented from exercising his 
remarkable gift’. Other references followed. ‘A well-known American Dr’ wrote 
that ‘the world’ would be ‘losing a great deal if [Hindelang] is not permitted to 
continue.’ A British solicitor and former patient of Hindelang’s thought that the 
German physician had discovered a substitute for insulin, and insisted that it 
would be a ‘tragedy’ if he was not allowed to ‘use his skill as a specialist’ and save 
lives when ‘the need is so great’. The Public Health Branch wanted to reconsider 
Hindelang’s case, swayed by ‘Prof. Carl’s apparent high professional standing’. But 
the case had already been handed over to a German tribunal, and there was little 
they could do.81
Another revealing case concerned Professor Max Hochrein, on whose behalf 
Paul Dudley White, a well-known and well-respected physician at Massachusetts 
General Hospital who later became Eisenhower’s cardiologist, wrote to the American 
authorities in Germany. Hochrein had been a long-standing member of the 
NsDAP, and, following a period of internment, was still out of work in spring 
1946. White explained that Hochrein had been ‘an acquaintance of mine extend-
ing over a good many years’, and he thought that, ‘despite his Nazi party member-
ship, he should be allowed to do medical work in Germany for the good of his 
people. He is an able man and doubtless can help to improve the standards of 
medical care and even of clinical investigation in his own field.’82 The Health 
Branch took this recommendation very seriously. ‘Because of your letter’, they 
replied, ‘this office has taken more than ordinary interest in Professor Hochrein 
80 Georg schaltenbrand, Neurology: FIAT Review of German Science, 1939–1946, Account of 
 Investigations and Advances Made by German Scientists (Office of Military Government for Germany, 
FIAT, Wiesbaden, 1948), pts. 1–3. Georg schaltenbrand (ed.), Naturforschung und Medizin in 
 Deutschland 1939–1946, für Deutschland bestimmte Ausgabe der FIAT Review of German Science, 
Vol.80–82: Neurologie (Wiesbaden, 1948).
81 BAK, Z45F, 5/331-2/6, G. H. Garde (Adjutant General) to Director, Public Health Branch, 
IA&C Div, Zonal Executive Offices, CCG, Bünde, 20 Nov. 1946. Bishop of Chichester reference for 
Prof. Carl von Hindelang, 20 May 1946. Gwendoline Hill (Advisory Officer save the Children Fund) 
to Major ledbury (Zonal Executive Offices, IA&C Division, 62 HQ CCG), 16 sept. 1946. The 
material on Hindelang was sent from British Public Health and Welfare Branch to the Director, OMG 
Bavaria (Attention senior Public Health Officer) on 15 Oct. 1946.
82 BAK, Z45F, 5/331-2/6, Paul Dudley White (Massachusetts General Hospital), to ETO surgeon, 
26 Apr. 1946.
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and will try to give him assistance in locating in some city where he could return 
to his specialty. The possibility of getting Professor Hochrein located with one of 
the Medical Faculties in the U.s. Zone is being given consideration. Undoubtedly 
his present situation is most unsatisfactory to him and it is unfortunate that his 
training and ability are not being utilised fully.’83 Although they failed to find him 
a job, it was not for lack of trying. But by then many of the direct responsibilities 
of selecting and employing Germans had already been handed over to the German 
authorities, who were not nearly as keen on Hochrein84—or perhaps resented 
being told what to do by the occupiers. American health officials shared White’s 
disappointment, they wrote later, and his interest was ‘deeply appreciated’, but 
‘under a policy of delegating full responsibility to the Germans for the manage-
ment of their own internal affairs as rapidly as possible, Military Government 
refrains from directing the placement of individuals’.85
The cases of Hindelang and Hochrein show that ‘indirect control’ was a real 
feature of health work in the American zone. This is explored further below. 
But for denazification priorities, these examples illustrate the power of refer-
ences and testimonials from the scientific establishment abroad. They point to 
the existence of a set of scientific and medical connections between German 
 doctors and medical colleagues abroad, who protected and aided them in their 
post-war careers, especially in the absence of other criteria. It was, after all, 
American policy ‘to encourage the reestablishment of relations between mem-
bers of the German medical profession and associations of medical men 
 elsewhere in the world’.86
Practical compromises were made later in the American zone than in the British, 
but the kinds of arguments used by health officials were similar and eventually had 
similar results. In addition, these compromises often found fertile soil because 
 American officials were much more explicit than their British counterparts about 
having to bring ‘American concepts and traditions’ to the defeated, and teaching 
democracy.87 As lucius Clay put it, the ‘Development of Democratic Attitudes 
and Methods’ had to be one of the main features of the American occupation; and 
so some morally compromising policies could be tolerated and justified if they 
helped German democracy.88
In autumn 1945, as non-fraternization regulations were lifted, and Americans 
were officially allowed to talk to and interact with German civilians, Eisenhower 
reminded the Us forces that the real work had only just begun: ‘the shooting war’ 
had been won, but ‘the war for men’s minds’ was still going on. American soldiers 
83 BAK, Z45F, 5/331-2/6, H. T. Marshall (Deputy Chief, PH&WB) to Paul Dudley White, 
9 sept. 1946.
84 BAK, Z45F, 5/331-2/6, Ross Jenney (Chief, PHB, OMG Bavaria) to Paul Dudley White, 
28 Jan. 1948.
85 BAK, Z45F, 5/331-2/6, Milford Kubin to Paul Dudley White, 10 Feb. 1948.
86 BAK, Z45F, 5/331-2/6, James Kind (staff secretary Berlin) to Dr Rudolf Thiel (Director of 
University Eye Clinic, Frankfurt), 11 Dec. 1947.
87 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (london, 1948), 480.
88 e.g. lucius Clay to John McCloy, 3 sept. 1945, repr. in Jean Edward smith (ed.), The Papers of 
General Lucius D. Clay (Bloomington, Ind., 1974), i. 66.
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had to be ‘democracy’s best ambassadors’.89 Once occupation staff ’s wives and 
 children joined them in Germany, they, too, were drafted into the democratization 
mission. Although they invariably lived in requisitioned houses or apartments, 
they were to introduce a humane element into the occupation and teach values 
such as compassion and benevolence. As representatives of a society ‘that enjoyed 
prosperity and democracy without persecuting or exploiting other peoples’, they 
were an example of democratic family and home life.90 Democratization rhetoric 
was present even in arguments about German appointments. In september 1945, 
military government departments were encouraged to use Germans as technical 
advisers and consultants, especially if they had ‘known liberal views’.91 They were 
to be taught ‘that in a democracy all employees of government, whether provi-
sional, advisory, or permanent employees, are in very real sense the literal servants 
of the people’.92 The conviction that Germans should and could learn about 
 democratic methods and processes led to the belief that military government ought 
not to intervene in their work, and made real ‘indirect control’ by American 
authorities more straightforward than in the British zone.
CONFRONTATIONs
Conflicts were an unavoidable feature of the occupation, and took place over a 
range of predictable issues. At the outset, émigrés and antifascist activists resented 
the Allies’ proclamations of collective guilt and the fact that they were not con-
sulted on what the new Germany should look like. During the occupation, com-
plaints came from all corners of the zone about officers’ ‘dictatorial ambitions’ and 
attempts to ‘run their places like little kingdoms’, which had the effect of ‘atomis-
ing Germany even beyond the four-zone split’.93 Other grievances concerned the 
shortages in food and other supplies, together with luxurious American lifestyles, 
pompousness, bureaucratic officiousness, or lack of interest in German suffering.
Many of these German complaints found American advocates, who used the 
American press to vent their views. An essay entitled ‘Malice in Blunderland’ 
described at length the contradictions and ineptitudes of American policy in 
 Germany, where brutish American officials lived off the land, implemented 
obstructive, short-sighted, and punitive programmes for personal gain, and failed 
to understand what was at stake. The author, Joan Crane, was married to an 
OMGUs economic adviser in Berlin. ‘The military here,’ Crane wrote, ‘with their 
89 BAK, Z45F, 44-45/4/6, Eisenhower ‘To all members of the United states Forces in the European 
Theater of Operations’, [undated].
90 Donna Alvah, Unofficial Ambassadors: American Military Families Overseas and the Cold War, 
1946–1965 (New York, 2007), 133.
91 BAK, Z45F, 44-45/8/18, Col. Bruce Easley (Adjutant General) to directors of divisions, staff 
Officers and chiefs of separate sections, 6 sept. 1945.
92 BAK, Z45F, 44-45/8/18, UsFET (Bruce Easley, Office of the Deputy Military Governor) to 
Commanding General, Us HQ Berlin District, 23 sept. 1945.
93 BAK, Z45F, 15/109-1/48, ‘The German View: a report for counter-intelligence’, from HQ, 
UsFET, Military Intelligence service Center, 19 Nov. 1945.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 03/19/2015, SPi
 The American Occupation Zone 209
This is an open access publication. Except where otherwise noted, this work is distributed under the terms of a 
 Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence, a copy of which is available 
at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. For enquiries concerning use outside the scope of the licence 
terms, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com.
rigid caste system and their punitive attitudes, are not the best group to demon-
strate democracy to a foreign nation. Brigadier generals, like the Cabots and the 
lowells,94 have an inclination to mingle with themselves, colonels and majors with 
colonels and majors. Neither is a West Point training especially conducive to the 
development of imagination in the field of human relations.’ Nor were they any 
better at picking suitable civilian advisers: ‘Advising OMGUs you will find scarcely 
an economist or sociologist of distinction in his own field. Top policy-making and 
advisory jobs have gone to unknown professors from second-rate colleges, minor 
business men and salesmen suddenly turned “economic experts”, and obscure 
 lawyers—docile men for the most part, content to follow rather than to guide the 
military.’ Visiting American industrialists were only interested in making a quick 
buck. Quoting a report submitted to the Us senate in December 1946, a shocking 
25 per cent of the Us forces in Germany had scored ‘feeble-minded or only slightly 
above’ in IQ tests, she maintained, and only 2 per cent ‘showed enough intelli-
gence to do satisfactory college work’; 10 per cent were ‘not even high grade 
morons’; And such ‘ignorant, sub-standard troops’ were ‘costing the American 
people $11,200 per man to support for each year that they remain in Germany’.95 
The Saturday Evening Post refused to print the article, its foreign editor explained 
to the military government, ‘on the grounds that it was overall too one-sided’96—
but other critical stories did make it to press.97
Even though the denazification criteria had relaxed by December 1945, dissent 
on the policy continued. By mid-1946 concerns began to be voiced about the lack 
of any real cleansing in the health service. Dr Gerlach, a German medical officer, 
complained to the American authorities about the ‘repeated cases where physi-
cians, having belonged to the former national socialist party, or having had con-
nections thereto, have been appointed [as] Hospital Directors, by a local office, in 
spite of there having been available equally well, or better qualified absolutely 
unincriminated candidates’. He demanded that ‘politically unincriminated 
 physicians—if equally qualified—should be granted preference over incriminated 
ones’. Neglecting to do so would mean that ‘almost all’ former hospital directors 
would simply be able to walk back into their old jobs.98
Faced with such criticisms, American officers, although often sympathetic, usu-
ally felt compelled to defend ‘pragmatism’. As leon standifer put it later, ‘Our 
image was, and still is, pragmatism’; and ‘pragmatism means getting the job 
done even though that may require the sacrifice of ethics, honor, and integrity’. 
94 Reference to the old American aristocracy, who did not understand ‘democracy’ and were thus 
ill-placed to teach it to foreigners. From John Collins Bossidy’s poem from 1910, entitled ‘Toast, Holy 
Cross Alumni Dinner’: ‘And this is good old Boston, The home of the bean and the cod, Where the 
lowells talk to the Cabots, And the Cabots talk only to God.’
95 BAK, Z45F, 3/177-2/4, Joan s. Crane, ‘Malice in Blunderland’, undated [Apr. 1947].
96 BAK, Z45F, 3/177-2/4, Martin sommers (Foreign Editor, Editorial Room, saturday Evening 
Post) to Col. F. V. FitzGerald, 9 Apr. 1947.
97 e.g. ‘An army wife lives very soft—in Germany. By Mrs lelah Berry, as told to Ann stringer’, 
Saturday Evening Post, 15 Feb. 1947. On Patterson’s, Clay’s and other OMGUs officials’ views of this 
article, see correspondence in BAK, Z45F, 3/177-2/4, Feb.–Mar. 1947.
98 BAK, Z45F, 5/331-2/6, Dr Gerlach (Public Health Commissioner), 26 Aug. 1946.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 03/19/2015, SPi
210 Compromises and Confrontations
This is an open access publication. Except where otherwise noted, this work is distributed under the terms of a 
 Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence, a copy of which is available 
at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. For enquiries concerning use outside the scope of the licence 
terms, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com.
such pragmatism was required particularly in handing civil control over to any 
Germans who were able to do the job, regardless of their political history.99 Philip 
Beckjord, chief of the Public Health Branch, replied to Dr Gerlach that ‘the Min-
ister of  liberation might well require the Ärztekammer to draw up lists of doctors 
who are both professional[ly] suitable, and the least politically incriminated, for 
certain public positions, i.e. hospital service chiefs’.
This phrase on ‘the least’ politically incriminated shows how far things had 
come. Beckjord admitted he was ‘very uneasy’ over the extent of denazification in 
the medical professions. As far as he was aware, he wrote, ‘no former Nazi who was 
supposed to have stopped practicing on August 1, either privately or in hospital, 
has done so. There are hundreds of such cases.’ OMGUs had issued an order to 
rescind all temporary medical licences from 1 August 1946. But by this deadline, 
Beckjord observed, ‘blanket extensions’ were granted and ‘the status quo [was] 
allowed to drift on in a welter of administrative confusion and conflicting interpre-
tations’. The fact was that military government had ‘issued an order which the 
Germans could not, or did not, carry out because of the feared effect on the public 
health’, which had to take priority, even if American prestige suffered as a result. 
Ultimately, he argued, temporary licences should be extended until each case could 
be assessed properly. He did not believe the occupiers ‘could really force the licen-
cees to stop practicing. If we did, the public reaction would be terrific—about 406 
of the profession would be affected; 250 doctors in stuttgart alone.’100 This refer-
ence to a public reaction against any more substantial denazification shows that 
concerns went far beyond the simple epidemic fears.
The American military governor’s monthly report for October 1945 noted that 
the Germans had become ‘somewhat bolder in their criticisms of Military Govern-
ment policies’; apart from attacks on non-fraternization, ‘the chief German reaction 
continued to be centered on the subject of denazification’. There was still a portion 
of the population, ‘largely concentrated in the more extreme left parties, which feels 
that denazification is not thorough enough and that mere removal from office does 
not constitute sufficient punishment’, but most Germans thought the opposite:
what they feel is the unjust inflexibility of the American denazification policy. These 
people are for the most part favorable to punishing ‘real’ Nazis but they dislike the 
fixing of an arbitrary date (1937) for judging the guilt of party membership. They 
claim that many of those who joined the party in the early days later repented of their 
move, whereas those who joined after 1937 were in many cases among the most ardent 
Nazis. They feel, further, that the punishment of dismissal is too indiscriminate as it 
places the heaviest burden on the lower middle class. They also repeat the familiar 
 argument that extensive dismissals interfere with efficiency. 101
The denazification report for the same month observed considerable public dis-
quiet and sympathy for ‘discharged Nazi small-fry’, demonstrated by ‘increasing 
99 standifer, Not in Vain, 240.
100 BAK, Z45F, 5/331-2/6, Minute from Philip Beckjord (Public Health Branch), to Director, 
Denazification Division (Attention Major Darlock), 27 Aug. 1946.
101 TNA, FO 371/46992, ‘Monthly Report of Military Governor, U.s. Zone’, No. 3, 20 Oct. 1945.
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numbers of petitions written [on] behalf of these ousted officials. Many are written 
by clergymen, others by respectable merchants and businessmen.’ In some places, 
church groups had been ‘especially active in an effort to reinstate teachers, on the 
grounds that many teachers joined the Nazi Party to prevent true Nazis from being 
hired as teachers’.102 Denazification strained relations between occupiers and 
 occupied throughout the early years of the occupation, and subsequent U-turns 
created further enemies. As William Griffith (the denazification adviser to the 
Office of Military Government for Bavaria), wrote in 1950, denazification policy 
had been a ‘fiasco’ and a ‘failure’. Although ‘[m]ost United states denazification 
personnel were technically competent, hard-working and sincere’, he regretted that 
‘their crusade for “real” denazification rested upon a faulty analysis of Germany 
and of Nazism, and—most important—of United states policy development. 
 Although they, more than the rest of Military Government, glimpsed the problem 
of the overthrow of authoritarianism (militarists, industrialists and bureaucrats) 
behind that of the overthrow of Nazism, they dissipated their efforts on the small 
fry, and never grasped the exigencies of time and numbers. By the time they 
 accepted the prevailing German standpoint that only Nazis should be attacked, it 
was too late even for that.’103
Apart from the more zealous American attempts to denazify the medical profes-
sion, the clashes and tensions between occupiers and occupied on health questions 
generally mirrored those in the other zones. Germans particularly resented that the 
priority of American public health work concerned the protection of American 
and Allied troops, with German health and welfare much lower on the list. As late 
as November 1946 German health departments were reminded that their primary 
task was to control infectious diseases and ‘to eliminate public health hazards which 
may threaten the safety of the occupational forces or which may interfere with 
Military administration of Germany, or which may create a hazard for other coun-
tries of Europe or the world’—and they continued to object to such a prioritiza-
tion of Allied health concerns over German problems.104 German health officers 
particularly resented that American health authorities, just like the British, French, 
and soviet, took the rising rates of venereal diseases much more seriously than 
diseases which did not affect their troops, such as tuberculosis.105
However, relations between Germans and Americans were less complicated than 
those with the other occupiers, primarily for two related reasons: the Americans were 
more popular in general, and they had considerably more resources at their disposal. 
102 TNA, FO 371/46992, ‘Denazification: monthly report of the Military Governor, U.s. Zone’, 
No. 3, 20 Oct. 1945.
103 William E. Griffith, ‘Denazification’, 75.
104 BAK, Z45F, 5/332-1/20, Milford Kubin (IA&C Div, PH&W Branch), ‘Revision of Military 
Government Plans and Operations necessitated by adoption of German land constitutions and 
 Bi-Zonal agreement with British Military Government’, 29 Nov. 1946. For earlier, similar statements, 
see BAK, Z45F, 3/169-2/159, ‘Minutes of the Meeting convened by Chief, Public Health Branch, 
G5 Division, sHAEF, for discussion of military government public health plans and operations’, 
15–16 Jan. 1945.
105 This is commented upon in lAB, B Rep. 012/902/5, ‘Besprechung der Amtsärzte am Don-
nerstag, d.23.5.1946’.
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There was less overt hostility towards American soldiers, and public opinion sur-
veys demonstrated that both the behaviour and the popularity of the American 
troops steadily improved as the occupation progressed. Only a minority of those 
polled felt that the Americans enriched themselves or had wasted or destroyed 
German property, and only a small proportion reported having ‘unpleasant experi-
ences with Americans’.106 A poll in early 1946 showed that the majority of inhabit-
ants in the American zone were optimistic that reconstruction would be accom-
plished with some degree of speed, energy, and fairness.107 A survey in spring and 
summer 1947 revealed that the majority of Germans in the zone thought that the 
United states would wield the most influence in world affairs, and it would be 
directed towards peace. Of the four Allies, the United states was most trusted to 
treat Germany fairly, and an overwhelming majority thought they were better off 
than those in the other three zones, and would have chosen the United states as an 
occupying power.108 These sentiments made the tasks of the occupiers much more 
straightforward and conflict-free.
Berliners in the western sectors were most likely to take a pro-American posi-
tion, even before the blockade of 1948–9. Health officers were no exception. Those 
in the western city districts eagerly awaited the arrival of the Americans in the 
summer of 1945, complaining about the months of sole soviet rule. At a Berlin 
Magistrat health office meeting in July 1945, shortly after the American, British, 
and French had taken over their districts, Dr Emanuel and Dr Redeker assured the 
assembly that things were going to get better now that the Us occupation troops 
had arrived. The ‘Americans want to help’, they insisted, and it was ‘even likely that 
they will send us some medicaments as soon as they can’.109 After July 1945, when 
the Berlin-wide health officials had regular contact with all four authorities, the 
Americans continued to be the most popular. At a Magistrat meeting in August 
1945, Colonel scheffers from the American Health Branch was given a warm wel-
come. He and his colleagues were there to help, scheffers said, and he was con-
vinced it was possible to work in friendly cooperation with the Germans. Only ‘the 
necessity for agreement with all Allied powers makes our work much more diffi-
cult’, he told them. Whether he was referring to problems with French or soviet 
obstruction (or both) is unclear, but it was a sentiment which the German health 
officers sympathized with.110 When Russian officers appeared at these meetings, by 
contrast, it was mainly to complain that disease rates were still too high and that 
106 OMGUs Report No. 94 (24 Feb. 1948), ‘Contacts between Germans and Americans’, in Anna 
J. Merrit and Richard l. Merrit, Public Opinion in Occupied Germany: The OMGUS Surveys, 
 1945–1949 (Urbana, Ill., 1970), 202–3, also 10.
107 OMGUs Report No. 22 (25 sept. 1946), ‘A study of Attitudes Toward the Reconstruction and 
Rehabilitation of Germany’, in Merritt and Merritt, Public Opinion, 103–6.
108 OMGUs Report No. 76 (29 Oct. 1947), ‘German attitudes toward the four occupying powers’, 
in Merritt and Merritt, Public Opinion, 180–1.
109 lAB, B Rep. 012/902-5, ‘Amtsarztsitzung vom 12. Juli 1945, 16 Uhr—Versammlung der 
 Amtsärzte am 12. Juli im Hauptgesundheitsamt.’
110 lAB, B Rep. 012/902-5, ‘Bericht über die Dienstbesprechung der Amtsärzte am Donnerstag, 
dem 23. August 1945 [2nd draft]. Original emphasis.
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not enough had been done to carry out soviet instructions, which did not endear 
them to the Germans.111
American resources made a huge difference. The arguments about malnutrition 
and tuberculosis that erupted in the British zone never did so to the same extent in 
the American zone. The United states was the richest of the occupation powers, 
and the Ally least affected by the war—and contributed, and was seen to contrib-
ute, generous quantities of material supplies, food, and aid. From their arrival, 
Germans were struck by American affluence and generosity. As Heide Fehrenbach 
notes, ‘The stereotype of the gum-chewing, chocolate-bar dispensing GI originated 
both in the actual social practices of U.s. occupation troops and in German 
 perception of these behaviors as somehow uniquely American.’ It served to differ-
entiate them from the British and particularly the soviets and French.112 Germans 
in all zones were convinced, correctly, that food rations were largest and more regu-
larly delivered in full, in the American zone.113
That is not to say that there were no serious shortages and supply problems. But 
American occupation officials argued—much more explicitly and forcefully than 
their British counterparts—with those at home unhappy about the occupation 
costs, that the democratization agenda could only succeed if Germans lived reason-
ably comfortably. Economic and political freedom was essential: material aid could 
help to convince Germans both about the reality of American support and the 
potency of American democracy.114 lucius Clay repeatedly pointed out that ‘dem-
ocratic processes’ could only succeed ‘in an atmosphere of political and economic 
stability’,115 and that the shortages of food and essential items such as fuel ‘were not 
conducive to the creation of interest in the ways of democracy’.116 At least in part 
this argument helped to convince sceptical politicians in Washington to agree to 
substantial increases in imports for German consumption.117 While similar argu-
ments also took place within the other Allied governments, the United states was 
least constrained by economic crises and supply problems at home and thus most 
able to respond generously.
111 e.g. statements by Colonel Pigarev and Colonel Prokopets, lAB, B Rep. 012/902-5, ‘Bericht 
über die Dienstbesprechung am Donnerstag, dem 4. Oktober 1945’, 4 Oct. 1945.
112 Heide Fehrenbach, Race after Hitler: Black Occupation Children in Postwar Germany and Amer-
ica (Princeton, 2007), 29.
113 e.g. Report No. 64 (25 Aug. 1947), ‘Trends in Attitudes Toward the Food situation’, in Merritt 
and Merritt, Public Opinion, 167–70.
114 Compare with Dagmar Ellerbrock, ‘Die kulturelle Konstruktion der neuen Ordnung: zum 
Zusammenhang von Demokratisierung und Gesundheitspolitik in der amerikanischen 
 Besatzungszone’, in Christian Groh (ed.), Öffentliche Ordnung in der Nachkriegszeit (Ubstadt-
Weiher, 2002), 122.
115 lucius Clay, ‘Memorandum: Internationalisation of the Ruhr’, Apr. 1946, repr. in Jean Edward 
smith (ed.), The Papers of General Lucius Clay: Germany 1945–1949 (Bloomington, Ind., 1974), i. 196.
116 Clay, Decision in Germany, 281.
117 There is a large literature on food policy in post-war Germany, and its complex development can 
only be touched on here. An interesting discussion of the arguments used by Clay are presented in 
Günter Trittel, Hunger und Politik: Die Ernährungskrise in der Bizone, 1945–1949 (Frankfurt, 1990). 
Also see Michael Wildt, Der Traum vom Stattwerden: Hunger und Protest, Schwarzmarkt und Selbsthilfe 
(Hamburg, 1986). John Farquharson, Landwirtschaft und Ernährung in der Bizone, 1945–1949 
(Frankfurt, 1990).
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As a result, supply problems were simply not as acute as in the other three zones. 
The costly new drug penicillin was made available for the treatment of venereal 
diseases earlier and in greater quantities than in the rest of Germany: the American 
Health Branch requested the War Department to provide penicillin for the treat-
ment of gonorrhoea among the Germans as early as september 1945.118 some 
German health officers were disappointed that penicillin was not then provided for 
other diseases, but it did immediately make the treatment of venereal diseases 
much more popular. Health officers noted that the numbers of registered cases 
‘increased markedly with announcements that penicillin was available for treat-
ment of infected civilians’.119 By December 1945, penicillin treatment for gonor-
rhoea was widely instituted, and the numbers of Germans treated continued to 
rise.120 In January 1946 the German authorities were authorized to supervise most 
penicillin treatments themselves, and by spring 1946 large quantities of the drug 
had been made available.121 By september 1947 supplies had increased to a monthly 
allocation of 21 billion units of penicillin for the zone: only 2 billion were needed 
for gonorrhoea, 12 billion units were used to treat syphilis, and 7 billion units were 
available for the treatment of non-venereal diseases.122 At the same time, the soviet 
zone suffered from severe shortages of penicillin, and even in the British and French 
zones it was not available in such plentiful capacities.
Debates between American and German doctors were also less severe because of 
the greater, and earlier, American willingness to put responsibilities into German 
hands. This tendency towards ‘indirect control’ was facilitated by two separate 
features of American policy. First, the urgent priority to release military forces for 
duties in the Pacific, and, after that, to discharge them to cut occupation costs, 
required that the American zone should be administered with as few American 
personnel as possible. For this reason alone German authorities thus had to be 
reinstated quickly, used consistently, and trusted to work effectively. second, the 
desire to create a federal democratic system meant that the German population 
needed to be taught democratic methods. They could not easily learn without 
practical experience in administrative and governmental affairs, even if only 
initially at the local levels. Once they had mastered local practice they could acquire 
regional and national powers. To this end, the reconstructed German administra-
tions were decentralized on the federal model at the level of the Land (or, as the 
Americans called it, the state).
118 ‘Public Health and Medical Affairs’, No. 3, 20 Oct. 1945. ‘Public Health and Medical Affairs’, 
No. 4, 20 Nov. 1945.
119 ‘Public Health and Medical Affairs’, No. 5, 20 Dec. 1945. On the popularity of penicillin in VD 
treatment, see lAB, B Rep. 012/902-5, ‘Besprechung der Amtsärzte am Donnerstag, d.23.5.1946’.
120 ‘Public Health and Medical Affairs’, No. 6, 20 Jan. 1946. But see leiby on controversies surr-
ounding the use of penicillin among the German population in the American zone, Richard leiby, 
Public Health in Occupied Germany, 1945–1949 (PhD University of Delaware, 1984), 157–9. Because 
of disputes, penicillin shipments were temporarily interrupted between Nov. 1946 and Jan. 1947.
121 ‘Public Health and Medical Affairs’, No. 7, 20 Feb. 1946. On the western sectors of Berlin, see 
lAB, B Rep. 012/902-27, lGA report for Apr. 1947 by epidemic department, 5 May 1947, on meet-
ings of the penicillin committee. Also see Timm, The Politics of Fertility, 222.
122 BAK, Z45F, 5/331-3/10, Office of Military Government, land Wuerttemberg-Baden, Public 
Health Conference in Berlin, 9 sept. 1947.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 03/19/2015, SPi
 The American Occupation Zone 215
This is an open access publication. Except where otherwise noted, this work is distributed under the terms of a 
 Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence, a copy of which is available 
at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. For enquiries concerning use outside the scope of the licence 
terms, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com.
In practice, these three issues—demobilization pressures, the democratization 
agenda, and the federal model—were closely intertwined. In september 1945, 
lucius Clay wrote to John McCloy (assistant under-secretary of War, Clay’s succes-
sor as American military governor, and a future Allied high commissioner in 
 Germany) that the Germans had to be encouraged to take on administrative 
responsibilities. local governments should be restored as soon as possible so that 
Germans could take on ‘definite authority to handle local problems without super-
vision from above’. local elections had to be held at the first opportunity, since 
they were ‘one of the most important [components] in reestablishing democratic 
attitudes and methods’. These elections, Clay argued, would ‘give the Germans an 
opportunity to learn democratic procedures on the lower levels before undertak-
ing elections for larger units. At the same time, the election of such local officials 
will tend to relieve Military Government of many duties at that level.’123 A few 
weeks later Clay spelled out even more clearly how these issues overlapped: ‘If the 
 Germans are to learn democratic methods,’ he wrote to McCloy,
I think the best way is to start them off quickly at the lower levels. Besides, this will 
help us reduce substantially the personnel required for Military Government. With so 
many officers returning to the United states during the coming months, we will 
 certainly not be able to staff a large number of the local detachments with qualified 
men even by a vigorous recruiting program. Yet, we can hardly withdraw the local 
detachments until the officials appointed by us have been replaced by others selected 
by the Germans. When this has been done, I think we can effectively supervise their 
activities from the next higher level.124
As a result, as early as september 1945 the Americans created federal administra-
tions for each Land with full legislative and executive powers, and from the start 
the German heads of these authorities, the minister-presidents, had more authority 
and independence than their counterparts in the other zones.125
The weight of administrative and governmental work was given to German staff 
some time before this was done in the British zone—including in the realm of 
public health. As the zone’s health report for January 1946 noted, 106 American 
medical officers in military government detachments had been redeployed, and by 
1 June 1946 there would be no more than 33 officers, with only 17 officers antici-
pated to remain by the end of June. The disbanded officials had been replaced by 
German civilians, ‘as the latter resumed satisfactory direction of public health’.126 
Other reports listed the various responsibilities that had already been, or were soon 
going to be, handed over to the German health authorities.127 By January 1946, 
123 lucius Clay to John McCloy, 3 sept. 1945, repr. in smith (ed.), Papers of Lucius Clay, i. 
66.
124 lucius Clay to John McCloy, 16 sept. 1945, repr. in smith (ed.), Papers of Clay, i. 76–7.
125 Wolfgang Benz, Potsdam 1945: Besatzungsherrschaft und Neuaufbau im Vier-Zonen-Deutschland 
(1986; 3rd edn. Munich, 1994), 130.
126 ‘Public Health and Medical Affairs’, No. 6, 20 Jan. 1946, 2.
127 e.g. BAK, Z45F, 5/331-3/10, agenda for meeting on 8 July 1946 to review public health 
 operations in the month of June 1946, 26 June 1946—anticipated the impending ‘shifting of respon-
sibility for [disease] reporting to the German authorities’.
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significant changes had already taken place: German public health authorities 
resumed more or less complete responsibility at the local level, German-run 
 nutrition teams were about to replace the American teams in operation,128 and 
American personnel were being withdrawn below the level of the Land.129
some conflicts persisted nonetheless. How far Germans could be trusted to 
carry out their newly regained responsibilities continued to be a matter of 
debate and disagreement, particularly after the British and American zones 
were merged into the economically unified Bizone in January 1947 (followed in 
April 1949 by addition of the French zone, just weeks before it became the 
Federal Republic of Germany). some British occupation officers were dismayed 
about the Americans’ heavy reliance on German authorities, before, they argued, 
any real reforms or changes in character or outlook had been achieved. As one 
British report observed, ‘Americans are convinced of the superiority of their 
handling of German administrative problems and of their general approach to 
the Germans, individually. Far more confidence is shown in the Germans, more 
authority delegated to them and greater social intercourse permitted.’ It was 
not unusual for Us authorities to organize a Bierabend (an evening of com-
munal beer-drinking) after their meetings, ‘where German men and women 
and American men and women mixed freely’. The report went on that the 
Americans found it ‘difficult to understand why we [the British] do not always 
adopt similar practices’. Particularly ‘in the administrative and economic field’ 
the Americans failed to ‘appreciate that the uncertainty of the political state of 
the Ruhr and the heavy industrialization of our Zone presents us with a differ-
ent set of problems’.130
British medical and nutritional officers worried that their American colleagues 
were being duped, and cautioned them against an over-reliance on German data. 
At a joint British–American Public Health Conference in Berlin in september 
1947—just when the debates about nutrition and tuberculosis were about to esca-
late in the British zone—Brigadier W. strelley Martin (from the British Control 
Commission’s Public Health Office, and British representative on the Combined 
Nutrition Committee), warned his American colleagues ‘against false German 
propaganda on health and nutrition matters’. He proposed that the Information 
Control Division should take over ‘control of such matters’ (i.e. the collection and 
analysis of medical and nutritional data), rather than leave it to Germans.131
Although there were fewer direct confrontations between American and German 
health officials about malnutrition and nutritional research, they did, just like in 
128 ‘Public Health and Medical Affairs’, No. 6, 20 Jan. 1946, 2.
129 Clay, Decision in Germany, 273.
130 TNA, FO 1032/1495, ‘Confidential Report on Joint Meeting of Representatives of the Zonal 
Advisory Council and the Regional Government Co-Ordinating Office (länderrat) at stuttgart on 
April 3rd, 1946’, 16 Apr. 1946. Also in Ralph Uhlig (ed.), Confidential Reports des Britischen Verbind-
ungsstabes zum Zonenbeirat der britischen Besatzungszone in Hamburg, 1946–1948—Demokratisierung 
aus britischer Sicht (Frankfurt, 1993), 59.
131 BAK, ZAF, 5/331-3/10, ‘Public Health Conference’ in Berlin on 9 sept. 1947, OMG land 
Wuerttemberg-Baden, 15 sept. 1947.
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the British zone, fundamentally disagree about the significance of tuberculosis.132 
Following the publication of the British report on tuberculosis, the American 
authorities ordered an investigation of conditions in their own zone.133 The com-
mission was headed by an eminent Us tuberculosis specialist, Esmond R. long, 
and came to similar conclusions.134 While the German public health authorities 
had claimed a sharp increase of tuberculosis, this was not evident to the American 
specialists. The German authorities argued that although tuberculosis death rates 
had not actually increased yet, there was a lag between the rise in cases and the rise 
in deaths, and that an increase in the mortality rate was imminent. However, the 
American commission thought that the German ‘data on incidence and prevalence 
are to be little trusted and that death rates are, under present conditions, the only 
reliable index of the trend of tuberculosis today’. like their British colleagues, 
although not in as biting terms, they pointed out that ‘the reliability of German 
postwar morbidity statistics’ was called into question by the ‘availability of ration 
supplements to tuberculosis cases . . . In view of the acute food shortage, it is only 
natural that these supplements should prove an incentive to the reporting of cases 
that would otherwise not be reported.’135
These kinds of findings sat uneasily with the American agenda of democratiza-
tion and self-sufficient German health authorities. But the American rejection of 
these particular German claims was not, however, accompanied by a more general 
rejection of German legitimacy and ability to take control over public health func-
tions, and during and after this episode Americans continued to hand over respon-
sibilities to the German health authorities.
This insistence on handing administrative and basic governmental powers to 
German appointees and offices became even clearer after the reformulation of 
American occupation policy during 1947. shortly after the re-elected President 
Truman’s appointment of George Marshall as secretary of state in January 1947, 
the basic occupation directive, JCs 1067, was replaced with a new document, 
JCs 1779. Unlike its predecessor, the new programme stated that a stable and 
132 On health policy discussions in the German länderrat of the American zone, see lia Härtel 
(ed.), Der Länderrat des Amerikanischen Besatzungsgebietes (stuttgart, 1951). Antje Mohr, Hessen und 
der Länderrat des Amerikanischen Besatzungsgebietes (Frankfurt, 1999).
133 On tuberculosis in the American zone, see Ellerbrock, ‘Die kulturelle Konstruktion der neuen 
Ordnung’, 109–25. Dagmar Ellerbrock, ‘Gesundheitspolitik in der amerikanischen Besatzungszone, 
1945–1949’, in Wolfgang Woelk and Jörg Vögele (eds.), Geschichte der Gesundheitspolitik in Deutsch-
land: von der Weimarer Republik bis in die Frühgeschichte der ‘doppelten Staatsgründung’ (Berlin, 
2002).
134 Esmond R. long and seymor Jablon, Tuberculosis in the Army of the United States in World War 
II: An Epidemiological Study with an Evaluation of X-ray Screening (Washington DC, 1955). Esmond 
R. long, ‘A Pathologists’ Recollection of the Control of Tuberculosis’, Perspectives in Biology and Medi-
cine, 5 (1961–2), 24–51. George Washington Corner, ‘Esmond R. long (1890–1979): President of 
the American Association for the History of Medicine (1940–1941), a Memoir by his long-Time 
Friend and Colleague Dr George W. Corner’, Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 54 (1980), 273–4. 
Other members of the commission included Philip E. sartwell, Colonel silas B. Hays, and Major 
Alonzo W. Clark.
135 Office of Military Government for Germany (Us), ‘Tuberculosis—special report of the Military 
Governor, Us Zone, Germany, adapted for publication by the civil administration division from a report 
rendered 5 March 1948 by a commission appointed by the secretary of the Army’, May 1948, 18.
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136 see e.g. Jeffry Diefendorf, Axel Frohn, and Hermann-Joseph Rupieger (eds.), American Policy 
and the Reconstruction of West Germany (Cambridge, 2008). Hans-Jürgen schröder, Marshallplan 
und westdeutscher Wiederaufstieg—Positionen, Kontroversen (stuttgart, 1990). Donald Bloxham, ‘The 
 Genocidal Past in Western Germany and the Experience of Occupation, 1945–1946’, European 
 History Quarterly, 34/3 (2004), 305–35.
137 Press release on JCs 1779, 15 July 1947, quoted in Axel lehman, Der Marshall-Plan und das 
neue Deutschland: Die Folgen amerikanischer Besatzungspolitik in den Westzonen (Münster, 2000), 99.
138 Us Department of state, Office of Public Affairs, Current Problems in the Occupation of  Germany: 
A Fact Sheet, June 1950, 5.
prosperous Europe depended on substantial economic contributions from a stable 
and prosperous Germany; that the European economy would not recover without 
a strong German industrial base.136 lucius Clay officially received the directive 
from Washington in July 1947, and a press release explained that the new policy’s 
aim was to provide ‘measures which will bring about the establishment of stable 
political and economic conditions in Germany and which will enable Germany to 
make a maximum contribution to European recovery’.137 The economic agenda 
was accompanied by political instructions to the zone’s authorities, and the new 
occupation directive urged Clay to take an active part in shaping the minds of the 
people in western Germany.
Where the first directives had made it clear that Germans were to be treated as 
an occupied population in a defeated (rather than a liberated) country, the new 
directive emphasized the importance of welcoming Germany as a new ally, and 
building a bulwark against the Communist East. In quadripartite meetings the 
United states continued to demand a German economic union, a central produc-
tion and foreign trade programme, and a central administration for overseeing 
reconstruction work in all four zones: but in practice the American approach had 
changed radically. Marshall’s announcement of the European Recovery Programme 
in June 1947 confirmed Washington’s intention to rearm Germany and prevent it 
from falling under soviet rule. Marshall Plan aid would jump-start the economies 
of western Germany and the other European allies and remove the material basis 
of discontent, but also restore confidence in free market democracy and provide a 
strong alternative to communism. By 1950, the economic rehabilitation of West 
Germany as a keystone of Western European recovery was entrenched in American 
foreign policy and had already shown substantial successes. And few American 
politicians or occupation officials would have denied then that Us aid—initially in 
the form of emergency GARIOA (Government and Relief in Occupied Areas) 
funds of around 1.9 billion dollars, followed by around 780 million dollars in 
reconstruction grants from the Economic Cooperation Administration by 
1950138—was central to the process.
In 1950, Robert Engler, who had returned from service in Germany in late 
1945, presented a rather pessimistic view of the American occupation. Americans 
had made many mistakes along the way, he declared: ‘Not deeply interested in 
European politics or ideology, the American often assumed that non-Nazis were 
always anti-Nazis, and anti-communists were always democrats. like many of his 
civilian friends, he equated capitalism with democracy, and was perturbed by those 
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139 Robert Engler ‘Individual soldier’, 84, 85.
140 Ellerbrock, ‘Die kulturelle Konstruktion der neuen Ordnung’, 121.
who substituted socialism. He was sure that the way Americans did things was 
best, and was eager for people to adopt baseball, Coca Cola and democratic 
 elections. But he was suspicious of parties and politicians.’ Americans had not 
appreciated the ‘discrepancies between ideals and realities of the American way’, 
Engler complained, and had failed, ultimately, ‘to recognize the occupation as an 
imperative part of their new world obligations’. It was ‘too early to predict the 
outcome’, he concluded, since ‘the discouraging patterns of so much of present-
day Germany suggests how difficult an objective we have set for ourselves and how 
much of the job still lies ahead’.139
But the absence of some of the conflicts that plagued the British zone was, in 
part, the result of different American priorities, which became more pronounced 
as the occupation went on. The focus on ‘democratization’ and the desire to build 
self-sufficient local and regional administrations on the federal model came from a 
combination of practical and ideological calculations, and, along with generous 
resources, helped to override some of those contradictions inherent in the 
oc cupation set-up. Where British staffs were paralysed by the apparent impossibil-
ity of remoulding totalitarian minds while keeping essential jobs staffed—of insti-
tuting ‘indirect control’, without fully trusting Germans to do the right job—the 
 Americans believed in the transforming attractions of the ‘American way of life’. 
No doubt a naïve belief in the power of baseball and Coca Cola helped a great deal. 
Most important of all, however, was the very different economic context of 
 American policy, which was able to answer German concerns about starvation and 
malnutrition, rising tuberculosis rates, and a host of other public health problems 
with food, with drugs, and with substantial material aid.140
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7
Public Health Work in the  
Soviet Occupation Zone
Pl ANS
Throughout the war the Soviet Union took part in meetings and summits with the 
United States and the United Kingdom, which produced agreements on the gen-
eral premises of the occupation: the NSDAP and its affiliated organizations were 
to be disbanded; perpetrators of war crimes were to be tried; and Nazis were to be 
removed from positions of influence. The Soviet Union signed up to these basic 
pillars of Allied policy even though their interpretations of Nazism differed signifi-
cantly from the other occupiers. Soviet officials, unlike their British, American, 
and French colleagues, identified the Nazi regime as a product of the crisis of 
monopoly capitalism, rather than as a mass movement, a reflection of German 
militaristic culture, or a psychiatric condition. So although the occupiers could 
agree on depriving the Junker landlords and industrial elites of their position and 
influence, they did so for different reasons: the British, Americans, and French saw 
the Junkers as the embodiment of the Prussian militarist mentality; the Soviets saw 
them as representatives of the capitalist ruling class. In the Soviet zone, Junker 
estates were to be expropriated and divided in radical land reforms, and their 
industrial establishments were to be nationalized; while the working classes were to 
be given the means for recovery and revival.1
On some issues, the occupiers’ public agreement on the treatment of Germany 
thus disguised significantly different priorities. The bulk of Soviet wartime prepa-
rations prioritized military security and Soviet reconstruction through German 
reparations. The Soviet demand for substantial reparations, in particular, handi-
capped the occupiers’ relationships; the wartime conferences had failed to settle 
their differences. In the absence of quadripartite agreements the Soviets simply 
made their own arrangements. In late 1944 Georgy M. Malenkov was put in 
charge of a Committee for the Rehabilitation of the Economy of liberated Areas 
(based in Moscow), to oversee the extraction of reparations and dismantling opera-
tions. They were represented in Germany by Maxim Z. Saburov.2 Anastas I. 
Mikoyan, deputy chair of Sovnarkom (the Council of People’s Commissars, later 
1 For an overview, see Mary Fulbrook, History of Germany, 1918–2000 (1991; Oxford, 2002).
2 Amy Knight, Beria: Stalin’s First Lieutenant (Princeton, 1995), 143. Peter Davies, Divided Loyal-
ties: East German Writers and the Politics of German Division, 1945–1953 (london, 2000), 20. Martin 
McCauley, Routledge Who’s Who in Russia since 1900 (london, 1997), 225.
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USSR Council of Ministers) and people’s commissar for foreign trade, tracked the 
transfers of equipment and capital to the Soviet Union. By May 1945, the com-
mittee supervised an operation of around 70,000 officials in the Soviet zone, most 
of them in uniform and with officer’s rank.3 With Soviet dismantling teams already 
at work, the Potsdam conference in July 1945 could only confirm existing dis-
agreement: the Soviet delegation, accompanied by their economic adviser Eugen 
Varga (the economist discussed in Chapter 2), demanded reparations of 10 billion 
dollars; the Western Allies rejected this. In the end it was resolved that each occu-
pier would meet their reparation demands through removals from their own zone, 
and the Soviet Union was to receive 25 per cent of any dismantled industrial plants 
from the western zones (partly in exchange for food and raw materials).4 The 
absence of the French at the early planning stages weakened the Soviet position, as 
they, seeking reparations of their own, would have been useful allies.
No less significant than strained relationships with the other occupiers were 
clashes between different factions within the Soviet authorities. Historians of the 
Soviet Union have been fascinated by domestic conflicts between its leading offi-
cials, although some rightly question the available sources and conclusions about 
Soviet policy we can legitimately draw from them.5 Nevertheless, there is clear evi-
dence of competing occupation strategies. At one end stood advocates of a moder-
ate foreign policy to build a neutralized, antifascist, united Germany, along with 
the Western Allies; at the other end stood supporters of a radical programme to 
turn Germany into a communist, ‘Sovietized’ satellite. The question of reparations 
figured centrally in both.
The more moderate political line, which dominated until 1946, was accompa-
nied by a policy of extensive and prompt reparations, and a radical deindustrializa-
tion of Germany. Supporters included the members of the influential State Defence 
Committee, created days after the German invasion in 1941: Vyacheslav Molotov, 
people’s commissar for foreign affairs; lavrenti P. Beria, people’s commissar for 
internal affairs and deputy chair of Sovnarkom; Georgy Malenkov, in charge of the 
Reparations Committee; and Molotov’s deputy, Clement E. Voroshilov. Beria, 
Malenkov, and others anticipated that all Allied forces would eventually withdraw 
from Germany, and thus argued for the seizure and transportation of German 
assets from the zone to the Soviet Union while that was still possible; speed was 
essential. In Germany this policy was supported by leading members of the Soviet 
Military Administration in Germany (SMAG), including Marshall Zhukov’s 
3 Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945–1949 (1995; 
Cambridge, Mass., 1997), 167, 26. Rainer Karlsch, Allein bezahlt? Die Reparationsleistungen der SBZ/
DDR, 1945–1953 (Berlin, 1993). Vladimir Rudolph, ‘The Agencies of Control: Their Organisation 
and Policies’, in Robert Slusser (ed.), Soviet Economic Policy in Postwar Germany: A Collection of Papers 
by Former Soviet Officials (New York, 1953), 18–86.
4 Peter Knirsch, Eugen Varga (Berlin, 1961), 9. On the reparations debates at Potsdam, see Melvyn 
leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War (Stan-
ford, 1992), 67. Also see J. E. Farquharson, ‘Anglo-American Policy on German Reparations from 
Yalta to Potsdam’, English Historical Review, 112/448 (1997), 904–26. On Soviet reparations policy, 
see Karlsch, Allein bezahlt?, 47, 60.
5 Naimark, The Russians in Germany, 319.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 03/19/2015, SPi
222 Compromises and Confrontations
This is an open access publication. Except where otherwise noted, this work is distributed under the terms of a 
 Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence, a copy of which is available 
at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. For enquiries concerning use outside the scope of the licence 
terms, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com.
deputy and chief Soviet representative on the Allied Control Council (ACC), 
Vasily D. Sokolovsky, and Zhukov’s first adviser and future Soviet high commis-
sioner in Germany, Vladimir S. Semyonov. They opposed an immediate Sovietiza-
tion of Germany or the creation of a satellite state, and supported extensive 
reparations and dismantling operations to aid Soviet reconstruction.6
But political and economic priorities came increasingly into conflict: seizing 
factories and goods would benefit Soviet reconstruction, but undermine the cred-
ibility of a Moscow-supported government in the zone. As a result, Andrei A. 
Zhdanov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee’s 
departments for foreign policy and culture, supported a more radical political pro-
gramme and a more cautious economic approach. When the Reparations Com-
mittee was established during the war, Zhdanov was among those to favour an 
economic recovery in the Soviet zone, and the payment of reparations through 
current production rather than radical dismantling. Zhdanov later became known 
for the ‘two camps’ doctrine, enunciated at the inaugural conference of the Com-
munist Information Bureau (Cominform) in September 1947, where the post-war 
world was divided into a capitalist, imperialist camp, led by the United States, and 
a socialist camp, led by the Soviet Union. According to this perspective, the solu-
tion to the German problem was the creation of a communist Germany (or por-
tion of it), which would be hampered by the removal of industry. In Germany, 
Zhdanov’s approach was represented by Sergey Tiulpanov, who, from summer 
1945, headed the SMAG’s Department for Agitation and Propaganda.
The conflict between these very different strategies soon affected the work of 
public health officers, both Soviet and German. But in May 1945, the most impor-
tant feature of the Soviet occupation brief was that for many problems no plans 
were made at all. Throughout the war, Stalin and his commanders were reluctant 
to focus on the occupation before Germany had been defeated; military operations 
took priority. Additional disorientation stemmed from the fact that Stalin’s analy-
ses of the big political decisions, as far as they were known, continually ‘zigzagged’ 
in response to events.7 In 1941 Stalin reportedly intended to divide Germany into 
several independent states, separating Prussia from the rest.8 In February 1943 he 
opposed this strategy, only to support it again at the Teheran conference in Novem-
ber 1943. At Yalta in February 1945, Stalin opposed dismemberment but favoured 
a division into occupation zones. At Potsdam he agreed to treat Germany as a 
6 Naimark, The Russians in Germany, 318–21. Jeanette Michelmann, Aktivisten der ersten Stunde: 
Die Antifa in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone (Cologne, 2002), 58–9. Peter Strunk, ‘Die Sowjetische 
Militäradministration in Deutschland (SMAD) und ihr politischer Kontrollapparat’, in Hans  lemberg 
and Karl Delhaes (eds.), Sowjetisches Modell und nationale Prägung: Kontinuität und Wandel in  Osteuroa 
nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg (Marburg, 1991), 172–3.
7 Aleksej Filitov, ‘Sowjetische Deutschlandplanungen im Krieg 1941–1945’, in Andreas Hilger, 
Mike Schmeitzner, and Clemens Vollnhals (eds.), Sowjetisierung oder Neutralität? Optionen sowjetischer 
Besatzungspolitik in Deutschland und Österreich, 1945–1955 (Göttingen, 2006), 25–40, at 25.
8 See Molotov’s telegram to Ivan Maisky, Soviet ambassador in london, dated 21 Nov. 1941, repr. 
in Jochen laufer and Georgii Kynin (eds.), Die UdSSR und die deutsche Frage 1941–1948: Dokumente 
aus dem Archiv für Außenpolitik der Russischen Föderation, i (Berlin, 2004), 11–12. Also see Filitov, 
‘Sowjetische Deutschlandplanungen im Krieg’ .
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single economic unit run by the ACC. It was clear only that Stalin, like his foreign 
minister and spy chief, was interested in a policy which granted security and exten-
sive reparations—but this could mean very different tactics and strategies.9 Histor-
ians still disagree about Soviet motives in Germany—whether a Soviet reorientation 
of Germany was always intended, or whether it was a reaction to American initia-
tives such as the Marshall Plan. Those writing at the height of the Cold War were 
certain about the far-sighted nature of Soviet aims, but more recent work portrays 
Soviet policies as reactive and piecemeal, rather than proactive and systematic. But 
even those who identify a clear political strategy in the Soviet occupation tend to 
agree that, apart from France, the Soviet Union was the least prepared and showed 
most inconsistencies in their occupation policy.10
In the light of such uncertainties, Soviet planners shelved many issues, from the 
recruitment of officers to concrete policies on practical problems, until after the 
war. Sergey Tiulpanov later wrote that the Soviet government did not possess a 
‘fleshed-out “theory of occupation administration” ’ or military government, only 
of liberation and German defeat: its work in Germany was guided by ‘general 
principles of Marxist-leninist theory and by the nature of the Second World War, 
which was an antifascist war of liberation even for the German people’.11 Georgy 
Zhukov agreed in his memoirs that Soviet troops came completely unprepared, 
particularly compared to the well-briefed and well-trained troops in the West.12
This did not mean that the Soviet military had no experience in military govern-
ment. During the war they had acquired practical experience in the constitution 
and running of the Allied Control Commissions in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, 
and Finland. In addition, a cadre of experts who had participated in the incorpora-
tion of the Baltic Republics and the Western Ukraine into the Soviet Union, took 
positions in the SMAG. Among them was Ivan A. Serov, who in 1939 had been 
people’s commissar for internal affairs in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, and during 
the war had overseen some of the forced population movements and deportations 
within the Soviet Union. From June 1945 to February 1947 Serov was deputy chief 
of the SMAG with responsibility for civilian administration, and head of the zone’s 
secret service. Another person with considerable experience was Vladimir S. 
 Semyonov, who in 1939 had been an adviser to the Soviet administration in lithu-
ania, and in 1945 became a political adviser to the SMAG, where he later ran his 
own department. And there was Andrei Y. Vychinsky, who had, as deputy foreign 
minister of the Soviet Union, taken part in the Allied Control Commission for Italy, 
and became Zhukov’s First Political Adviser.13 Drawing on their recommendations, 
the Soviet State Defence Committee issued the first  general directives for the 
9 Filitov, ‘Sowjetische Deutschlandplanungen im Krieg’. laufer and Kynin (eds.), Die UdSSR und 
die deutsche Frage. Michelmann, Aktivisten.
10 Scherstjanoi in Wolfgang Benz (ed.), Deutschland unter alliierter Beatzung, 1945–1949/1955 
(Berlin, 1999), 76. See also Naimark, The Russians in Germany, 9 ff.
11 Sergei Iwanowitsch Tjulpanow, ‘Die Rolle der SMAD bei der Demokratisierung Deutschlands’, 
Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, 15 (1967), 240–52, at 243. Jan Foitzik, Sowjetische Militäradmin-
istration in Deutschland (SMAD), 1945–1949: Struktur und Funktion (Berlin, 1999), 44.
12 Zhukov, quoted in Foitzik, Sowjetische Militäradministration, 44.
13 Foitzik, Sowjetische Militäradministration, 75–6 and ‘Kurzbiographien’, 476, 481.
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 administration of the territories occupied by Soviet troops in April 1944, but none 
made any particular recommendations for Germany. Only directives from January 
and April 1945 provided any details about the organization of military headquarters 
in Germany, and many details were still missing even there.14
As shown in Chapter 2, the Soviet authorities were eager to supplement their 
patchy plans and threadbare directives with preparations from the other occupiers. 
Anglo-American plans for the structure, organization, and administrative divisions 
of military government, and the training of officers were repeated in Soviet direc-
tives, particularly after March 1945, when the Americans made available their 
military government handbooks.15 These details helped to establish the administra-
tive and structural parameters of the occupation apparatus—which broadly mir-
rored the German government’s ministerial divisions, and was to be controlled by 
‘indirect rule’. The extremely low staff allocations in spring 1945, of only 125 
people to the entire SMAG,16 stemmed not only from a lack of resources and a 
radical underestimation of the extent of Soviet involvement in German affairs, but 
also from copying Anglo-American preparations. SHAEF directives and manuals 
emphasized that the Allies were to supervise, oversee, and control, not to do the 
required jobs themselves. The Soviet authorities, like the British and Americans, 
underestimated the number of staff required.
The other occupiers’ preparations filled some of the gaps in the Soviet govern-
ment’s plans. Others, as seen in Chapters 3 and 4, were filled by German commu-
nist émigrés in Soviet exile, which had a particular impact on public health. The 
Soviet authorities’ lack of direction on many day-to-day issues dictated that the 
émigrés were enlisted wherever possible17—arguably a form of ‘indirect rule’ in 
practice. Germans active in the orbit of the German Communist Party (KPD) in 
exile, the National Committee Free Germany (NKFD), and in various Soviet 
political, educational, and military institutions, busily prepared for post-war 
 Germany by drawing up lists of cadres to be appointed and urgent tasks to be 
 carried out. Given their lack of resources and trained personnel, the Soviet authori-
ties often had few options other than to rely on émigrés. They did not have the 
capacity to govern their part of Germany on their own.
The ‘Guidelines for the Work of the German Antifascists in the Territories 
Occupied by the Soviet Army’, drafted by the Moscow KPD group in April 1945, 
are a useful example.18 This six-page document listed some of the most important 
14 Foitzik, Sowjetische Militäradministration, 76.
15 FRUS, vol. iii. 1945 (1968), 443. Ralf Possekel, ‘Sowjetische Speziallager in Deutschland’, in 
Sergei Mironenko et al. (eds.), Sowjetische Speziallager in Deutschland 1945 bis 1950 (Berlin, 1998), ii. 
54. Michelmann, Aktivisten.
16 Jan Foitzik, ‘Organisation der sowjetischen Besatzung in Deutschland und Auswirkungen von 
kompetenzieller Diffusion auf die Rekonstruktion der Besatzungspolitik’, in Hilger, Schmeitzner, and 
Vollnhals (eds.), Sowjetisierung oder Neutralität?, 97–116, at 106.
17 Naimark, The Russians in Germany, 10, 41. Alexander Fischer, Sowjetische Deutschlandpolitik im 
Zweiten Weltkrieg 1941–1945 (Stuttgart, 1975), 119 ff.
18 ‘Richtlinien für die Arbeit der deutschen Antifaschisten in dem von der Sowjet Armee besetzten 
deutschen Gebieten’, 5 Apr. 1945, KPD, Dokument 31 in Gerhard Keiderling (ed.), ‘Gruppe Ulbricht’ 
in Berlin, April bis Jus 1945: Von den Vorbereitungen im Sommer 1944 bis zur Wiedergründung der KPD 
im Juni 1945 (Berlin, 1993), 260–5.
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tasks, and had important advice for the Soviet authorities in areas controlled by the 
Red Army. Apart from the urgent need to reactivate the media (radio stations, 
newspapers, and publishing houses for ‘progressive literature’), the main priority 
was to establish administrative organs, to be staffed by the native population. local 
officials would then carry out and oversee the most urgent tasks: the organization 
of basic health and hygiene measures, the distribution of food, the allocation of 
housing, the control of utilities (gas, water, electricity, and transport), the health 
service, as well as education (training, libraries, and schools), banking, and trade. 
Soviet commanders (assisted by the German émigrés) were to identify and appoint 
suitable mayors, who could then assemble and preside over local authorities,  ideally 
containing at least ‘5 to 7 antifascists’.
German antifascists were valuable assets, the authors of this document insisted: 
some would be most useful if based at Soviet army headquarters, overseeing the 
publication of newspapers and the resumption of radio broadcasts to pacify and 
educate the local population, and prevent skirmishes with Soviet troops; others 
could assist in the recruitment of reliable and trustworthy locals, and ‘ensure that 
the newly created organs contain reliable antifascists and really work within the 
guidelines’.19 They would be most useful to the Soviet troops by establishing net-
works of ‘trusted persons’ (Vertrauensleute). Using their knowledge of local person-
alities and political organizations, the émigrés would be able to recruit dependable, 
politically reliable individuals to oversee initiatives in their villages, streets, factor-
ies, and apartment blocks—and Soviet commanders could communicate with the 
German population through them and ensure the local population’s compliance. 
With the help of ‘trusted persons’, the émigrés would be able to identify leading 
Nazis, and even begin to register all former members of the NSDAP, and those 
who had fought in the Wehrmacht and the Volkssturm.
These guidelines, and similar documents, were categorical about the criteria by 
which ‘trusted persons’ could be identified: those Germans who before 1933 had 
been involved in antifascist organizations, and had ‘remained steadfastly opposed 
to the Hitler regime’, were the best candidates for key jobs. They were likely to be 
‘workers’ who had been opposed to Nazi rule. Soviet commanders and their 
German aides were also encouraged to make contact with ‘responsible forces from 
the ranks of the intelligentsia who are capable of further development and who did 
not belong to the Nazi Party or Hitler Youth’. In addition, the authors thought it 
was worth checking ‘who, from those intellectuals, engineers, doctors and teachers 
who had joined the Nazi Party in the last war years, but who had not carried out 
any active work within it, could be made use of ’. A sentence stating that the wives 
of Nazi Party members should not be utilized was crossed out in the April 1945 
draft.20 Similar compromises were forced onto the British and Americans in the 
post-war years. The émigrés, trying to act as intermediaries between the Soviet 
occupiers and the German population, seem to have arrived at similar conclusions, 
but rather earlier.
19 ‘Richtlinien für die Arbeit der deutschen Antifaschisten’, 265.
20 ‘Richtlinien für die Arbeit der deutschen Antifaschisten’, 262.
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The KPD in exile ran a series of re-education courses for German POWs. The 
NKFD—one of the German émigré groups featured in Chapter 3—was central to 
initiatives to persuade German soldiers to surrender and to re-educate them in cap-
tivity. As Khrushchev recalled in his memoirs, Walter Ulbricht and his associates 
actively carried out ‘antifascist propaganda, using loudspeakers along the front lines 
and calling on the German troops to surrender. This work was carried out mainly at 
night. Ulbricht would crawl along the front lines with his loudspeakers, directing his 
message to the soldiers and officers of [Field Marshall] Paulus’ army group. Ulbricht 
and I always ate together, and I joked with him: “Well, what is this, Comrade 
Ulbricht? You haven’t earned your daily bread today. No one surrendered.” He calmly 
continued what he was doing.’21 Paulus, who commanded the German Sixth Army’s 
assault on Stalingrad in 1942, was one of the most prominent Germans to surrender. 
He joined the NKFD and its special organization for officers, the league of German 
Officers (Bund Deutscher Offiziere), and became a vocal critic of Nazi Germany.22
With backing from the Soviet government, Walter Ulbricht, Wilhelm Pieck, and 
Anton Ackermann organized training courses for hundreds of Germans in Soviet 
exile to prepare them for administrative work in Germany. Two-month training 
courses began in Nagornoye, near Moscow, in September 1944, before the Red 
Army had crossed the German border. By December 1945 five courses had taken 
place with around twenty-five to thirty participants on each.23 They supplemented 
training courses for Germans organized by the political administration of the Red 
Army (GlavPURRKA) and the party schools in Moscow. Together with Dimitrov, 
Manuilsky, and other senior Comintern personnel, Pieck, Ulbricht, and Ackermann 
also prepared and lectured on training courses for Soviet officers. Sergey Tiulpanov 
remembered that shortly before the Red Army crossed the borders of the Soviet 
Union, the German communists gave lectures about future tasks in the occupied 
territories. Elaborating upon resolutions of the 1935 Comintern congress, they 
talked about the need for communists to work with other antifascist forces.24
The émigrés also compiled lists of future administrators, which the Soviet 
authorities actively used. Around 2,500 Germans were employed by the political 
administration of the Red Army during the war, and many of them featured in 
staff lists for future political and administrative jobs.25 Wilhelm Pieck estimated 
21 Sergei Khrushchev (ed.), Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, ii. Reformer, 1946–1964, trans. George 
Shriver (University Park, 2006), 463–4.
22 Bodo Scheurig, Freies Deutschland: Das Nationalkomitee und der Bund Deutscher Offiziere in der 
Sowjetuniuon, 1943–1945 (Cologne, 1984). Gerd R. Ueberschär (ed.), Das Nationalkomitee Freies 
Deutschland und der Bund Deutscher Offiziere (Frankfurt am Main, 1995). Protocol of the inaugural 
meeting in Moscow in Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland, Sitz Mexico, Deutsche, wohin?: Protokoll 
der Gruendungsversammlung des National-Komitees Freies Deutschland und des Deutschen Offiziersbun-
des (Mexico, 1944).
23 Foitzik, Sowjetische Militäradministration, 46. Also see Wilhelm Pieck speech in KPD party 
school, 9 Jan. 1945, in Keiderling, ‘Gruppe Ulbricht’, 139–56.
24 Sergei Iwanowitsch Tjulpanow, Deutschland nach dem Kriege: Erinnerungen eines Offiziers der Sow-
jetarmee, ed. Stefan Doernberg (West Berlin, 1987), 58. Foitzik, Sowjetische Militäradministration, 45.
25 Jan Foitzik, ‘Sowjetische Militäradministration in Deutschland’, in Broszat and Weber (eds.), 
SBZ-Handbuch: Staatliche Verwaltungen, Parteien, gesellschaftliche Organisationen und ihre Führungeskräfte 
in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands, 1945–1949 (Munich, 1993), 7–71, at 12.
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that between 1 May and 10 June 1945, 275 German cadres from the KPD and the 
NKFD were sent into the Soviet zone.26 On their way they worked as translators, 
advisers, and general ‘intermediaries’. After their arrival they often became mayors, 
district administrators, or officials themselves.27
COMPROMISES
The immediate problems faced by Soviet troops were similar to those in the other 
zones. The German novelist Theodor Plievier, who travelled from Moscow to 
 Germany in spring 1945, wrote that, after the bombing raids in February 1945, 
Dresden looked as though ‘a giant plough had swept over the earth leaving behind 
a complete wreckage’. ‘Nothing was left of the big hotels’, he wrote, ‘five or six had 
stood just there. In their place, wave after wave of rubble and masonry frozen into 
immobility. From the rubble emerged a column here; the arch of a window there; 
further away the shell of a split tower; a decapitated church; famous Dresden 
façades motionless in the middle of a general collapse, covered by soot and grime, 
strangely ghostlike.’28 Dresden was an extreme physical reminder of the conse-
quences of defeat, but it was not a unique sight in the new Soviet zone. Branden-
burg and Mecklenburg in the north of the zone had also seen heavy fighting, and 
Berlin was a mess of rubble and devastation on an unbelievable scale—perhaps 
only equalled by the traces of the Germans’ torching of Warsaw.
Soviet officers—like everyone else—were concerned about the potential for 
public health disasters. The bombing raids had destroyed urban facilities for coping 
with health problems; the parts of the hygiene infrastructure to escape the bomb-
ing then collapsed during the artillery attacks and street battles of the last weeks of 
the war. Conditions were dire in many parts, but nowhere were they more serious 
than in Berlin. The provision of clean water, electricity, and gas, and the collection 
of garbage had all stopped. Sewage spilled into rivers and lakes, and corpses piled 
up because they could not be buried fast enough. Flies, rats, mosquitoes, lice, and 
other disease carriers bred and multiplied. City inhabitants lived crowded together 
in cellars, bomb shelters, and underground tunnels, and were easy targets for 
spreading infections. Those hospitals not entirely destroyed overflowed with 
patients and the rapidly increasing stream of wounded soldiers and evacuees. There 
were acute shortages of doctors, drugs, beds, and medical apparatus.29
26 Keiderling, ‘Gruppe Ulbricht’, 100. Foitzik, Sowjetische Militäradministration, 47.
27 Foitzik, Sowjetische Militäradministration, 81. For a literary account of the work done by indi-
viduals who returned with Red Army troops, see Theodor Plievier, Berlin (Munich 1954; 1st Eng. edn. 
london, 1956).
28 Plievier, Berlin (English edn.), 9. Dresden was almost completely destroyed by bombing raids 
that took place on the night of 13–14 Feb. 1945 by 800 aircraft of an Anglo-American force. The city 
continued to be bombarded in raids until 17 Apr. 1945. See Frederick Taylor, Dresden: Tuesday, Febru-
ary 13, 1945 (london, 2004).
29 From the many reports on health condition in Berlin, see e.g. lAB, B Rep. 012/902-27, Worm 
(Reviervorsteher, Polizeipräsident in Berlin, Polizeirevier 2) to Polizeigruppe Mitte, ‘Übertragbare 
Krankheiten’, 7 June 1945. lAB, C Rep. 118–272, Dr Schulz (Bezirksrat, Stadt-Bezirksamt Pankow) 
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Berlin was a central destination in the vast population movements in Central 
and Eastern Europe in the last months of the war. German expellees made their 
way westwards, just as returned POWs and non-German displaced persons moved 
homewards and eastwards. large numbers of people trekked through Berlin, either 
because they did not believe the rumours about the state of the capital, or because 
there was no other way they knew to go. Many of these people were malnourished, 
and had been exposed to typhus, dysentery, and typhoid fever. German health 
reports observed that typhus rates had increased rapidly and in direct relation to 
the numbers of refugees moving through refugee camps in Berlin.30 Just days after 
the war ended Berlin was gripped by an outbreak of diarrhoea.31 German and 
Soviet doctors were uncertain about whether it was an epidemic of dysentery or a 
more harmless outbreak of diarrhoea, but there were no facilities for the bacterio-
logical identification of the disease agent, and no drugs or sera even if they could 
have identified it.
There was violence and looting in all zones by the victorious troops, but in the 
east it was of an entirely different scale. Military discipline among Soviet troops 
completely broke down in the last stages of the war. Soldiers proved impossible to 
control as they went on drinking, raping, and looting sprees during their advances 
through Eastern Europe, which only increased when they marched into German 
territory.32 The defeat of Berlin, in particular, was accompanied by an eruption of 
violence against, and rapes of, German civilians, peaking in the notorious fortnight 
of 24 April to 5 May, but it was endemic everywhere in the zone. Perhaps as many 
as one in three (of around 1.5 million) women in Berlin were raped at the end of 
the war. One estimate claims that in total almost 2 million German women were 
raped by members of the Red Army, many more than once.33 Commanders’ 
attempts to punish their troops often proved futile, and they were only able to 
regain control weeks, sometimes months, later.
Official Soviet directives spelled out that the German people, especially its work-
ing classes, were not to be equated with the leaders of the Third Reich, and 
instructed Soviet troops to treat the German population accordingly. The Soviet 
to Polizei-Inspektion, Berlin Pankow, ‘Bericht über den Gesundheitszustand der Pankower Bürger’, 
30 Aug. 1945. lAB, C Rep. 907/03-64, Hanns Renntmeister, ‘Berlin im Mai-Juni 1945’ [undated] 
lAB, C Rep. 907/03-110, Fritz Kunze, ‘Aus einem Erinnerungsbericht von Fritz Kunze, Mitglied der 
KPD, über die Arbeit der Antifaschisten in Kaulsdorf seit dem 23.April 1945’ [undated]. lAB, C Rep. 
907/03-111, Dr Hans Kupke, ‘Antworten auf den Frage-Spiegel—Befreiung und Beginn der 
 antifaschistisch-demokratischen Umwälzung’, [undated]. TNA, FO 1012/134, report on public 
health in Berlin, 10 July 1945. TNA, FO 1050/10, Chief (IA&C Division, Bünde) to Chief of Staff, 
Public Health Report, 28 Sept. 1945.
30 lAB, B Rep. 012/902-28, ‘Bericht des lGA II 1’, 20 Dec. 1945.
31 lAB, B Rep. 012/902-5, ‘Berichte der leiter der Bezirksgesundheitsämter über den Gesundheit-
szustand usw. in den einzelnen Bezirken’, 14 June 1945.
32 The rapes of German civilians by soldiers of the Red Army tend to be discussed in isolation, but 
they were far from unique. On wartime rapes and post-war consequences in Hungary, see James Mark, 
‘Remembering Rape: Divided Social Memory and the Red Army in Hungary, 1944–1945’, Past and 
Present, 188 (2005), 133–61.
33 Helke Sander and Barbara Johr (eds.), Befreier und Befreite: Krieg, Vergewaltigungen, Kinder 
(Munich, 1992), 54. Atina Grossmann, Reforming Sex: The German Movement for Birth Control and 
Abortion Reform, 1920–1950 (Oxford, 1995), 193.
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High Command’s April 1945 ‘Directive on the Treatment of the German Civilian 
Population’, ordered troops to moderate their behaviour, since brutality would 
only lead to greater German resistance and prolong the war, bloodshed, and 
expense. ‘A more humane attitude towards the Germans’, the directive stated, ‘will 
ease our warfare on their territory and will without doubt reduce the doggedness 
of the German defence.’ It urged commanders to appoint German mayors and to 
create German administrations, and it directed them not to seek retribution against 
ordinary members of the NSDAP, if they appeared loyal enough to the Red 
Army.34
These instructions completely failed to contain the Soviet troops’ hatred of 
 Germans. Soldiers had marched through countless villages and towns (often their 
own) destroyed by the Wehrmacht. They had also been exposed to accounts, such 
as by the writer and journalist Ilya Ehrenburg, of what the Red Army had found at 
Maidanek, Auschwitz, and the other German-run ‘death factories’.35 In an effort to 
boost morale, Ehrenburg had incited revenge and the desire to hold the Germans 
to account. One of his best known articles was simply entitled ‘Kill!’:
We have understood: the Germans are not people. From today on the word ‘German’ 
for us is the most frightful curse. From today on the word ‘German’ discharges rifles. 
We will not speak. We will not be indignant. We will kill. If, during the day, you have 
not killed a single German, your day has been in vain. If you believe that your neigh-
bour will kill a German for you, you have not understood the menace. If you do not 
kill the German, the German will kill you. He will take your loved ones to his accursed 
Germany. If you cannot kill the German with a bullet, kill the German with a bayo-
net. If on your sector there is a lull, if you are waiting for the battle, kill the German 
before the battle. If you let the German live, the German will hang a Russian man and 
violate a Russian woman. If you have killed one German, kill another: there is nothing 
more joyful for us than German corpses. Don’t count the versts. Count one thing 
alone: Germans whom you have killed36
Ehrenburg’s slogans could now easily be interpreted as support for the eruption of 
violence.37 While the German communists who accompanied the troops frequently 
condemned the Soviet army’s rampage, they themselves were unsure about how 
their countrymen should be treated. Too many people had supported and voted 
for Hitler for them not to carry a share of responsibility.38
34 Repr. in Possekel, ‘Sowjetische Speziallager in Deutschland’, 51–2. Also see Michelmann, Aktiv-
isten, 63. Naimark, The Russians in Germany, 91–180.
35 Ilya Ehrenburg, ‘Remember’ (Aug. 1944), in Ilya Ehrenburg, We Come as Judges (london, 
1945).
36 Ilya Ehrenburg, ‘V Germanii’, Krasnaja zvezda, 22 Feb. 1945, extract in Julian l.laychuk, Ilya 
Ehrenburg: An Idealist in an Age of Realism (Bern, 1991), 201–2. Ilya Ehrenburg, The War: 1941–1945 
(Cleveland, 1967). Ilya Ehrenburg, ‘Rats Shed Their Tiger Skins’, 24 Feb. 1945, in What We Saw in 
Germany: With the Red Army to Berlin, by Thirteen Leading Soviet War Correspondents (london 1945). 
Ehrenburg, We Come as Judges.
37 This point is also made in G. A. Tokaev, Comrade X (london, 1956), 290. Tokaev was one of 
Zhukov’s scientific advisers. Many thanks to David Edgerton for telling me about this book.
38 But I am sceptical of Herf ’s claim that the émigrés’ bitterness towards the German population 
was ‘the justification for imposing a post-war dictatorship on an untrustworthy and dishonoured 
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The social divisions in the Red Army often inflamed clashes between command-
ers and their troops. As B. J. Kospoth, a British POW held captive in Pomerania 
and liberated by Soviet troops, remembered: ‘[o]fficers and soldiers of the Red 
Army’s motorised troops seemed to be an entirely different type of men . . . from 
their comrades in the infantry. I have known them to warn inhabitants of villages 
through which they have passed against the undisciplined riflemen who were 
coming after them. I have seen them abstain from looting and even decline drinks 
because they were on duty. They are the aristocrats of the Red Army, while the 
infantry is its disinherited proletariat, its predestined “cannon fodder” in the good 
old Prussian sense. Most of the excesses of which the Red Army is guilty in occu-
pied countries are committed by its ragged, hungry, lewd infantry.’39
It was this infantry of angry and starved men that set the tone of the occupiers’ 
relationships with the German population. Not only did their attacks limit the 
possibility for friendly relations at the outset, but they also added a further set of 
health and social problems. First, as waves of suicides took place, often directly in 
anticipation of or response to the arrival of the Red Army, more corpses had to be 
disposed of, and failed attempts required medical attention. Theodor Plievier wrote 
of ‘an epidemic of slashed wrists—attempts which succeeded only rarely’.40
Second, the mass rapes resulted in tens of thousands of unwanted pregnancies, 
and women throughout the zone turned to doctors to carry out abortions, or they 
simply carried them out on their own.41 The Berlin health authorities, in agree-
ment with the SMAG, temporarily suspended the legislation which prohibited 
abortions (the notorious Paragraph 218), making it possible for the district health 
officials to sanction them, at public cost, until almost the last month of pregnancy, 
‘on any women who certified that she had been raped by a foreigner, usually but 
not always a member of the Red Army’.42
Third, the rapes also dramatically increased the rates of venereal diseases, as 
hundreds of thousands of individuals contracted and passed on infections. The VD 
problem was to haunt the Soviet and the German health authorities for years to 
people’. Jeffry Herf, Divided Memory: The Past in the Two Germanies (Cambridge, Mass., 1997), 24 ff. 
Instead, from the beginning they emphasized the importance of having to work with and truly convert 
the German population. Nor was the Soviet occupation zone (or later GDR) understood by them as 
a dictatorship.
39 B. Kospoth, Red Wins: An Account of the Author’s Experiences in North-Eastern Germany After Its 
Occupation by the Russian Army in 1945 (london, 1946), 115–16.
40 Plievier, Berlin, 203. On suicides, see e.g. lAB, C Rep. 907/03-133, Eduard Mellenthin, ‘Zur 
Situation nach der Befreiung’, 18 Mar. 1965.
41 lAB, B Rep. 012/902-5, ‘Versammlung der Amtsärzte am 26.Juli 1945 im Hauptgesundheit-
samt—Tagesordnung’, 26 July 1945; ‘Bericht über die Dienstbesprechung der Amtsärzte am Don-
nerstag, dem 6. September 1945’; ‘Besprechung der Amtsärzte am Donnerstag, den 25. April 1946’. 
lAB, C Rep. 131/03-2, Bezirksamt Berlin-Mitte, Gesundheitsamt to Herrn Bürgermeister Weiß, 
‘Tätigkeitsbericht’, 19 Feb. 1946.
42 Grossmann, Reforming Sex, 193–4. Atina Grossmann, ‘A Question of Silence: The Rape of 
German Women by Occupation Soldiers’, October (Apr. 1995), 43–65. Atina Grossmann, ‘The 
Debate That Will Not End: The Politics of Abortion in Germany from Weimar to National Socialism 
and the Postwar Period’, in Manfred Berg and Geoffrey Cocks (eds.), Medicine and Modernity: Public 
Health and Medical Care in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Germany (Cambridge, 1995). Annette 
F. Timm, The Politics of Fertility in Twentieth-Century Berlin (New York, 2010).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 03/19/2015, SPi
 The Russian Occupation Zone 231
This is an open access publication. Except where otherwise noted, this work is distributed under the terms of a 
 Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence, a copy of which is available 
at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. For enquiries concerning use outside the scope of the licence 
terms, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com.
come, in spite of the SMAG health officers’ pleading to mobilize all resources at 
their disposal.43 The Soviet commanders introduced a ban on fraternization, rather 
belatedly in the summer 1946, over a year late, and after the Americans had aban-
doned their ban. It sanctioned only official Soviet–German contacts, but seemed 
to have had little immediate effect, as many Soviet soldiers were still billeted in 
German communities.44 While for the Western Allies the non-fraternization policy 
was to prevent opportunities for pro-German propaganda to influence Allied sol-
diers, in the Soviet zone it was primarily a measure to contain the VD problem, 
and, in part, also to protect the German population. American and British observ-
ers (particularly those opposed to non-fraternization in their own zones) noted 
with concern that the Soviets seemed to lack any real rules against fraternization.45 
The strongest message about rape only came in March 1949, when a directive by 
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet provided serious punishment: a mandatory 
sentence of ten to fifteen years in a labour camp.46
The devastation and disorder were altogether more severe in the Soviet zone 
than in the rest of the country, but many of the problems mirrored those else-
where. The change from fighting a war to organizing a peace was difficult and beset 
with contradictions. The Soviet military government was overtaxed, stretched by 
too few personnel and resources, and too many urgent demands. From 1945 to 
1949, the SMAG ran the zone. Its central headquarters were based in the Berlin 
district of Karlshorst, and it had offices in each of the five provinces of the zone, as 
well as the special Berlin Kommandatura. Its structure stretched to eighteen dis-
trict offices (which in 1946 were reduced to twelve, and dissolved completely in 
1948), below which were the local German organizations.47
The plans had provided for far too few personnel, but in the first months of the 
occupation the SMAG establishment expanded rapidly: the spring 1945 directives had 
planned for 125 staff; the first organizational charts from July 1945 provided for 1,447 
positions in thirty specialist departments; and only a year later the SMAG counted 
60,000 jobs.48 Nonetheless, expanding the personnel charts was one thing, but filling 
the jobs was quite another. In practice, personnel shortages remained acute for a number 
of reasons: bureaucratic recruitment procedures, the unpopularity of service in 
 Germany, and the fact that many officers were sent home for a variety of offences.49 The 
SMAG’s Health Department was one of the many departments affected by these short-
ages. Founded by an order on 6 June 1945, it began its work on the basis of SMAG 
43 BAB, Z47F, 7317/56/21, Sokolov (Deputy Head of the SMAG Health Department) to Koslen-
kov (Commander of health in the Province of Saxony), 26 Dec. 1945.
44 Foitzik, ‘Sowjetische Militäradministration’, 13. Only towards the end of 1946 were occupation 
troops separated from German civilians.
45 lucius Clay to Henry Stimson, 18 Aug. 1945, repr. in Jean Edward Smith (ed.), The Papers of 
General Lucius D.Clay—Germany, 1945–1949, i (Bloomington, Ind., 1974), 59. Also see Naimark, 
The Russians in Germany, 92.
46 Naimark, The Russians in Germany, 96.
47 Jan Foitzik, ‘Die Sowjetische Militäradministration in Deutschland’, in Jan Foitzik (ed.), Inventar 
der Befehle des Obersten Chefs der Sowjetischen Militäradministration in Deutschland (SMAD), 1945–
1949 (Munich, 1995).
48 Foitzik, ‘Organisation der sowjetischen Besatzung in Deutschland’, 106.
49 Naimark, The Russians in Germany, 25–34.
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Order No. 5 from 10 July 1945.50 It was headed by Major-General A. Y. Kuznetsov and 
his deputy, Colonel Andrei J. Sokolov, and initially made up of around 100 members, 
drawn from a range of Soviet medical faculties and the Red Army sanitary service. 
A chart of the department from summer 1945 listed 96 members of staff. In 1946 this 
had grown to 110, but then shrank to just 70 in February 1947. By 1949 there were 
only 41 people left.51 The majority of Soviet health officers were well qualified—
according to a number of envious reports by western officials, a ‘highly qualified elite 
force’—but there were not enough of them, many did not speak German, and few had 
been sufficiently prepared for the turmoil and devastation in Germany.52
The Health Department’s responsibilities were directly comparable to those of 
the other zones. It was to oversee and direct all practical public health business: 
organize epidemic work, create the basic structures of a sanitary infrastructure and 
German health service, control the personnel of the German health service and its 
institutions, oversee medical supply and distribution across the zone, resume the 
work of German medical industry (for both German requirements and Soviet 
reparations demands), and direct the medical departments at the universities. 
Unlike the British and American health offices, it was also specifically charged with 
studying the German health system and medical industry (and was given the 
archive of the military-medical Friedrich Wilhelm Academy for this purpose) so as 
to identify and extract useful research and products for Soviet use.53
Soviet health officials’ work was made easier because they had already identified, 
in principle at least, potential German collaborators, and agreed to make use of 
them wherever possible—both Germans already in the zone and those still in exile. 
In the spring of 1945, three ‘initiative groups’ of German exiles accompanied the 
Red Army to Germany. Walter Ulbricht’s group went to Berlin and helped to set 
up the new Magistrat and the Berlin district councils. The second group was 
headed by Anton Ackermann, and moved with the First Ukrainian Front into 
Saxony. The third group, led by Gustav Sobottka, joined the Second Belorussian 
Front on its move into Mecklenburg. All three assisted the Soviet occupation 
authorities. Their first tasks concerned the recruitment of German administrators, 
and the formation of local and regional authorities. In many cases, they themselves 
took up leading positions in these new organs.54
This collaboration of Soviet officials with German émigrés and ‘trusted persons’ 
alleviated some of the problems that distracted the other occupiers. Through KPD 
50 Foitzik (ed.), Inventar.
51 ‘Stellenplan von 1945’, ‘Stellenplan von 1946’, ‘Stellenplan vom Feb.1947’, ‘Stellenplan von 
1949’, all in Tatjana W. Zarewskaja-Djakina, ‘Abteilung Gesundheitswesen’, in Jan Foitzik et al. (eds.), 
SMAD-Handbuch: Die Sowjetische Militäradministration in Deutschland 1945–1949 (Munich, 2009), 
446–55.
52 Wilhelm Weiß, Das Gesundheitswesen in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone, Bonner Berichte as 
Mittel- und Ostdeutschland (Bonn, 1957). Anna-Sabine Ernst, ‘Die beste Prophylaxe ist der Sozialis-
mus’: Ärzte und medizinische Hochschullehrer in der SBZ/DDR, 1945–1961 (Berlin, 1997), 11.
53 Foitzik et al. (eds.), SMAD-Handbuch.
54 This was noted with disdain by some British and American officials, e.g. TNA, FO 371/46733, 
Political Intelligence Department to Foreign Office, ‘ “Free Germany” Committee members in gov-
ernments of Brandenburg, Mecklenburg and Saxony’, 10 July 1945.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 03/19/2015, SPi
 The Russian Occupation Zone 233
This is an open access publication. Except where otherwise noted, this work is distributed under the terms of a 
 Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence, a copy of which is available 
at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. For enquiries concerning use outside the scope of the licence 
terms, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com.
initiatives, over 70 German communists and 300 re-educated POWs were sent 
back to Germany for administrative work during June 1945, and afterwards the 
Soviet authorities regularly gave in to KPD requests for more cadres from the 
POWs in the antifascist schools.55 Of the thousands of POWs who eventually 
returned to the Soviet zone, many ended up working for the police force, an area 
in which the British authorities faced enormous recruitment problems.56 As time 
went on, the Soviet authorities at regional levels also increasingly relied on regional 
KPD party groups, especially for their ‘general situation reports’ and their testimo-
nials on candidates for jobs. In the field of public health, too, Soviet officials relied 
on this German input to put a form of ‘indirect control’ into practice.
That is not to say that there were no problems. The occupiers held the absolute 
authority for decisions, and the Soviet officers’ early appointments of mayors and 
local authorities could be just as random and ill-judged as those in other zones. 
Selections were often a result of coincidence, convenience, and ignorance. While 
Soviet commanders did regularly seek out those recommended by émigrés as oppo-
nents of the Third Reich, and they did frequently appoint such individuals, this 
strategy was not foolproof, nor were there sufficient numbers of trusted people 
available. Active Nazis and incompetent people regularly found their way into 
administrations, here just as in the other zones. Nonetheless, the complete lack of 
orientation and guidance that weighed down particularly the British, was allevi-
ated by consistent orientation points: German antifascists (above all communists 
and social democrats) were recognized to share important interests with the Soviet 
authorities, and were enlisted to carry out the most urgent tasks, without having to 
convince Soviet politicians that such contacts were necessary.
Even before the local administrations were set up, the Soviet authorities actively 
sought to pass responsibilities to the Germans.57 Following the guidelines formu-
lated by the KPD, they tried to appoint house and street elders (Obleute). The 
guidelines had specified that local and municipal administrations were to rely on a 
network of individuals who could oversee developments on a very micro-level: in 
their streets, blocks, factories. The appointment of house, street, or block elders 
was often one of the first acts of the military commanders.58 Unlike in the western 
zones, these early appointments could be made without having to appease weary 
and watchful politicians at home.
55 Naimark, The Russians in Germany, 42. In spring 1945 the KPD leadership in Berlin had around 
50 émigré communists at their disposal and around 100 re-educated POWs, see Keiderling, ‘Gruppe 
Ulbricht’, 35.
56 Kai Schoenhals, The Free Germany Movement: A Case of Patriotism or Treason? (london, 1989), 
esp. 129 ff.
57 e.g. Wolfgang Kohlhaase’s film Ich War Neunzehn (1968) depicts the journey of a 19-year-old 
German son of German émigré communists in Moscow, who accompanied the Red Army on their 
way to Berlin. The film is based on the autobiographical account of the East German filmmaker 
Konrad Wolf, whose father, the writer Friedrich Wolf, had emigrated to Moscow with his family. See 
e.g. Marc Silberman, ‘The Filmmaker Konrad Wolf ’, New German Critique, 49 (Winter 1990), 163–
91. Holger Südkamp, ‘Ich War Neunzehn: zur filmischen und politischen Bedeutung von Konrad 
Wolf ’s DEFA-Film’, Europäische Geschichtsdarstellungen—Diskussionspapiere, 2/3 (2005).
58 e.g. Berliner Zeitung, 7 July 1945, quoted in Keiderling, ‘Gruppe Ulbricht’, 50.
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These ‘elders’ or ‘trusted persons’ were used for a variety of basic tasks: to help 
organize the clearing of rubble, the compilation of lists of inhabitants and early 
censuses, the distribution of ration cards, and later more substantial population 
counts.59 Their methods were not always appreciated. In November 1945 the 
mayor for the city district Mitte reported that in response to the order to clear 
rubble, street and house trustees had been trying to enlist the population to help. 
‘But one street trustee’, the mayor noted with concern, had done this ‘in a manner 
in which we no longer want to act today. He simply wrote: “Those who do not 
come to shovel rubble won’t get ration cards!” The district officials must ensure 
that street and house trustees put their demands to the population in more polite 
terms, because we do not want to employ Nazi methods!’60 Such conflicts notwith-
standing, the Soviet authorities initially saw these trustees as useful for the collec-
tion of information and for ensuring the population’s compliance with orders.61 To 
people like Walter Ulbricht, they were also the backbone of a new organization—
potential building blocks as well as means of control.
In Berlin this temporary system facilitated general control in the early occupa-
tion, but it was of special significance for public health operations. In order to 
contain the spread of infectious diseases, health officials had to locate, identify, and 
then treat or isolate infected persons. The new Magistrat health office instructed all 
doctors in the city to take part in this work.62 But the identification of infected 
people was fraught with problems, since so many had reasons to avoid contact with 
the authorities. Unregistered refugees and displaced persons tried to hide away, as 
did Nazi Party officials, Wehrmacht deserters, escapees from POW camps, as well 
as looters, criminals, orphans, and prostitutes. Confinement in quarantine camps 
was dreaded by all. House trustees were enlisted to help. At a Magistrat health 
meeting in June 1945 it was agreed that with help from ‘the street and health trus-
tees and suitable assistants, every existing household is to be checked for suspected 
cases of infectious diseases. They are to be reported to the responsible doctor, who 
will examine them and in turn report to the district health official.’63 Over the next 
59 lAB, C Rep. 907/03-133, Eduard Mellenthsin, ‘Zur Situation nach der Befreiung’, 18 Mar. 
1965.
60 lAB, C Rep. 131/02-02, Protokoll der am 26.November 1945 stattgefundenen Bezirksamtssit-
zung, 26 Nov. 1945.
61 lAB, Magistrat Verordnung 1 June 1945. Also see the Magistrat’s ‘Status über die Organisation 
der Haus-, Straßen- und Blockobleute im Rahmen der Selbstverwaltung der Stadt Berlin’, Sept. 1945, 
in Senat von Berlin (eds.), Berlin—Quellen und Dokumente, 1945–1951 (West Berlin, 1964), 239 ff.
62 lAB, B Rep. 012/902-5, ‘Verordnung über die Bekämpfung übertragbarer Krankheiten, 
1.6.1945’, 14 June 1945. C Rep. 118–40, Magistrat der Stadt Berlin, Abteilung für Gesundheits-
dienst, Hauptgesundheitsamt, 8 Aug. 1945. Also see instructions by the ZVG, e.g. ‘Verordnung über 
den Aufbau des öffentlichen Gesundheitswesens: Bekämpfung übertragbarer Krankheiten’ of 17 Sept. 
1945, repr. in Das Deutsche Gesundheitswesen, 28 (1946).
63 lAB, B Rep. 012/902-5, ‘Niederschrift über die Dienstbesprechung mit den Amtsärzten und 
leitenden Ärzten der Berliner Gesundheitsämter am Donnerstag, dem 14. Juni 1945, in der Univer-
sitätsklinik der Charité’. B Rep. 012/902-27, Amtsartz und leiter des Gesundheitsamtes Schöneberg, 
‘Anordnung vom 18.6.45 über den zahlenmässigen Nachweis der bekanntgewordenen Infektions-
meldungen in den Bezirksgesundheitsämtern’, 21 June 1945. B Rep. 012/902-27, Gesundheitsamt 
Bezirk Wedding to Magistrat der Stadt Berlin, Abteilung Volksbildung, Presseamt, 21 June 1945.
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few months, the district health officials regularly enlisted the trustees for health 
work. less successfully, they were occasionally used to locate Nazi doctors and 
their property.64
The trustee system was abandoned as more permanent German authorities were 
established. After the Western Allies moved into their sectors of Berlin in July 
1945, they initially made some use of the elders already in place, but then banned 
the system.65 Even Ulbricht and the KPD leadership lost interest once the forma-
tion of political parties had been allowed and they could proceed with more sys-
tematic party work. The establishment of local, municipal, and regional authorities 
now became the prime focus. But here, too, the Soviet authorities’ German con-
tacts facilitated and sped up the construction of these more permanent 
organizations.
The Soviet preference to give the Germans responsibility for as much of the 
routine administration as possible certainly stemmed to a large degree from their 
personnel shortages, a problem comparable to, but more severe than, the  American 
demobilization pressures, and which had eventually similar results. Soviet health 
officers complained regularly about shortages. An officer based in Brandenburg, 
one of the most devastated areas of the zone, complained in November 1945 that 
only four health officers were available for the area, and the head of the Health 
Department had been away on leave for most of the month. It was vital, he 
argued, that more staff were made available—at the very least, those going on 
leave had to be assigned deputies who could carry on in their absence. Soviet 
specialists also had to be recruited, particularly epidemiologists and venerolo-
gists.66 lack of personnel also hampered the American and the British health 
operations, but the Soviet authorities were less cautious from the outset about the 
establishment of German administrations, and they proceeded earliest. In late 
June 1945, after the British and Americans had withdrawn from the territory of 
the Soviet zone, the SMAG released an order to create military government offices 
in the five provinces, to be matched by German provincial administrations.67 
They were formally endorsed at the beginning of July 1945, and received legisla-
tive powers in October 1945.68
Unlike the other occupation powers, who at the outset only established local 
and regional German administrations, the Soviet authorities quickly took steps to 
64 e.g. lAB, C Rep. 131/03-02, Mostroph (Strassenobmann), ‘Meldung betr. Volksgesundheits-
bund der NSDAP’, 26 Jan. 1946.
65 The system of elders was banned in the American sector on 18 Sept. 1945, and in the British 
sector on 12 Oct. 1945. Keiderling, ‘Gruppe Ulbricht’, 52.
66 BAB, Z47F, 7317/57/11, Major Rubanov (SMA Brandenburg) on work of the Soviet Health 
Department in Brandenburg in Nov. 1945.
67 On German self-government in public health: a report from Saxony stated that by early Sept. 
1945 ‘the German organs of self-government had created 23 town departments of health, 12 regional 
departments and 7 mixed (town/region) departments, which entered the system of self-government. 
The town, district and provincial directorates are constructed according to a definite structure which 
answers the needs dictated by the German population’s need for the provision of medical services on 
wide democratic principles.’ BAB, Z47F, 7317/57/11, monthly report for Nov. 1945 from SMA 
Saxony Health Department, 19 Dec. 1945.
68 Benz, Deutschland unter alliierter Besatzung, 440.
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create German-staffed specialist zonal authorities.69 Soviet Order No. 17 of 27 July 
1945 established a series of central administrations (Zentralverwaltungen), to func-
tion essentially like ministries and responsible for the whole zone. The Central 
Health Administration, the Zentralverwaltung für das Gesundheitswesen (ZVG), 
was one such quasi-ministry, with German émigrés and their old political contacts 
from before 1933 making up a significant part of the organization.70 While British 
officials struggled to implement some form of indirect control of German health 
workers, the Soviets found this easier, undoubtedly aided by the fact that Maxim 
Zetkin (a Soviet citizen, whom we have encountered in Chapter 4), was vice-
president of the ZVG and above suspicion—a real ‘intermediary’. Soviet officers 
sometimes seemed embarrassed about telling German doctors and health officials 
what to do, since, in their eyes, German medicine was so superior.71 In these condi-
tions, the ZVG soon developed from a mere recipient of Soviet orders into a pow-
erful institution.72 On issues not affecting the health of the Soviet troops, it was left 
essentially a free hand.73
The availability of German collaborators, and their practical preparations, alle-
viated some of the taxing problems of the early occupation period. Nonetheless, 
the Soviet zone was no different in that many of the projects could not be ful-
filled. The conviction that it would be possible to compile complete registers of 
former NSDAP members (as had been anticipated in the KPD guidelines), let 
alone punish them consistently, proved naïve and unfeasible. For many in the 
Soviet zone, Nazi Party membership, and particularly an individual’s degree of 
activity in and support of the Nazi regime, remained contested and disputed for 
years to come.
The cleansing of German society from Nazi personnel and ideology was to be a 
major part of Soviet policy in Germany, and that included the health service. Some 
of the earliest evidence on German medical atrocities had been collected by a Soviet 
committee, years before preparations began for the American-initiated Nuremberg 
medical trials of 1946–7. Stalin had established the National Commission on Nazi 
69 By comparison: the Länderrat was established in the American zone on 17 Oct. 1945 as a confer-
ence of the state presidents to coordinate the state administrations, with greater powers after 1947. 
Central German administrations were also formed for the US-UK Bizone in 1947, dealing with food, 
traffic, economy, finance, and postal services.
70 BAB, DQ1/2, ‘Befehl des Obersten Chefs der Sowjetischen Militär-Administration und 
Oberkommandierenden der sowjetischen Besatzungstruppen in Deutschland, den 27. Juli 1945, 
Nr.17’, signed by Marshall Zhukov, lieutenant-General Bokov, Colonel Kurasov, lieutenant Ognev.
71 On the German medical achievements to be learnt by Soviet specialists, see e.g. BAB, Z47F, 
7317/56/23, Kuznetsov (SMAG health department) to Marshall Zhukov, 7 Feb. 1946.
72 One of its responsibilities was planning the distribution of doctors across the zone. By con-
trast, Benz claims that the 11 central administrations were ‘mere supporting organs without their 
own responsibilities’, referenced with a West German PhD thesis from 1967. Wolfgang Benz, Pots-
dam 1945: Besatzungsherrschaft und Neuaufbau im Vier-Zonen Deutschland (Munich, 3rd edn. 
1994), 132. Regarding the ZVG, this position cannot be supported; also compare to Ernst, ‘Die 
beste Prophylaxe’, 28–9.
73 e.g. on social security and insurance policy, see Udo Schagen, ‘Kongruenz der Gesundheitspoli-
tik in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone?’, in Wolfgang Woelk and Jörg Vögele (eds.), Geschichte der 
Gesundheitspolitik in Deutschland: Von der Weimarer Republik bis in die Frühgeschichte der ‘doppelten 
Staatsgründung’ (Berlin, 2002), esp. 400.
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War Crimes in November 1942 to collect evidence on German atrocities through 
interviews with witnesses, interrogations of German prisoners, forensic investiga-
tions, and documentary research. Between 1943 and 1947, the commission pre-
pared over 250,000 reports. Such evidence was marshalled by the Soviet authorities 
in their first prosecutions of war crimes of the Second World War; the particular 
case concerned a German massacre of psychiatric patients at Kharkov, but on the 
basis of these investigations other details of German medical atrocities were then 
also widely publicized.74
The Soviet authorities took early steps to intern leading Nazi officials and remove 
active party members from their offices and positions of responsibility. like the 
other occupiers, they used questionnaires to assess individuals’ involvement in 
Nazi activities (see Fig. 7.1).75 The medical profession was only one of the many 
professional groups to be denazified. As in the other zones, Soviet and German 
officials were aware of the extent to which doctors had been active within the 
NSDAP and its affiliated organizations. A ZVG memo from March 1946 esti-
mated that at least ‘65 to 80 per cent’ of the doctors in the Soviet zone had joined 
the NSDAP.76 Among doctors in Saxony, a Soviet report stated, ‘up to 85 per cent 
were members of the fascist party. Undoubtedly, this fact has resulted in the wide-
spread infestation of the organs of health with fascist elements. Cases have been 
observed, where individual leaders of the German health institutions have con-
cealed their membership of the fascist party, and only after careful, many-sided 
study of the leading elements of the German health service were all the fascists 
revealed.’77 In January 1946, Kuznetsov reported to Marshall Zhukov that even 
after the most ardent Nazis had been sacked from the medical faculties, the num-
bers of Nazis remained high. ‘In Halle and Thuringia’, Kuznetsov went on, no 
purge at all could be carried out ‘because of the absence of transport’.78
German health officials were concerned by early signs that the Soviet authorities 
intended to take the purge of the health service very seriously. When Georg 
 Wundram was appointed by General Berzarin in May 1945 to organize and run 
the Berlin veterinary service, it initially seemed to be straightforward. ‘When 
I asked whom I should consider,’ Wundram remembered, ‘the gentlemen told me 
the following: You can take anyone who joined or was forced to join the party after 
1933, as long as they did not act as functionaries.’ But just a few weeks later, on 30 
June 1945, a Soviet order demanded the immediate dismissal of all former party 
members, and Wundram was now told that, from ‘the 20 veterinary officers just 
recruited, I had to dismiss 12 immediately’. Wundram ‘made a complaint to 
74 Paul Weindling, Nazi Medicine and the Nuremberg Trials: From Medical War Crimes to Informed 
Consent (london, 2004), 31–2.
75 e.g. on a list of tasks for Feb. 1946, one was the ‘Characterisation of the German doctor cadres 
on the basis of an examination of 8500 questionnaires’ Z47F, 7317/56/23, plan from Kuznetsov, 
17 Jan. 1946. See also BAB DQ1/92, ‘Fragebögen für sämtliche Heilberufe’, [undated].
76 BAB, DQ1/93, Aktennotiz, 18 Mar. 1946.
77 BAB, Z47F, 7317/57/11, monthly report for Nov. 1945, from SMA Saxony health department, 
19 Dec. 1945.
78 BAB, Z47F, 7317/56/23, Kuznetsov report for Dec. 1945, 23 Jan. 1946.
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Figure 7.1. Questionnaire for medical professions, Soviet zone [February 1946]
This material is not covered by the Creative Commons licence terms that govern the reuse 
of this publication. For permission to reuse please contact the rights holder directly.
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 Councillor [Wilhelm] Pieck, and we agreed that those who had been dismissed 
were to be re-employed a few days later as individuals conscripted to community 
service’.79 But the incident seemed to signal that the Soviets’ denazification inten-
tions were not to be written off lightly. Dr Wolf, a German health official from 
Saxony, reported in November 1945 that his office had given the Soviet authorities 
a list of ‘over forty people’ who were ‘simply indispensable’. But the Soviet officer 
had not been sympathetic at all—‘thirty people have been crossed out, and for the 
remaining ten a deadline for their replacement has been given: a fortnight, at most 
four weeks’.80 A few months later Kuznetsov wrote to Zhukov that ‘it has been 
suggested, for a second time, to the heads of the sector of the province to carry out 
a quicker and more energetic purge in the German organs of health and to replace 
members of the fascist party by antifascists and democratically inclined doctors’.81
A number of doctors, particularly in the fields of virology and vaccine research, 
had been under suspicion for some time. The bacteriologist Heinrich Zeiss, who 
had established the central bacteriological laboratory in Moscow in 1921, and 
worked there and at other biochemical and medical-geographical research insti-
tutes until his contract was terminated in 1930, now came into view again. He had 
reported details on Soviet conditions to the German embassy in Moscow through-
out his time in the Soviet Union, had joined the NSDAP in 1931, and in 1933 
became director of the prestigious Institute of Hygiene in Berlin. Although the 
NKVD’s accusation that Zeiss had masterminded the bacteriological warfare 
against the Soviet Union could not be substantiated, it was not surprising that 
Zeiss was arrested in 1945. In fact, we now know that Zeiss’s diverse research 
projects were all geared towards the German conquest of the East.82 He was tried 
by the Soviet authorities in 1947, and died in March 1949 in a prison hospital in 
Vladimir from Parkinson’s disease.83 Even if some of these efforts were driven by 
score-settling rather than more systematic denazification criteria, from the start the 
Soviet authorities made determined efforts to cleanse German society.
But denazification of the health service was seriously hampered by the shortages 
of doctors who could take over once the Nazi doctors had been dismissed.84 Short-
ages of general practitioners, specialists, nurses, and health officials were particu-
larly severe in the two central and northern provinces of the zone, Brandenburg 
79 ‘Arbeitsdienstverpflichtete’, BAB, DQ1/1338, Diskussion zum Referat Dr leo, ‘Massnahmen 
gegen Pg.-Ärzte, Ausbildungs- und Prüfungsangelegenheiten der Angehörigen der Heilberufe, die 
durch den Faschismus verfolgt waren’, 3.Tagung der leiter der landes- und Provinzialgesundheit-
sämter am 11.11.45.
80 ‘Arbeitsdienstverpflichtete’, BAB, DQ1/1338.
81 BAB, Z47F, 7317/56/23, Kuznetsov’s report for Dec. 1945, 23 Jan. 1946.
82 Paul Weindling, ‘Heinrich Zeiss, Hygiene and the Holocaust’, in Dorothy and Roy Porter (eds.), 
Doctors, Politics and Society: Historical Essays (Amsterdam, 1993), 181.
83 Hans Harmsen, Gesundheitspolitische Organisation in der DDR und im Ostblock: Zur Entwicklung 
und Organisation des Gesundheitswesens in der DDR unter Mitberücksichtigung der UdSSR und ost-
europäischer Volksdemokratien (Hamburg, 1975).
84 Ruth Mattheis has claimed the opposite, Ruth Mattheis, ‘Der öffentliche Gesundheitsdienst in 
der Nachkriegszeit: Reorganisation und zukunftsorientierte Ansätze’, in Akademie für öffentliches 
Gesundheitswesen in Düssldorf (eds.), 50 Jahre Gessetz über die Vereinheitlichung des Gesundheitswesens 
(Düsseldorf, 1984), 43–4.
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and Mecklenburg, and were discussed on many occasions.85 During a meeting in 
November 1945, a German health official from Brandenburg, Dr Christians, 
expressed his concern about the huge personnel problem faced by his office. They 
were short of at least 150 doctors. He had been ordered to staff the main office 
with twelve doctors, but he only had two. Although he had been asking the south-
ern provinces for months to send him doctors, they had only managed to send 
four.86 But problems also existed in the south of the zone. Saxony and Thuringia, 
while occupied by American troops, had been saturated with doctors, but this 
surplus quickly evaporated when the Soviets arrived. Dr Drechsler, a health official 
from Thuringia, noted that before November 1945 300 surplus doctors had been 
counted in his area, but by mid-November 1945 most of them had moved west-
wards into the British or American zones.87
The combination of potentially disastrous health conditions and serious person-
nel shortages limited the scope of denazification in the medical profession, and 
compromises increasingly dominated in the new policies. As in the other zones, 
the initial period of quick dismissals and strict applications of procedures was fol-
lowed by a reassessment, as Soviet and German authorities insisted that more flex-
ible and viable arrangements were necessary. And ideologically, the focus on a 
structural transformation of German society—the weakening of the socio- 
economic base which had given rise to and supported Nazism, through land reform 
and expropriation—made it easier to be less insistent on the removal of any par-
ticular individuals.88 Far from the ambition that NSDAP members should not be 
allowed to remain in any positions of responsibility, in reality, just as in the other 
zones, former Nazi doctors became a crucial pillar of the zone’s health service.
A letter from July 1946 outlined three main problems with the denazification of 
medicine: ‘1.) Unreliability of the questionnaires. 2.) Support of some Nazi doc-
tors from official organs. 3.) lack of replacements.’89 Problems with the question-
naires were widely acknowledged, and plagued not just the health service. 
Questionnaires alone, this memorandum reiterated, could ‘give no correct picture 
about the political past of the person concerned. It is necessary to obtain detailed 
information with the help of the local police authorities, but particularly through 
the local groups of the antifascist parties.’ The second point affected the health 
service more specifically. Mayors and regional administrators were keen to hold 
onto their doctors, Nazi or not, and regularly stymied attempts to identify and 
remove former Nazis from their jurisdiction. The smooth running of their regions 
85 BAB, DQ1/93, Deutsche Zentralverwaltung für das Gesundheitswesen, ‘Ärzte-Planung’ 
[undated, autumn 1945]. DQ1/93, Präsident des landes Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, ‘Verordnung 
Nr. 130, betr. die Einberufung von Ärzten und anderen Angehörigen der Heilberufe zu fachlichen 
Dienstleistungen’, 26 Sept. 1946.
86 BAB, DQ1/1338, 3.Tagung der leiter der landes- und Provinzial-Gesundheitsämter vom 10. 
November 1945.
87 BAB, DQ1/1338, 3.Tagung der leiter der landes- und Provinzial-Gesundheitsämter vom 10. 
November 1945.
88 Compare Mary Fulbrook, The Two Germanies, 1945–1990: Problems of Interpretation (london, 
1992), 64.
89 BAB, DQ1/93, letter to Schölmerich, 22 July 1946.
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depended, to a large extent, on a functioning health service, and losing medical 
personnel would only hamper their work.90 The job of convincing local authorities 
to part with their Nazis would be easier if new candidates were available to replace 
them, but they were in extremely short supply. The third point was therefore the 
most serious. The lack of professionally and politically adequate replacements 
could only be overcome over a long period of time, the letter maintained, and only 
through detailed coordination of the regions and the assessment of cases on their 
individual merits. In the shorter term, compromises had to be made.
The shortages on one hand and the restrictions imposed by the denazification 
directives on the other were regularly voiced concerns by German health officials. 
As early as June 1945, Ferdinand Sauerbruch told the Berlin health officers that the 
personnel question had become acute. ‘In future’, he said, ‘personnel measures 
need to consider above all that the medical supply of the population suffers no 
significant damage.’ At these and subsequent meetings, there was overwhelming 
agreement that those doctors who had at some point been involved in the NSDAP 
should be allowed to continue. This was not only because, as Sauerbruch main-
tained, this was the ‘humanly loyal’ thing to do, but primarily because it was ‘in 
the interest of public health’. A strict application of party membership as a reason 
to dismiss doctors, Dr Emanuel insisted, was ‘regrettable’, and would ‘lead to a 
crisis, especially in the care for venereal diseases’.91
This argument was made more vocally as conditions deteriorated. At a meeting 
in September 1945, a Red Cross representative complained that ‘[w]e are doing 
everything possible, but we have no personnel at our disposal, no nurses and no 
medical auxiliary personnel. We have been told that we are not allowed to employ 
women who have been involved in the Nazi women’s organizations. Where are we 
supposed to get personnel from? If the ex-Nazi women cannot be used, then noth-
ing is possible.’92 The Saxony health officer said that ‘he could not easily do with-
out the assistance of former party members, not even without the active ones’. In 
Brandenburg, another health officer reported, ‘over 90 per cent of the hospital doc-
tors were in the [Nazi] Party. For the time being, technically irreplaceable doctors, 
such as surgeons, will have to stay in their positions, but also other specialist doc-
tors and directors must still be employed in the interim, even if they were in the 
Nazi Party.’93 Others said that there were not even enough people available for 
training, which was itself a long process. A month later, one health official observed 
that ‘we are forced into the role of the Nazi protectors, just simply by having to 
carry out absolutely essential work’. But, he added, he and his colleagues also knew 
90 e.g. lAB, C Rep. 118–584, Dr H. Graass, ‘Darstellung meiner Arbeit als Ärztlicher Direktor im 
Waldhaus Charlottenburg’, [undated].
91 lAB, B Rep. 012/902-5, ‘Bericht über die von der Abteilung für Gesundheitsdienst veran-
staltete Dienstversammlung der leitenden Ärzte und der Amtsärzte der Berliner Gesundheit-
sämter am Donnerstag, den 31.5.1945, 16 Uhr in der Chirurgischen Universitätsklinik der 
Charité’, 14 June 1945.
92 Zhukov’s order of 19 Sept. 1945 dissolved the Red Cross in the Soviet zone, and all regional 
offices were also to be dissolved. But at meetings, German health officers sometimes continued to 
identify former Red Cross members as such.
93 BAB, DQ1/1338, meeting of Land and provincial health officers, [19 Sept. 1945], 71.
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that ‘generally speaking, the equation of Nazi Party member equals Nazi activist 
simply does not reflect reality’.94
The realization that Nazis, even active ones, were necessary for maintaining 
order and preventing public health disasters also struck many Soviet officials. In 
anticipation of the winter months, the Soviet authorities insisted that denazifica-
tion in the medical sphere had to be conducted pragmatically. Even though Soviet 
officials generally reserved the right to make final decisions on individual cases, 
they were often willing to accept lenient and pragmatic adjudications.95 As Kuznetsov 
explained to Zhukov, ‘The general purification of these posts from Nazis is taking 
place dependent on the selection of suitable candidates and on the necessity of 
preserving an uninterrupted health service for the population, given the vastly 
increased tendency to get sick.’ One series of compromises was made, with Soviet 
approval, just days after hostilities ended: people like Ferdinand Sauerbruch, Erwin 
Gohrbandt, and Georg Wundram were recruited to the Soviet zone’s health serv-
ice, regardless of previous military and political activities. Some Germans were 
disconcerted that doctors with Nazi affiliations such as Sauerbruch were being 
appointed, and that Soviet commanders seemed so lenient with Nazis.96
Soon, more extensive compromises were being contemplated. At a meeting in 
September 1945, Paul Konitzer (the president of the ZVG) explained that the 
question of what could be done with the ex-Nazi doctors had been raised with the 
Soviet authorities, and everybody accepted that compromises had to be made. At 
the most recent negotiation, he said, ‘[w]e were told that we should make those 
doctors and other personnel work for us. We must not give them any positions of 
responsibility, but should make them work under supervision. At the moment we 
cannot proceed without them.’97 Through so-called ‘emergency contracts of 
employment’, it became possible to employ former Nazis temporarily to carry out 
important jobs, and to allow them to continue in their clinical jobs. Fritz leo (or 
lettow), a concentration camp survivor and department head in the ZVG, 
explained that while ‘politically implicated men and SS doctors will be excluded 
completely’, actually, ‘as far as is absolutely necessary and tolerable, active fascists 
could perhaps still be employed for another three to six months’. And, he went on, 
‘small-fry and nominal Nazis (Mitläufer) will be continued to be treated accom-
modatingly. A similar procedure will be instituted for hospitals and other 
institutions.’98
94 BAB, DQ1/1338, ‘Diskussion zum Referat Dr leo’.
95 BAB, Z47F, 7317/56/23, report from Kuznetsov to Zhukov, 14 Feb. 1946. Heinz Domeinski, 
‘Zur Entnazifizierung der Ärzteschaft im lande Thüringen’, in A. Thom and H. Spaar (eds.), Medizin 
im Faschismus (Berlin, 1985), 250–5.
96 Wilhelm Pieck reported that he had received complaints that too many Nazis were still at liberty, 
and had even acquired administrative posts; complaints particularly concerned Sauerbruch’s appoint-
ment. ‘Gespräch Wilhelm Piecks mit Oberstleutnant K. l. Selesnjow’, 26 June 1945, in Keiderling, 
‘Gruppe Ulbricht’, 581–2.
97 BAB, DQ1/1338, ‘Protokoll über die Sitzung am 18.9.45’, 59, 67.
98 BAB, DQ1/1338, meeting of Land and provincial health officers, [19 Sept. 1945], 71. At the 
same meeting, Konitzer’s proposal to compile a list of antifascist doctors received only a lukewarm 
welcome.
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Just as in the other zones denazification was to focus primarily on the health 
administrative and hospital positions, and was to be applied less strictly among the 
general practitioners; just as in the other zones, this emphasis was hampered by the 
fact that health officers’ jobs were not popular. Professor Walter, from the 
 Mecklenburg health office explained: ‘What can we offer our officers of health? At 
the beginning we could not even pay their wages. Now they get the salary of a 
schoolteacher. We have taken them away from their practices, we cannot give them 
cars, and we don’t have food for them either. A man is much better off in his pri-
vate practice than as a health officer. Currently I have no other doctors and have to 
work with 90 per cent Nazis. I consider it unlikely that we will get new recruits in 
the near future.’ Dr Wolf pointed out that ‘general practitioners—especially our 
disreputable Nazi doctors—earn 10,000 marks a week’.99
It was not just health officers’ jobs that were unpopular. Epidemic work, the 
most urgent of all, was universally loathed by doctors, especially where it required 
working in refugee camps and quarantine stations. As a result, the German health 
authorities devised a system of emergency conscription. They extended the emer-
gency measures that had been in operation during the war years, with the crucial 
difference that the doctors called up were specifically those who had been members 
of the NSDAP.100 At a meeting in November 1945, ZVG officials explained they 
had agreed with the Soviet authorities that although former members of the 
NSDAP were generally not to be employed, ‘[i]ndispensable qualified personnel 
such as doctors, technicians, mathematicians, statisticians, technical or administra-
tive specialists can be conscripted from the ranks of former NSDAP members, if 
they have not been active Nazis and if their employment is necessary for recon-
struction, for the prevention of dangers or for the overcoming of crises. This is a 
form of work conscription.’101 Soon, even active Nazis were included in this 
arrangement. In December 1945, a directive stated that ‘[w]e do not have enough 
doctors for the struggle against epidemics and the treatment of refugees’, and the 
‘situation is deteriorating as more and more refugees arrive. In addition to the 
measures already ordered, the following is decreed: All doctors, if they have been 
members of the Nazi party or one of its affiliated organizations, who apply to dis-
trict health offices for employment or permission to practice, are henceforth 
obliged to work in the prevention of epidemics and treatment of refugees.’102
This conscription was widely practised. Since the ratio of doctors to patients 
continued to be much better in the south of the zone, former Nazi doctors from 
Saxony and Thuringia in particular were ordered to participate in urgent epidemic 
operations in the most devastated areas in the north of the zone. As early as 
99 BAB, DQ1/1338, ‘Diskussion zum Referat Dr leo’, 148.
100 leo, BAB, DQ1/1338, meeting of Land and provincial health officers, [19 Sept. 1945], 71. 
‘Notdienstverordnung vom 15.10.1938’ and ‘VO zur Sicherstellung der ärztlichen Versorgung vom 
27.5.1942’, both in Ernst, ‘Die beste Prophylaxe’, 182.
101 BAB, DQ1/1338, ‘Diskussion zum Referat Dr leo’, especially statement of Mössig, 147 ff. Also 
see DQ1/93, ZVG draft, 16 Oct. 1945.
102 BAB, DQ1/93, ZVG to lGA Saxony, Thuringia, Mecklenburg, Provinzialgesundheitsamt 
Sachsen and Brandenburg, 29 Dec. 1945.
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 September 1945, a health official from Saxony reported that in his area, Nazis had 
been ‘divided into three groups. The first group has to be dropped completely. The 
second will be used in special operations—a kind of penal appointment—and will 
be paid wages. The third group will be left to run their practices, but with some 
limitations and without the [full] responsibilities.’103 A Soviet report on the health 
situation in Brandenburg observed that in November 1945, thirty-five doctors had 
been received from Thuringia, and most were ordered to carry out epidemic 
work.104 Numerous individual cases also document this development. In  December 
1945, the ZVG sent a Dr Rauschning to the Brandenburg health office. He ‘was 
forbidden to practise medicine by the American Military Forces because of his 
membership in the NSDAP’, they explained, but here he was ‘suitable for employ-
ment in the epidemic service’.105 In the same week, a Dr Amschler, who had also 
been a member of the NSDAP, was sent to Brandenburg so that he could be ‘put 
to work in the interest of the public good’, and his ‘special knowledge and ability’ 
be taken into account.106
Through these conscriptions, two problems were solved at the same time: the most 
devastated areas received much-needed medical personnel from those with a surplus 
(see Fig. 7.2), and politically implicated doctors were somewhat punished by having 
to move to new areas and carry out difficult and dangerous work. Some ZVG people 
also gave a more strategic interpretation: sending Nazi doctors to new areas, where 
they would generally not know anybody, would help to break up ‘anti-democratic 
cliques’.107 It was perhaps unavoidable that Nazis would have to be tolerated in public 
health employment, one memo agreed, but it could at least be arranged that ‘those 
reactionary elements who form a tightly woven and suffocating belt around our 
reform attempts’ were removed from their areas, and their networks severed.108
This policy had some unintended consequences. Health officials in the areas 
most in need of medical personnel complained that they were only ever sent 
Nazi doctors, and never any politically useful individuals, which made their 
own denazification attempts utterly futile. Hermann Redetzky, in charge of the 
Mecklenburg health office, wrote that ‘[u]p to now, almost all the doctors who 
have been sent to Land Mecklenburg-Vorpommern to work in the epidemic 
service or the care of resettled persons have been old party members (member-
ships from 1931 to 1933). As grateful as we are about the support given in these 
allocations of doctors, I would like to register considerable concern about that 
fact that only such heavily implicated Nazi doctors are being sent to us. The 
already difficult issue of political cleansing and the assistance of Nazi doctors is 
thus made infinitely more  problematic. Of course, I have no complaints about 
the practical work done by these doctors, but I believe that it must be possible 
103 BAB, DQ1/1338, meeting of Land and provincial health officers, [19 Sept. 1945], 71.
104 BAB, Z47F, 7317/57/11, Major Rubanov (SMA Brandenburg), on work of SMA health 
Brandenburg in Nov. 1945. Z47F, 7317/57/11, landesgesundheitsamt Thüringen to SMA Thürin-
gen, 14 Dec. 1945, ‘betr. Monat November 1945’.
105 BAB, DQ1/92, ZVG to Provinzialverwaltung der Mark Brandenburg (Abteilung für Gesund-
heitswesen, Potsdam), 21 Dec. 1945.
106 BAB, DQ1/92, ZVG to Dr Amschler, 28 Dec. 1945.
107 BAB, DQ1/93, ZVG minute, 18 Mar. 1946. Ernst, ‘Die beste Prophylaxe’, 128.
108 BAB, DQ1/93, Memorandum from Poelz [?] to leo, Hess, Gysi, 16 Oct. 1945.
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to make a more balanced selection.’109 At a meeting in November, Dr Christians 
re iterated that he did ‘not want the province of Brandenburg to become a high density 
province, or that the Nazis from SS-Obergruppenführer to SS-Untergruppenführer 
Figure 7.2. ‘Ärzte-Planung’, map for redistribution across the Soviet zone, 12 December 1945
This material is not covered by the Creative Commons licence terms that govern the reuse 
of this publication. For permission to reuse please contact the rights holder directly.
109 BAB, DQ1/93, Hermann Redetzky (President of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern health office), to 
lGA Thüringen and Sachsen, and ZVG, 16 May 1946.
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all end up in the province of Brandenburg, of all places. From a hundred 
 doctors, I would like to get at least ten antifascists.’110
These pleas had little effect. Even more problematic was that doctors often 
resisted the conscription orders, or fled on the way to their new placements. Dr 
Christians noted that ‘doctors come very unwillingly to the province of  Brandenburg, 
and when they see the delightful scene that awaits them, they don’t even get out of 
the train’.111 In November 1945, a note from the Thuringia health office stated that 
of 106 ex-Nazi doctors sent to Brandenburg and Mecklenburg, only 80 had 
reached their destination.112 The Saxony health office reported that from their ini-
tial surplus of over 300 doctors, half had meanwhile fled to the western zones, and 
the other half had simply refused to be conscripted.113 Mayors and other district 
officials often supported the doctors’ refusal to move, and the ZVG’s attempts to 
take ‘strictest measures’, or ‘to lock up ruthlessly all those who refuse[d]’, were 
greeted with scorn.114
In spite of these problems, the conscription of former Nazi doctors into the 
health service was widely seen as an effective measure. While conscription into the 
epidemic service had been designed as a stopgap measure, and even a form of pun-
ishment, in practice, much to the disgust of left-wing health officers, it was often a 
means for the permanent rehabilitation of Nazi doctors. In December 1946 the 
communist Carl Coutelle noted with concern that the epidemic urgency had 
passed, but that many of those sent to new areas had in the meantime opened new 
private practices. Nobody bothered them anymore since they had apparently done 
their duty, and, since the health authorities in their new areas often did not know 
about their backgrounds, they rarely had to face any further denazification.115
While the conscription itself was based on necessity, it also contained the idea 
both of a neutralization of Nazi elements in the public health service, and the pos-
sibility of atonement or probation through such work. Occasionally it was spelled 
out that work in the epidemic operations could enable Nazi doctors to make up for 
their past. One notice proclaimed that by relocating to areas where they were most 
needed, ‘every doctor does his bit to overcome the heavy burden of guilt which 
unworthy doctors have incurred in their treatment of other peoples and their own 
countrymen in the concentration camps’.116 Sauerbruch, who himself was not very 
keen on an appointment to the Berlin Magistrat, was offered a kind of atonement: 
‘especially because you have loaded on yourself a certain share of the blame,’ he was 
told, ‘you must now do everything to help the millions of Berlin inhabitants by 
110 BAB, DQ1/1338, ‘3.Tagung der leiter der landes- und Provinzial-Gesundheitsämter vom 
10.November 1945’, 117.
111 BAB, DQ1/1338, ‘3.Tagung der leiter der landes- und Provinzial-Gesundheitsämter vom 
10.November 1945’, 117.
112 BAB, DQ1/93, lGA Thüringen an SMA Thüringen, 28 Nov. 1945. Ernst, ‘Die beste Prophylaxe’, 159.
113 BAB, DQ1/93, memo to Fritz leo, 14 Nov. 1945.
114 BAB, DQ1/1338, ‘Besprechungsniederschrift über die Sitzung der leiter aller Provinzial- u. 
landesgesundheitsämter der sowjetischen Okkupationszone in der Zentralverwaltung für das Gesund-
heitswesen am 2. Oktober 1945’.
115 BAB, DQ1/182, ‘Protokoll der Tagung der Personalreferenten der lGA am 21.12.1946’.
116 BAB, DQ1/93, ‘An alle Ärzte!’ [undated].
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building up an ordered health service and thus to protect them from the serious 
damage of epidemics. This is an honourable task.’117
Although health conditions gradually improved—by late 1947 most water and 
sewage installations had been repaired and the major infectious disease rates 
 lowered—German and Soviet commentators were forced to conclude that the 
denazification of the medical profession had largely failed. As Kuznetsov noted in 
February 1946, not only were communists and social democrats still a minority in 
the German health service, but the removal of Nazis had so far been unsuccessful. 
Among the local and regional health departments, he wrote, there were at least 
25–30 per cent former Nazis, and the ‘chief doctors at the hospitals, who play a 
considerable role in the German populations’ health provision, are the group which 
is most infested by former Nazis. Amongst 417 chief doctors of the major 
 hospitals . . . there are over 50 per cent Nazis.’118
CONFRONTATIONS
Confrontations between German and Soviet officials took place over a range of 
issues. Conflict stemmed particularly from German dismay about regular reminders 
that Soviet interests, rather than German welfare, were of primary importance. One 
of the most contentious problems was that of venereal diseases, at all times a major 
concern of the Soviet authorities. Soviet reports contained lengthy discussions of 
this topic, and expressed great alarm about high infection rates among their troops 
and the population at large. The German authorities were blamed when a series of 
measures and Soviet orders did not seem to have had much effect. A Soviet health 
officer based in Saxony reported that ‘the VD infection rates among the military 
personnel in the area, which remained high during October, have also not improved 
in November. The German authorities have failed to open venereal departments in 
Dresden and leipzig.’119 Some months later, Kuznetsov complained to Zhukov 
that, despite his department’s best efforts, VD rates were still very high, mainly 
because the German health authorities had not done enough to reduce them. The 
high VD rates, he maintained, could be ‘explained not only by the current social 
and economic circumstances of Germany, but they are also the result of the unsat-
isfactory work of the German organs of health. Despite an increase in the number 
of medical institutions which treat venereal diseases, the German organs have still 
not taken satisfactory measures in response to the commander-in-chief ’s order of 
7 August 1945 to come to grips with venereal diseases.’120
117 Hans Mahle, ‘Aus unveröffentlichen Erinnerungen’, 1988, in Keiderling, ‘Gruppe Ulbricht’, 
721. In their memoirs, both Mahle and Walter Ulbricht claim to have approached and recruited 
 Sauerbruch independently, and it is not clear who actually talked to him.
118 BAB, Z47F, 7317/56/23, Kuznetsov to Zhukov, 14 Feb. 1946.
119 This passage was underlined. Z47F, 7317/57/11, monthly report for Nov. 1945 from SMA Saxony 
health department, 19 Dec. 1945. The VD problem was top of the list in Z47F, 7317/57/11, report for 
Nov. 1945, on state of health services in Saxony, Serkova, 20 Dec. 1945, signed also by Morosov.
120 Z47F, 7317/56/23, Kuznetsov letter to Zhukov, 7 Feb. 1946.
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These complaints about inadequate German efforts to some extent reflected 
Soviet health officers’ attempts to avoid responsibility for failures and administra-
tive responsibilities. But they also stemmed from the realization that German doc-
tors did not always agree that the VD problem really was the most pressing of all 
the health issues. In November 1945, Franz Redeker reminded a Magistrat health 
meeting yet again that ‘the occupying powers were particularly sensitive with regard 
to venereal diseases’. The meeting knew what this entailed—having to concentrate 
all efforts into VD control when other problems, tuberculosis for example, were 
deemed to be more urgent.121 These tensions were exacerbated because, in contrast 
to the Western Allies, the Soviets had hardly any penicillin at their disposal to 
make VD treatment more popular. Treatment was dependent on traditional and 
unpopular methods without rapid results, such as the use of Salvarsan, which had 
long and complex treatment courses and side effects.122 Penicillin, which made the 
treatment of gonorrhoea and syphilis so much faster and painless in the other 
zones, was only available in very small quantities in the Soviet zone, and never for 
the treatment of non-venereal diseases, much to the German health officials’ 
dismay.123 In February 1946, a SMAG report complained of shortages and called 
for increased production of penicillin at the plant in Adlershof, and the urgent 
supply of other drugs through the Soviet zone’s trade with the western zones.124 
But the ZVG complained about severe shortages of penicillin as late as January 
1949.125 Throughout the post-war years, at joint meetings of health officials from 
the four Berlin sectors, those from the eastern city districts heard how their western 
colleagues had been given drugs which they themselves lacked.126
Perhaps the greatest source of confrontations between German and Soviet offi-
cials, and between different Soviet interests, regarded the policy of extracting repa-
rations from industrial installations, from goods and raw materials—including 
both the organized waves of dismantling industries, railway tracks, and harbour 
installations, and the Soviet soldiers’ spontaneous hunts for trophies (including 
raw material, cars, food, money). Initially, the situation was particularly extreme in 
Berlin, where much of the industrial centre was to be removed. Dismantling squads 
rushed to work, because the imminent arrival of the other Allies in the western 
sectors meant they would soon have to give up those parts. As Theodor Plievier 
described, ‘[t]here had hardly been time to clear up the corpses of the war casual-
ties and suicides which were lying everywhere in the grounds. Machines, furniture, 
work benches and cupboards, window and door frames, floors and window sills, 
121 lAB, B Rep 012/902-5, Magistrat health meeting on 8 Nov. 1945.
122 Stefan Kirchberger, ‘Public Health Policy in Germany, 1945–1949: Continuity and a New 
Beginning’, in Donald W. light and Alexander Schuller (eds.), Political Values and Health Care: The 
German Experience (Cambridge, Mass., 1986), 204. Timms, The Politics of Fertility, 37.
123 Andreas Dinter, Seuchenalarm in Berlin: Seuchengeschehen und Seuchenbekämpfung in Berlin 
nach dem II.Weltkrieg (Berlin, 1999).
124 BAB, DQ1/139, excerpt of SMAG report, 12 Feb. 1946, also ‘Massnahmen zur Abstellung 
noch bestehender Mängel in der Durchführung des Befehls Nr. 030’, also quoted in Timms, The  Politics 
of Fertility, 224.
125 BAB, DQ1/2209, Dr Marcusson, 20 May 1951. Timms, The Politics of Fertility, 224.
126 lAB, B Rep. 012/902-5, ‘Besprechung der Amtsärzte am Donnerstag, d. 22.11.1945’.
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water pipes and drains, electricity cables, the “whole works” as the lieutenant called 
it, everything had to be dismantled.’127 This practice seemed to confirm the German 
stereotype of the barbarian, destructive, and stupid Russian enemy. The popula-
tion saw little distinction between dismantling and plain demolition. Sticking to 
the timetable and loading the necessary weights appeared more important than the 
condition of the goods obtained, and much was broken.
The Soviet Health Department was directly caught between the priority to col-
lect German research, drugs, and goods on the one hand, and stabilizing the public 
health situation on the other. The resulting tension was a recurrent subject in the 
health reports submitted by Kuznetsov and his staff. A December 1945 report on 
the public health conditions in Saxony illustrated at length that, here, in ‘the rich-
est province in the whole of the Soviet occupation zone of Germany’, all important 
industries could be found. The area was ‘the base for the provision with goods, 
both for the maintenance of the occupation forces and also for the delivery of 
goods to the Soviet Union by way of reparations’.128
Kuznetsov regularly compiled lists of what had been dismantled and studied 
under his department’s supervision, and listed the wagonloads of medical equip-
ment and drugs which had already been sent back to the Soviet Union.129 
In  February 1946, he wrote to Zhukov that under the newly designed production 
plan for German medical industries ‘it has been envisaged that medicines and 
instruments worth approx. 30 Million marks should be produced for delivery to 
the [Soviet] Union and for covering the needs of the occupation forces’. The SMAG 
Health Department had worked out a plan of reparations, Kuznetsov went on: 
particularly those items which were ‘in greatest deficit in the USSR—ascorbic acid, 
bromine and x-ray tubes, etc.’ were to be delivered to the Soviet Union.130 Medical 
institutes and university clinics were also to be dismantled. ‘In connection with the 
excessive surplus of medical faculties in the Soviet Zone’, Kuznetsov said, ‘the deci-
sion was taken not to continue the medical faculty in Rostock, and instead to send 
its equipment to the Soviet Union so as to allow for the re-establishment of the 
Stalingrad medical institute. Following a government decision, a group of profes-
sors from the Stalingrad medical institute are currently visiting the zone. They are 
engaged in the selection of equipment for their institute.’131
The harsh reality of reparations resulted in German protests, but this was not 
simply a conflict between Germans and Russians. The reparation teams were also 
resented by many military government officials for disrupting the smooth running 
of the zone, and there were considerable tensions within the Soviet military and 
127 Plievier, Berlin, 243.
128 Z47F, 7317/57/11, monthly report for Nov. 1945 from SMA Saxony health department, 
19 Dec. 1945.
129 On collecting scientific findings, see BAB, Z47F, 7317/56/21, correspondence about the Soviet 
investigations of the bacteriological laboratories in the Soviet zone. Also Z47F, 7317/56/21, Sokolov 
to Smirnov, 8 Dec. 1945. Z47F, 7317/56/21, letter and report from Col. lebediv and Major  Kiktjenka 
to Deputy Commander of the Department of Internal Affairs of the SMAG (Colonel lapjenkov), 
5 Oct. 1945.
130 Z47F, 7317/56/23, report from Kuznetsov to Zhukov, 7 Feb. 1946.
131 Z47F, 7317/56/23, Kuznetsov to Zhukov, 7 Feb. 1946.
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between the authorities responsible for extracting reparations and those responsi-
ble for relations with the Germans.132 The ruthless policy of removing as much 
material as possible, and as quickly as possible, it was regularly argued, would cause 
economic chaos and political uprisings, and undermine the Soviet ability to admin-
ister the zone, not to mention their reputation. Kuznetsov’s Health Department 
was caught between conflicting Soviet agendas. While obeying reparations policy, 
health officers argued that, given the prevalent concerns about epidemics, German 
medical industry would have to produce significant amounts of vaccines and drugs 
for German consumption, or else imports were going to be necessary. This seems 
to have had some success, even before Soviet economic policy was altered more 
dramatically in 1947. A newspaper article in October 1945 reported that because 
of the dire need for vaccines, a series of medical factories were being restarted in the 
zone. Zhukov also ordered that German health offices were to be given vaccines 
from the Red Army stores, and one store had already handed over 3,000 litres of 
typhus vaccine to the Berlin authorities.133
Many Germans justified their hatred of Soviet rule by pointing to the evident 
randomness of their appropriations and their lack of interest in the plight of the 
German population. Doctors and health officers, in particular, complained about 
how Soviet commanders had taken their cars, petrol, or clinical equipment. How 
could they, as agreed, build a new medical institute, one letter from the ZVG 
stated, if the commander in Saxony had confiscated their 3,000 tons of cement? 
Their building officials had told them that they could do nothing until the cement 
was released. This case was only resolved when Maxim Zetkin met the Soviet 
authorities in person and obtained the release of the building materials.134 At a 
meeting of German health officers in November 1945, Professor Walter from the 
Mecklenburg health office reported that it was crucial to the fight against tubercu-
losis that the population was screened by X-ray examinations, but ‘[i]n  Mecklenburg, 
the majority of sanatoria have been seized by the Red Army, and we are temporar-
ily defenceless against that’.135 Among individual doctors, the confiscation of their 
cars and petrol were fiercely resented. One example of many is Dr Bendixen’s com-
plaint that his car had been taken, even though he presented the Soviet officer with 
his special licence. After much pleading, it had eventually been returned, but with 
differently sized tyres so that he could still not use it.136
Complaints from the social democrat and communist health officials stemmed 
particularly from their disappointment with Soviet policy. Their own political 
work was made so much harder, they argued, and their credibility reduced, because 
the Soviet authorities not only did not seem interested in building socialism in 
Germany, but actually hindered their own efforts in this respect. Max Klesse, a 
132 Naimark, The Russians in Germany, 26.
133 BAB, DQ1/1524, ‘Straffe Organisation des Gesundheitsschutzes: unfassende Vorbeugungs-
maßnahmen der Sowjetischen Militärverwaltung’, Der Morgen, 31 Oct. 1945.
134 BAB, DQ1/1612, DZG to Colonel Sokolov, 23 Aug. 1946.
135 BAB, DQ1/1338, ‘3.Tagung der leiter der landes- und Provinzial-Gesundheitsämter in der 
sowjetischen Besatzungszone, 10.11.45’.
136 BAB, DQ1/92, Dr med. H. Bendixen to Provinzialgesundheitsamt Halle, 27 Oct. 1946.
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social democrat who worked in the ZVG, argued that ‘[a]t least we Marxists know 
so well that the necessary re-education of the German people is no purely ideologi-
cal or pedagogical matter, but depends on us antifascists having to win the confi-
dence of the masses through stable prices, wages, and work conditions. If the 
German people fell for Hitler, it was not least because with the help of rearma-
ment, control of money and capital markets he managed to take care of the lives of 
the little man.’ The supply questions would have to be solved urgently, Klesse 
argued, as so many communists and socialists had taken up positions in the admin-
istrations, public opinion would blame any failures on the left. It was especially 
counterproductive, ‘if the population sees how entire factories such as the local 
DIWAG are being “relocated”, and patients will start to die in the foreseeable 
future because they have no insulin and liver medications’.137
A few weeks later, Klesse again vented his anger over the nature of Soviet rule. 
Soviet commanders abused their power, he wrote, and their ‘objective incompe-
tence’ and ‘lack of any sense of responsibility’, combined with the fact that so 
many in the Red Army were stealing or simply taking what they wanted, were very 
counterproductive. He was fed up with the indifference shown by many of the 
Soviet administrators, he declared, as well as their ‘stinking laziness, complacency, 
and rudeness, especially by the lowest ranks of officials and translators and other 
liaison personnel of the Red Army, who often treat Germans like dirt or simply 
ignore them altogether’. As an urgent measure, ‘the dishonest, the incompetent, 
the lazy, the irresponsible, and the other kinds of parasites’ must be removed from 
service in Germany. But ‘one of the gravest aspects’ of the current situation, in 
Klesse’s view, was ‘the very scant consideration of the Soviet Union for the posi-
tions of the left in Germany’. Overall, ‘the destruction of the German industrial 
basis weakens the proletariat and the entire left, the expulsion of the eastern 
 Germans by the Poles threatens the food supply, and the removal of German loco-
motives and railways puts at risk any potential imports’. All this would prevent any 
real change in German society. ‘The result must be to stir up nationalism again,’ he 
wrote, ‘because actual existence determines consciousness: hunger, cold, disease, 
and epidemics will not be blamed by the masses on Hitler, but shoved onto the 
Soviets and the German left, unless some significant changes will take place 
shortly.’138
These disputes were undoubtedly intense and bitter: there were regular Soviet 
complaints about the German authorities’ lack of drive and initiative, and the 
counteracting German ideas of betterment of the indigenous population. There 
was little room for reconciling these positions. In February 1946, Kuznetsov grum-
bled that the ‘newly created apparatus of the central German health administration 
still needs systematic help and leadership because of its lack of suitable administra-
tive experience. This help is given to it by the Health Department of the Soviet 
Military Administration.’139 Similarly, Soviet officials in the regional military 
137 BAB, DQ1/1634, Max Klesse to Walter Ulbricht, 22 May 1945.
138 BAB, DQ1/1634, memorandum by Max Klesse, 1 July 1945.
139 BAB, Z47F, 7317/56/23, report from Kuznetsov to Zhukov, 14 Feb. 1946.
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 government offices sometimes insisted on doing even the most trivial tasks 
 themselves.140 In July 1949, one leading SMAG officer declared that the German 
central administrations had only produced a lot of paper, and left 90 per cent of 
the work to the SMAG.141
But in contrast to the British zone, and more quickly than in the American, the 
slogan of ‘indirect rule’ characterized the Soviet control of the German administra-
tions throughout the occupation years—at least in aspiration, if not quite in real-
ity. Responsibility for public health work rested on the German authorities from 
the start, and Soviet–German confrontations were not accompanied by a Soviet 
rejection of German legitimacy or ability to do this work. Rather, these tensions 
have to be understood as attempts by the Soviet officers to make their own jobs 
more important. Soviet health work across the zone consisted primarily in the 
distribution of orders (which they had been given by the central SMAG Health 
Department in Berlin) to the German officers in their region, and in the initiation 
of surveys and inventories.142 Soviet officers could then do little more than ‘suggest’ 
to the German authorities that certain things should be done. As one report stated, 
‘[i]t has been suggested to the German self-administration of the POW camp . . . to 
carry out a two-week-long quarantine and to strengthen the sanitary-prophylactic 
work in the DP camps’.143 They frequently complained that the German health 
departments nominally under their control often bypassed them entirely, which 
not only contradicted the logic of the occupation, but made them seem less impor-
tant than their colleagues in other parts of the occupation machinery.144
The German medical officers, in turn, resented any interference and often simply 
shrugged off or ignored their occupiers’ criticisms, whether about their failures in 
the control of VD or on other questions. Soviet complaints about the inadequacy 
of disease rates were typically answered by the argument that current conditions 
made German doctors’ work impossible. At one meeting in Berlin in October 
1945, Soviet health officers complained that typhus patients were taken to hospi-
tals only days or even weeks after their infection, undermining any quarantine 
efforts. German doctors responded that there was nothing they could do: the refu-
gee influxes were not being regulated by the occupiers, and resulted in huge defi-
ciencies that hampered their work. They were overworked already, and the Soviets 
made demands that were impossible to fulfil. Above all, their epidemic work was 
limited by great shortages of food and drugs. ‘If one can only give out advice 
140 Naimark, The Russians in Germany.
141 Alexandr Fjodorovich Kabanov (Deputy to the Chief for Civil Affairs, SMAG), quoted in 
Foitzik in Hilger, Schmeitzner, and Vollnhals (eds), Sowjetisierung oder Neutralität?, 109.
142 BAB, e.g. Z47F, 7317/56/21, Serkova (Commander of health sector of SMAG Saxony) to 
Kuznetsov, 21 Dec. 1945, stated that she would order the Germans to send information on how the 
German hospitals were organized, run, and managed.
143 BAB, Z47F, 7317/57/11, monthly report for Nov. 1945 from SMA Saxony Health Depart-
ment, 19 Dec. 1945.
144 In the files, a regular pattern was that the German provincial authorities contacted the ZVG 
with queries or demands; the ZVG then went to the Soviet authorities in Berlin, who in turn sent 
directives to their regional Soviet officers, e.g. BAB, DQ1/182, ‘Protokoll der Tagung der Personalref-
erenten der lGA am 21.12.1946’. Also see Ernst, ‘Die beste Prophylaxe’.
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instead of food and vitamins’, Dr Emanuel noted, ‘this merely arouses the popula-
tion’s distrust’.145 On another occasion, German health officers argued that as hard 
as they tried, they were slowed by the fact that ‘organizational issues had not been 
solved (such as the refusal to grant petrol, the steeling of our cars and bicycles, and 
so on)’. ‘Incidentally’, they noted, ‘the local Russian commanders were only rarely 
sticking to the orders they had received from the Soviet administration.’146
Despite these quarrels, the fact that the weight of administration rested on the 
German officials was beyond doubt. The data and findings from the German 
health officials were regularly incorporated into Soviet reports without amend-
ment, often even without identification. Sometimes even data about Soviet troops 
were taken from the German authorities. ‘Why do you use data about Soviet mili-
tary personnel VD infection rates from the German health authorities?’, one com-
mander queried—not unreasonably, since Soviet personnel were not allowed to be 
treated by German doctors.147 On questions which did not directly impact on 
Soviet troops, the German health authorities were generally left in charge of their 
own work and designed their own policies. Even in disputes between different 
German authorities the Soviet authorities rarely got involved. The Soviet personnel 
shortages had dictated that German authorities be used consistently and from the 
start, and this was reinforced by the availability of reliable Germans who could 
carry out this work.
The Soviet authorities relied heavily on preparations by German émigrés, and 
used them to supplement their own directives. Although they gave no guarantees 
that the émigrés’ instructions were going to be considered and acted upon, the 
usefulness of these preparations struck many Soviet commanders in charge of new 
territories, and many of the recommendations were implemented. It was precisely 
this level of intermediaries between the occupiers and the occupied (both the 
émigré communists themselves, and the trusted persons appointed by them) that 
was missing from the British and American preparations. As a result, the Soviet 
authorities came equipped with some instructions, even though they had not pre-
pared themselves in any detail for the handling of many specific occupation tasks. 
Neither emergency public health nor the longer-term reorganization of the German 
health service featured in their preparations, but they could nonetheless begin 
public health tasks quickly by drawing upon the German communists’ and Anglo-
American authorities’ insights.
However, most of the potential benefits of the SMAG’s early and consistent 
policy to operate public health work through the German health officers were 
cancelled out by the significantly worse material starting conditions, which were 
exacerbated by the Soviet dismantling programme, the behaviour of Soviet troops. 
and the policy to let their troops live off the income, produce, and production of 
145 lAB, B Rep. ‘Bericht über die Dienstbesprechung am Donnerstag’, 4 Oct. 1945.
146 BAB, DQ1/1338, ‘Bespechungsniederschrift über die Sitzung der leiter aller Provinzial- u. 
landesgesundheitsämter der sowjetischen Okkupationszone in der Zentralverwaltung für das Gesund-
heitswesen am 2.Oktober 1945’, 11.
147 BAB, Z47F, 7317/56/21, Sokolov (SMAG health department) to Koslenkov (Commander of 
health of the province of Saxony), 26 Dec. 1945.
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the zone. By the autumn of 1947, Andrei Zhdanov and his supporters in SMAG, 
who favoured an approach which prioritized Soviet political over economic inter-
vention in Germany, seemed to be winning the argument148—but by that time it 
was too late. The announcement (in June 1947) and arrival (from mid-1948) of 
Marshall aid to the western zones, but not to the Soviet zone, cemented and wid-
ened the material and political divisions between the East and the West of 
Germany.
148 Tjulpanow, Deutschland nach dem Kriege.
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8
The Forgotten Zone: Public Health Work 
in the French Occupation Zone
Pl ANs
By spring 1945, it was clear that all the different French political factions wanted 
to be represented in the occupation. Among them, very few voices called for rec-
onciliation with the defeated enemy. After France’s liberation, nationalist slogans 
were used across the political spectrum, including the ever-popular ‘le Boche 
 payera’—familiar to French and Germans alike from the demands for reparations 
at Versailles in 1919.1 Within the body which coordinated the French Resistance 
and oversaw its work, the National Resistance Council (Conseil National de la 
Résistance, CNR), there were different visions of France’s future tasks in Germany 
and beyond. What separated, and united, these different approaches had huge 
implications for public health work in the French occupation project.
One of the most influential French analysts of the German problem was the 
sorbonne historian Edmond Vermeil. His work had a number of implications for 
French occupation plans: Germany would continue to strive for domination, he 
predicted, unless permanently prevented by force, and so the occupation had to be 
a long-term project. A distinction between the Nazi leadership and the wider pop-
ulation was meaningless, since reform could not be achieved just by the removal of 
leaders; it would have to change deeply rooted traditions, institutions, habits of 
thought and sentiments. The ‘essential task in the political constitution of post-war 
Germany’, Vermeil advised, had to be to ‘ “de-Prussianize” the country, transfer-
ring its political centre of gravity from the North-east to the south-west’, now 
under French (and American) occupation. This solution was not only to neutralize 
Prussia and its intellectual and military heritage from German life (and, inciden-
tally, boost the importance of France), but also had ‘the advantage of placing the 
1 ‘The Germans will pay’. In 1919 the slogan had been ‘le boche payera tout’ (‘the Germans will 
pay all’). see Gerd Krumeich, ‘Vergleichende Aspekte der Kriegsschulddebatte nach dem ersten 
Weltkrieg’, in Wolfgang Michalka (ed.), Der Erste Weltkrieg: Wirkung, Wahrnehmung, Analyse (Weyarn, 
1997), 919. The slogan’s English counterpart, ‘We will squeeze the orange until the pips squeak’ (often 
attributed to lloyd George) was coined by Eric Geddes, a British Conservative politician, see Alfred 
F. Havighurst, Britain in Transition: The Twentieth Century (1962; Chicago, 4th edn. 1985), 148. 
Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking, 1919 (1933; london, new edn. 1945), 14. Charles Callan Tansill, 
‘The United states and the Road to War in Europe’, in Harry Elmer Barnes (ed.), Perpetual War for 
Perpetual Peace: A Critical Examination of the Foreign Policy of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Its 
 Aftermath (Caldwell, Ida., 1953).
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new centre of gravity in the neighbourhood of, if not under the direct control of 
or in close dependence on, the United Western Nations’.2
France’s occupation project combined reforms within Germany with a reshap-
ing of the political map of Europe. Future peace and security, Vermeil insisted, 
depended on whether Germany was firmly tied into (Western) Europe. ‘The West-
ern democracies’ had to counter Nazism through the creation of a Europe ‘at once 
diverse and united, between the Atlantic eventually dominated by the United 
states and a Russia at full tide’. The Continent must be reshaped ‘under some 
constitution conformable to the interests of our civilisation, [as the] offspring of 
Western humanism’, where a regenerated Germany could ‘find herself a niche’. It 
should be a ‘Europe regenerated by Germany’s own regeneration and by the estab-
lishment of normal relations between Germany and the Continental countries 
surrounding her, between the Continent and Great Britain, and between the 
 British Empire and the French’.3 To this end it was crucial that the Western Allies 
created a firm and durable union themselves. ‘[I]n short’, as A. l. Rowse put it in 
a review of Vermeil, the problem of Germany was ‘the problem of Europe’.4
Charles de Gaulle also saw clear and long-standing continuities in the history 
and psychology of Germany, to whom France had fallen victim three times. But 
where Vermeil argued that cutting up Germany into states or regions would 
reintroduce fragmentation and ‘fatal pluralism’, which had given rise to Germany’s 
‘morbid nationalism’ in the first place, de Gaulle insisted that only decentralization 
would teach the Germans a lesson and ensure future French security.5 Defeat and 
temporary exhaustion of Germany were not a sufficient guarantee. The ‘first condi-
tion necessary to prevent Germany from returning to its bad ways’, he thought, 
was the ‘abolition of a centralised Reich’. He explained:
if each of the states within the German federation could exist by itself, govern itself in 
its own way, handle its own interests, there would be every likelihood that the federa-
tion as a whole would not be led to subjugate its neighbors. This would be even more 
likely if the Ruhr, that arsenal of strategic materiel, were given a special status under 
international control. Further, the Rhineland would, of course, be occupied by French, 
British, Belgian and Dutch armies . . . lastly, there was every reason to suppose that the 
saar, retaining its German character, would be transformed into a separate state and 
united to France by trade agreements which would settle the question of our repara-
tions in terms of coal. Thus the German federation, recovering its diversity and turn-
ing its eyes toward the west, would lose the means of war but not those of its own 
development. In addition, none of its fragments would be annexed by the French, 
thus leaving the door to reconciliation open.6
2 Edmond Vermeil, Germany’s Three Reichs: Their History and Culture, trans. E. W. Dickes (london, 
1944), 409. This is a reissued and translated version of Vermeil’s L’Allemagne: Essai d’explication (Paris, 
1940) which was first published just months before France’s defeat and then seized and banned by the 
German occupation authorities.
3 Vermeil, Germany’s Three Reichs, 407.
4 A. l. Rowse, ‘What Is Wrong with the Germans?’ (1937); repr. in Rowse, The End of an Epoch 
(london, 1947), 181–92.
5 Vermeil, Germany’s Three Reichs, 408–9.
6 Charles de Gaulle, The Complete War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle (1954–9; london, 1998), 720–1.
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He supported a return to some of the pillars of French foreign policy after 1919: 
the assumptions that saar coal and Ruhr industrial resources should be used to 
rebuild and expand France’s economy; Prussia should be dismantled; the Rhine-
land should be removed from Germany and put under French control; and the 
area around the Ruhr should be placed under international control. Georges 
Bidault—president of the CNR, and co-founder of the French Christian Demo-
cratic Party (Mouvement Républicain Populaire, MRP), and foreign minister after 
1944—helped to put these priorities into practice,7 as did General Pierre Koenig, 
French commander-in-chief, military governor, representative on the Allied Con-
trol Council (ACC) in Berlin and a close ally of de Gaulle.
socialist groups shared some of these ideas, but they placed greater emphasis on 
the reform and reintegration of Germany into a wider European framework. They 
were also less vocal about the desirability of revenge. A number of French socialists 
argued for balance: neither ‘generous but facile indulgence’ of the Germans, nor 
retribution of a kind that would ‘thrust them back into a past that has for ever van-
ished’, was in France’s long-term interests.8 One advocate of rehabilitation, not ret-
ribution, was the veteran socialist politician and former (and future) French prime 
minister, léon Blum. He had survived three years in a succession of Vichy prisons, 
and two years in Buchenwald and Dachau, before being rescued by  American 
troops, days before the end of the war, and returned to Paris.9 Even while a prisoner 
in Buchenwald he rejected collective responsibility and, unlike Vermeil, insisted on 
the need to distinguish between German leaders and the population they had led.10 
His and his family’s fate (his son was an imprisoned army officer and his brother 
died in Auschwitz), and his stature as one of the few French leaders untarnished by 
association with the Vichy regime,11 gave him particular authority.
Blum helped to write the French socialist Party’s (section Française de 
l’Internationale Ouvrière, sFIO) first post-war statement on Germany. It said 
that the country had to be occupied and disarmed, its industry internationally 
controlled, its landed property divided up, its war criminals punished, and its 
education system transformed. But there was hope that ‘one day the German 
democratic elements and the working classes will themselves create a humane 
and pacific German nation’. The party wanted ‘to call the attention of the coun-
try to the dangers of nationalist revenge which asks for the dismemberment of 
Germany and the annexation of specifically German territory’.12 Instead of 
7 Jürgen Klöckler, Abendland—Alpenland—Alemannien: Frankreich und die Neugliederungsdiskus-
sion in Südwestdeutschland 1945–1947 (Oldenbourg, 1998), 52  ff.
8 Vermeil, Germany’s Three Reichs, 409. Robert Verdier and Pierre Guidoni (eds.), Les Socialistes en 
Résistance, 1940–1944: Combats et débats (Paris, 1999).
9 Johannes Glasneck, Léon Blum: Republikaner und Sozialist (Frankfurt, 2003). louise Elliott 
Dalby, Léon Blum: Evolution of a Socialist (New York, 1963).
10 léon Blum, ‘Aprés un bombardement du camp, Juin 1944’, in ‘Notes d’Allemagne’, repr. in L’Œuvre 
de Léon Blum: Mémoires; La Prison et le procès; A l’échelle humaine; 1940–1945 (Paris, 1955), 513.
11 Blum was one of the ‘Vichy 80’, a group of French parliamentarians who on 10 July 1940 voted 
against the constitutional amendment that dissolved the Third Republic and established the Vichy 
administration under Marshall Philippe Pétain. He was arrested and charged with treason at the Riom 
Trial.
12 Le Populaire, 16 Aug. 1945, quoted in Dalby, Léon Blum, 374.
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annexation, they proposed an international administration of the Ruhr and the 
Rhineland by the Big Four, until the United Nations could appoint a perma-
nent body. Industrial profits would fund the reconstruction of those countries 
devastated by occupation and war, and a small portion would be used for 
 Germany to meet its basic needs, so the Allies would not have to pay. Using 
continued German production, they argued, was a more effective and viable 
alternative to proposals such as the Morgenthau Plan, which called for radical 
deindustrialization.13
Germany would have to be ‘detoxified’ and reformed, and permanently inte-
grated into a new, stable European framework (by force if necessary), rigorous 
enough to prevent any future German war. European federalism was ‘the begin-
ning of hope and an instrument of peace’, and essential to French security. ‘We 
must make Europe,’ Blum wrote; ‘We must make it with Germany and not for 
her.’14 For this project, French domestic policy had to be joined up with its 
foreign policy: French reconstruction had to be proceed together with that of 
Germany; social and economic reforms in France had to be matched by similar 
reforms in the occupation zones and elsewhere to build the basis for a socialist 
European federation which could readmit Germany into the community of 
nations. The emphasis on Europe also featured in proposals put forward by 
politicians such as the radical René Mayer, a future president of the European 
Coal and steel Community. Mayer argued that French economic needs and col-
lective security could best be guaranteed in the context of a new European 
federation.15
The French left had no monopoly on plans for a reorganization of Europe, but 
by 1945 it had shaped these discussions to a significant degree. After their split 
with de Gaulle, the Christian Democrats provided some guiding ideas for  European 
integration, and were to eventually put may of them into practice.16 But in 1945, 
still led by de Gaulle, many on the anti-Vichy French Right—among them the 
future architects of Western European integration, Jean Monnet and Robert 
 schuman—still focused on France’s place in the world without giving much 
thought to the wider European framework. In their plans the occupation of 
 Germany was above all a means for French reconstruction.17 This was a crucial dif-
ference in the frantic months after the war when occupation policy was being 
formulated. Where de Gaulle and his allies thought about Europe-wide mecha-
nisms to enable France to control and exploit Germany’s economic potential, many 
socialists and radicals focused on a reform and re-education of Germany as part of 
13 Le Populaire, 21–2 and 28 June 1946, both quoted in Dalby, Léon Blum , 374–5.
14 Le Populaire, 25 Mar. 1946, in Dalby, Léon Blum, 377.
15 In 1951–2 he served as deputy prime minister of France, and in 1953 briefly as prime minister. 
Between 1955 and 1958 Mayer was president of the High Authority of the European Coal and steel 
Community. Contrast with Carlo schmid’s vision of Europe: Petra Weber, ‘Guter Patriot und guter 
Europäer—das Europa Carlo schmids’, in Volker Depkat and Piero Graglia (eds.), Entscheidung für 
Europa—Decidere l’Europa: Erfahrung, Zeitgeist und politische Herausforderungen am Beginn der 
europäischen Integration (Berlin, 2010), 243–62.
16 Wolfram Kaiser, Christian Democracy and the Origins of the European Union (Cambridge, 2007).
17 Alan Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (2nd edn. london, 2000), 335.
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a wider European solution. Only during Robert schuman’s time as prime minister 
in 1947–8, in discussions with and under pressure from the Americans, did 
 European integration become the policy of the leading faction of the French Right, 
which reflected a realization that the national plan for unilateral reconstruction 
had failed.18 But that is jumping ahead of the story.
In 1945, the first of the two main strands of thought in the French military 
government was the conservative, militarist approach of de Gaulle, incorporating 
aspects of Vermeil’s assessments of the German character, and led on the ground by 
by Pierre-Marie Koenig. The second, more socialist position, drawing on different 
components of Vermeil’s conclusions, was led in the zone by Émile laffon. A lawyer 
and engineer by training, laffon was a rising star of the FFI and the Resistance. He 
had been a captain in the Free French Air Force, and from June 1943 until 1944 
commissioner of the interior in Algiers. later as a representative of the French 
Committee of National liberation (Comité Français de libération Nationale, 
CFlN, which became the provisional government after the Normandy landings), 
laffon oversaw the organization of the Resistance.19 He was regularly parachuted 
into occupied France as a liaison between london and France.20 In April 1944 he 
became commissioner in charge of civil affairs, and four months later, on the day 
of the liberation of Paris, took office as secretary general of the Ministry of the 
Interior. A year later he was appointed administrateur général in Germany, the 
highest civilian job in the French occupation. like Vermeil and Blum, he opposed 
a dismemberment of Germany and annexation of German territory by France. 
Instead, he argued that a systematic development of the zone’s economy in its 
entirety was preferable to annexing the saar, Ruhr, and Rhineland. laffon was not 
a member of the socialist Party, but his position was close to that of leading social-
ists, and he filled his staff in Baden-Baden with young members from the Resist-
ance, many of whom were socialists.21 Many of his staff shared a missionary 
mindset, and saw the occupation as a vehicle for wider reforms, and France as a 
role model for the entire continent. A new beginning, they argued, could only be 
achieved in cooperation with the Germans.22
The frequent clashes between Koenig and laffon exemplified very different 
approaches to the occupation. They partly stemmed from the fact that France was 
in upheaval in a way that the other occupiers were not. Both the United states and 
Britain saw changes of government at the end of the war (Roosevelt died in April, 
and Churchill lost the general election in July)—and this change of Anglo-American 
18 Milward, European Rescue, 325 ff. Kaiser, Christian Democracy, 3.
19 The CFlN was formed on 3 June 1943 under the leadership of Charles de Gaulle and Henri 
Giraud to coordinate the campaign to liberate France; from Nov. onwards it was run by de Gaulle 
alone. It provided the seeds of the later Provisional Government of the French Republic, under de 
Gaulle’s premiership.
20 Alain lattard, ‘Zielkonflikte französischer Besatzungspolitik in Deutschland: Der streit laffon-
Koenig, 1945–1947’, Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 39/1 (Jan. 1991), 1–35, at 7.
21 lattard, ‘Zielkonflikte’, 7. Robert Aron, Histoire de la Libération de la France (Paris, 1959). 
Charles-louis Foulon, Le Pouvoir en province à la Libération (Paris, 1975).
22 On laffon, see ‘Zaunkönig in der Ente: schlußstrich under die Erbfeindschaft’, Der Spiegel, 
32/1949, 4 Aug. 1949, 5. lattard, ‘Zielkonflikte’. Klöckler, Abendland.
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leaders was held responsible for stalin obtaining a number of soviet demands in 
the face of American or British opposition. The Fourth French Republic saw 
twenty-six governments come and go between 1944 and 1958.23 Even if there was 
considerable continuity in the ‘French thesis’ on Germany,24 the changing govern-
ments represented significant fissures within the French political establishment, 
which slowed and hampered preparations for the occupation.
Many battles were fought in the French press, which eagerly reported the faults 
and shortcomings of the occupation. left-wing groups attacked the army, and later 
the French military government in Germany, for having too few members of the 
Resistance, and for harming French interests with pro-German or pro-Vichy poli-
cies. An accusation aired repeatedly was that the French occupation army was a 
refuge for collaborators avoiding punishment at home. The communists claimed 
that Vichyites had created a ‘little Vichy’ in Germany, a claim in fact confirmed 
when a Commission of Inquiry in April 1946 found that thirteen of the zone’s 
highest officials were implicated in the Vichy regime, and recommended their dis-
missal.25 Even before the occupation began, clashes between different factions—
Gaullists and socialists, doves and hawks, military and civilians, pro- and 
anti-Americans—mirrored those taking place in the Paris ministries and across 
France, and frequently limited any one group’s room for manoeuvre. Hardly any 
of these proclamations made any direct reference to public health provisions among 
the occupied population. But these fault lines shaped the possibilities for public 
health work, and often became visible only when the French teams encountered 
their first health panics in the zone.
The French occupation of Germany had a difficult set of starting conditions. 
Political divisions were exacerbated by the institutional chaos. In Paris the acro-
nym-littered landscape was initially dominated by the Interministerial Committee 
for German and Austrian Affairs (Comité Interministériel des Affaires Allemandes 
et Autrichiennes, CIAAA), which began to prepare and issue directives shortly 
after its creation in July 1944. Its General secretariat (sécretariat Général aux 
Affaires Allemandes et Autrichiennes, sGAAA) consisted of representatives from 
six different ministries, who attempted to coordinate their different interests and 
those of commanders in Germany and Austria. This authority for the occupied 
territories was reformed, renamed, and repopulated several times over subsequent 
months. less than a year into the occupation, the CIAAA was expanded by two 
further ministries and became the Commissariat for German and Austrian Affairs 
(Commissariat Général aux Affaires Allemandes et Autrichiennes, CGAAA), 
headed by René Mayer, before being dissolved after the departure of de Gaulle 
from the political scene in March 1946. Other, generally short-lived offices 
appeared in its place, such as the state secretariat for German and Austrian Affairs 
(sécrétariat d’État aux Affaires Allemandes et Autrichiennes, sEAAA), created in 
23 Robert Gildea, France Since 1945 (Oxford, 2002), 41.
24 F. Roy Willis, The French in Germany, 1945–1949 (stanford, Calif., 1962), 45–6. Also see Willis, 
France, Germany and the New Europe, 15  f.
25 Willis, France, Germany and the New Europe, 35.
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November 1947, but already dissolved by summer 1948.26 These bodies were a 
fertile environment for power struggles and competition.
France had a zone that made little structural, political, or economic sense. 
The French occupation territory was created out of areas formerly allocated to 
the British and American zones. The Americans retained key cities such as 
 stuttgart, and key infrastructures such as the motorway between Karlsruhe, 
stuttgart, and Munich. The French area contained several Länder whose capitals 
were outside the zone (Karlsruhe in Baden, stuttgart in Württemberg, and 
Cologne in the Rhineland). Only one city, ludwigshafen, had more than 
100,000 inhabitants. Despite being the most rural zone, it was far from self-
sufficient.27 French leaders, aware of these shortcomings, periodically attempted 
to revise the boundaries. In March 1945, de Gaulle urged his commanders to 
trump the Americans by arriving first in the south-western territories. success-
ful in the ensuing race, de Gaulle then refused to hand over stuttgart to the 
Americans. This battle ended in a political debacle: French troops were forced 
to clear out of the city, and French–American relations barely had time to 
recover before discussions in the ACC caused more serious and permanent 
disagreements.
The French authorities also had a serious time problem. General de lattre de 
Tassigny and the First French Army crossed the Rhine only seven months after the 
liberation of Paris. One of the few guides available to French personnel was the 
sHAEF Handbook for Military Government in Germany—but only in English, 
until a French translation was published in March 1945.28 Concrete French direc-
tives on occupation policy only appeared months after they had begun their occu-
pation duties: the CIAAA issued its first instructions to General Koenig in late July 
1945. These stated that the primary aim of the occupation was security, to be 
achieved through a three-pronged approach—control of the German economy, 
decentralization of political structures, and lasting democratization and denazifica-
tion of German cultural life.29
26 Klöckler, Abendland, 50  ff. On Mayer’s work, Raymond Poidevin, ‘René Mayer et la politique 
extérieure de la France’, Revue d’histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale et des conflits contemporains, 134 
(1984), 73–97.
27 Foundation for Foreign Affairs, Field Report on the French Zone in Germany (Washington DC, 
1946), 5. On the EAC’s decision to divide Baden and Württemberg along the Karlsruhe–Munich 
autobahn, Philip Mosely, ‘The Occupation of Germany’, Foreign Affairs (July 1950).
28 A French translation was completed by Dec. 1944, published in Mar. 1945 as A.M.F.A. Mémento 
pour les officiers de détachements de gouverment militaire. Jérôme Vaillant, ‘Bedeutung und Ausmaß des 
französischen Einflusses auf die kulturelle Entwicklung im Nachkriegsdeutschland’, in Vaillant (ed.), 
Französische Kulturpolitik in Deutschland, 1945–1949: Berichte und Dokumente (Konstanz, 1984), 11; 
1st pub. as Vaillant (ed.), La Dénazification par les vainqueurs: La Politique culturelle des occupants en 
Allemagne 1945–1949 (lille, 1981). Reinhard Grohnert, Die Entnazifizierung in Baden 1945–1949: 
Konzeptionen und Praxis der ‘Epuration’ am Beispiel eines Landes der französischen Besatzungszone (stutt-
gart, 1991), 13. COl AC 836, Enemy Branch, Foreign Office and Ministry of Warfare, london, 
‘Germany Basic Handbook’, Aug. 1944.
29 ‘Note sur le problème allemand’ (19 July 1945), ‘Directives pour notre action en Allemagne’ (19 
July 1945) and ‘Compte-rendu de la séance du comité interministériel’ (20 July 1947), all in Alain 
lattard, Gewerkschaften und Arbeitgeber in Rheinland-Pfalz unter französischer Besatzung, 1945–1949 
(Mainz, 1988).
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Not only did these instructions come very late, they also contained signifi-
cant ambiguities. In part to preserve French leaders’ room for manoeuvre (and 
therefore leaving many issues untouched), they failed to resolve or even identify 
some fundamental contradictions: French economic priorities favoured a uni-
fied administration of Germany, but French political and security strategies 
favoured decentralization, if not dismemberment.30 Different military govern-
ment departments found themselves pitted against each other, and many offi-
cers were unbriefed or bewildered. Henri Humblot remembered that he had 
taken courses with the French military administration, but, before coming to 
Germany in 1945 as a young communist and an agrégé d’allemand fresh from 
university, he had no administrative experience, no instructions or guidelines, 
and no idea about his new responsibilities as an officer in charge of re-education 
and sport.31
French troops therefore drew heavily on sHAEF’s guides, particularly in special-
ist or technical fields. Denazification instructions matched those issued in the 
other zones: the priority was to arrest war criminals and NsDAP functionaries, on 
the basis of existing lists. All active Nazis were to be removed from public office 
and to be replaced with acceptable German appointments. If no tolerable German 
replacements could be found, military government would have to take on those 
tasks in the interim.32 This was not quite what the French’s own diagnoses of 
Nazism had prescribed. Taking the recommendations of Vermeil and others at 
their word, commentators and historians have argued that French attitudes towards 
denazification were more straightforward than those of the other occupiers. F. Roy 
Willis wrote that they were ‘not hampered . . . by the need to distinguish between 
good and bad Germans, since they believed all Germans to be more or less under 
the influence of Nazism, and more especially of aggressive and militaristic nation-
alism’.33 But although French analyses on key questions differed from those of the 
other occupiers, France’s late start meant that it was bound—for both practical and 
political reasons—by Anglo-American policies, and forced to rely on sHAEF 
preparations.
Public health was no exception. By the time French participation was agreed, 
sHAEF’s G5 Division had already produced guidelines on the mission, policy, 
timing, and general premises of public health work, which were issued unchanged 
to the French teams.34 Instructions to AMFA’s (Corps d’Administration Militaire 
30 lattard, ‘Zielkonflikte’.
31 Henri Humblot, ‘Kontrolle und Anregung der Jugendbewegungen in süd-Würtemberg: Ein 
Erlebnisbericht aus den Jahren 1945 bis 1949’, in Vaillant (ed.), Französische Kulturpolitik in Deutsch-
land, 1945–1949. Humblot helped to establish the Internationale Bund für sozialarbeit in 1949 in 
Tübingen (since 1995 known as the Internationale Bund, IB), see Philipp Mausshardt, ‘Wer war 
Henri? Ehemalige Hitlerjungen und der Internationale Bund’, Die Zeit, 29 Nov. 1996.
32 Grohnert, Die Entnazifizierung in Baden, 13–14.
33 Willis, France, Germany and the New Europe, 42.
34 COl AB 35/1, ‘Chapitre VI: santé Publique’ [undated]. Compare with ‘Chapter VI: Public 
Health’, in sHAEF, Handbook for Military Government in Germany prior to Defeat or Surrender (incor-
porating revision 1–20 December 1944) (Washington, 1944). Also see TNA, WO 219/3882, sHAEF, 
Technical Manual for Public Health Officers (prepared 22 Nov. 1944, rev. 2 Feb. 1945).
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Française en Allemagne) Health section (section santé) thus shared the premises 
of health work elsewhere.35
A French translation of chapter 6 of sHAEF’s Handbook for Military Govern-
ment thus explained the premises of health work in occupied Germany to AMFA’s 
health personnel.36 The main function of public health officers was to control 
infectious diseases and to prevent their spread across German borders—a task 
which required, it noted, functioning local health agencies. German health offices 
would continue to operate while active Nazis and Nazi sympathizers were removed 
and replaced by ‘acceptable personnel’. Captured military stocks and local sup-
plies had to be utilized to meet the urgent needs of the Allies; additional stocks 
would only be provided to prevent health problems from interfering with military 
operations, and only for the protection of UN nationals and Allied troops. But, 
this chapter stated, military government officers were likely to confront severe 
health problems among the German population. These arose directly out of prob-
lems such as the overpopulation of many cities, camps, and shelters; the destruc-
tion of the sewage system and other public health installations; the spread of 
infections by population movements; and widespread malnourishment, demor-
alization, and nervous disorders. Typhus, typhoid, diphtheria, dysentery, scarlet 
fever, and venereal diseases, among others, would become pressing concerns, and 
essential medical supplies and equipment to tackle them were likely to be in short 
supply.37
French health officers also studied the relevant excerpts from the Civil Affairs 
Handbook on Germany.38 This, and the Technical Manual for Public Health Officers, 
could not give solutions to all the health problems they were going to encounter, 
explained lieutenant General A. E. Grasett from sHAEF’s G5 Division to his 
French staff, but they could provide starting points.39 Other preparatory material 
available to AMFA’s Health section included lists of health departments in 
35 COl AB 35/1, ‘Organisation à mission des services de la santé Publique’ [undated]. Also see the 
translated technical guides: ‘Guide technique No. 1 sur la santé Publique en Allemagne’, ‘Guide 
technique No. 2 de la santé Publique en Allemagne: Bibliographie politique, administrative et profes-
sionnelle’, ‘Guide technique No. 3 de la santé Publique en Allemagne: Projets d’instructions a remet-
tre aux Amtsärzte’, ‘Extraits du Guide d’administration des centres de rassemblement: Personnes 
deplacées, réfugiés et service social’, ‘Directives pour la santé Publique du Gouvernment Militaire: 
Extraits du “Technical Manual for Public Health Officers” ’, ‘Organisation du 5ème Bureau de 
sHAEF’, ‘Collection des lois de la santé Publique d’après le volume “sammlung Deutscher Gesund-
heitsgesetze de Ritter-Möllens-Hallbauer”—tome II administration de la santé (Gesundheitsverwal-
tung)’, and other guides in this file.
36 COl AB 35/1, ‘Chapitre VI: santé Publique’ [undated]. Compare with ‘Chapter VI: Public 
Health’, in sHAEF, Handbook for Military Government. TNA, WO 219/3882, sHAEF, Technical 
Manual for Public Health Officers (prepared on 22 Nov. 1944, rev. 2 Feb. 1945).
37 COl AB 35/1, ‘Chapitre VI: santé Publique’ [undated].
38 The Civil Affairs Handbook is listed in the catalogue of the library of the GMZFO’s Direction 
Générale des Affaires Adminstratives (DGAA), see COl AC 707/1, ‘Catalogue de la bibliothèque de 
la Direction Générale des Affaires administratives’ [undated].
39 COl AB 34/4, Forces Expéditionnaires Alliées, Division G5, A. E. Grasett (lieutenant General, 
Assistant Chief of staff of G5, sHAEF), ‘Manuel technique à l’usage des officiers de la santé Publique 
du Gouvernment Militiare’ [undated].
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 south-western Germany, and charts depicting the organization of the German 
health service. At least some of this material was prepared by the Americans, before 
the French zone was carved out of the American and British zones.40
French health teams came equipped with the same set of inconsistencies and 
paradoxes as their colleagues in the other zones. Public health protection was iden-
tified as a crucial element of military success, but Allied input—both of personnel 
and supplies—was strictly limited. Military government public health functions 
were to be restricted to urgent epidemic work, but at the same time health was to 
be recognized as ‘closely interlaced with many other military functions’.41 Condi-
tions were likely to be poor, and could threaten Allied troops and neighbouring 
populations, but Germans were to shoulder the burden of health work. Conscrip-
tion and casualties had reduced numbers of qualified medical personnel, but a 
purge of ‘active Nazis, ardent Nazi sympathisers, Nazi agencies and ideologies’ was 
deemed vitally necessary. Although the threat of epidemics demanded the central-
ized collection of data and coordinated anti-epidemic measures, a centralization of 
the health system was deemed undesirable, and the local health office (Gesundheit-
samt) was to be the main pillar of the health administration.
The French Public Health Directorate seemed well aware of German doctors’ 
widespread support for Nazism. Books and pamphlets by leading Nazis such as 
leonardo Conti, the Third Reich’s health minister (Reichsgesundheitsführer), and 
the eugenicists Eugen Fischer and Otmar von Verschuer, had been translated into 
French during the Vichy years.42 The Health Directorate also collected a range of 
German publications on eugenics and hereditary biology, as well as reports on 
organizational changes in the health service since the end of the First World War.43 
A number of background studies explained that the Nazi regime had many loyal 
and vociferous supporters among the medical profession. A paper entitled ‘The 
German Doctor’ observed that the medical profession not only shared the charac-
teristics of the German bourgeoisie at large which had enabled the rise of Nazism 
(such as strong nationalism and the ‘conviction that everybody was envious of 
Germany and wanted to destroy it’), but many had particularly supported the 
Nazis’ racial and eugenic ambitions.44 Doctors had joined the NsDAP even before 
40 e.g. COl AB 35/1, ‘list of health departments in south Germany as of 1 October 1938’ [in 
English, undated], ‘Health personnel in south Germany as of 1 January 1939’ [in English, undated], 
and various handwritten notes in this file.
41 COl AB 35/1, ‘Chapitre VI: santé Publique’ [undated], para. 634.
42 e.g. Karl Epping, État et Santé (Paris, 1942) contained chapters by Conti, Hans Reiter, Otmar 
von Verschuer, Eugen Fischer, and Arthur scheunert. Otmar von Verschuer, Manuel d’eugénique et 
hérédité humaine (trans. from the German by George Montandon, Paris, 1943). On Verschuer, see 
Robert Proctor, Racial Hygiene: Medicine under the Nazis (Cambridge, Mass., 1988); Paul Weindling, 
‘ “Tales from Nuremberg”: The Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Anthropology and Allied Medical War 
Crimes Policy’, in Doris Kaufmann (ed.), Geschichte der Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft im Nationalsozial-
ismus: Bestandsaufnahme und Perspektiven der Forschung, ii (Goettingen, 2000), 635–52; Paul Wein-
dling, ‘Weimar Eugenics: The Kaiser-Wilhelm Institute for Anthropology, Human Heredity and 
Eugenics in social Context’, Annals of Science, 42 (1985), 303–18.
43 COl AC 707/1, ‘Catalogue de la bibliothèque de la Direction Générale des Affaires administra-
tives’ [undated].
44 COl AB 35/1, ‘le Médecin allemand’ (Paris, 11 Feb. [1945]).
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1933, the paper noted, and were rewarded by the restriction of non-Aryan doctors, 
which helped their advancement. The Nazis had ‘found in the medical corps a 
devoted tool for the execution of all party orders’. Doctors had not protested 
against the treatment of the populations occupied by Germany, nor against wors-
ening work conditions in their own country, which had ‘profoundly influenced the 
health of the German people’. some doctors had committed war crimes, including 
those who conducted medical experiments on concentration camp inmates.45
But although this and other reports outlined how the German health service 
had been changed, compromised, and damaged by Nazi ideology, it also suggested 
that it was not beyond redemption. Implicit in its recommendations was the belief 
that if the structural and ideological changes since 1933 were annulled and reversed, 
a sound health service could flourish once again. The Office for Public Health 
(Amt für Volksgesundheit) had been created as a Nazi propaganda organ to com-
plement the work of the local health office (Gesundheitsamt); dissolving the former 
would allow the latter to resume its full responsibilities.46 In this conclusion French 
health officers diverged from the analyses of Vermeil, Joseph Rovan (more about 
him later), and other French experts on Germany, who identified a century of 
continuous German militarism, expansionism, and national psychological short-
comings. AMFA’s medical officers, by contrast, did not treat the health system as 
the latest manifestation of long-standing, harmful German traits. Rather, they 
thought the transformations since 1933 could be peeled back to reveal sound pro-
fessional principles. This was an important distinction which caused tension with 
other military governments’ departments—which mirrored divisions between 
health teams and other personnel in the other occupation zones.
French troops thus shared many of the other occupiers’ problems. Tensions 
between military and civilian agendas, gaps between plans and realities, a need for 
flexibility coupled with an absence of clear instructions, and a paradoxical location 
of public health in the occupation programme all presented the occupiers with 
impossible choices. But in addition, French preparations for their occupation of 
Germany were also shaped by contradictions not quite shared by the other occupi-
ers: their staffs had to rely on Anglo-American preparations even where they seemed 
to run counter to French analyses, interests, and policies. Moreover, the French 
occupation project had to accommodate contradictory directions for future French 
reconstruction, such as a simultaneous demand for both centralization and radical 
decentralization. It was not going to be an easy job.
COMPROMIsEs
First contacts between occupiers and occupied were full of inconsistencies. Neg-
ative first impressions, fuelled by violence, brutality, and misunderstandings, 
dominated contemporary accounts. French commanders, like their soviet coun-
terparts, found it difficult to keep their troops in check. French soldiers and 
45 COl AB 35/1, ‘le Médecin allemand’.   46 COl AB 35/1, ‘le Médecin allemand’.
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members of the Resistance, many of whom had suffered personally (and knew 
many others people who had), now ‘took pleasure in seeing the Germans scatter 
in terror at the sight of the French army’.47 In his 1955 history of the Vichy 
Regime Aron wrote that the Resistance had ‘consisted not only of heroes, of acts 
of the highest morality, the greatest courage and purest patriotism. There existed 
among them disreputable people, black sheep who disfigured organisations 
which were based on faith and ideals.’ It was clear that ‘under cover of the Resist-
ance, acts of banditry were committed. There were thefts of jewelry, public and 
private funds, and sometimes a paying off of old scores which had nothing what-
ever to do with politics.’48 His observation also holds true for the French occupa-
tion troops.
Violence was not just the result of a breakdown of army discipline, but was 
occasionally encouraged by semi-official instructions or individual commanders’ 
condoning of misconduct. As in the British and American zones, the French 
armies’ manuals had painted a stark and unreal picture of Germans. AMFA’s first 
information bulletin in March 1945 advised French officers to be wary of German 
sadomasochistic personality traits: ‘[E]very manifestation of strength’ was 
 ‘agreeable to him [the German] in his deepest character’, it warned, and urged 
officers not to ‘forget that the German is, in his inner nature, sensitive only to 
force. Every manifestation of force is deeply pleasing to him.’49 Many French 
soldiers discovered that this advice proved ultimately futile in the execution of 
their daily tasks.
French troops’ relations with the German population were not helpted by Jean 
de lattre de Tassigny’s approach to life in the zone. The area around lake  Constance, 
relatively unsullied by war, complemented his ambitions. His staff occupied luxu-
rious villas, organized showy parades, and feasted on enormous banquets. He 
encouraged his officers to bring their families, and to set up rest camps and  sanatoria 
for French deportees. Thousands of French children spent their summer holidays 
in the Black Forest.50 He was quickly accused of ruling with all the ceremonies of 
an ‘imperial viceroy’.51 Le Monde’s military correspondent, Jean Planchais, observed 
that under de lattre’s rule officers ‘got into the habit of enjoying a high standard of 
living, and on returning to the circumscribed living conditions in France itself, 
they felt the change more painfully and deeply for being, in their eyes, the victims 
47 Willis, France, Germany and the New Europe, 33.
48 Robert Aron in collaboration with Georgette Elgey, The Vichy Regime, 1940–1944 (london, 
1958) (1st French edn. 1955).
49 Mission Militaire pour les Affaires Allemandes, AMFA, Bulletin d’information, No. 1, Mar. 1945, 
3. Also quoted in Willis, The French in Germany, 148, 93.
50 Willis, France, Germany and the New Europe, 34. On the holiday camps, see ‘In the French 
Zone—system secluded from the rest of Germany—a rigid economic policy’, The Times, 20 Dec. 
1946. On the sanatoria in the Black Forest, see COl AB 35/2, Docteur F. Desplats, ‘Commandement 
en chef français en Allemage, Gouvernement Militaire de la Zone Française d’Occupation, la Direc-
tion de la santé Publique & Aide sociale de juillet 1945 au 30 mai 1949’ [30 May 1949].
51 Willis, France, Germany and the New Europe, 33. General du souzy, ‘Jean de lattre: “Grand de 
France”’, in Commandant storelli et al. (eds.), Jean de Lattre, maréchal de France: Le Soldat, l’homme, 
le politique (Paris 1953), 81.
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of ingratitude’.52 De lattre’s approach provoked bitter resentment from local 
 Germans and fierce criticism from French observers.
While some commanders acted out their imperial ambitions, others were more 
measured. In August 1945 General de Beauchesne promised Berliners in the 
French sector that the French would provide the population with as much aid as 
possible. It would maintain order and act ‘in fullest fairness’. France had to remem-
ber French suffering of the previous years, he declared; they could not forget the 
175,000 hostages shot on French soil, the burnt-down villages, the massacres of 
French citizens, or the deaths of 200,000 French deportees in concentration camps. 
But, he went on, France was magnanimous and sought no revenge. The French 
military government would only demand strict discipline and cooperation from 
the Germans to show that they had put a final end to Nazi crimes and methods.53
similar sentiments were aired by General de Gaulle during his first visit in autumn 
1945. He said that France would not seek revenge, insist on collective responsibility, 
or even press for severe measures. Instead, the military government’s own newspaper 
reported, he wanted to inaugurate a different tone—new to both French and 
 Germans—of conciliation, and to continue France’s historical mission to spread 
enlightenment.54 In its occupation of Germany, de Gaulle proclaimed, France would 
‘obey the sort of historical vocation’ which it had carried in the past. Even if France had 
to take possession of German territory in the Ruhr—which, he explained, was a ‘guar-
antee’ for both Western European security and French reconstruction—French policy 
would be measured and forward-looking. German cities would require and receive 
French material assistance, and the French occupation would help the ‘states of the 
Rhineland’ to find their ‘western spirit’, and ‘abandon the idea of a Germany grouped 
around the now destroyed Prussia, in order to turn towards the horizon, which will give 
them more hope towards Western Europe, and above all towards France’.55
These early proclamations contained indications about longer-term French aims 
and ambitions in Germany. Joseph Rovan, the politician, scholar, and influential 
expert on Germany, argued that the French now had to ‘help [the Germans] to 
become themselves again’.56 Rovan, a student of Vermeil’s, was himself of German 
origin. Born in 1918 in Munich to Jews who had converted to Protestantism, he 
converted to Catholicism and emigrated to France in 1934. He later joined the 
Resistance, and the Gestapo arrested him in February 1944 and sent him to Dachau, 
where he befriended Edmond Michelet, future minister in de Gaulle’s post-war gov-
ernment, whose staff he initially joined as a political adviser.57 In a much-quoted 
52 Jean Planchais, ‘le Malaise de l’armée’, Tribune libre, 16 (1958), 24, in Willis, France, Germany 
and the New Europe, 34.
53 lAB C Rep. 101/1928, ‘Verordung’, 12 Aug. 1945.
54 ‘le Voyage du Général de Gaulle en Allemagne occupée’, La Revue de la Zone Française (GMZFO, 
Direction de l’Information), 1 (15 Nov. 1945), 1–11.
55 Charles de Gaulle quoted in ‘le Voyage du Général de Gaulle en Allemagne occupée’.
56 Rovan quoted in Matthieu Osmont, ‘René Cheval (1918–1986), itinéraire d’un médiateur 
franco-allemand’, Relations internationales, 2/126 (2006), 31–49, at 34. see Rovan’s obituary in the 
Telegraph, 10 Aug. 2004.
57 Joseph Rovan, Erinnerungen eines Franzosen, der einmal Deutscher war (Munich, 2003); 1st pub. 
as Mémoires d’un Français qui se souvient d’avoir été Allemand (Paris, 1999).
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article in L’Esprit in October 1945, Rovan argued that France’s occupation had to 
achieve both a renewal of, and reconciliation with, Germany. Germans had to be 
reacquainted with their own humanist tradition—Goethe, Kant, and Beethoven. 
Above all, the French had to inculcate in them something the French possessed but 
the Germans lacked: an appreciation of the ‘dignity of man’ and ‘that universalism 
which is the vocation of the French spirit’. ‘le grande nation’ had to teach others the 
meaning of liberty.58 As an officer at the Directorate for Public Education at 
 Baden-Baden, Rovan set out to shape French occupation and re-education policy in 
these terms. These ideas distinguished the French occupation project from the other 
Western Allies. Where particularly the British, and even the Americans, found it 
 difficult to explain their longer-term purpose in Germany, beyond the activities 
 surrounding the four Ds (demilitarization, deindustrialization, denazification, 
decartelization), the French, like some of the soviets, had a clearer sense of their long-term 
objectives. This did not increase the popularity of France or the soviet Union, but in both 
cases it removed some of the uncertainties about the purpose of the occupation.
The French occupation began to take shape in the early summer of 1945. The 
other three military governments were already more or less set up. General Pierre-
Marie Koenig became commander-in-chief (Commandement en Chef Français en 
Allemagne, CCFA) in June 1945, reporting to de Gaulle in Paris. A month later 
French troops moved into Berlin and took up the French part of the ACC, but this 
office was only loosely connected to the zone and also reported directly to Paris. In 
August 1945, Émile laffon became administrator of the Military Government of 
the French Zone of Occupation (Gouvernement Militaire de la Zone Française 
d’Occupation, GMZFO), and moved into the new headquarters in the town of 
Baden-Baden. laffon’s organization, also responsible to Paris, was divided into 
four directorates: administrative affairs (which included public health); economics 
and finance; justice and law; and public safety and security. This structure was 
replicated at the regional level, which involved considerable duplication and con-
fusion about responsibilities. Regional military governments (known as délégations 
supérieures) were set up for each of the four Länder, with headquarters in Koblenz, 
saarbrücken, Tübingen, and Freiburg, and headed by a governor (known as délégué 
supérieur). The military occupation teams continued to exist at all levels, side by 
side with, but independent from, the civil administration.59
The various local and regional military government offices and their channels of 
communication with headquarters were slow to emerge. Partly this reflected a lack of 
policy directives, which meant that officers everywhere had to improvise. When asked 
later about what instructions he had been given, Roger Humbert, an economist based 
in Berlin, just laughed.60 Even when officers in Baden-Baden worked out more detailed 
guidelines and policies, they could not be sure that they actually reached the relevant 
local officers, let alone that the officers took any notice of them.61
58 Joseph Rovan, ‘l’Allemagne de nos mérites’, Esprit, 13/115 (1 Oct. 1945).
59 Foundation for Foreign Affairs, Field Report, 17.
60 COl AOR 1/1a, ‘Roger Humbert, Politique allemande de la France’, tape of interview.
61 Jérôme Vaillant, ‘Bedeutung und Ausmaß’, 11.
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Partly this was also a structural problem. Joseph Rovan remembered that the 
French set-up was one of ‘total confusion’.62 The origins of this confusion lay 
directly in the push and pull of the contradictory tendencies of centralization and 
decentralization. French politicians sought to destroy the political unity of 
 Germany, and opposed any centralization. But French economic interests, and the 
effective management of a defeated and devastated country, required centralized 
decision-making for the zone and coordination with the other zones. De Gaulle 
and his staff initially opted to follow political interests, just as the reality of admin-
istrative work in Germany supported the direct opposite. Moreover, the French 
occupation machinery was deliberately decentralized, just when practical problems 
required it to be centrally coordinated.63
French officials working on cultural and educational policy often welcomed the 
absence of control, which allowed them to develop their own initiatives, more or 
less free from restriction. Henri Humblot remembered that there were significant 
differences between the regional military governments, and a ‘curious mosaic’ of 
ideas, programmes, initiatives, and personalities within each office. Because of the 
lack of central instructions, occupation policy could develop from the ground 
upwards, and was, as a result, particularly suited to local conditions and prob-
lems.64 But to health officers this only created more problems. Many public health 
measures would be effective only if applied throughout the zone. Disease data and 
vital statistics had to be collected centrally, and drugs and medical supplies agreed 
by the authorities in Paris had to be distributed on the basis of a centrally agreed 
formula. like the Directorate of Economy and Finance, public health staffs com-
plained about the reality of decentralization, which made their work so much 
harder.65
The French zone’s health authorities were built as haphazardly as the rest of the 
military government. Delays at the beginning were caused by the First French 
Army’s G5 Division’s slow handover to the GMZFO’s Public Health Directorate. 
Public health officers in the southern parts of the zone had begun to set up provin-
cial authorities in spring 1945, but their efforts were nullified by the handover of 
Karlsruhe and stuttgart to the Americans. Areas in the north of the zone were not 
fully occupied until July 1945.66 By september 1945 the Public Health Directorate 
62 Rovan quoted in lattard, ‘Zielkonflikte’.
63 Rainer Hudemann, ‘Zentralismus und Dezentralisierung in der französischen Deutschland- und 
Besatzungspolitik 1945–1947’, in Winfried Becker (ed.), Die Kapitulierung von 1945 und der Neu-
beginn in Deutschland (Cologne, 1987), 181–209. Clay observed that although France supported 
German dismemberment, it practised administrative centralization in its own zone, see lattard, 
‘Zielkonflikte’, 21. Also see the newspaper clipping and minutes in TNA, FO 371/46992, ‘French 
Policy in Germany: Powers of Central Administration—from our own correspondent, Paris, 2 December 
1945’, The Times, 3 Dec. 1945.
64 Henri Humblot, ‘Kontrolle und Anregung der Jugendbewegungen in süd-Würtemberg: Ein 
Erlebnisbericht aus den Jahren 1945 bis 1949’, in Vaillant (ed.), Französische Kulturpolitik in Deutsch-
land, 1945–1949.
65 e.g. COl AB 35/3, l’Inspecteur Général Coulon (Directeur de la santé Publique) to Monsieur 
le Directeur du Personnel et du Matériel et du Budget, [23 Jan. 1946].
66 COl AB 35/2, Desplats, ‘la Direction de la santé Publique’.
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in Baden-Baden had seventeen officers: some came from the military, but most 
from AsTO (Assimilés spéciaux pour les Territoires Occupés).67
One of the civilian appointments was Frédéric Falkenburger. Born in Berlin in 
1890, he studied medicine at the University of strasbourg before the First World 
War. Afterwards he worked at a venereal disease clinic, then at a local health insur-
ance body in Berlin, before emigrating to Paris in 1933. He was naturalized in 
1937 (after a brief period in Moscow), and became ‘Frédéric’. like Joseph Rovan, 
who made a similar journey, he made influential contacts in Paris and later within 
the Resistance. He worked for the Centre National de la Recherche scientifique 
(CNRs), and then as an anthropologist at the Musée de l’Homme in Paris, where 
his colleagues included Paul Rivet (an eminent anthropologist and the French del-
egate at the founding meeting of UNEsCO), and Jacques soustelle (a minister 
under de Gaulle, later general secretary of the Gaullist party, Rassemblement du 
Peuple Français (RPF), and governor general of Algeria).68 Falkenburger was 
deprived of his French citizenship in 1940, arrested in 1942, and interned in Gurs 
in the Pyrenees. His son thought that only his medical skills saved him from depor-
tation. He escaped, joined the Resistance, and lived illegally until the liberation of 
France in June 1944. It seems that he converted to Catholicism after divorcing his 
Jewish wife and marrying a Roman Catholic.69
Falkenburger offered his services to the French occupation staff, while still under 
the command of General louis-Marie Koelz, and based at the Hôtel de l’Europe 
in Paris. An old colleague, Jacques soustelle, just appointed minister for the colo-
nies in de Gaulle’s provisional government, recommended Falkenburger to Gen-
eral Koelz, who called him in for an interview. The two men noted that they had 
fought at the same locations during the First World War, on opposite sides. shortly 
afterwards, Falkenburger received two letters: a rejection from the Hôtel de 
l’Europe; and personal note from General Koelz, appointing him to the rank of 
médecin lieutenant-colonel at the Health Directorate in Baden-Baden, under the 
command of Inspector General Charles Coulon. He worked there for four years, 
before becoming head of the health service of the French high commissioner in 
Germany.70 Individuals’ careers in the French apparatus were often shaped by per-
sonal connections and character references from influential people. Falkenburger’s 
acceptability was helped by the fact that he had been educated in France, was bilin-
gual, and fully naturalized. In 1946 he arranged a job for his son, Paul Falkenburger, 
as a public education officer in Freiburg. later, Paul Falkenburger was General de 
67 COl AB 35/3, l’Inspecteur Général Coulon, feuille de renseignements—formation: Direction 
de la santé Publique, 11 sept. 1945.
68 On Rivet, see Christine laurière, Paul Rivet: Le Savant et le politique (Paris, 2008). On soustelle, 
see Denis Rolland, ‘Jacques soustelle, de l’ethnologie à la politique, 1939–1943’, Revue d’histoire 
moderne et contemporaine, 1 (1996), 137–50.
69 He died in Mainz in 1965. see Joseph Walk, Kurzbiographien zur Geschichte der Juden, 1918–
1945 (Munich 1988), and Werner Röder and Herbert A. strauss (eds.), Biographisches Handbuch der 
deutschsprachigen Emigration nach 1933/International Biographical Dictionary of Central European Emi-
gres 1933–1945, 3 vols. (Munich and New York, 1980–3). Paul Falkenburger (with Corine Defrance), 
‘Ich bin ein Berliner’: Berlin, Paris, Bonn—la voie d’un interprète (Paris, 2006).
70 Falkenburger, ‘Ich bin ein Berliner’.
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Gaulle’s and Georges Pompidou’s interpreter at meetings with Konrad Adenauer 
and Helmut Kohl.71
The French zone had suffered considerably less war damage than the others, 
particularly the soviet and British zones. An article in The Times observed, almost 
jealously, that the French had been lucky: they had a small area, largely rural, with 
only a handful of towns, and, by German standards, little physical destruction. In 
addition, only a small proportion of the great flood of German expellees from the 
east headed there.72 But the French territory, too, was marred by chaos and disrup-
tion, particularly in the north. In 1952 the French economist André Piettre pub-
lished a study of post-war Germany, in which he contrasted the demographic and 
economic conditions encountered by the four occupying powers. Citing German 
data, he noted that towns with more than 100,000 inhabitants, had been hit pro-
portionately harder in the French zone: in such towns in the soviet zone only 23 
per cent, and in the British and American zones 33 per cent, of buildings, had been 
completely destroyed, but in the French zone it was 44 per cent. Only 11 per cent 
of buildings remained intact in these larger French towns, compared to 39 per cent 
in the soviet zone, 21 per cent in the British, and 19 per cent in the American 
zone.73 An American report agreed that the French zone’s cities—Friedrichshafen, 
Freiburg, saarbrucken, Koblenz, Mainz—had been destroyed to around 50 per 
cent.74 The French zone had few large towns, and none comparable in size to cities 
such as Frankfurt and Dresden, but this still represented considerable damage to 
buildings, sanitary installations, and infrastructures.
French troops noticed that conditions changed radically as they crossed to the 
eastern bank of the Rhine. The cities near the targets of the Allied bombs were 
eerily empty, while undamaged towns and villages nearby overflowed with people 
seeking shelter. When the French authorities began to take population censuses in 
spring 1945, Baden-Baden contained 15,000 refugees, and Konstanz’s population 
of 70,000 was double its normal size.75 Many German officials had abandoned 
their posts. In the First French Army area, all the members of the state administra-
tion and all but a few of the Landräte had fled, and at least 30 per cent of mayors 
had disappeared.76 This mess was not cleared up in a hurry. In the autumn of 1946 
Carl Welty, an ornithologist from Indiana, led a Quaker relief team in the French 
zone, and thought that conditions were still dire. Coming from luxembourg, 
71 Falkenburger, ‘Ich bin ein Berliner’.
72 ‘In the French Zone’, The Times, 20 Dec. 1946.
73 Berlin: 30% total destruction, 45% partial destruction, and 25% intact. British zone: 33% total 
destruction, 46% partial destruction, 21%per cent intact. American zone: 33% total destruction, 48% 
partial destruction, 19% intact. soviet zone: 23% total destruction, 38% partial  destruction, 39% intact. 
French zone: 44% total destruction, 45% partial destruction, 11% intact. André Piettre, L’Économie 
allemande contemporaine (Allemagne occidentale) 1945–1952 (Paris, 1952), 67, quoting data from Deut-
schland-Jahrbuch (1949), 291. Also see Michael Balfour ‘Four Power Control in  Germany’, in Balfour 
and John Mair, Four Power Control in Germany and Austria, 1945–1946 (Oxford, 1956), 8.
74 Foundation for Foreign Affairs, Field Report.
75 First French Army, Monthly Historical Report (Apr. 1945), 2 and Monthly Historical Report (May 
1945), both quoted in Joseph R. starr, Denazification, Occupation and Control of Germany, March-July 
1945 (1950, salisbury, 1977), 16.
76 starr, Denazification.
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where ‘[a] genteel air of prosperity pervaded the whole place’, he was immediately 
struck by the ‘terrific contrast the minute we crossed into Germany!’77 His first 
destination was the city of Koblenz (one of ‘the avenues of Nazism’, according to 
de Gaulle78): ‘even after dark [it] turns your stomach. It is a terrific desolation of 
gutted architecture.’ By then the main streets had been cleared of rubble, but it was 
rare to see ‘a building damaged slightly enough that a family can live in it . . . People 
simply pile enough rocks in the windows and doors to make a wall, and then 
shovel the rest of the rubble inside the burned-out building.’ The city looked ‘so 
sick that one doubts its recovery’, and reconstruction would be ‘a monumental job, 
taking years and years at the present slow rate’.79
Towns like Koblenz were in a grim state, but the most shocking reports came 
from French officers in Berlin. The French sector of the city, like the zone, had 
been carved out of parts initially allocated to the British and Americans. Renée 
Bédarida, a young French women fresh out of the Resistance, worked as an AsTO 
officer for the ACC in Berlin. In a letter she described the ‘hallucinative spectacle’ 
of a ‘city of death’: ‘not a street remains intact’, she wrote, ‘all houses are gutted, 
isolated façades. Women of the NsDAP collect the intact stones one by one. 
 Passersby are used to this spectacle as if they were in a normal city. They are dirty, 
badly dressed, and always loaded with a sack of potatoes or a bundle of dead 
branches.’ Berliners lived crammed in cellars or barely habitable rooms. she wrote 
that underground tunnels and rivers were littered with corpses, and their nauseat-
ing smell pervaded everything.80 Roger Humbert recalled that when he arrived in 
Berlin in 1945 to join the French Directorate of Economy and Finance, there was 
nothing there. ‘We had to be the government of Germany’, he said, a job made 
all the more difficult by the problems caused by refugees and displaced 
persons.81
French health teams were as concerned about epidemics and public health dis-
asters as those in the other zones. Given their zone’s close proximity to France, 
these concerns were heightened when, in March 1945, the first cases of typhus 
were verified west of the Rhine. The Us Army, together with sHAEF, set up a 
cordon sanitaire along the Rhine from the Netherlands to the swiss border: civil-
ians were prohibited from crossing without first submitting to an examination and 
DDT dusting. Those from prisons, concentration camps, refugee camps, and 
assembly points were ‘dusted’ en masse.82 General Coulon from the Public Health 
Directorate urged his superiors to grant funds for an increased production of DDT 
and typhus vaccine, and to initiate the compulsory vaccination of all military 
77 Joel Carl Welty, The Hunger Year: In the French Zone of Germany (Beloit, Wis., 1983), 11, 
17–18.
78 ‘le Voyage du Général de Gaulle en Allemagne occupée’.
79 starr, Denazification, 16–17.
80 Renée Bédarida, letter, 15 Oct. 1945, repr. in Renée Bédarida, ‘Une française à Berlin en 1945’, 
in Klaus Manfrass and Jean-Pierre Rioux (eds.), France-Allemagne 1944–1947: Akten des deutsch-
französischen Historikerkolloquiums, Baden-Baden, 2.-5. Dezember 1986 (Paris, 1990), 149.
81 COl AOR 1/1a, ‘Roger Humbert, Politique allemande de la France’, recorded interview.
82 Earl F. Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944–1946 (Washington, 
1990), 196.
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 government personnel.83 In the end, the cordon sanitaire and accompanying meas-
ures were deemed a success. ‘While we had reason to fear the outbreak of a typhus 
 epidemic’, noted a retrospective of the French Military Government’s Directorate 
of Public Health in 1949, ‘in fact, we had no epidemic of any kind. We only 
recorded two secondary cases [of typhus] apart from the fifty-odd cases brought 
into the zone by refugees from Central Europe and from other zones of Germany’; 
by 1946 no new typhus cases were recorded.84 But that is jumping ahead of the 
story; in the months after the war the threat of a typhus epidemic was still a great 
concern.
French health officers were also alarmed by rising rates of venereal diseases. In 
August 1945, a note from General Melnotte, director of the French troops’ health 
service, told Coulon that the problem had become urgent. The health of troops in 
Germany was ‘gravely compromised’ by sexually transmitted infections, he wrote, 
caused mostly by soldiers’ contacts with German women. It was ‘absolutely essen-
tial and urgent to impose rigorous preventive measures, even if they are brutal’.85 
like the other occupiers, the French authorities attempted to limit venereal dis-
eases with a battery of measures: raids on public venues, control of prostitution, 
compulsory examination of suspects, issuance of registration cards which declared 
infection, and compulsory reporting of all cases of syphilis and gonorrhoea by the 
local German health offices.86 In late August 1945 Émile laffon yielded to the 
Public Health Directorate’s advice and authorized the compulsory hospitalization 
of German women who infected members of the French military.87 similar meas-
ures were in use in the other zones.
All in all, the French zone had a similar range of infectious diseases and public 
health concerns as elsewhere. First reports from Berlin’s health officials to their 
French superiors noted an alarmingly high rate of dysentery in the French sector, 
particularly in the inner-city district of Wedding. The situation had been made 
worse because not nearly enough drugs and medical supplies were available to limit 
the spread. Hospitals were forced to send away all but the most acute of the infec-
tious cases.88 Other towns also complained about broken water and sewage pipes 
and other components of the sanitary infrastructure. Freiburg’s centre, reduced to 
rubble by an RAF bombing raid in November 1944, had all the ingredients for a 
health crisis. When the French troops arrived, over 1,200 corpses were reported to 
83 COl AB 48/3, l’Inspecteur Général Coulon (Directeur de la santé Publique, GMZFA) to 
Monsieur sabatier (Directeur Général des Affaires Administratives), [summer 1945] and following 
draft letter to General Koenig. The price of typhus vaccine was apparently 114 francs per person, see 
COl AB 35/3, ‘Note explicative concernant l’effectif budgetaire du service Medical du GM’ 
[undated].
84 COl AB 35/2, Desplats, ‘la Direction de la santé Publique’.
85 COl AB 47/4, le Médecin Général Melnotte to Monsieur le Général Coulon, 6 Aug. 1945.
86 e.g. COl AB 47/4, memorandum on ‘Vénéréologie’, [1946], which lists VD measures, and 
‘Fiche de déclaration de maladie vénérienne’. COl AB 47/4, l’Inspecteur Général Coulon, ‘Note 
concernant la lutte contre les maladies vénériennes’, 17 Aug. 1945.
87 COl AB 47/4, l’Administrateur Général laffon to Messieurs les Délégués supérieurs pour le 
Gouvernement Militaire, ‘lutte contre les maladies vénériennes’, 30 Aug. 1945.
88 lAB B Rep. 012/902-27, 21 June 1945, report by H. lehmann (Gesundheitsamt Bezirk 
 Wedding) to Magistrat der stadt Berlin.
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be still buried under the rubble.89 With rising temperatures and groundwater they 
threatened to pollute the city’s entire water supply. The French instructed the city’s 
university medical faculty to survey the health situation. They identified, apart 
from problems such as the destruction of buildings, pipes, hospitals, and laborator-
ies, one particular area of concern: food shortages. since the end of the war official 
daily rations had decreased from 1,759 to just 586 calories per person per day.90 
some commentators have since directly attributed the rising mortality rates to 
food shortages; the historian Eduard seidler has calculated that infant mortality 
rates in Freiburg were over 30 per cent in spring 1946.91 Concerns about imminent 
starvation were reinforced by reports from nearby towns, whose food supplies had 
more or less run out. Although shortages could be alleviated with surpluses from 
adjacent rural areas, the lack of transport and military security regulations often 
made this impossible.92
Despite these problems, comparatively speaking, physical and demographic con-
ditions were more favourable than those in the rest of Germany. Most communities 
east of the Rhine, one report stated, had at least an embryonic health organization 
of a doctor and several registered nurses or midwives.93 German mortality in the 
zone was lower than mortality in France itself.94 Major infectious disease incidence 
rates were persistently lowest or second-lowest in the French zone (and consistently 
highest in the soviet zone).95 Even in Berlin, problems were comparatively less 
severe in the French sector. Because it was much smaller than the other three, both 
in area and population, the French authorities also had to deal with a smaller share 
of the overall burden. The two French districts had to accommodate and feed by far 
the smallest share of newly arriving German refugees: by November 1945 fewer 
than 2,000 refugees lived in the French sector, compared with almost 6,000 in the 
American, almost 9,000 in the British, and over 10,000 in the soviet sector.96 since, 
as report after report pointed out, refugees were directly associated with escalating 
disease and mortality rates, the French sector was exposed to fewer problems, and 
only spent a fraction of its budgets on refugee health costs.97
Comparisons of physical conditions indicate that the immediate public health 
challenges were less severe in the French zone, but they do not take into account 
89 Eduard seidler, Die Medizinische Fakultät der Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg im Breisgau 
(1993), 397.
90 Hans-Georg Hofer, ‘Zwischen Reinigung und Reintegration: Die Freiburger Universitätsmedizin 
nach 1945’, in sigrid Oehler-Klein und Volker Roelcke (eds.), Vergangenheitspolitik in der univer-
sitären Medizin nach 1945 (stuttgart, 2007), 250.
91 Hofer, ‘Zwischen Reinigung und Reintegration’. seidler, Die Medizinische Fakultät.
92 MG-CA Weekly Field Report, 28 Apr. 1945, No. 46, 9, quoted in starr, Denazification, 9.
93 First French Army, ‘Monthly Historical Report’ (Apr. 1945), 11, quoted in starr, Denazification, 67.
94 F. Desplats suggested this was because the French population contained a higher number of old 
people. COl AB 35/2, Desplats, ‘la Direction de la santé Publique’.
95 GMZFO, Zone Française d’Occupation en Allemagne, Résultats de six mois d’activité (May 1946), 49.
96 lAB C Rep. 118–59, ‘Denkschrift zur Frage des Umsiedlerproblems in der stadt Berlin’, Mag-
istrat der stadt Berlin, Hauptamt für sozialwesen, 16 Nov. 1945. Also see lAB B Rep. 012/166, 
Weekly reports on expellees and returning soldiers, 5 Nov. 1945.
97 e.g. lAB B Rep. 203/5114, Bezirksamt Wedding von Gross-Berlin to Gouvernement Militaire 
Francais du Grand-Berlin, 3 June and 3 July 1947.
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the material, political, or conceptual resources at the disposal of public health 
 officers. Health work everywhere in Germany was shaped by shortages, but they 
were of different scales, and dealt with differently, in each occupation zone. In the 
French zone confrontations over supply shortages plagued the relationship between 
the occupation authorities, and the German doctors and general population, for 
years. At the same time, personnel shortages were negotiated by a series of modifi-
cations to initial plans and directives.
As far as medical personnel was concerned, health teams argued that initial staff-
ing allocations had underestimated requirements. This was despite the fact that the 
density of military government personnel was highest of all in the French zone, 
since the policy of decentralization required personnel for all technical fields at 
even the local level. The Times reported in December 1946 (after demobilization 
had begun to reduce the size of all four military governments) that the French had 
a density of 18 French officials to every 10,000 Germans; the British had a density 
of 10; and the Americans of only 3 officials in their respective zones. The French 
authorities delegated fewer responsibilities to the Germans than the other occupi-
ers, and German authorities had fewer powers than their counterparts in the other 
zones.98 Demobilization directly contradicted the idea that the Germans ought not 
to be given political and administrative responsibilities until they had learnt the 
lessons of history, and the assumption that the occupation would be a long project. 
But because of financial pressure from Paris, demobilization began early in the 
French zone and proceeded quickly—from around 300,000 in autumn 1945, to 
200,000 in January 1946, 75,000 in May 1947, and only 53,000 soldiers in May 
1948.99 Public health staff, like their counterparts elsewhere, were united in their 
insistence that there were simply not enough people available for urgent public 
health work, and not even all jobs in the Health Directorate could be filled.100 
Budget cuts and reductions in the overall size of the French occupation forces only 
caused further panic. 101
Demobilization brought into sharp focus the lack of qualified, and politically 
acceptable, German medical personnel. Already before the end of the war, a French 
report had identified severe personnel shortages in the German health service, 
exacerbated, it noted, by restrictions on non-Aryans’ right to practise medicine and 
the drafting of many doctors into the army. Many old and retired individuals had 
been used during the war: in 1943, over 300 practising German doctors were older 
than 80 years, and 3,000 were older than 70 years of age, but many of them would 
98 ‘In the French Zone’, The Times, 20 Dec. 1946. On competing estimates for the numbers of 
military government personnel in the other zones, see Balfour, ‘Four Power Control in Germany’, 
102–6.
99 Willis, France, Germany and the New Europe, 34. Estimates in Klöckler, Abendland, 29. For an 
example of rumours about cuts to the French occupation apparatus, see TNA FO 371/64348, British 
Consulate General, Baden-Baden, to Ernest Bevin, Foreign Office, 21 Jan. 1947.
100 COl AB 35/3, ‘Note explicative concernant l’effectif budgetaire du service Médical du GM’ 
[undated].
101 A cut in the health budget in late 1946 meant that the pharmaceutical office of the French zone’s 
health directorate was reduced to just a chief, a deputy, and 2 typists. COl AB 35/2, Desplats, ‘la 
Direction de la santé Publique’.
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not be able to continue for much longer.102 After the occupation began, the German 
health offices also warned about shortages. The health authorities in Berlin pointed 
out that the ratio of German doctors to inhabitants was persistently most unfa-
vourable in the French sector: in the autumn of 1945 the British sector had 1.75 
doctors per 1,000 inhabitants, and the American sector 1.16; but only 0.71 doc-
tors per 1,000 inhabitants were available in the soviet sector, and only 0.67 in the 
French sector.103 This uneven distribution of doctors in Berlin—which mirrored 
the uneven distribution of doctors across Germany—continued to plague the 
French (and soviet) health authorities for some time. By November 1946, the 
French districts were still short of medical personnel. The Berlin health office cal-
culated a minimum need of 8 doctors per 10,000 inhabitants, and lamented the 
unbalanced distribution: the soviet sector had a shortage of 358 doctors, and the 
French a shortage of 119. At the same time, the American sector had an excess of 
156, and the British an excess of 321.104
such personnel shortages, when fears about epidemic crises were at their most 
acute, led to a series of compromises, above all in denazification. In the British, 
American, and even soviet zones, these compromises involved a recognition of the 
irreconcilable gaps between what had been planned and what now seemed feasible. 
As a result, the far-reaching ambitions for a wholesale cleansing of German society 
were abandoned, and formerly active, influential, and loyal members of the 
NsDAP were recruited to work in the health service, if the occupiers deemed this 
to be ‘in the interest of public health’. In the French zone, although the denazifica-
tion compromises produced similar results, they took a different form, as Anglo-
American policies, acquired by default, were abandoned and replaced with French 
approaches.105 These new procedures similarly allowed for the retention of politi-
cally suspect technical specialists.
At first, the French authorities followed sHAEF instructions on the identifica-
tion of former members of the NsDAP and their removal from positions of public 
responsibilities. Using questionnaires and blacklists compiled by the Americans, 
they attempted to categorize individuals into one of five categories of guilt. Through 
the application of sHAEF criteria, by May 1946 almost 11,000 individuals deemed 
to have been ‘Nazi leaders’ had been arrested and interned.106
But from the start there was significant opposition to the questionnaires and the 
inflexible categories they generated.107 less than six months into the occupation, 
laffon and his staff rejected the denazification criteria used in the other zones and 
replaced them with a new concept of German ‘self-purification’ (auto-épuration). 
The new procedure involved individual assessment of Germans by Germans, using 
102 COl AB 35/1, ‘le Médecin allemand’ (Paris, 11 Feb. [1945]).
103 lAB B Rep. 012/5, ‘Bericht über die Dienstbesprechung am Donnerstag, dem 4.Oktober 
1945’, 4 Oct. 1945.
104 lAB B Rep. 012/277, ‘Vermerk über die Amtsarztsitzung am 14. November 1946 im großen 
saal des landesgesundheitsamtes’, 15 Nov. 1946.
105 The French had a separate term for this process: épuration, a purification or purge.
106 la Zone Française d’Occupation en Allemagne, Résultats de six mois d’activité (May 1946), 52.
107 COl AB 43/3, Emile laffon to Messieurs les Administrateurs de Province, Baden-Baden, 
22 Aug. 1945.
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local testimony and evaluation. Where until then an individual’s (non-)member-
ship of the NsDAP (and dates of joining) was sufficient evidence, now local and 
provincial German denazification commissions were to consider a range of evi-
dence available in each case, so as to determine the degree of complicity or guilt. 
The commissions would be constituted from members of the same profession as 
the accused, and representatives from political parties, trade unions, and former 
victims of the Nazi regime. They would have the power to impose sanctions, such 
as forced retirement, demotion, or dismissals without pension (but the French 
governors could veto their decisions or demand further investigations).108
soon, French denazification procedure differed from that in the other zones in 
three main points: first, it rejected party membership as a sufficient sign of guilt 
and, conversely, non-membership as a sign of innocence; second, it insisted on 
examining individual cases on their merits, instead of using predetermined categor-
ies; and third, it prescribed that the process had to be run by the Germans them-
selves, under French direction.
laffon explained in a memorandum that he was particularly concerned about 
the likely effects of Anglo-American denazification procedures on ‘anti-Nazi ele-
ments’, who might, in their despair, refuse to cooperate with the French occupa-
tion authorities.109 By contrast, the new system would be ‘both more thorough and 
more systematic’. A report from November 1945 explained that the Germans 
should take over denazification for both psychological and political reasons. They 
were motivated by ‘a certain psychological interest that does not directly affect the 
French authorities in their operation of political justice’. The Germans had ‘ “lived” 
the Nazi regime’, and were ‘better able to assess the elements of the inquiry than 
the French officers, many of whom have experienced Germany only since the 
occupation’, and were therefore ‘ill-prepared to perform denazification’. There 
were also political calculations. Anti-Nazi Germans were ‘not necessarily Franco-
philes’, the report noted, and they might form ‘a block against the occupiers if they 
had to testify before a French court’. Moreover, if the Germans took responsibili-
ties for denazification ‘in inevitable cases where injustices are committed, the 
French won’t be blamed’. Nonetheless, the report went on, the French occupation 
authorities would still ultimately be in charge: they would select and approve the 
members of the German commissions, and would monitor (and if necessary, veto) 
proposed sanctions.110
That, at least, was the idea. In practice, the old sHAEF system and the new 
French procedure ran parallel for some time, creating confusion and inconsisten-
cies.111 Another report from November 1945 noted that denazification was a 
108 COl AB 43/3, laffon to the Health Directorate, 19 sept. 1945.
109 COl AB 43/3, laffon to the Health Directorate, 19 sept. 1945.
110 COl AB 43/4, ‘Rapport General sur la dénazification en zone française d’occupation pour le 
mois de Novembre 1945’.
111 This has been highlighted by the older historiography of the French zone, see e.g. Klaus- Dietmar 
Henke, Politische Säuberung unter französischer Besatzung: Die Entnazifizierung in Württemberg- 
Hohenzollern (stuttgart, 1981). Klaus-Dietmar Henke, ‘Politik der Widersprüche: Zur Charakteristik 
der französischen Militärregierung in Deutschland nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg’, in Claus scharf and 
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 complex problem, since it had to find a way to remove supporters of the Nazi 
regime from positions of influence, without abetting those ‘solely driven by feel-
ings of revenge’. There were still ‘no appreciable results’ to show from the new 
system, which had already been in operation for several months.112 A report from 
the following month observed that the denazification commissions could only deal 
with around 100 cases per day. New commissions were being created where pos-
sible, but they were limited—of course—by personnel shortages. And it was back-
breaking work: ‘all the French denazification staff had to work 9 to 12 hours a day’. 
Despite this, the report stated, there were already ‘some successes’, and the German 
members of the commissions took their work very seriously. Any differences of 
opinion could usually be resolved by the deputies of the German provincial admin-
istrations, who had specific responsibility for denazification matters.113
Apart from an unrealistic time schedule, denazification in the French zone was 
also criticized for significant regional variation, as each decentralized Land author-
ity developed its own procedures. All attempted to assess individual cases on their 
merits, as laffon had specified, but some (such as in Württemberg) were admired 
for their fine-tuning and for being able to determine shades of individual guilt, 
while others struggled under the weight of cases. Even at the local level there was 
significant variation, and different commissions reacted differently to similar evi-
dence. The Germans, one memorandum noted, often did not know what to do 
and needed further guidance, in particular where medical staff was concerned. The 
fact that some doctors were allowed to practise while others in a similar situation 
were suspended, was ‘very disadvantageous’.114 Criticism from inside the zone, 
from other zones (particularly the American), and from France led military gov-
ernment staff to adapt or change procedures.115 But by spring 1947, a report from 
April proudly noted, 476,000 cases had been examined from a population of just 
under 2 million, resulting in sanctions in 39.2 per cent of cases—which compared 
respectably to the British and American zones.116 This figure disguised great varia-
tion not just across the regions and provinces, but also in the different professions 
Hans-Jürgen schröder (eds.), Die Deutschlandpolitik Frankreichs und die französische Zone 1945–1949 
(Wiesbaden, 1983), 49–90. Klaus-Dietmar Henke, ‘Die Grenzen der politischen säuberung in Deut-
schland nach 1945’, in ludolf Herbst (ed.), Westdeutschland 1945–1955: Unterwerfung, Kontrolle, 
Integration (Munich, 1986), 127–33.
112 COl AB 43/4, ‘Rapport General sur la denazification en zone française d’occupation pour le 
mois de Novembre 1945’.
113 COl AB 43/3, ‘Épuration de personnel allemand, rapport général au 31 Décembre 1945, 
 statistiques provisiores de l’épuration systematique’ [31 Dec. 1945].
114 COl AB 43/3, note from F, 2 Mar. 1946. For similar complaints, also see COl AB 43/3, Déna-
zification du corps médical [1945].
115 On internal criticisms, see e.g. COl AB 43/3, GMZFO Cabinet Civil, laffon to DGs, ‘Objét: 
Dénazification’, 2 Apr. 1947. On the criticisms voiced in the American and French press, see Grohn-
ert, Die Entnazifizierung in Baden. On effects of the French system on American denazification policy, 
see R. Grohnert, ‘Die “auto-épuration”: Der französische sonderweg in der Entnazifizierung’, in 
Edgar Wolfrum, Peter Fäßler, and Reinhard Grohnert (eds.), Krisenjahre und Aufbruchszeit: Alltag und 
Politik im französisch besetzten Baden 1945–1949 (Munich, 1996), 165–85.
116 COl AB 43/3, ‘Rapport général sur l’épuration dans la Zone française d’Occupation en Alle-
magne à fin Avril 1947’.
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to be denazified. Denazification was strictest in the field of education, where fewer 
than 50 per cent of the old elementary and secondary school teachers were kept on, 
and the police, but far fewer proportions were punished among those who worked 
in industry, public works, science, and above all medicine.117
The procedure was different from the other zones, but the results—at least as 
far as they concerned the medical profession and health offices—were very simi-
lar. Just as in the other zones, politically suspect specialists deemed to be indispen-
sable were widely tolerated and exempted from cleansing procedures. That was 
the case even though in the French zone, too, the staff of the medical faculties, 
health offices, and health professions contained high percentages of formerly 
active, loyal Nazis. A recent estimate suggests that 75 per cent of members of the 
medical faculty of the University of Freiburg had joined the NsDAP.118 Even if 
party membership alone was no longer a sufficient criterion of an individual’s 
complicity, French officers were in no doubt about the extent of the problem, and 
they continued to use party membership as a signifier of ‘particularly strong activ-
ity within the party’.119 A French proposal to the Allied Health Committee in 
Berlin admitted frankly that there could be no ‘question of eliminating all doctors 
belonging to the Party as they form the majority, up to 96 per cent in certain 
districts’.120
Faced with warnings that medical care and training were threatened by strict 
denazification, French officials initially responded by attempting to find replace-
ments. It should be possible to eliminate the most dangerous elements while still 
providing care to the civilian population, one note from september 1945 main-
tained. If the removal of doctors presented a threat to public health, because they 
were ‘indispensable in a particular location’, a politically acceptable replacement 
should be found.121 But French health officers also wavered about how to define 
Nazi complicity. To eliminate all Nazi party members would surely be to ‘imitate 
Nazi methods’, one memorandum argued; better to ‘show humanity and eliminate 
117 Willis, France, Germany and the New Europe, 43. On the denazification of forestry workers and 
lawyers, see Grohnert, Die Entnazifizierung in Baden, 95–102. Evidence of the temporary and limited 
nature of denazification in the French zone is the existence of an influential lobby group of academics 
who had not yet been reinstated, the Verband der nicht-amtierenden (amtsverdrängten) Hochschullehrer, 
founded in Tübingen in 1950, Karsten Jedlitschka, Wissenschaft und Politik: Der Fall des Münchner 
Historikers Ulrich Crämer (1907–1992) (Berlin, 2006).
118 silke seemann, Die politische Säuberungen des Lehrkörpers der Freiburger Universität nach dem 
Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs, 1945–1947 (Freiburg, 2002); silke seemann, ‘Entnazifizierung und 
 Vergangenheitsbewältigung in der Medizinischen Fakultät nach 1945’, in Bernd Grün, Hans-Georg 
Hofer, and Karl-Heinz leven (eds.), Medizin und Nationalsozialismus: die Freiburger Medizinische 
Fakultät und das Klinikum in der Weimarer Republik und im ‘Dritten Reich’ (Frankfurt am Main, 
2002), 471–95.
119 COl AB 43/4, laffon to DGs, Épuration du corps médical [n.d.].
120 TNA, FO 1050/737, ‘Measures proposed for the denazification of the German Medical Corps’, 
paper submitted by French member for consideration at the 4th AHC meeting, 22 sept. 1945. COl 
AB 43/4, ‘Projet’, transmitted to Berlin via telephone, 26 sept. 1945. The Health Directive supplied 
the material for this proposal presented in Berlin, see COl AB 43/3, Health Directorate, ‘Note pour 
la Commission de Berlin. Objet: Épuration des médecins’, 15 sept. 1945.
121 COl AB 43/3, Health Directorate, ‘Note pour la Commission de Berlin. Objet: Épuration des 
médecins’, 15 sept. 1945.
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only those active Nazis’. But who the ‘active Nazis’ were was hard to define, since 
Germans’ own testimony always claimed they had not been actively involved.122
Next came the decision to make temporary allowances which broke the rules. In 
October 1945 laffon reminded his staff that the cleansing of vital fields (such as 
industry, agriculture, finance, and commerce) had to be conducted in a way that 
did not destroy ‘any possibility of an early resumption of economic life’.123 Although 
it was wrong to continue to employ health officers who had been revoked by the 
denazification commissions, one memo admitted, it was often impossible to find 
replacements for them; so they would, as a temporary measure, have to continue 
their work.124 As in the other zones, denazification was hampered because it applied 
above all to medical administration, for which volunteers were hardest to find. 
M. Curial from the Health Directorate noted how ‘inconvenient’ it was to have to 
find replacements for indispensable health officials removed from their jobs.125 By 
February 1946 laffon directed that since there were more jobs than qualified 
people, some Nazis would have to be employed—on the proviso that they should 
not be used in public functions, or, if possible, remain in their old jobs, and the 
employment offices were to keep a record of these unpalatable appointments.126
These compromises mirrored those that took place in the other three zones. If 
anything, the flexibility of the French zone’s system made them happen earlier. Mem-
bers of the medical profession, in particular, benefited from a system of hearings 
before German denazification commissions. Doctors and health officers were well-
respected authority figures, and able to defend themselves in front of their neigh-
bours and colleagues. And many managed to argue, consistently and convin cingly, 
that doctors by their nature were above politics. They were treated more leniently by 
the commissions than other professions, and often cleared on the spot.127 Across the 
French zone, the proportion of cases examined and sanctions taken against was sig-
nificantly lower in the health professions than in any other field.128
CONFRONTATIONs
In 1949, an account of the work of the Health Directorate during the occupation 
observed that the public health picture had improved quickly after the initial 
months of chaos: by the summer of 1946, no epidemics were in evidence in French 
122 COl AB 43/4, Memorandum on ‘Dénazification du corps médical’ [undated, late 1945].
123 COl AB 43/4, laffon to DGs, 31 Oct. 1945.
124 COl AB 43/3, laffon memo, 22 Dec. 1945. Desplats’s history of the Direction de la santé 
Publique & Aide sociale also states that the ‘period of chaos gradually ceased as we put into place new 
medical personnel first with provisional, then with definitive licences’. COl AB 35/2, Desplats, 
‘la Direction de la santé Publique’.
125 COl AB 43/3, Générale des Affaires Administratives, memorandum on a meeting with 
M. Curial, 22 Dec. 1945.
126 COl AB 43/3, laffon to DGs, 8 Feb. 1946.
127 COl AB 43/3, laffon memo, 22 Dec. 1945.
128 see e.g. Zone Française d’Occupation en Allemagne, ‘Résultats de six mois d’activité’, May 
1946, 52—also reproduced in table 28.
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occupied territory, and the mortality rate was low and far exceeded by births. Dis-
eases such as typhus, cholera, and dysentery, which continued to plague those parts 
of the country flooded with refugees, were in sharp decline. Diphtheria rates were 
declining as a result of the systematic vaccination programmes. The number of 
hospital beds appeared to be sufficient to cope with demands (even if the rate 
occupancy was very high), and continued to rise. Even the numbers of beds in 
tuberculosis sanatoria had increased, from only just over 2,000 in 1946 to over 
6,000 in 1948, once some of the requisitioned beds had been returned.129
But this benign official picture of public health progress obscures significant 
tensions. There were contradictions in all zones: between different sections of the 
occupation authorities, and between occupiers and the occupied population. 
A number of them centred around, and impacted upon, public health. In the 
French zone, some of these tensions became more acute and crippling than else-
where because they were fuelled by the widespread unpopularity of the occupiers. 
They were disliked not just by the Germans. French occupation officers, both in 
the abstract and the concrete, were often scorned and parodied by the Americans, 
who portrayed them as ‘officious’, ‘bureaucratic’, conceited, pompous, or exces-
sively nationalist.130 As one British soldier mocked, the American’s ‘dislike of the 
French was born in Normandy, and neither God nor Eisenhower can change it’.131
But it was Germans’ dissatisfaction with the French that dominated reports. In 
the contemporary press the French zone was described as ‘the step-child among the 
four zones’, run by a country ‘which, itself, has come out of the war impoverished 
and diminished in importance’.132 Kurt schumacher, leader of the social Demo-
cratic Party in the British zone and later in the Federal Republic, described the 
French as the ‘Russians of the West’ (Westrussen)—as unwelcomed and loathed by 
the population of the zone as the soviets were in theirs.133 But as Michael Balfour, 
a member of the British Element of the Control Commission (CCG(BE)  ) in 
Berlin, qualified: the two were not hated in quite the same terms. German animos-
ity towards the soviets ‘was fed by habitual Teuton scorn of slavs’, he thought 
‘nobody could deny that the French, for all their Negro troops and the stories of 
their degeneration, were a cultured race’. Nonetheless, he reported, the Germans’ 
perception was that ‘[t]he British like us but don’t always notice that we are there, 
the Americans like us but treat us like badly behaved children, the French hate us 
on equal terms’.134 Accounts of French revenge, pillage, and rape amplified such 
views.135 Above all the French were resented for being there at all.
129 COl AB 35/2, Desplats, ‘la Direction de la santé Publique’.
130 e.g. see Welty, The Hunger Years, 24. Don Aminado Del Monte, Travel Notes: Souvenirs of the 
French Military Occupation Zone in Austria and Germany, 1945, 1946, 1947 and May 1948 (Karachi, 
1951).
131 lieutenant-Colonel W. Byford-Jones, Berlin Twilight (london, 1947), 25.
132 Foundation for Foreign Affairs, ‘Field Report’, 4.
133 Quoted in e.g. Kurt Klotzbach, Der Weg zur Staatspartei: Programmatik, praktische Politik und 
Organisationen der deutschen Sozialdemokratie, 1945–1965 (Berlin, 1982), 156.
134 Balfour, ‘Four Power Control in Germany’, 58.
135 leon C. standifer, Binding Up the Wounds: An American Soldier in Occupied Germany, 
 1945–1946 (Baton Rouge, la., 1997), 87, 146–7.
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Public health work was influenced by the tendency of the Germans to look 
beyond their zone, and to compare their lot with that of other parts of the coun-
try.136 The French zone, like the soviet, never did very well in comparisons with the 
British and Americans, in particular falling short of the behaviour, influence, and 
material wealth of the United states.137 Fearing that France was in danger of ‘losing 
the peace’138—of being unable to implement its occupation agenda if the German 
population became ever more hostile—one response was to encourage fraterniza-
tion between French occupation officers and the German population. The non-
fraternization rule was one of the sHAEF directives the French authorities had 
inherited after joining the occupying powers. Paul Falkenburger, the young French 
public education officer, remembered that one of the few specific instructions 
before taking up his job in Freiburg, was not to fraternize with the occupied popu-
lation. In practice, he found it easy to circumvent the rules. like most of his col-
leagues he went to work in civilian clothes, and his superior—the military governor 
of Baden—was happy enough to relax the rules.139 In December 1945 General 
Koenig authorized French soldiers of all ranks to circulate among German civil-
ians. Even private visits were acceptable, if they adhered to ‘the correct attitude and 
rules’. Although French troops were in principle forbidden from lodging with 
German civilians, Koenig noted that this would be permitted where ‘certain diffi-
culties of billeting’ arose.140
Once the ban was lifted, laffon and his staff actively encouraged contact. 
Fraternization at cultural, religious, and musical events was desirable in princi-
ple, laffon declared, even if some French officers regrettably showed little discre-
tion and had relations with former Nazis.141 The essential point was that good 
French behaviour and friendly associations with the Germans were essential 
components of the French mission in Germany. To the Germans, the French 
should be ‘not merely the functionaries who administer them with the funds of 
their military government, but men and women whom they meet in the streets, 
in the shops, the soldiers whom they see coming out of a dance on sunday or 
children returning in the evening from a lycée or a school’. laffon regretted that 
‘[t]oo many cases’ were reported to him which ‘show that too many French in 
the occupation give the appearance of a true spirit of “colonialist” or even “racist”. 
For too many  Frenchmen the Germans are slaves who do not have the right even 
to elementary politeness.’ This would not do. By early 1947 contacts and  relations 
136 German scholars have coined the term Vergleichsmentalität, or mindset inclined to comparisons. 
see e.g. Rainer Gries, Die Rationen-Gesellschaft—Versorgungskampf und Vergleichsmentalität: Leipzig, 
München und Köln nach dem Kriege (Münster, 1991).
137 Anna J. Merritt and Richard l. Merritt (eds.), Public Opinion in Occupied Germany: The 
OMGUS Surveys, 1945–1949 (Urbana, 1970).
138 This phrase was in common usage in Britain and the United states. see e.g. Robert Eisler and 
Eric George Hart, Winning the Peace: A Comprehensive Policy (london, 1948). Keith Hutchinson, 
‘Germany’s steel Ration’, The Nation, 162 (26 Jan. 1946), 100. Robert Vansittart, The Leopard and the 
Spots: Selected Extracts from ‘Lessons of my Life’ (Win the Peace Pamphlet No. 1, london [1944]), 51.
139 Falkenburger, ‘Ich bin ein Berliner’.
140 COl AC 1031, Koenig to Commandant supérieur des Troupes d’Occupation en Allemagne, 
13 Dec. 1945.
141 COl AC 1031, laffon to Monsieur le Général de Corps Armée, 5 Dec. 1945.
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had normalized and  prospered, particularly once increasing numbers of French 
officers had brought their families to settle in the zone, laffon was relieved to 
convey.142
Exchange trips, conferences, and other shared events were an immediately visi-
ble feature of this policy. Paul Falkenburger fondly remembered initiatives such as 
a meeting of French and German students in Titisee in the Black Forest, which 
resulted in a number of Franco-German marriages.143 German scientists, doctors, 
and health officers were among the first to take part in these new exchanges, which, 
they said, often simply continued older Franco-German scientific and medical col-
laborations.144 The new policy of scientific and cultural ‘fraternization’ was in evi-
dence when the British psychiatrist E. B. strauss toured the American and French 
occupation zones in spring 1946. While in the French zone he took part in an 
international conference of psychiatrists and neurologists at the University of 
Tübingen’s nerve clinic. He was particularly impressed, he wrote in his report for 
the Medical Research Council, by the visionary French administrator of the uni-
versity, who told him: ‘we French cannot impress the Germans with our material 
power and resources, which are non-existent; so we concentrate on supporting and 
reinforcing the cultural life of the country. It is important that the Germans should 
realise that the French care for the arts and sciences as much as themselves.’145 One 
example was the medical officer for the Berlin district Reinickendorf (in the French 
sector), a Dr Bloss, whom the French military government invited to the Hôpital 
saint-louis in Paris to learn about a new method of healing serious wounds. Upon 
his return, Dr Bloss gave lectures and talks to his colleagues about what he had 
learned, and repeatedly emphasized the friendly, cooperative, and accommodating 
treatment he had received in Paris.146
Apart from this focus on Franco-German relations, a second strategy to over-
come the unpopularity of the French occupation was the military government’s 
decision to fight bad press—in France and abroad—with detailed accounts of the 
accomplishments of its different departments. In early 1948, General Koenig 
instructed the heads of the six directorates to ‘popularize’ their activities and 
achievements for public consumption, and particularly for French journalists, who 
142 COl AC 1031, laffon to Directors General, 1 Feb. 1947. Marriages between members of the 
French occupation forces and German civilians were still forbidden at this stage, but French officers 
could resign their posts and return to France with their German spouse. By september 1947, the ban 
on French–German marriages was formally lifted, see COl AC 1031, Koenig, 29 Oct. 1947.
143 Paul Falkenburger, ‘Intervention: souvenir de l’ancien curateur adjoint de l’université de 
 Fribourg’, in Manfrass and Rioux (eds.), France-Allemagne, 285.
144 shortly before his expulsion from the Third Reich, the German-Jewish oncologist Ferdinand 
Blumenthal noted that French–German scientific collaborations had prospered for decades and had 
particularly enriched fields such as cancer research. Blumenthal, ‘Avant-propos pour le chapitre con-
cernant la lutte contre le cancer en Allemagne’, in Jacques Bandaline, La Lutte internationale contre le 
cancer (Paris, 1933), 242–3. On his expulsion and move to Belgrade, see ‘Ferdinand Blumenthal’, 
Morgen, 15 July 1935. Blumenthal died in 1941.
145 TNA, FD 1/2483, ‘Observations and suggestions: Report on his visit to certain universities in 
the American and French zones, August 1946, by E. B. strauss’ [Aug. 1946].
146 see lAB B Rep. 012/5, Aktennotiz, 11 Mar. 1947, and note from Bezirksamtsarzt Reinicken-
dorf, 2 Aug. 1947.
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until then had mainly received information from the Germans themselves.147 
Médecin-Général F. Desplats’s narrative of the Health Directorate’s work, covering 
the period from the beginning of its existence in July 1945 to spring 1949, was one 
product of this popularization drive.148 A largely descriptive account of how the 
Health Directorate successfully tackled a series of public health problems, it resem-
bled, in both approach and substance, health officers’ histories of those of the other 
military governments.149
Despite cultural propaganda and promotional histories, however, public 
health work in the French zone, according to German health officers, continued 
to be cast in an unfavourable light by a combination of French policies and dis-
couraging comparisons to other parts of the country. Health officers’ work was 
caught between the priorities of French reconstruction and German recovery. 
Nowhere were these conflicts more visible, and vocal, than in arguments about 
food and food shortages, which quickly spilled over into debates about public 
health.
From the moment they set foot on German soil, the needs of the French occu-
pation troops appeared to come into conflict with those of the occupied popula-
tion. In contrast to the British and American zones, but like the soviet zone, the 
territory occupied by France had to provide much of the occupation troops’ 
upkeep. The burden on each inhabitant, F. Roy Willis has calculated, was propor-
tionately heavier in the French zone than in the British or American.150 The high 
density of military government officers and the fact that families of occupation 
staff were encouraged to settle in the zone, added bodies to be housed and mouths 
to be fed. One report from 1946 estimated that around 17,000 French people 
lived in the town of Baden-Baden alone. It thought that the ‘amounts of foodstuffs 
used by the occupying forces throughout the zone must be considerable, especially 
if it is remembered that the rations accorded them are far superior to those given 
out to the average person. To the number of administrators accompanied by their 
families must be added numerous mobilized troop contingents, which are rationed 
in Germany.’151
some French reports observed that German rations during the first occupation 
year were in the region of 1,000 to 1,300 calories per person per day, and rose to 
at least 1,400 calories in 1947 and 1,869 in 1948.152 But others reported extended 
147 COl AB 35/2, le Général d’Armée Koenig, PIO le Général Navarre (Chef des services de 
Direction), PA le lt.C-Colonel Henry (Chef de la Division d’Études et de Documentation), ‘Note—
Objet: Articles de vulgarisation pour la presse française’, 20 Jan. 1948.
148 COl AB 35/2, Desplats, ‘la Direction de la santé publique’. Desplats is listed as the ‘Chef du 
service de santé du GM’ in Claude Albert Moreau and Robert Jouanneau Irriera, Présence française en 
Allemagne: Essai de géographie cordiale de la zone française d’occupation (Régie autonome des publica-
tions officielles avec le concours des Éditions Henri Neveu, 1949).
149 BAK, Z45F, 5/323–3/2, Philip Beckjord, ‘Post-war Developments in the Public Health of Aus-
tria, 1945–1949’, 1949.
150 Willis, France, Germany and the New Europe, 41.
151 Foundation for Foreign Affairs, Field Report, 9–10.
152 Commandement en Chef Français en Allemagne, Recueil de documentation économique (Baden-
Baden, 1949), chart 2. Commandement en Chef Français en Allemagne, La Zone Française 
d’Occupation, Janvier 1948, 47, also noted moderate improvements between 1946 and 1947.
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drops to significantly below the 1,000 calory-mark for the normal consumer.153 In 
March 1946 the Health Directorate initiated a series of nutrition surveys, which 
confirmed the insufficiency of food rations.154 But, unlike in the British zone, it 
was not the data itself that was a source of conflict, rather the policies that pro-
duced them. German sources directly blamed the occupation army’s excesses for 
the lack of food. Karl Brandt, a German agricultural economist who had fled to the 
United states in 1933, criticized the fact that the food shortages, felt throughout 
Germany in 1947, were at their worst in the French zone, where the occupation 
army lived off the land. Brandt’s argument was also a political one: European secu-
rity and unity demanded the reconstruction of Germany as an equal partner, he 
maintained, but this project was undermined by French economic policy in the 
French zone.155
German doctors assumed the roles of spokesmen for the German population at 
large. Food shortages had a direct impact on German public health, they argued. 
Members of the University of Tübingen’s medical faculty produced a series of four 
memoranda on the food situation from August 1945 until summer 1946, which 
contained reports from various medical specialists about the physical effects of the 
food shortage. They painted a picture of a town on the verge of a hunger catastro-
phe. For the Germans real hunger had come with the occupation army; the physi-
cal destruction, lack of transport, and disruption of trade with the lost eastern 
territories were all exacerbated by the French living off the fat of the zone. One of 
their recommendations was the reduction of the population’s working day to 
between four and six hours, ‘to save calories’.156 Throughout the first years of the 
occupation, German health officers insisted that lack of food was directly linked to 
rising rates of tuberculosis, the diminution of the population’s physical and mental 
capacities, and the declining health of children.157
Political rather than medical concerns appeared to dictate the French allocation 
of food. They discussed food as part of the ever-present question of ‘deserving’: 
after all, as the French representative at the Nuremberg trials testified, at least 
150,000 French people had died as a direct result of undernourishment caused by 
German occupation, and thousands more as an indirect result of it.158 Food rations 
available to Germans were also frequently compared to official rations in France.159 
153 Commandement en Chef Français en Allemagne, La Zone Française d’Occupation, Jan. 1948, 
‘Èchelle du rationnement en calories’, 54.
154 TNA, FO 1050/687, Commission Interalliée de Nutrition, section santé Publique du Wurt-
temberg (Zone Française), Médecin Colonel Fabre.
155 Karl Brandt, Germany: Key to Peace in Europe (Claremont, 1949), 51. Brandt was initially based 
at the New school for social Research, before joining the University of stanford’s prestigious Food 
Research Institute. He was a vocal critic of the Morgenthau Plan, see esp. Karl Brandt, Germany is Our 
Problem (Washington, 1946). Karl Brandt, Is There Still a Chance for Germany? (Hinsdale, Ill., 1949).
156 see reports quoted by seidler, Die Medizinische Fakultät, 402.
157 TNA, FO 1050/687, Commission Interalliée de Nutrition, section santé Publique du Wurt-
temberg (Zone Française), Médecin Colonel Fabre.
158 M. Gerthoffer (French representative at the Nuremberg trials), quoted in Aron, The Vichy 
Regime, 430–1. Willis, France, Germany and the New Europe, 5.
159 GMZFO, Direction de l’Information, ‘le Rationnement en Allemagne’, La France en  Allemagne, 
3 (1946), 47–50.
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Additional food rations were given to German members of the Resistance and 
German political refugees in the saarland who had fought for the FFI.160 French 
nutrition policy was also used to bolster re-education programmes through giving 
ration supplements to participants at international youth camps and to pupils and 
schoolteachers living away from their families.161 Desplats wrote laconically that 
food questions had ‘rapidly turned into top priorities because of the repercussions 
on the general political situation’.162
similar, if less emotional, confrontations between German health officers and 
the French authorities took place over the requisitioning of German hospitals, and 
shortages of drugs and other medical supplies. like the food shortages, both issues 
were part of the bigger debate about economic policy in the zone and the relation-
ship of France’s reconstruction to Germany’s recovery. But while in the food con-
troversy the French Health Directorate often sided with the Germans, here it was 
even more directly exposed to the contradictory nature of its assignment: like its 
counterpart in the soviet zone, it was charged with the dual tasks of having to 
protect German public health, while at the same time prioritizing the health of 
French citizens and assisting French reparations and dismantling units. When in 
July 1945 French health officers toured and studied the German pharmaceutical 
factories and laboratories in the zone, they did so not just ‘to protect them against 
looting’, but primarily ‘to put them back into action to produce the most indispen-
sable products’ for export to France. By October 1945, pharmaceutical production 
in the zone ‘permitted . . . the supply of France with products of prime necessity 
which were totally lacking’.163
France’s experience as an occupier was from the beginning shaped by the history 
of Franco-German relations. One of the lasting effects of this historical baggage, 
though elusive, was that it stimulated Frenchmen’s search for France’s ‘lost great-
ness’.164 French politicians’ and diplomats’ ambition for France to be once again 
recognized as a Great Power, as stanley Hoffmann has argued, ‘inspired the entire 
new politico-administrative class coming out of the war and the Resistance . . . since 
humiliation had to be erased, since its most painful sign was the loss of precious 
rank, the high level before the fall had to be reconquered.’165 As they marched into 
Germany, and indeed throughout the post-war decades, the French authorities 
tried to overcome the stigma of defeat and loss of power. The fact that France’s 
place among the occupiers was in reality far more a product of the decisions and 
actions of the other Allies than of French efforts simply added to the urgency of 
that desire. By August 1944, French politicians insisted that the embarrassments of 
160 COl AEF 626, DG Agr et Rav to GMFZO secretariat General, 19 Nov. 1948.
161 COl AEF 626, Ravitaillement to GM Rhein-Pfalz, 18 Oct. 1947. COl AEF 626, Zentralauss-
chuss für Ernährung Baden-Baden to Chef de la Division de la production agricole et du Ravitaille-
ment, 28 July 1948.
162 COl AB 35/2, Desplats, ‘la Direction de la santé publique’.
163 FIAT, ‘The Manufacture of sulfonamides and Related Intermediates in the French, British and 
American Zones of Occupation, Germany’, FIAT Final Report No. 915, london, 30 May 1947.
164 Phrase used by Gildea, France Since 1945, 6.
165 stanley Hoffmann, ‘The Trauma of 1940: A Disaster and Its Traces’, in Joel Blatt (ed.), The French 
Defeat of 1940: Reassessments (Oxford, 1998), 365.
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1940 were now light years away, but in reality the scars of defeat and German rule 
ran deep. signs could be detected not just in the nature of French soldiers’ conduct 
and their daily interactions with the German population, but much earlier, even 
before French troops set foot on German soil. Conceptually, the goals and priori-
ties of the occupation, and the political solutions available to French leaders to 
achieve them, were a direct product of this history.
And yet, by 1949, the initial goals and priorities of the French project had been 
largely overturned by the French zone’s growing proximity to the American and 
British zones, and its integration into ‘Trizonia’, the future Federal Republic of 
Germany. It was only through political and material support that the persistent 
conflicts and confrontations in the French zone could be resolved. By then, France 
itself had already been a beneficiary of substantial amounts of Marshall aid.166 The 
new alignments had immediate and visible effects in the zone. In the French sector 
of Berlin food rations increased markedly during the soviet blockade.167 Or, 
according to Desplats’s history, the twelve months from June 1948 to June 1949 
saw a complete transformation of the German economy, a currency reform, and 
the arrival of Marshall aid for imports of both food and medical supplies. There-
after, drugs such as penicillin, streptomycin, and insulin could be imported, and 
pharmaceutical supplies in the zone soon reached or even exceeded pre-war levels. 
By the time the nutrition surveys were terminated in December 1948, health offi-
cers reported ‘very noticeable improvements in the nutritional state of population’ 
in the wake of the currency reform. By then, too, the sanatoria in the Black Forest, 
which the French military government had acquired for use by French children, 
prisoners of war, and concentration camp survivors, were returned to the German 
authorities, because of, as Desplats put it, ‘a change in orientation’ by the military 
government.168
166 During Oct. to Dec. 1947 France received £337 million in emergency credits, followed by $284 
million of interim aid on 2 Jan. 1948; and a further $989 million for the 12 months Apr. 1948–Apr. 
1949. Willis, France, Germany and the New Europe, 20.
167 lAB, GMFB/114, note on forthcoming increases in food rations in the French sector, 15 Oct. 
1948.
168 COl AB 35/2, Desplats, ‘la Direction de la santé Publique’.
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9
Some Conclusions
When the occupation armies arrived in Germany during 1944 and 1945, public 
health problems were among the most pressing issues. By the time the two German 
states were founded in 1949, mortality rates and infectious disease rates had 
declined significantly, pharmaceutical production and supply had recovered, and 
German health administrations in all four zones successfully supervised and con-
trolled public health work. But it would be misleading to draw a straight line 
between these two points in time, as scholars have tended to do. This study has 
examined how British, American, Soviet, French, and German health officers con-
ceived of the problem of public health in Germany at the end of the Second World 
War, and how, as a result of a number of political, social, and economic develop-
ments, their assessments changed during the following four years.
CompArISoNS
The aftermath of the Second World War in Germany is richly documented in a 
wide range of sources. probably the hardest part in writing this book has been the 
selection of which subjects to include, which files from the often very large archives 
to draw upon, and which features of this mass of research material to present and 
examine in detail. Throughout the study I have argued that public health was 
deeply embedded in broader problems and policies of occupation, and this per-
spective demanded, apart from the files generated by public health branches and 
medical officers, also reference to a range of other sources, both published and 
unpublished. Through this broad perspective, I have attempted to construct a new 
framework in which the problem of public health can be examined, without being 
constrained by inflexible disciplinary divisions. That framework enables a more 
sensitive and representative understanding of what public health work in post-war 
Germany involved. By bringing together a series of issues which are not generally 
seen in the same context—medical and political programmes in Germany, Allied 
wartime and post-war perceptions of the German problem, German and Allied 
views on the occupation, and developments in the four zones—this research helps 
to bridge a number of institutionalized divisions in German post-war history and 
historiography.
How has this comparison modified our understanding of the post-war period? By 
a comparison of the history of the four zones and Berlin sectors, the policies of all 
four occupation powers re-emerge in all their complexities and in their extraordinary 
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similarities and differences. obviously the four occupation powers differed from 
each other in many crucial respects. But since all four were tied into a very similar job 
on German soil, a comparison of the occupation zones has been able to challenge 
some of the received views.
A fundamentally similar kind of emergency epidemic control was practised in 
each zone. Everywhere, public health became an important component of admin-
istering the German territory. All occupiers’ desperate attempts to maintain a basic 
level of public health were accompanied by the realization that this could not be 
done without the involvement of German doctors and health officers. Health 
issues were dealt with at local, regional, and zonal levels; they were reviewed by 
specialist officers, committees, and departments, and featured regularly in admin-
istrators’ meetings and reports. In each zone, this left behind a comparable paper 
trail. And faced with similar kinds of problems, such as the shortages of qualified 
German medical personnel, the authorities of the different zones of occupation 
often resolved them in very similar ways.
But the occupiers’ different initial approaches to the German problem influ-
enced their proceedings and had effects which lasted throughout the post-war era. 
Each of the occupiers implemented the way in which they saw the world, and these 
different paradigms, in combination with institutional inertia, guided their pro-
grammes for the reconstruction of the defeated country. This did not always mean 
that the creation of an exact copy of the home scenario was either practical or desir-
able. But in each zone, public health work was closely related to the ways in which 
the occupiers understood and approached the occupation of Germany.
The devastation of Germany turned out to be much greater than the High Com-
mands had imagined and planned for, and the reconstruction of the destroyed 
country suddenly became much more challenging and urgent. For all four occupa-
tion powers, the situation encountered in Germany short-circuited their plans for 
a systematic cleansing of the German state and society from Nazi influence. Each 
occupier initially intended to carry out thorough denazification, and the German 
medical profession was always going to figure heavily in these efforts, since doctors 
had been among the most Nazified groups in Germany. The liberation of concen-
tration camps then brought to light details of a series of medical crimes conducted 
under Nazi supervision. The German medical establishment—this was now clearer 
than ever—needed to undergo a thorough cleansing and systematic punishment 
under Allied control.
But in each zone, the destruction and chaos encountered by army detachments 
prevented the systematic application of these intentions. Shortages of housing, 
food, drugs, and disinfectants, in combination with the millions of people on the 
move, presented a scenario, so it was argued everywhere, in which epidemics 
would flourish if unchecked. Even merely proceeding within the very limited 
terms of the directives to ‘prevent starvation or widespread disease’ demanded 
more effort and focus than expected. medical officers in all four zones claimed 
that there was no time to punish or dismiss German doctors, let alone to organize 
a thorough sweep. German doctors were among both the most highly regarded 
members of their communities and the most urgently needed professionals, and 
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soon became indispensable contact points for the occupiers. In the Soviet zone, 
the compulsory draft of former Nazi doctors into the epidemic service proved an 
overt means for their rehabilitation. Similar developments could be observed 
elsewhere.
As time went on, sympathy with and respect for German medicine, and a shared 
belief in the fundamentally apolitical nature of medical work, were added to the 
mix. Thus, in all zones, the demands imposed by having to fulfil basic health and 
administrative functions resulted in a relaxation of the criteria for the selection 
and denazification of German medical personnel. At the same time, old scientific 
and medical networks began to guide the occupiers’ selection of German staff, and 
political networks were also recreated.
once occupation began, the occupiers’ moral certainty—still so clear in the 
planning period of occupation—began to crumble under the growing weight of 
 awkward questions and colliding priorities. public health went to the heart of 
fundamental problems of the occupation, and the epidemic argument soon began 
to acquire a far-reaching and persuasive power. one of the very first measures 
instituted in spring 1945 was the establishment of a sanitary border along the 
rhine to limit the spread of typhus. over the coming months, DDT dusting and 
delousing was made compulsory for refugees and German civilians attempting to 
cross this border, and soon similar measures were contemplated for other borders— 
including Germany’s border to poland, as well as some of the boundaries between 
the zones.1 The focus on reducing the threat of epidemics meant that there was 
little room for concerns of individual welfare, no matter whether they related to 
refugees, prisoners of war, or even occupation soldiers.2 problems arising out 
of compulsory epidemic measures also manifested themselves in the methods 
to reduce the incidence of venereal diseases. Compulsory hospitalization and 
 vaccination measures were enforced by withholding ration cards in case of non-
compliance, but these procedures vexed doctors and health workers everywhere. 
While doctors frequently complained about the occupiers’ lack of concern for 
their individual welfare, the legitimacy of these complaints and their demands for 
help were fiercely debated and contested.
overall, then, there were many similarities between the four scenarios. Each of 
the occupiers lacked guidance and found it difficult to implement the model of 
indirect control, and their initial appetite for toughness was mediated by the new 
reality. But the comparisons have also helped to crystallize significant differences 
between the occupiers’ approaches. The four powers were affected to different 
degrees by the Second World War. France and the Soviet Union had lost millions 
of men and women, and at the beginning of the occupation many of their country-
men were still on German soil. Germany, defeated for now, seemed geographically 
much closer and more dangerous than it did to Britain or the United States. As a 
1 military Government of Germany, ‘public Health and medical Affairs: monthly report of 
 military governor, U.S. Zone’, No. 5, 20 Dec. 1945.
2 Compare to paul Weindling, Epidemics and Genocide in Eastern Europe, 1890–1945 (oxford, 
2000), 396–7.
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result, national security concerns dominated both the Soviet and the French 
 occupation projects. To the British authorities, by contrast, although they had 
been in the war for longest and had felt the economic consequences very directly, 
Germany and the German problem seemed more remote. The United States was 
still further separated.
The symbolism of 1945 as the dawn of a new era was most keenly felt by France, 
for whom participation in the occupation of Germany became a vital component 
of its post-war programme. Influential French politicians argued that France now 
had to play a central role in the reconstruction of Europe and assume—or resume—
its rightful place among the great powers. According to Léon Blum, the ‘highest 
form of patriotism’ was ‘not to push our country to the highest point of military 
power but to make her the interpreter, the agent, the procurer of ideas which 
respond to her particular vocation in the world’.3 Even those who did not share 
Blum’s belief in the values of a ‘substitution of international sovereignty for national 
armaments as a guarantee of peace’,4 agreed that France’s special task lay in the 
political and diplomatic spheres. France, they insisted, was uniquely placed to 
mediate between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. It had to cement its 
partnership with the Soviet Union, which could lend support for central French 
demands for German reparations and an international control of the ruhr.5 
Through its policy on Germany and, more specifically, through its occupation 
programme,6 France set out to achieve a number of goals. But by 1949 many of the 
initial goals and priorities of the French project had changed fundamentally, and 
with it France’s perceived role in Germany.
Who, as far as the occupiers were concerned, was responsible for carrying the 
burden of public health in Germany? German health officers had to be a major part 
of any public health initiatives. Thus, both by design and necessity, all four occupi-
ers practised some form of indirect control of the German administrations in their 
zones. But in all zones this was a source of conflict. The comparison has shown that 
everywhere, the primary focus of health policy towards the benefit of occupation 
troops and Allied nations spurred German doctors to defend supposedly German 
interests. In the British zone, this conflict was accompanied by more fundamental 
questions regarding the trust that could be put into German  assessments—questions 
which undermined the practicability of any real indirect control. out of the four 
occupiers, the British were perhaps most reluctant and slowest at making Germans 
responsible for their own administrative and governmental matters, and through-
out, the process was accompanied by significant tensions. In the French zone, too, 
the German authorities had for some time fewer responsibilities and powers than 
their counterparts in the American and Soviet zones.
3 Le Populaire, 3 Aug. 1945, quoted in Louise Elliott Dalby, Léon Blum: Evolution of a Socialist 
(New York, 1963), 372.
4 Le Populaire, 3 Aug. 1945.
5 robert Gildea, France Since 1945 (oxford, 2002), 13 ff.
6 on this distinction, see rainer Hudemann, ‘Zentralismus und Dezentralisierung in der franzö-
sischen Deutschland- und Besatzungspolitik, 1945–1947’, in Winfried Becker (ed.), Die Kapitulation 
von 1945 und der Neubeginn in Deutschland (Cologne and Vienna, 1987), 181–209.
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The ways in which ‘intermediaries’ between the occupiers and the occupied 
population were used, or not, distinguished the Soviet and French from the British 
and American occupation zones, and proved to be of direct significance for public 
health policy and practice.7 Differences between the Soviet and the western zones 
arose out of the fact that the Soviet authorities had at their disposal a set of willing 
German helpers who could be trusted to assist the Soviet occupation programme. 
By contrast, the absence of trusted German collaborators, which arose in part out 
of the western occupiers’ rejection of German émigrés’ participation in the recon-
struction of Germany, was a much greater feature in public health work in the 
British zone than was the case in any of the other three zones.
As they took up their occupation duties, the American authorities’ lack of 
German collaborators was partly alleviated by their prominent agenda to teach the 
German population about the values of an American federal democracy. General 
Eisenhower observed that democratization could only work by example: once the 
Germans saw what America represented, as embodied by the GI, they would learn 
by imitation and become good democrats in time. This conviction partly annulled 
the psychological insights about the German authoritarian personality which were 
still popular at the outset of the occupation. In one sense, the Soviet position 
 actually demonstrated marked similarities: since fascism represented a violent 
 convulsion of the late capitalist and imperialist European state, the elimination of 
the old ruling class, in whose pay and for whose ends fascism had arisen, would 
eliminate the socio-economic basis for fascism, and a new society could then be 
created. The notion that fascism was not an ‘innate’ and permanent German char-
acteristic allowed both the United States and the Soviet Union to entrust the 
 Germans with the reconstruction of their public health system.
But the Soviet and American zones also differed in important respects, and this 
research has put the debates regarding their Americanization and Sovietization 
efforts in Germany into a new light. The availability of role models for a reorienta-
tion of German minds soon became a major emphasis of the American project in 
Germany, and American occupation policies were re-evaluated and reformulated 
in this light. The ban on the fraternization of US officers with the Germans was 
lifted to facilitate a more constructive recruitment of hearts and minds. Competi-
tion with the other occupying powers played an important role, and an alienation 
of the German population was to be avoided at all costs. As an American memo 
from may 1945 stated, ‘[a]n important development which will bear watching is 
that while russians may be undertaking a vigorous programme of winning over 
Germans, we may be going on a tack which will result in estranging them. All in 
all it is going to be a mess.’8  However, contrary to these anticipations, the Soviet 
zone was surprisingly bare of Soviet role models. much to the frustration of 
German communists and social democrats, the Soviet authorities often displayed 
7 Compare my usage of the term with that in Arnd Bauernkämper, Konrad Jarausch, and marcus 
m. payk (eds.), Demokratiewunder: Transatlantische Mittler und die kulturelle Öffnung Westdeutschlands 
1945–1970 (Göttingen, 2005).
8 BAK, Za4f, 44–45/4/6, Lt. muelder to Col. Calder, 26 may 1945.
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little concern about alienating the German population, and little interest in 
 winning them over to their side.
The Soviet and French zones, too, shared similarities. Both powers were econo-
mically and politically still crippled by the legacies of the war, and both attempted 
to use German occupation to enable reconstruction at home. Although both, as a 
result, had a clear sense of their enduring objectives in Germany, for both the dual 
reparation and reconstruction agendas quickly came into direct conflict, and both 
suffered from the German population’s scorn. But France was also very different. 
Where the Soviet Union failed to provide role models, the French occupation 
authorities, like the Americans, initiated a successful drive to impart their culture 
of French liberty and democracy, and their way of thinking. Just when the Soviet 
commanders were attempting to enforce their non-fraternization policy, the 
French were revelling in having overcome it. To Émile Laffon and his staff, French 
civilizing contacts with the Germans were an essential part of the French mission.9 
In this sense, the French zone resembled the American more than any other, as 
both the United States and France attempted to remake Germany in their own 
image. In addition, both ruled over decentralized occupation zones, and proved to 
be most keen to establish regional identities and attachments.
In the British scenario, the pervasive acceptance of a Freudian, psycho-social 
understanding of the German personality led to its commitment to an expensive 
system of psychological profiling in the German personnel research Branch (GprB), 
whose task it was to apply psychological testing methods to the selection of  Germans 
to administrative posts. While its recommendations were not made use of systemati-
cally after 1945 (since they regularly clashed with the ‘practical point of view’10), the 
fact that this unit of well-paid psychologists existed at all in those cash-strapped 
times points to some ways in which the British approach to Germany differed from 
that of the other occupiers. After the occupation of Germany began, objections to 
the implementation of such concepts often did not attack the principle but only the 
practicality of the concept, at a time when so many posts needed to be filled urgently. 
The psychological approach thus had some currency even as practical compromises 
were being made. As the Labour mp and BBC journalist patrick Gordon Walker 
observed, military government was very good at clearing away the rubble, but ‘[w]hat 
is lacking is any policy beyond getting things running again as quickly as possible. 
There is vigour but not direction.’11 By comparison, the American, French, and 
Soviet authorities each had some orientation points which made their occupation 
tasks easier, but which the British authorities lacked. on some issues the psychologi-
cal concepts remained in currency throughout the early occupation years, reinforced 
and amplified by economic pressures. In the French zone, although psychological 
analyses were also popular, they were always modulated by a perspective on the need 
to enlighten, ‘re-educate’, and impart the French mission.
9 CoL AC 1031, Laffon to Directors General, 1 Feb. 1947.
10 TNA, Fo 1039/129, Col. A. F. merry to major H. reade (Assistant Controller, p & I Branch, 
Economic Division Advance HQ), 19 Feb. 1946.
11 patrick Gordon Walker, The Lid Lifts (London, 1945), 86.
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perhaps the biggest differences concerned the military, political, and financial 
means and manoeuvrability of the occupiers. The United States was least marred 
by internal divisions and emerged from the war as the strongest international leader 
and economic power. The other three occupiers had far fewer resources to draw 
upon: Britain was near bankruptcy and financially dependent on America, while 
the new Labour government had begun to put in place a newly compreh ensive, 
and massively expensive, welfare state; both France and the Soviet Union struggled 
to fulfil demands of their own reconstruction programmes. The costly new wonder 
drug penicillin is an example in miniature of the importance of  economic power.
pUBLIC HEALTH IN oCCUpIED GErmANY
Throughout the post-war era, the problem of public health was embedded in much 
broader occupation problems, and was much more than a limited technical matter. 
Even the emergency measures to prevent the spread of epidemics and improve the 
defeated population’s health were influenced by much broader considerations, and 
themselves impacted upon much wider Allied programmes in Germany than their 
specific focus on infectious diseases might at first suggest. public health work was 
closely tied up with questions such as how the defeated German population should 
and could be treated, whether and how Nazism could be eradicated, and what 
 Germany’s future path ought to be. In sum, therefore, public health in Germany pro-
vides a sharply defined frame of reference for a comparison of the occupation regimes. 
But it has also done more than that. It has revealed the great extent to which the char-
acter and components of public health work in each zone were shaped by administra-
tive, political, and economic problems, and, conversely, the regularity with which 
prospering public health was understood to be at the heart of a German revival.
The questions posed at the beginning of the study were underpinned by an 
attempt to understand the role of public health in the occupation period as a whole. 
In this context, one question to which I have provided an answer—and which in 
turn helps us to understand the occupation more generally—is how and why health 
officers’ claims that public health work was a major priority in the occupation 
period came to be so powerful and effective after 1945. The research demonstrates 
that the occupiers’ preparations for health work were very different from their pro-
grammes once occupation began, but why was this the case? In some sense their 
new focus on epidemics was not surprising. Typhus, a disease transmitted by lice, 
was long known to flourish among groups of refugees and populations on the move 
who lacked shelter, clean clothing, water, and food. It was associated with war and 
famine, and known to prosper in camps. other diseases such as dysentery and 
cholera were also known to be closely related to social disorder and the lack of a 
functioning hygiene infrastructure, and to follow the movement of troops and the 
disruption of war.12 The spectre of cholera probably still lingered in public memory 
as a shocking disease which could wipe out communities with great speed. And if 
12 e.g. Dorothy porter, Health, Civilisation and the State (London, 1999), esp. 80–4.
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it was not cholera they knew about, the majority of the health  officers in Germany 
after 1945—both Allied and German—had themselves lived through the 1918 flu 
epidemic and seen what devastation could be caused if  diseases spread unchecked. 
A number of them had worked as doctors or health officials at the time, and would 
have been directly involved in strategies to curb the spread of influenza. Now, in 
the aftermath of a second savage war, a renewed declaration of epidemic urgency 
gave them considerable leverage. Given these long-established concerns of public 
health work (regardless of whether it was done by Americans, russians, British, 
French, or Germans) with epidemic control, one question which this study has 
examined is not so much why the focus on epidemics became so widespread after 
1945, but why the early Allied preparations had been so inadequate.
But there was also more to this issue. While the threat of spreading epidemics 
was an endlessly discussed subject in all occupation zones, epidemics were actually 
no real problem. There were no epidemics in post-war Germany, and the few local 
outbreaks of infectious diseases (primarily of typhus and dysentery) were success-
fully contained.13 once they had braced themselves for the worst, health officers 
often reported that the situation was not all that bad. An omGUS report from 
october 1945 noted that ‘[d]espite all of the adverse factors which are present 
from a public health standpoint, the health of the German people at present 
cannot be said to be such as to endanger the occupation or the occupation 
troops’.14 And still, the argument about the importance of public health long 
outlived the initial time of chaos and confusion; it continued to be heard every-
where, and proved to be a pervasive and effective means for mobilizing resources 
and support. How did the public health argument acquire such power and force?
A partial answer lies in the fact that to the German health officers, the new era 
of epidemics was synonymous with the end of German civilization as they had 
known it. public health crises—real or imagined—not only threatened to destroy 
the last vestiges of social structure and cohesion in the defeated country, but they 
were also a symbol for how much German society, and with it the health officers’ 
work, had changed from what it was before the war. Dr paul Konitzer, president of 
the Central Health Administration in the Soviet zone (ZVG), commented in 
october 1945: ‘We got too used to walking on the crutches of civilization. And we 
are now too easily discouraged, when—as now—our usual and customary aids 
have been knocked out of our hands through the after-effects of Hitler’s extermina-
tion  policies.’15 At the same meeting, Konitzer’s colleague Dr Bermann agreed that 
current public health work was fundamentally different from the work they had 
carried out previously. ‘In the past’, he thought, ‘we have been used to a certain 
13 Also see Ellerbrock in Wolfgang Woelk and Jörg Vögele (eds.), Geschichte der Gesundheitspoli-
tik in Deutschland: Von der Weimarer Republik bis in die Frühgeschichte der ‘doppelten Staatsgründung’ 
(Berlin, 2002), 325–6. Dagmar Ellerbrock, ‘Healing Democracy’: Heilende Demokratie (Bonn, 
2004), 22.
14 TNA, Fo 371/46992, ‘monthly report of military Governor, U.S. Zone’, No. 3, 20 oct. 1945.
15 BAB, DQ1/1338, ‘protokoll der 2. Tagung der Leiter der Landes- und provinzialgesundheit-
sämter im Sowjetischen okkupationsgebiet in der Deutschen Zentralverwaltung für das Gesundheits-
wesen am 2. und 3. oktober 1945’, 9.
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kind of epidemic work which I would like to call fine tuning; it was all about 
reaching point zero. The doctor generally noticed almost nothing of these meas-
ures, which did not extend beyond a small circle of initiates. But now a fundamen-
tal change has occurred. We have to learn to think differently. For the present time, 
measures have become necessary which used to be common 100 years ago.’16 
Although the ongoing social collapse was recognized by some as a unique chance 
to start afresh and build something new, most also mourned the demise of their 
profession’s earlier successes and triumphs. German reports on the public health 
situation were frequently written in highly emotional language, and, much to the 
annoyance of the occupiers, contained some embellished statements on the 
German nation’s decline as a whole.
But to the occupation officers, the situation was often no less shocking and no 
less symbolic. Their wartime discourse had frequently likened the German problem 
to a disease demanding a cure. As one British officer put it, ‘[w]e must treat the 
disease from which Germany has been suffering for so many centuries organically, 
not symptomatically’.17 In addition, a crucial factor was that quite unexpectedly, 
Germany—which had been revered abroad for the greatness of its industrial, scien-
tific, and medical advances—now resembled an underdeveloped nation much more 
than a developed one, and had lost its moral compass. This realization suddenly put 
public health work in Germany into a new light. Far from being able to limit the 
German standard of living, it was not even always clear how living conditions and 
health standards could be prevented from slipping any further. The problem was 
not simply one of sheer physical devastation. Some of the British health officers had, 
by the time they came to Germany, already encountered health crises in the course 
of their colonial service on the Indian subcontinent, and some Americans had par-
ticipated in health operations in, for example, the Caribbean.18 A number of the 
army health officers, red Cross workers, and other relief teams now in  Germany 
had also previously worked at other theatres of the war; and some had organized 
medical and relief work in the famine and epidemic conditions in East Asia.19
16 BAB, DQ1/1338, ‘protokoll der 2. Tagung der Leiter der Landes- und provinzialgesundheitsämter’.
17 Wilfred Byford-Jones, Berlin Twilight: On Life under the Allied Occupation (London, 1947).
18 See e.g. Arthur p. Long, ‘The Army Immunization programme’, in Ebbe Curtis Hoff (ed.), 
 Preventive Medicine in World War II, iii. Personal Health Measures and Immunization (office of the 
Surgeon General, Department of the Army, Washington, 1968). TNA, FD1/418, 13 Aug. 1947, 
Edward mellanby noted that the British zone’s public health adviser and representative on the Allied 
Health Committee, Brigadier W. Strelley martin, ‘was formerly an Indian service man’.
19 Anecdotal evidence on previous medical work in devastated conditions included that from 
 Bernhard Fisher, who had carried out medical and relief work with the Friends Ambulance Unit 
(FAU) in Ethiopia, Austria, and the Netherlands before coming to Germany (IWm, Sound Archive, 
10653/4). michael rowntree from the FAU had worked in Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Italy, and France 
before coming to Germany (IWm, Sound Archive, 10883/8). The German doctors Carl Coutelle, 
rolf Becker, and Herbert Baer had both in Spain and at the Burmese front ‘worked among the civilian 
population, dealing with famine conditions and epidemics of scabies, cholera, typhus and dysentery’, 
and had ‘helped to run training schools for lay personnel where hygiene and first aid has been taught 
so that these people could be sent out to epidemic areas to help the overburdened medical personnel’ 
(TNA, Fo 371/46844, London China medical Aid Committee to G. W. Harrison, German Section, 
Foreign office, 18 June 1945); Coutelle discussed this experience in BAB, DQ1/1338, ‘Sitzungspro-
tokoll der 4. Tagung der Leiter und Landesprovinzialgesundheitsämter am 12. Januar 1946’, 15.
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many of them had already experienced public health problems which were simi-
lar to, if not much worse than, those they now faced in Germany. But Germany in 
1945 represented a different challenge. British and American officers, in particular, 
were shocked not simply by the destruction itself that greeted them upon their 
arrival in Germany, but also by seeing people like themselves and a nation like their 
own in such a state. A feeling of similarity—as well as a high regard for German 
culture, science, and medicine—had accompanied Anglo-American attempts to 
come to grips with the German national character. At the heart of British and 
American health officers’ admiration of past German health policy achievements, 
and of the fervour with which they turned to German doctors for cooperation, was 
thus not simply the practical problem of having to administer the occupied terri-
tory, but also a surviving sense of German superiority in medical, administrative, 
and social welfare matters. This dated back to the early Weimar years, and was—
then, as in 1945—often coupled with a concern about the apparent inability by 
the United States or Britain to follow suit.20 In the Soviet zone, a comparable but 
slightly different set of permutations resulted in a situation where Soviet officers’ 
familiarity with German-caused destruction and resulting health crises in parts of 
poland and russia, was accompanied by the high esteem in which much German 
medicine and science was held, as well as by the long-standing participation of 
leading German communists in organizations of the Communist International.
public health work in all four zones thus embodied some of the fundamental 
considerations about what the Germans were like, and whether, and how, they 
could be recruited to support the occupiers’ agendas. British, American, Soviet, 
and French understanding of what Nazism was—a psychiatric condition or a 
social-structural problem—directly shaped their strategies for dealing with its 
 remnants in the aftermath of the Third reich. British and American views on what 
public health work in Germany involved changed drastically in the course of the 
war and post-war years, just as their political assessments also changed. In these 
terms, it also becomes clear that another reason why the threat of epidemics 
received so much attention, was because it undermined one of the Allied prepara-
tions’ most central assumptions. While plans had stated that the problem of 
German public health could be dealt with in isolation from and differently to 
health questions which affected other European countries and United Nations 
 citizens, both the potential problem of epidemics and the very real problem of 
venereal diseases revealed that this was manifestly not the case. The German prob-
lem now emerged at the heart of European reconstruction overall, and German 
public health was realized to be inseparably entangled with the health of occupa-
tion troops and neighbouring countries.
The disease argument as put forward by doctors and health officials received fur-
ther ammunition from the fact that not long after occupation had begun, the Allied 
authorities began to recognize that diseases and unsettled conditions in  Germany 
presented not only a practical danger to the health and survival of populations 
20 on ‘declinism’ in British science, and economic and military policy, see esp. David Edgerton, 
Science, Technology and the British Industrial ‘Decline’ (Cambridge, 1996).
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in Europe, but also a threat to the success of their own aims and programmes. As a 
British directive from August 1945 observed, ‘[i]dleness, boredom and fear of the 
future are the best allies of Nazism past and present. Nazism has been destroyed, but 
the people who are used to having their thinking done for them will be helpless 
unless they are taught to think for themselves.’21 The Germans were unlikely to be 
sympathetic to attempts to recruit them to a western-style democracy if they were 
sick or dying. As the threat of a revival of Nazism subsided, fears about a communist 
revolt in the western zones, triggered by poor living conditions and escalating eco-
nomic problems, grew in importance. Similarly, German communists and social 
democrats in the Soviet zone recognized that public health and improved living 
conditions were essential preconditions for convincing the population that their 
programmes presented viable new alternatives. As the social democrat max Klesse 
warned in July 1945: ‘actual existence determines consciousness: hunger, cold, dis-
ease and epidemics will not be blamed by the masses on Hitler, but shoved onto the 
Soviets and the German Left, unless some significant changes take place quickly.’22
The Soviet position on German public health, in turn, was marked by contra-
dictions which arose directly out of the ambiguities and incongruities in Soviet 
German policy overall. The Soviet authorities enabled the appointment of trust-
worthy and high-calibre Germans to the newly created Central Health Adminis-
tration in the Soviet zone—itself understood at the time as a landmark—and 
 supported these Germans’ efforts to draw upon and redevelop some features of the 
German public health heritage. The Soviet health officers themselves were admired 
as a trained elite force, and their work was recognized as a crucial component of the 
administration of the eastern zone. But the ruthless reparations policy, on the other 
hand, severely hampered any real improvement in public health. In part, therefore, 
the disagreements and confrontations between German and Soviet authorities—
like those between the Germans and the French—centred not simply on the sig-
nificance of the German population’s health and well-being, but on the nature of 
future German reconstruction much more generally. A number of German health 
officers insisted that public health had to be improved before any other, political 
aims could be achieved, but the Soviet authorities were not clear about what the 
longer-term aims of Soviet policy in Germany actually were. Far from rejoicing in 
an alleged Sovietization of their zone, German communists and other left-wing 
officials in the East were greatly concerned by the seeming lack of interest in 
 Germany by their Soviet occupiers. By contrast, in the eyes of the British and par-
ticularly the French and American authorities, public health turned out to be a 
precondition for the success of their political agendas. In sum, it was because of 
these kinds of concerns, and particularly because of the realization that public 
health and political goals were inextricably linked, that the epidemic argument 
acquired a far-reaching and persuasive power in all four occupation zones, and 
contributed to fundamental shifts in occupation policies and agendas.
21 TNA, Fo 1030/387, Directive from Commander in Chief, ‘Administration, Local and regional 
Government and the public Services’, 23[?] Aug. 1945.
22 BAB, DQ1/1634, memorandum by max Klesse, 1 July 1945.
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